Gender violence in armed conflicts by Viana, dir. Vitor Rodrigues
FILIPE ABREU NUNES (cooRdENAção)
VÍToR RodRIGUES VIANA, JoRGE SAMPAIo, PHILIPPE ScHMITTER, 
ANA SANToS PINTo, MARIA doLoRES ALGoRA WEBER, cARLoS GASPAR
Gender Violence in Armed 
conflicts
GENdER VIoLENcE IN ARMEd coNFLIcTS
Violence based on gender is considered the worst form of cruelty, that seriously inhibits the 
individual ability to enjoy rights and freedoms and seriously harms the transition from armed 
conflicts to peace. Moreover, it deeply affects women, girls, but also men and boys across the 
world, not only during armed conflicts but also long after the cessation of armed hostilities. 
Therefore, gender based violence undermines the link between security and development.
Portugal’s National defense Institute was the very first governmental defense organization 
belonging to a NATo country, that sought the collaboration of the academia and a comprehensive 
set of other actors, in an effort to understand this phenomena.
This volume is the result of an entire day of speeches, presentations, debates, discussions 
and exchanges between an international audience of academics, politicians, military officers, 
students, public officials, and representatives of non-governmental organizations.
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Foreword
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Democratic Republic of  Congo, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, So-
malia, Sudan, Rwanda, Colombia, Uganda, Liberia and many other places, hostilities pro-
vided a cover for all species of  gender based violence (GBV). Violence based on gender 
is considered the worst form of  cruelty, that seriously inhibits the individual ability to 
enjoy rights and freedoms and seriously harms the transition from armed conflicts to 
peace. Moreover, it deeply affects women, girls, but also men and boys across the world, 
not only during armed conflicts but also long after the cessation of  armed hostilities. 
Therefore, gender based violence undermines the link between security and develop-
ment. GBV is, indeed, considered the ultimate generational form of  violence. 
Bearing in mind this type of  violence, Portugal’s National Defense Institute devel-
oped a research project in which the final goal was to gather international experts to 
address comprehensively key aspects of  GBV, especially within the context of  armed 
conflicts. 
The National Defense Institute was the very first governmental defense organization 
belonging to a NATO country, that sought the collaboration of  the academia and a com-
prehensive set of  other actors in an effort to understand this phenomena. By the same 
token, it also sought to develop a proper insight about the “techniques” of  GBV, such as 
rape, torture, mutilation, sexual slavery, forced impregnation and murder, and likewise the 
measures available to the international community to fight against the horrifying scope 
and magnitude of  such acts in contemporary armed conflicts.
With the institutional support of  the Portuguese Ministry of  Defense, NATO Pub-
lic Diplomacy Division, the University of  Coimbra, the Portuguese Catholic University, 
the European Security and Defense College, the Democratic Control of  Armed Forces 
(DCAF), and Banco Português de Investimento (BPI), was possible to convey an interna-
tional seminar on December 4th 2012 in Lisbon, at the National Defense Institute.
It was an entire day of  speeches, presentations, debates, discussions, and exchange 
of  points of  view in which an international audience of  academics, politicians, military 
officers, students, public officials, and representatives of  non-governmental organiza-
tions, which led to the publication of  this volume. Unfortunately not all presentations 
are included. Nevertheless, this collection of  texts will stand as an effort to contribute to 
eliminate one on the worst forms of  violence in armed conflicts. 
Here – as in the conference – we divided the different experiences and contributions 
in three areas. Firstly we present a mosaic-like picture of  GBV, of  its diverse roots and 
brutal forms and expressions all over the world, then we tackle the complex relation-
ship between GBV and International Law and, finally, we point out at expectations that 
demonstrate very clearly that we do have alternatives to respond and that new paths are 
possible – if  only we gather our will as well as our shared wisdom in one single and as-
sertive voice. 
All in all the presentations and the public debates has highlighted us the following 
key ideas:
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• Gender Based Violence is used as a weapon with the intention to demoralize and 
destabilize. Gender crimes are a result of  an organized action and they intend 
to harm, so consequently, they are, indeed, indignity crimes. Furthermore, rape 
is a “cheap” and very effective weapon of  war, which is used on a daily basis in 
today´s conflicts;
• Gender Based Violence must be known. Knowledge is a remarkable important 
factor of  prevention. Women are affected in many ways by war and some of  
them are very specific to them. Their plight does not receive the attention it 
deserves. The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on 
“Women, Peace and Security” recognizes the disproportionate impact that war 
and conflicts have on women and children and calls for the inclusion of  gender 
perspectives in peace negotiations, humanitarian planning, peacekeeping opera-
tions, post-conflict peace building and governance. In this context it is essential 
the existence of  gender advisers to military operations and the practice of  a peace 
oriented journalism;
• Gender Based Violence is a continuum of  violence. Men, women, the elderly, 
young kids,  people in public positions of  power or merely members of  a family, 
all experience gender-based violence during armed conflicts, in periods of  transi-
tion from war to peace, and during the post-conflict phase. GBV can thus be un-
derstood as a continuum of  violence that varies in form and intensity depending 
on the dynamics of  conflict;
• Gender Based Violence is a comprehensive problem that touches all actors di-
rectly and indirectly involved an armed conflict, and therefore, initiatives such 
as the “Montreux Document” on pertinent international legal obligations and 
good practices for States related to operations of  private military and security 
companies, during armed conflicts is a good step in the right direction. Besides, 
humanitarian workers, private companies, military forces, police forces, United 
Nations peacekeepers, and governmental institutions need to develop and imple-
ment good practices to deal with this phenomenon.
• Gender Based Violence cannot enjoy impunity; it must be accounted by national 
and international legal systems, in terms of  criminal and disciplinary action. In 
this domain the following features are paramount: education, and training of  
armed forces; the existence of  reporting mechanisms; and the role of  military 
commanders to prevent the use of  GBV as a tool of  war.
The UNSCR 1820 (2008) stated the following: 
“Noting that civilians account for the vast majority of  those adversely affected by armed conflict; that 
women and girls are particularly targeted by the use of  sexual violence, including as a tactic of  war to 
humiliate, dominate, instill fear in, disperse and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of  a community 
or ethnic group; and that sexual violence perpetrated in this manner may in some instances persist after 
the cessation of  hostilities… Recalling its condemnation in the strongest terms of  all sexual and other 
forms of  violence committed against civilians in armed conflict, in particular women and children… 
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Reiterating deep concern that, despite its repeated condemnation of  violence against women and children 
in situations of  armed conflict, including sexual violence in situations of  armed conflict, and despite its 
calls addressed to all parties to armed conflict for the cessation of  such acts with immediate effect, such 
acts continue to occur, and in some situations have become systematic and widespread, reaching appalling 
levels of  brutality… Recalling the inclusion of  a range of  sexual violence offences in the Rome Statute 
of  the International Criminal Court and the statutes of  the ad hoc international criminal tribunals… 
Reaffirming the important role of  women in the prevention and resolution of  conflicts and in peace build-
ing, and stressing the importance of  their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the 
maintenance and promotion of  peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making 
with regard to conflict prevention and resolution… Deeply concerned also about the persistent obstacles 
and challenges to women’s participation and full involvement in the prevention and resolution of  conflicts 
as a result of  violence, intimidation and discrimination, which erode women’s capacity and legitimacy to 
participate in post-conflict public life, and acknowledging the negative impact this has on durable peace, 
security and reconciliation, including post-conflict peace building… Recognizing that States bear primary 
responsibility to respect and ensure the human rights of  their citizens, as well as all individuals within 
their territory as provided for by relevant international law… Reaffirming that parties to armed conflict 
bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of  affected civilians…” 
This quote recognizes not only the dimension of  the problem posed by GBV, but 
also the importance of  the State’s action and the willingness of  the armed groups in-
volved. In the same line the International Criminal Court Prosecutor has referred to 
GBV as “crimes of  domination with the aim of  shattering any sort of  resistance and the 
leadership ability directed mainly to the civilian population”.
Lastly, being aware that producing documents is the stress-free part of  the eradicat-
ing process, and therefore implementation is the harshest task that all parties face, we 
hope that this collection of  essays at least, give a symbolic contribution to enhance the 
awareness and the individual will to eradicate these practices everywhere in our world.
Lisbon, September 2013
Seminar’s Steering Committee,
Carla Gomes, Ph.D. Candidate (University of  Coimbra, Portugal)
Lieutenant-Colonel Francisco Leandro, Ph.D. (National Defense Institute, Portugal)
Mónica Dias, Ph.D. (Catholic University, Portugal)
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Opening Remarks
Teresa Morais
Is the Portuguese Secretary of  State of  Parliamentary Affairs and Equality. She holds a PhD, a 
Master Degree and a BA from the Law School of  the University of  Lisbon. She was a Lecturer at 
the Law School of  the University of  Lisbon and the University Lusíada. She held previously positions: 
Vice-President of  the Parliamentary Group of  the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and coordinator in 
the areas of  Justice and Equality (2009-2011); Member of  the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, 
Rights, Freedom and Guarantees; Member of  the Committees of  Corruption Monitoring; Member of  
the Constitutional Revision; President of  the Subcommittee on Equality and Member of  the Council for 
Supervision of  the Information Services. 
Senhor Diretor do Instituto da Defesa Nacional
Senhoras e Senhores Representantes dos Ramos das Forças Armadas
Senhoras e Senhores Auditores do Curso de Defesa Nacional
Senhoras e Senhores Oradores
Minhas Senhoras e Meus Senhores
Quero agradecer o convite que me foi dirigido pelo Senhor Diretor do IDN para 
estar presente na sessão de encerramento deste seminário que aborda o tema da Violência 
de Género nos Conflitos Armados, matéria de enorme relevância que verdadeiramente toca 
numa das maiores fragilidades e insuficiências do sistema de proteção dos direitos hu-
manos.
Num dia em que se ouviram diversos especialistas que abordaram diferentes perspe-
tivas de análise do tema, seria tarefa difícil e delicada, se não mesmo impossível, pretender 
trazer, também eu, aqui, uma perspetiva técnica desta questão.
Não tenciono fazê-lo, convicta, aliás, de que também não será isso o que se espera 
desta minha breve participação.
Na verdade, o tópico que gostaria de aqui explorar é genérico mas explica, a meu ver, 
muito do que de específico se pode dele desentranhar e não é outro senão o da desigual-
dade entre mulheres e homens que caracteriza ainda o nosso mundo e, com mágoa se 
reconhece, marca também a sociedade portuguesa, desigualdade que é verdadeiramente a 
fonte de muitos dos males de que sofre a Humanidade.
Vivemos num mundo que desvaloriza e desperdiça as capacidades e as competên-
cias de metade da Humanidade, em muitos países, aliás, a sua metade mais qualificada, 
e quando assim é não se pode esperar outra coisa que não seja desequilíbrio e injustiça.
Apesar das lutas seculares das mulheres pelo reconhecimento da igualdade de direi-
tos em todos os domínios e das enormes conquistas que essa luta foi obtendo ao longo 
IDN CADERNOS 9
dos anos, pelo menos no plano jurídico-formal, a verdade é que a desigualdade persiste 
e manifesta-se de formas muito diversas, tanto nos efeitos nocivos imediatos que dela 
decorrem para a Humanidade, como em relação a tudo aquilo de que essa Humanidade 
resulta privada e prejudicada pela falta de aproveitamento útil de tudo o que as mulheres 
poderiam dar, para além do que efetivamente já dão, ao desenvolvimento e à criação de 
um mundo mais justo.
Esta desigualdade enraizada e perseverante explica, insisto, muito e manifesta-se das 
mais perversas formas e a todos os níveis. Explica que sejam ainda tão poucas as mulhe-
res nas Forças Armadas em todo o mundo (e também em Portugal) e que apesar de todo 
o tipo de proclamações, de planos e de programas diversos que pretendem promover 
uma maior participação das mulheres, a sua representação nessas forças seja, na maior 
parte dos países, residual, panorama que se agrava substancialmente se atendermos ao 
número de mulheres em postos de chefia.
A utilização sistemática de um grande número de mulheres em funções de apoio e 
de natureza administrativa mostra bem como a velha e bafienta doutrina de que “o homem 
se fez para a guerra e a mulher para dar paz ao guerreiro” tem, na prática, modalidades suaves 
de derrogação.
A desigualdade continua quando verificamos a composição dos contingentes de mi-
litares dos mais diversos países que integram as missões internacionais. A minoria de 
mulheres de que gostamos de nos orgulhar e de sublinhar pela novidade que encerra é 
bem reveladora do caráter assistemático e, mais uma vez residual, da sua presença.
Digo isto sem ignorar e sem pretender desvalorizar os esforços feitos para impulsio-
nar a presença de mulheres nessas missões e reconhecendo com agrado alguns avanços 
recentes.
Julgo aliás que, em 2010, o reconhecimento do valor da participação das mulheres 
em contextos específicos levou à formação de equipas exclusivamente constituídas por 
mulheres, conhecidas por FET (female-only teams), que julgo terem sido implementadas 
pela primeira vez pelos Estados Unidos na missão no Afeganistão, no âmbito da ISAF 
(International Security Assistence Force). Sem pretender defender que a formação de equi-
pas exclusivamente por mulheres deva ser o princípio, (tanto quanto parece não ser de 
acolher o princípio de constituição de equipas exclusivamente por homens), no caso 
concreto parece ter havido razões para a utilização das FET, dadas as características 
socioculturais daquela comunidade e a particular dificuldade de estabelecimento de 
contactos entre os militares homens e as mulheres afegãs, com prejuízo para todas as 
partes envolvidas.
Mas a desigualdade é também o que explica, a meu ver, o tópico central do debate 
que aqui se desenvolveu: a violência de género nos conflitos armados.
Tem-se repetido em vão que as populações civis, particularmente as mulheres e as 
crianças, são a grande maioria da população afetada pelos conflitos armados, incluindo os 
refugiados e desalojados. A necessidade de medidas específicas de proteção das mulheres 
e raparigas contra a violência de género, em especial a violação e todas as formas de abu-
so sexual, está consagrada há décadas nos mais relevantes instrumentos internacionais e, 
Gender Violence in Armed conflicts10
no entanto, a violência sobrevive a todas as proclamações, a todas as intenções, a todas 
as sensibilizações.
Não querendo repetir aquilo que hoje seguramente aqui foi dito e analisado com de-
talhe, lembro apenas que vai a caminho dos seus quarenta anos a Declaração da Assembleia 
Geral das Nações Unidas sobre a Proteção de Mulheres e Crianças em Situações de Emergência e de 
Conflito Armado onde se recordavam as disposições contidas nos instrumentos de direito 
internacional humanitário relativas à proteção das mulheres e crianças em tempo de guer-
ra e de paz e se declarava a proibição e a condenação dos ataques sobre a população civil, 
“infligindo incalculável sofrimento, especialmente às mulheres e crianças”.
Tem doze anos feitos a célebre e tão citada Resolução 1325 do Conselho de Seguran-
ça das Nações Unidas, que tanto sublinhou o imperativo de proteção das mulheres e das 
meninas contra a violência de género em todas as suas formas e enfatizou a necessidade 
de considerar as carências especiais das mulheres e raparigas na repatriação e realojamen-
to, em cenários de pós-conflito, Resolução que clama ainda por uma efetiva aplicação1.
Depois disso, por diversas vezes e por diversas formas, a União Europeia reiterou as 
mesmas prioridades. Gostaria de referenciar especialmente a Resolução do Parlamento 
Europeu sobre a situação das mulheres nos conflitos armados e o seu papel na reconstru-
ção e no processo democrático nos países em situação de pós-conflito. Nesta Resolução:
• Enfatiza-se a importância dos serviços de saúde reprodutiva nas situações de con-
flito e nos campos de refugiados, situações em que “disparam as taxas de mortalidade 
materna e infantil, ao mesmo tempo que se propagam doenças sexualmente transmissíveis”;
• Sublinha-se a responsabilidade dos Estados no fim da impunidade e na instaura-
ção de procedimentos judiciais contra os responsáveis de, entre muitas outras bar-
baridades, a violência sexual, a gravidez e a esterilização forçadas e a exploração 
sexual de mulheres e crianças.
Por outro lado, realça-se também o que muitos outros documentos relevantes têm 
sublinhado: o papel fundamental das mulheres e das suas organizações na resolução dos 
conflitos, na reconstrução pós-conflito e na construção e manutenção da Paz.
Por outro lado ainda, cumpre sublinhar os esforços desenvolvidos pela NATO na 
implementação da Resolução 1325 e o compromisso por diversas vezes reiterado da 
necessidade da sua aplicação, em 2007 com a aprovação da Política Global2 e em 2008 
com a divulgação de boas práticas por parte de Estados aliados, bem como através da 
nomeação de conselheiros de género em comandos estratégicos, no Afeganistão e no 
Kosovo, matérias de que já hoje aqui se falou seguramente com um desenvolvimento 
muito superior àquele que esta minha intervenção justifica.
O que se observa do trabalho destas organizações, a que no mínimo deveríamos 
acrescentar a OSCE e o Conselho da Europa, igualmente empenhadas nesta matéria e 
1 Portugal foi um dos países que aprovou um Plano de Ação para a Implementação desta Resolução que está 
a ser executado com a participação de um grupo de trabalho com representantes de diversos ministérios, 
tendo sido produzido um relatório intercalar de execução, apresentado em Maio de 2011 à Assembleia da 
República.
2 Revista em 2011.
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com um percurso assinalável, é que todas elas, com as suas especificidades e diferentes 
missões se encontram empenhadas nesta luta contra as violações dos direitos de todas as 
pessoas mas particularmente das mulheres e crianças.
Porém, o estádio deste processo em que, de facto, nos encontramos mostra bem a 
insuficiência dos resultados alcançados, em todos os domínios, mantendo-se resiliente a 
causa explicativa de muitos destes problemas: a desigualdade perseverante entre mulheres 
e homens.
Num dos documentos acessíveis nos briefings da NATO, vi recentemente transcrita 
uma pergunta lançada, numa intervenção sobre o tema, pelo Secretário-Geral da NATO. 
A questão era exatamente: Seria um mundo onde as mulheres gozassem de direitos iguais aos dos 
homens mais seguro e mais estável?
Quanto à resposta o Secretário-Geral considerou-a difícil de dizer, mas acrescentou: 
“mas em última análise uma paz duradoura em muitas das zonas mais problemáticas do mundo depende 
desta resposta”.
Compreendo que a resposta seja difícil mas confesso-me, apesar de tudo, menos 
cética quanto a uma resposta positiva. E ainda que, chegados a essa situação de igualdade 
efetiva de direitos, chegássemos à conclusão de que o mundo nada tinha ganho em se-
gurança e em estabilidade, situação sobre a qual só podemos verdadeiramente especular 
porque realmente essa igualdade não existe, sempre poderíamos dizer que pelo menos 
teríamos iguais responsabilidades pela situação em que o mundo se encontra, o que neste 
tempo de desigualdades se não pode dizer.
A responsabilidade surge na sequência de atos decisórios sobre a paz e sobre a guerra 
de onde as mulheres estão de facto, largamente, para não dizer completamente, afastadas.
A sub-representação das mulheres em lugares de decisão política e em postos re-
levantes nas chefias militares permite sem esforço e sem distorção, em meu entender, a 
conclusão de que quem afasta as mulheres dessa decisão ou simplesmente nada faz para 
as integrar por forma a terem uma participação equilibrada e paritária nos mecanismos 
de decisão política, mas também económica e seguramente militar, assume com quem 
escolheu para seus parceiros, a responsabilidade pelo falhanço das políticas e pelos erros 
de cálculo que elas sempre comportam.
As mulheres são vítimas de discriminações múltiplas e diversas violações de direitos, 
qualquer que seja a posição em que se encontrem: são vítimas no pior dos cenários de 
vitimização quando se encontram entre os afetados pela guerra, (de que aliás já eram 
as vítimas mais vulneráveis por razões de desigualdade crónica a que estavam sujeitas 
em muitos casos); são vítimas ainda quando, em situação de pós-conflito, lhes falta o 
essencial à reconstrução das suas vidas; são vítimas também quando lhes negam uma 
participação igual na construção da paz e na reconstrução das nações, mas são ainda 
vítimas quando lhes negam, de forma expressa ou subliminar, o acesso a lugares onde, a 
par com os homens, deveriam participar na decisão de tudo o que é relevante para a vida 
das nações e dos povos.
Na realidade, a situação geral das mulheres no mundo, sendo muito diversificada, 
é certo, de acordo com as regiões ou os ordenamentos jurídicos e as realidades fácticas 
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que tomemos em consideração, é ainda amplamente marcada pela menorização da sua 
participação nestes processos de decisão. Este estado de coisas, na verdade, não melho-
ra, quando aguardadas Primaveras são afinal Invernos de desilusão para os direitos das 
mulheres.
Suponho que por esta altura atravessará algumas mentes aquela linha de pensa-
mento supostamente sensata e seguramente aconselhável às posturas de Estado for-
mais, segundo a qual o caminho se está a fazer, com moderação e cautelas, até porque 
estas coisas requerem tempo, que estamos aliás muito melhor do que há cinquenta anos 
atrás… etc., etc.
Pois bem, quanto a isso direi apenas, com todo o respeito por quem assim pensa, que 
o tempo para a sensibilização para os direitos, para o despertar das consciências, para a 
aprendizagem paciente do respeito pelos direitos alheios, na minha mente e, garantida-
mente, na de muitas e muitos dos presentes se esgotou.
Estamos, definitivamente, numa fase em que se exige a efetivação da igualdade de 
direitos, com a impaciência de quem não tem tempo para esperar mais umas décadas para 
ver concretizada na vida, a igualdade, há décadas, inscrita nas leis.
Pela minha parte lembrarei isso todos os dias, como é meu dever e meu gosto.
Muito obrigada pela vossa atenção.
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Opening Remarks
Vítor Rodrigues Viana
Major-General, Director of  the National Defense Institute
Senhor Ministro da Defesa Nacional, Excelência,
Começo por agradecer a sua disponibilidade para presidir à sessão de abertura deste 
seminário, uma presença que muito nos honra e que constitui uma motivação acrescida 
para a promoção de um debate estimulante sobre um tema, sem dúvida, importante para 
a Defesa Nacional.
Excelentíssima Senhora Dra. Charlotte Isaksoon, em representação da Organização 
do Tratado do Atlântico Norte.
Excelentíssimo Senhor Diretor Executivo do Centro de Direitos Humanos da Uni-
versidade de Coimbra, Professor Doutor Jónatas Machado.
Excelentíssima Senhora Professora Doutora Elizabete Azevedo-Harman, em repre-
sentação do Diretor do Instituto de Estudos Políticos da Universidade Católica Portu-
guesa.
Caros Convidados,
Senhoras e Senhores Auditores do Curso de Defesa Nacional,
Minhas Senhoras e Meus Senhores,
Constitui motivo da maior honra para o Diretor do Instituto da Defesa Nacional po-
der testemunhar a abertura de um Seminário Internacional subordinado ao tema “A vio-
lência de género em conflitos armados”. Trata-se do primeiro seminário organizado em 
Portugal sobre um tema que é da maior importância e atualidade e que, muito justamente, 
está no centro da agenda das organizações de segurança e cooperação internacional. 
Ao longo deste seminário, teremos connosco personalidades nacionais e interna-
cionais, académicos, militares, empresários, investigadores e a comunidade de pessoas 
interessadas nas dinâmicas da paz. Vamos refletir em conjunto sobre uma das formas 
de violência mais devastadora, cujos efeitos, se prolongam muito para lá do silenciar das 
armas, com consequências bastante negativas nos esforços de transição para a paz e em 
particular nos processos de Reforma do Setor de Segurança. 
A organização de um Seminário deste alcance não poderia ser obra de uma só enti-
dade. Ele é o resultado da convergência de esforços de três instituições – o Instituto da 
Defesa Nacional, o Instituto de Estudos Políticos da Universidade Católica Portuguesa 
e o Centro de Direitos Humanos da Universidade de Coimbra – às quais foi possível 
associar cofinanciadores, sendo de destacar neste domínio o contributo da Divisão de 
Diplomacia Pública da NATO. 
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Quero, antes de mais, saudar e felicitar os nossos parceiros e dirigir-lhes um agrade-
cimento muito especial. E quero sublinhar o seu qualificado envolvimento, não apenas na 
organização deste Seminário, mas também na produção de um livro que estará disponível 
na primavera de 2013 e que incluirá os contributos escritos de todos os participantes. 
Desejo também saudar todos os participantes, moderadores e conferencistas neste 
seminário, e aqueles que mesmo não podendo estar presentes, contribuem de forma 
escrita com o seu pensamento. E permitam-me também que assinale o simbolismo da 
presença da Senhora Doutora Angela Charlotte Isaksoon.
Uma palavra também de estímulo e apreço para a Comissão Tripartida organizadora 
deste evento, que trabalha desde Outubro de 2011, na preparação do dia de hoje.
Minhas Senhoras e Meus Senhores,
Embora a violência de género em conflitos armados seja um tema pouco trabalhado 
em termos de divulgação pública, não se pode dizer que seja estranho às atividades de 
investigação e de formação avançada do IDN. No fundo, estamos hoje a dar visibilidade 
a uma linha de investigação associada à Reforma do Setor de Segurança, que o Institu-
to da Defesa Nacional vem desenvolvendo em articulação com o Colégio Europeu de 
Segurança e Defesa da União Europeia e a Fundação Internacional sediada na Suíça, 
denominada Democratic Control of  Armed Forces. 
Esta temática enquadra-se, de resto, na linha de investigação do IDN, intitulada “po-
lítica e segurança internacional”, que tem por objetivo analisar o estado atual e a evolução 
previsível das políticas e estratégias de segurança e defesa, bem como o quadro de rela-
cionamento externo que decorre de iniciativas de cooperação regional ou internacional. 
Nesse contexto, temos analisado também a dimensão normativa da segurança global 
no que respeita à intervenção humanitária, responsabilidade de proteger, segurança hu-
mana, direitos humanos e interdependência securitária. 
Quando falamos de violência de género em conflitos armados, falamos da violência 
que explora relações, atividades e preconceitos sociais. Por exemplo, através da utilização 
de menores, de indivíduos do sexo feminino, de indivíduos em posições de visibilidade 
pública ou fragilizadas, de modo a produzir um dano psicologicamente replicável a uma 
escala exponencial, capaz de exercer o domínio de um grupo, ou produzir um efeito re-
levante no contexto do conflito armado. 
A violência de género tende a ser uma violência generalizada, organizada, capaz de 
infligir um enorme nível de sofrimento e, em simultâneo, produzir a degradação psico-
lógica, o terror e a rutura moral das populações não combatentes, de forma persistente 
e prolongada. 
As formas e os objetivos deste tipo de violência ultrapassam em muito aquilo que 
seria tolerável no padrão do sofrimento humano num contexto de conflito armado. 
Falamos de crianças associadas a grupos armados, de violência sexual, de condicio-
namento dos direitos reprodutivos, bem como de muitas formas de humilhação sexual. 
Falamos, numa palavra, do inaceitável. 
Os três painéis temáticos que constituem o corpo deste evento abrangem as causas, 
os instrumentos e os processos de um combate urgente contra a impunidade e a favor da 
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criação de condições para erradicação desta forma de violência brutal, contra a dignidade 
dos indivíduos.
A este propósito, gostaria ainda de evocar duas referências, que espelham bem a 
relevância deste tema para a comunidade internacional a que estamos vinculados.
A primeira vai para a Resolução 1820 (2008) do Conselho de Segurança das Na-
ções Unidas. Ela condena expressamente toda e qualquer forma de violência dirigida a 
mulheres e crianças no contexto dos conflitos armados, em especial aquelas formas que 
utilizam a violência sexual. Nessa resolução, reconhece-se o impacto negativo deste tipo 
de violência num projeto de paz sustentável, na segurança e reconciliação, incluindo o 
pós-conflito numa perspetiva de construção da paz.
A segunda referência é uma reflexão muito interessante do Senhor Procurador do 
Tribunal Penal Internacional que, no momento da pronúncia da acusação no caso Jean-
Pierre Bemba, resumiu ao coletivo de juízes o grave problema com que estamos confron-
tados: “Os crimes de género são a arma mais barata que dispõe das munições mais fáceis 
de obter, e em maior quantidade (por utilizarem simplesmente as pessoas)… os crimes 
de género são crimes que visam obter o domínio de outros indivíduos… são crimes 
perpetrados com a finalidade de esmagar qualquer resistência… e toda a capacidade de 
liderança…”
Em ambos os casos, reconhece-se a necessidade de combater a impunidade dos 
autores de tais crimes, cuja gravidade vem sendo cada vez mais reconhecida pela co-
munidade internacional. Reconhece-se, no fundo, que tocam o centro da dignidade dos 
indivíduos e que, por isso mesmo, tornam os esforços de paz tarefas verdadeiramente 
complexas e desafiantes.
Desejo sinceramente que os trabalhos deste seminário e a publicação da obra que 
se lhe seguirá, permitam compreender melhor as causas deste fenómeno e desenhar ca-
minhos para a sua erradicação. Desejo que constituam um contributo determinado a 
favor do reforço de uma consciência de paz e segurança a desenvolver em torno de cada 
indivíduo, desenhando limites inultrapassáveis, mesmo no contexto do uso da violência 
armada. 
Os crimes de género têm sido apelidados de crimes “da indignidade”. Nessa pers-
petiva, este seminário é, efetivamente, um contributo para a promoção da dignidade da 
pessoa, mesmo no contexto de um conflito armado.
Muito obrigado.
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Introduction
During the past decade, the issue of  sexual based violence in armed conflicts has 
received increasing social and political visibility. This growing attention derives, on the 
one hand, from the brutal empirical evidence regarding the scope and magnitude of  the 
problem and the knowledge that has been disseminated about it: for instance, the way 
how, in conflict zones, women (not only, but mainly) are the victims of  devastating forms 
of  sexual violence used to reach political and military goals. On the other hand, such 
visibility results from the promotion, by states and international organizations alike, of  a 
strong political agenda targeting gender issues in general and gender based violence dur-
ing armed conflicts in particular. Following the unanimous approval by the UN Security 
Council of  Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, in 2000, a new gender regime in 
international security has developed around the production of  a variety of  documents 
and specific policies aiming at the implementation of  the resolution. In addition, a third 
factor has contributed to enhanced visibility: the fact that sexual violence during armed 
conflicts and international operations has also been produced or facilitated by members 
of  military and security forces themselves.  
This paper addresses the question of  sexual violence in armed conflicts as an ex-
treme expression of  gender based violence, aiming at a general description of  its scope, 
and characteristics, as well as of  the answers that have been proposed in its regard. The 
paper starts by identifying the diversity of  expressions of  sexual based violence, the 
actors involved and  patterns of  development. Secondly, it centers on the causes and 
consequences of  sexual violence as they have been described and analyzed in current 
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scholarship and field reports. Finally, a third section focuses on policies that have been 
designed by international security organizations and examine their implementation.
Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts: the Scope and Magnitude 
of  the Problem
Sexual violence is a complex phenomenon and a contested concept that has been 
defined in different ways. In general, however, it is often conceived as one of  the most 
extreme forms of  gender-based violence understood as “any harm that is perpetrated 
against a person’s will, and that results from power inequities that are based on gender 
roles”1. Among the various definitions of  sexual violence, it seems useful to stick to the 
one proposed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Task force on Gender and Humanitarian 
Assistance, that defines sexual based violence as “Any sexual act, attempt to obtain a sexual 
act, unwanted sexual comments or advances, or acts to traffic a person’s sexuality, using 
coercion, threats of  harm or physical force, by any person regardless of  relationship to 
the victim, in any setting, included, but not limited to home and work.”2 
Sexual violence in armed conflict includes such diverse expressions as rape, mass 
rape, sexual abuse and exploitation, forced prostitution, sexual mutilation, sexual slavery, 
forced pregnancy or sterilization, or traffic with objectives of  sexual exploitation. It oc-
curs in a variety of  contexts, during and after conflicts, including houses, fields, detention 
places, military sites, safe-heavens as clinics and hospitals, sacred places such as churches, 
synagogues or mosques, refugee camps or during the displacement of  populations.
One very clear pattern of  sexual violence in armed conflicts is that the victims are 
mostly women and the perpetrators are mostly men. These may be members of  mili-
tias, of  regular armed forces and security forces, paramilitary groups, non-state armed 
groups, humanitarian and peacekeeping personnel, and civilians (Bastick, Grimm and 
Kunz, 2007). While statistical estimates of  sexual violence in conflict present many prob-
lems of  both under and over estimation (Peterman and Palermo, 2011), reports from the 
field are overwhelming.  In the Democratic Republic of  Congo, for instance, a country 
that has been named ‘the world capital of  rape’ (Palermo and Paterman, 2011: 925) and 
the worst place on earth to be a woman, “the fighting has been increasingly associated 
with high rates of  sexual violence that, at times, have been referred to as a ‘plague’ or of  
epidemic proportions” (Addario and Egan, 2008). Some reports mention around 400,000 
women victims of  rape during the conflict presently living in this country; another study 
found that 1,152 women are raped every day – a rate equal to 48 per hour, much higher 
than the previous estimate of  16,000 rapes reported in one year by the United Nations3.
However, it is also important to note that in the roles of  victims, survivors or perpe-
trators there are men, women and children. There is a tendency to hide sexual violence 
over men due to the social stigma it involves. Men and boys are particularly vulnerable 
1 Reproductive Health Response in Conflict Consortium (2003) Gender-based Violence Tools Manual, 9.
2 IASC, Inter-Agency Standing Committee (2005). Task force on Gender and Humanitarian Assistance,
3 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/12/48-women-raped-hour-congo
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when in detention or forcibly recruited by armed groups and do not often report the 
crimes committed against them for fear of  being stigmatized (Bastick, Grimm and Kunz, 
2007). Types of  male sexual violence that have been reported include: total/ partial cas-
tration, mutilation of  the genitals, sexual humiliation, sexual enslavement, forced incest, 
and rape (Russell, 2007, Zawati, 2007, Onyango and Hampanda, 2011). Moreover, al-
though male sexual violence has been reported in many armed conflicts in recent years, 
“communities and organizations are not prepared to deal with male survivors of  sexual 
violence because it undermines the ideals of  social constructions of  masculinity. Com-
pared with females, male survivors lack access to reproductive health programs and are 
generally ignored in gender-based violence discourse” (Onyango and Hampanda, 2011).
On the other hand, a similar tendency to silence exists with regard to women per-
petrators: for instance, the role of  Hindu fundamentalist women in encouraging sexual 
violence against Muslim women in India in 2003 and similarly by Hutu women against 
Tutsi women in Rwanda in 1994 (Gangoli, 2006).
Another important characteristic of  sexual violence is its persistence throughout 
history. The mass rapes in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1991 e 1995 were a dramatic 
recall of  a historically rooted phenomenon, which also involved regular armies during 
the whole XX century (Battistelli, 1999; Seifert, 1994; Stiglmayer, 1994, Hayden, 2000; 
Beverly, 1996; Sharratt and Kaschak, 1999). Occasions where sexual violence has been 
widely reported include the Armenian genocide by Ottoman Turkey in 1915, the Japa-
nese attack on the Chinese in Nanking during the II World War, the Chinese civil war, the 
partition of  India and creation of  Pakistan and the liberation war in Bangladesh in 1971. 
But also during and after the Cold War, in the Crimean war, the Vietnam war and Cam-
bodia, the conflicts in Latin America and Haiti, and in many countries in Africa (Angola, 
Djibouti, Liberia, Mozambique, Ruanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan or the Democratic 
Republic of  Congo) and Asia (East Timor, Sri Lanka, Burma, Kashmir (India) or Papua 
New Guinea); and also in wars and conflicts in central Europe and Eurasia, including Af-
ghanistan, Turkey, Kuwait, Georgia, Bosnia and Kosovo (Leatherman, 2011: 2; Bastick, 
Grimm and Kunz, 2007).  No part of  the world is left out of  this black list. 
The Causes and Consequences of  Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts
There are a variety of  causes for sexual violence during conflicts. One rather com-
mon explanation is that it is frequently used as a cheap ‘weapon of  war’ to advance stra-
tegically or military motivated objectives, such as clearing of  a civilian population from 
a certain area. In this case it “is committed to instill terror in a population and to incite 
flight from a given territory” (Bastick, Grimm and Kunz: 14); other times it has been 
part of  genocide, contributing to the destruction of  a particular ethnic group. Likewise, 
since women in developing countries are frequently in charge of  basic economic support 
activities, essential to the daily lives of  their families, violence against them is used as a 
weapon of  social disruption.
A second explanation, closely connected to the former, relates sexual violence with 
the objectives of  punishing or humiliating an enemy group. Susan Brownmiller has mas-
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terly described this in her famous book Against our Will: Men, Women and Rape:   “Men of  
a conquered nation traditionally view the rape of  “their women” as the ultimate humilia-
tion, a sexual coup de grace. Rape is considered by the people of  a defeated nation to be 
part of  the enemy’s conscious effort to destroy them (…). The body of  a raped woman 
becomes a ceremonial battlefield, a parade ground for the victor’s trooping of  the colors. 
The act that is played out upon her is a message passed between men – vivid proof  of  
victory for one and loss and defeat for the other’ (Brownmiller, 1993: 38). When used 
against women and girls, this form of  humiliation is also aimed at their families and com-
munities, shamed for failing to protect them. 
Some authors have also called attention to the fact that sexual violence can be moti-
vated by cultural beliefs, for instance, the belief  that the rape of  a virgin conveys magical 
powers or invincibility. Other times, it has been identified as a way to express aggression 
and brutality of  armed groups, encouraged or tolerated as a ‘morale booster’ or a “reward 
for bravery’” (Bastick, Grimm and Kunz: 15).  This observation resonates on Collins’ 
comment on violence in general, when he notes that “The key to an understanding of  
violence (…) is above all the structure of  solidary groups and the moralities that reflect 
their emotional ties. The moral boundaries may set some persons beyond the pale of  
moral obligation, but they may also organize confrontations that make violence not just 
morally indifferent but morally motivated.” (Collins, 2004: 419). 
All these explanations focus on sexual violence as a primarily expression of  domina-
tion, related to particular understandings of  masculinity and femininity. In the words of  
Seifert “rape is not an en aggressive expression of  sexuality, but a sexual expression of  
aggression” (Seifert, 1992:1). However, it is also useful to bring into the analysis some re-
cent conceptualizations of  violence where it is seen as the result of  an excess or a deficit 
of  sense. As noted by Wieviorka “[we should ]approach what is the more mysterious, the 
core of  violence: not the frustrations it eventually reveals, not the more or less rational 
calculations of  those who appeal to this resource in case of  need, not the culture from 
where it arises. It is out of  the idea of  loss and overabundance of  sense that violence is 
built, the excess and lack it involves; it is the twisted, perverted, or sometimes perverse 
subjectivity, what makes it possible” (Wieviorka, 2006:266/267). 
If  we follow this perspective, understanding the causes of  sexual violence in con-
flicts would require that different types and forms of  violence be acknowledged (Baaz 
and Stern, 2009). They might be a result of  overabundance of  sense, as in the case of  
violence resting upon a strong ideology or being used as a ‘weapon of  war’, but also situ-
ations of  loss of  sense, when violence seems to result from a lack of  organization and 
discipline or is linked to a general breakdown of  law and order.
In any case, the dramatic and devastating personal and social consequences of  sexual 
violence during and after conflicts are much clearer than its causes. Among the personal 
consequences there are the grave health implications at both physical and psychological 
levels, with survivors experiencing extremely serious physical injuries, trauma and depres-
sion. These aspects have a huge socio-economic impact since being a victim of  sexual 
violence often leads to stigmatization and family rejection. Even if  it is important not to 
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look at victims as always helpless and unable of  agency (that is why some prefer to speak 
of  survivors), those who are raped, usually suffer severe social ostracization, and women 
and girls,  in particular, may even be the victims of  ‘honor killings’. Many times, war-time 
violence continues after conflicts, fostering social disruption and the de-structuration of  
entire communities. 
In the face of  the above descriptions, it is not difficult to understand why sexual 
violence in armed conflict has come to be understood as one major source of  instability 
and insecurity. The brutal evidence of  its disproportionate degree (IRIN, 2007; Seifert, 
1992; Skjelsbaek, 2001; Bastick, Grimm and Kunz, 2007), as well as of  peacekeepers’ 
sexual misconduct and involvement in human trafficking and exploration (Allred, 2006), 
were at the basis of  what some have called a new gender regime in international security 
(Carey, 2001), framing the answers to the problem on the part of  international security 
organizations.
The Answers from States and International Organizations
Although public and international attention to the problem of  sexual violence in 
conflicts has been limited in the past, it has hardly been an ‘invisible’ problem, since as 
some have noted, it has always been capitalized by the parties in conflict.  However, “It is 
true to say that the international community has, for a long time, failed to demonstrate a 
clear desire to do something about the problem of  sexual violence during armed conflict. 
The turning point came in the early 1990s as a result of  sexual atrocities committed dur-
ing the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and it seems that, finally, the issue has emerged 
as a serious agenda item of  the international community” (UN Women, 2000) .
The need for gender mainstreaming into international peace support operations 
emerged during the last decade as a major requirement in the political agenda of  inter-
national defense and security organizations. Following years of  strengthening of  interna-
tional law and politics of  implementing gender sensitivity norms in peacekeeping, a new 
international regime of  ‘gender mainstreaming in peace missions’ has been identified as 
an important juncture in world history, with new norms and institutions emerging rapidly 
after the unanimous approval of  the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 
1325 in 2000. This was the first UNSC resolution to specifically address the impact of  
armed conflict on women, and women’s contributions to conflict resolution and sustain-
able peace. UNSCR 1325 stresses the importance of  women’s equal and full participa-
tion as active agents in the prevention and resolution of  conflicts, peace negotiations, 
peace building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and post-conflict reconstruction. 
It calls on member states to ensure women’s equal participation and full involvement in 
all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of  peace and security. It urges all actors 
to increase the participation of  women and incorporate gender perspectives in all United 
Nations peace and security efforts, including demobilization, disarmament and reintegra-
tion (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR).
After the approval of  the resolution, not only UN member states but also other 
international organizations concerned with security issues, European Union (EU), the 
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North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), have started to design and develop policies aiming at im-
plementing the resolution and monitoring its progress. 
During the following decade, the UN developed policy initiatives and approved 
various other resolutions that together can be seen as forming a consistent international 
political agenda on the gender dimension of  conflicts and security. In March 2007, the 
United Nations Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict body was launched to coordinate ef-
forts across 13 United Nations entities and increase efforts to end sexual violence during 
and in the wake of  armed conflict. 
In 2008, UNSC Resolution 1820 was the first Security Council resolution to rec-
ognize conflict-related sexual violence as a matter of  international peace and security. 
It called for armed actors to end the practice of  using sexual violence against civilians 
to achieve political or military ends, and for all parties to conflict to counter impunity 
for sexual violence and provide effective protection for civilians. In 2009, two other 
resolutions were approved: UNSC 1888 strengthening the implementation of  SCR 
1820 through assigning leadership and establishing effective support mechanisms, and 
Resolution 1889 addressing obstacles to women’s participation in peace processes and 
peacebuilding, as prescribed in SCR 1325. It called for the UN Secretary-General to 
submit to the Security Council a set of  indicators for use at the global level to track 
implementation of  SCR 1325. One year later, in 2010, UNSC 1960 provides an ac-
countability system for addressing conflict related sexual violence. In January 2010, 
United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Kimoon, appointed Margot Wallström as his 
Special Representative on sexual violence in conflict, later replaced by Zainab Hawa 
Bangura in June 2012.
OSCE, whose Code of  conduct on Political-Military Aspects of  Security, namely the section 
on democratic control and the use of  armed forces, was long considered unique in the 
security landscape, (Hhébali, 2003, Eulriet, 2009), issued in 2006 an Implementation Plan on 
Gender Mainstreaming. This document stressed the empowerment of  women as essential 
for comprehensive security and called for changes in the Code of  Conduct, including im-
provements on the number and role of  women in the armed forces. 
The European Union was also fertile ground for policy initiatives in this field. 
While gender mainstreaming has long been an objective of  the EU, its adoption as a 
strategy for European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP4) operations has known a 
major impetus following the adoption of  UNSC 1325 (Valenius, 2007; Eulriet, 2009). 
A variety of  documents have been issued, including a generic document on standards 
of  behavior for personnel in ESDP missions  and an operational paper setting out 
measures to implement UNSCR 1325, both in 2005, a check list to facilitate the inclu-
sion of  a gender perspective from the outset of  the planning and conduct of  opera-
tions (2006), providing for the appointment of  a gender advisor in missions,  and a 
document outlining a Comprehensive approach to the EU Implementation of  the UNSCRs 
4 Later renamed Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP).
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1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security. In 2006 the first gender advisor to a mission 
was appointed, and since then various other gender advisors have been appointed to 
ESDP missions. 
With some delay, NATO has also started to design initiatives and policies aimed 
at implementing UN Resolutions. From 2007, the Euro-Atlantic partnership council 
designed a policy tasking member countries to develop practical proposals for the im-
plementation of  the resolution and developed a conduct code  for military personnel 
in operations; in 2009 a first gender advisor was deployed to the ISAF headquarter in 
Afghanistan and, as part of  this process, a study was commissioned to eight special-
ists from four countries to identify best practices and lessons learned from the imple-
mentation of  UNSC Resolution 1325 in NATO’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
(PRT) in Afghanistan.  In 2009, an important directive was issued aiming at integrating 
UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspectives in the NATO Command Structure Includ-
ing Measures for Protection during Armed Conflict (Bi-SC Directive 40-1, September 
2009), which summarizes the alliance’s policy in this matter. The previously existent 
Committee on Women on the NATO Forces, later renamed Committee on Gender Perspectives, 
was mandated to support the implementation of  the various resolutions and an of-
fice on gender perspectives was established. In addition, Heads of  State and Govern-
ment approved in November 2010 a concrete NATO action plan on mainstreaming 
UNSCR 1325 into NATO-led operations and missions, subject to review every two 
years. NATO’s Secretary-General issues a year report on progress in implementation 
of  UNSR 1325 and related resolutions5 and in August 2012 the first NATO Secretary 
General’s Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security was appointed.
Considering such a large set of  policy initiatives, one question must be asked: to what 
extent have these political agendas been implemented? 
Against initial expectations, enthusiasm with UNSC 1325 has progressively been 
replaced by cautious statements and skeptical analyses, in the face of  what was identified 
as a gap between rhetoric and practice. While recognizing the groundbreaking character 
of  this UN agenda and its potential for awareness raising, both scholarly and policy as-
sessments have pointed to the limited results achieved if  compared to initial ambitions 
(Carey, 2001). Reasons for this have been attributed to the vagueness of  implementation 
principles, due to the regime’s large aspirational scope, short track record and lack of  
compliance on the part of  states that find it easy to support unobjectionable principles 
if  lack of  commitment will be perceived as justifiable. Carey stressed this fundamental 
problem of  how in a context of  scarce resources states and international actors alike may 
choose to prioritize competing needs, calling attention to the fact that ‘UN bodies and 
states are unlikely, except perhaps in countries that observe Sharia law, to oppose gender 
mainstreaming on principle, but they may ignore them under the exigencies of  the mo-
ment or the budgetary constraints of  the day’ (Carey, 2001:63).
5 The 2011 report can be found at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_81007.htm? 
selectedLocale=en
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In NATO, the first study commissioned to evaluate the impact of  Resolution 1325 
in NATO PRT’s in Afghanistan concluded that awareness of  the resolution and of  the 
different security situation and needs of  men and women varied across work areas and 
three actions were proposed to fully integrate the resolution into NATO operations: use 
of  a comprehensive strategy, hold commanders accountable for progress and establish-
ment of  expert functions to enhance integration (Olsson and Teijpar, 2009).
In the case of  the EU, notwithstanding the long list of  documents and policy ini-
tiatives, a number of  important shortcomings questioning its effectiveness have also 
been identified. Referring to the lack of  compliance with existing regulations, Eulriet 
noted that, on the one hand, due to the intergovernmental mechanisms of  the EU, 
the Council is not in a position to force compliance if  member states are reluctant to 
oblige when they are invited to implement the measures they have otherwise approve 
regarding gender mainstreaming (Eulriet, 2009). On the other hand, at the level of  
the Community legal order, despite the existence of  a framework that provides a grid 
against which policies can be evaluated, a great margin of  appreciation is left to the 
member states. As a result, “The policy tools that have been designed within ESPD, 
while aiming to address all personnel and forces, have so far only affected a minority 
of  troops”(Eulriet, 2009: 752) 
Notwithstanding these evaluations, there is the hope that the extent of  recognition 
and awareness raising, as well as the high level of  international pressure will have some 
practical effects in the future, conditioning national policies and orientations with regard 
to gender sensitivity in the planning and conduct of  international operations.
Conclusion
This chapter has outlined central features of  sexual violence in armed conflicts.   It 
started by highlighting the scope and magnitude of  the problem, stressing the variety of  
expressions of  sexual violence which are characteristic of  armed conflict situations, the 
diversity of  agents involved, both as victims, survivors and perpetrators, its historical 
persistence and its present impact.  Secondly, it provided a short revision of  the causes 
and consequences of  sexual violence as they have been listed and analyzed in the existing 
literature.  Finally, it examined the answers to this problem formulated by international 
security organizations, including the UN, NATO, the EU and OSCE. 
The analysis showed that a new and vigorous agenda of  gender related initiatives 
and policies has been developing during the past decade, strengthening what some have 
called a new gender regime in international security. But it also pointed to the deficit of  
implementation of  many of  the proposed policies. In any case, and regardless the doubts 
about the contribute of  these formal initiatives to real change, the mere existence of  
this new and ambitious political agenda shows that there is a fundamental change in per-
spective with regard to gender violence and sexual violence in particular:  it is no longer 
considered to be a side-effect of  insecurity; it is increasingly seen as a source of  insecurity 
in itself. This is a crucial change towards conceptualizing sexual violence as not only a 
human rights emergency but as political, strategic and military problem. 
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This new perspective leads to the recognition that it is impossible to promote peace 
and provide security at a global scale – whatever the phase of  the conflict – without fac-
ing and trying to stop this persistent and devastating form of  insecurity.
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“The rebels came to our village in Kivu and said that we would get both food and money if  we became 
soldiers and helped them defeat Kabila’s army. They said that it would be easy to defeat Kabila and that 
we didn’t need to be afraid because the enemy escaped as soon as it saw the rebels. Several of  the rebels 
were boys my age and they had nice uniforms and new guns. I and three other boys from my village went 
with them and fought in both Katanga and Kindu. Many died during the fighting, I was scared but my 
commander said that I was a good soldier. When we took Kindu we first had to cross the Congo river, by 
boat. The enemy shot at us the whole time but I was more afraid of  drowning because I cannot swim. It 
has been over two years since I was home and saw my mother and brothers and sisters. If  there is peace 
I will go home and try to get a job.” 1
Introduction
Due to several circumstances, children and juveniles can find themselves in a situa-
tion in which they are in conflict with the law. Especially during armed conflicts, they are 
particularly exposed to recruitment in order to take part in the hostilities, becoming then 
potential perpetrators. They are regarded as “ideal” soldiers and girls, in particular, are 
seen also as ideal war sexual slaves. So, what expects these recruited children is a nest of  
horror, in which, defenceless, they fall directly into the conflict and, afterwards, they may 
1 14-year-old Jean-Pierre is a member of  the RCD rebel movement in the Democratic Republic of  Congo. 
In Save the Children, Sweden, available at http://www.rb.se/chilwar/ett_01/media.htm
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also fall into the corridors of  justice. Many times, they also have to face the anger of  an 
entire population who accuses them of  the most hideous crimes and atrocities. 
The main purposes of  this presentation are to call the attention to the case of  chil-
dren associated with armed groups and forces, to point out, along the text, some spe-
cificities of  the girl-soldier and, mainly, to debate what happens to these children and 
juveniles when the war is over and they have to face the law. It is not my purpose here to 
discuss whether these children committed those crimes or not, or even to classify or to 
deny the hideousness of  these crimes as I believe that, in the end, children and juveniles 
are what adults turned them into. Although quite relevant, another problematic that I will 
not analyse here is the age of  criminal responsibility, due to time constraints. 
One of  my most important purposes here, today, is to focus on how the justice sys-
tem deals with those different children and juveniles who have taken a direct part in the 
conflict. Many children are denied due process and they are detained under inhuman con-
ditions. More often than could be expected, children are brought to trial and sentenced 
in ways that violate their rights. Quite often, they face a trial without legal representation 
and without being provided with the very basic criminal procedures, like, for instance, 
fair hearings. They are sentenced to confinement too easily and against the international 
principle according to which deprivation of  liberty should be a measure of  last resort and 
for the shortest appropriate period of  time.2 
Once imprisoned, they are often subject to degrading conditions and all sorts of  tor-
ture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Often they share cells with adults, exposing 
them to physical and sexual abuse. Detained children are easy targets to violence at the 
hands of  guards and other detainees. They are frequently denied adequate food, medi-
cal and mental health care, education, and access to basic sanitary facilities. When these 
children and juveniles eventually return to society, their chances of  becoming a balanced 
adult are minimal. Not rehabilitated, the probability of  falling into crime is high.3 
I will begin by analysing the conceptual framework underlying this text, which in-
cludes the concepts of  child associated to armed groups and forces (child soldier), juve-
nile justice and transitional justice. In the next section, I will discuss, albeit perfunctory, 
the contextualisation of  the problem of  children associated with armed groups and forc-
es. This will be followed by the issue of  juvenile justice, given the umbilical relationship 
between the two. I will then briefly touch on aspects concerning transitional justice. In 
the subsequent section, I will attempt to establish the relationship between transitional 
justice and juvenile justice.
Conceptual Framework
Underlying the topic under discussion is the recent evolution of  international law 
that tends to generalise international individual criminal responsibility. According to clas-
2 For more information, see http://www.child-soldiers.org/index.php
3 For more information see Briggs, Jimmie, “Meninos-Soldados – quando as crianças vão à guerra”. 
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sical doctrine, individuals are not considered a subject of  public international law4. In 
fact, international crimes committed by individuals would ultimately be punished by the 
States, a solution that clearly respects a Westphalian conception. However, the extremely 
rapid metamorphosis made international individual criminal responsibility inarguable, 
possible due to the dawning of  international criminal law.5 This applies to the perpetra-
tors of  acts that the international community qualifies as international crimes. This trend 
has been consolidated through the creation of  numerous ad hoc international tribunals, 
with the unequivocal high point being the creation of  the International Criminal Court6. 
Whereas in many theatres of  war a considerable percentage of  crimes may have been 
committed by children, it is imperative to introduce the concept of  child associated with 
armed groups or forces, commonly known as child soldier. Although the term “child 
soldier” is the most well known, it is slowly falling into disuse as it is a contradiction of  
concepts that the words “child” and “soldier” can form a single compound word. It is 
argued that the words “child” and “soldier” should never go together, with the preferred 
version being “children associated to armed groups and forces”, which I support. The 
intention is that this expression be used to describe the same reality as the concept of  
“child soldier”. In any case, in view of  the absence of  a legal definition of  both “child 
soldier” and “child associated with armed groups or forces”, I prefer that contained in 
the Cape Town Principles7, according to which this concept applies to “any person under 18 
years of  age who is part of  any kind of  regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, 
including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers, and anyone accompanying such groups, other than 
family members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage.” While 
accepted in many forums, the definition I chose is sometimes criticised for being too 
broad. However, I assume the risk of  having chosen it, as it is in keeping with my own 
personal conception of  the protection that should be afforded to children associated 
with armed groups or forces and which I believe should be as broad as possible8.  
It is important to introduce the concept of  juvenile justice, precisely because chil-
dren associated with armed groups or forces, having perpetrated acts objectively qualified 
as a crime, may be subject to it. Juvenile justice in general is the set of  legal, substantive 
and procedural rules that apply to “children in conflict with the law”, which, according 
4 “The definition and prosecution of  international crimes, under current international law, still fall under the 
States and the standards of  international law that contemplate them do not project directly onto the sphere 
of  legal influence of  individuals” (Gonçalves Pereira, 2000: 385) (free translation).
5 “The advent of  international criminal law (…) aims to take yet another decisive step towards the interna-
tional protection of  human rights. Moreover, it seeks to consolidate individual responsibility at the legal-
international level (…) it represents the affirmation of  the international legal personality of  individuals and 
confirms its understanding as a primary unit and subject par excellence of  this branch of  law.” (Machado, 
2004:350) (free translation). In the same sense see Brownlie (1997: 585)
6 “The International Criminal Court brings a new paradigm of  international criminal law, in the integration 
of  international law and internal legal orders” (Miranda, 2006:337) (free translation).
7 The Cape Town Principles are the result of  a symposium that took place in this city in April 1997. This 
symposium sought to bring together experts and partners committed to preventing the recruitment of  
children, demobilising and reintegrating those already recruited.
8 Similarly, the definition advocated during the preparatory work of  the International Criminal Court.
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to UNICEF, refers to “anyone under 18 who comes into contact with the justice system as a result of  
being suspected or accused of  committing an offence.”9 It may be true that juvenile justice applica-
ble in the context of  post-conflict may face challenges and specificities that do not exist 
during peacetime. However, both converge towards a common goal, which is to grant 
fair and legal treatment to children and youth in conflict with the law, in a more favour-
able manner from that granted to adults in the same situation. I shall dwell on some of  
the specifics of  juvenile justice within the scope of  transitional justice.
The concept of  transitional justice is also fundamental for this essay. Working with 
transitional justice involves dealing with the past, with atrocities committed and suffered 
during armed conflict. Therefore, I understand that transitional justice “is the set of  judicial 
and non-judicial mechanisms, which intend to respond to human rights violations committed during an armed 
conflict, seeking the accountability of  the perpetrators of  those acts, as well as compensation for the victims, 
with a view to, inter alia, individual and collective reconciliation, and peace” (Marcelino Gomes, 2011).
Children Associated with Armed Groups and Forces: Contextualisation
Armed conflicts are fertile ground for the recruitment of  children and youth, with 
a view to using them, either directly (fighters) or indirectly (cooks, messengers, sexual 
slaves, etc.) in war hostilities. Recruitment can be forced (rape, cheating, drugs, etc.) or 
voluntary. Underlying voluntary recruitment are factors such as poverty, lack of  edu-
cational or employment alternatives, the need to avenge the death of  loved ones and 
orphanhood, among others. Regardless of  whether recruitment is voluntary or forced, it 
should be noted that it is already imbued with a tragic past that transforms these children 
into victims. I stress this point as it will prove to be critical if  we are faced with the inevi-
tability of  judging children who, in a theatre of  war, committed acts qualified as crimes. 
In other words, when we judge them as alleged perpetrators, it is important to remind 
ourselves of  the reasons that led them to join these groups and commit such acts. When 
the conflict ends, these children face the legal, psychological, social, etc. consequences 
resulting from their participation in armed conflict. 
The time of  demobilisation also implies a double vulnerability for girls, for they are 
both girls and “soldiers”.10 Girl-soldiers are frequently identified with “sexual slaves” so, 
their return and acceptance to the community is often imperilled as they are considered 
no longer “pure” and, therefore, it becomes too difficult for these girls to enrol on Dis-
armament, Demobilisation and Rehabilitation (DDR) programmes as this enrolment will 
be the recognition of  their past as girls-soldiers. 
We can find principles forbidding child recruitment in 1977 by the Additional Proto-
cols to the Geneva Conventions of  1949, and later by the Convention on the Rights of  
the Child (CRC) of  1989, which established 15 years as the minimum age for recruitment 
and participation in hostilities. As a result of  massive campaigns to raise that age, the 
9 Available at  http://www.unicef.org/chinese/protection/files/Conflict_with_the_Law.pdf, consulted in 
February 2013.
10 For more information, see Girl Child-soldiers face new battles in civilian life, in http://www.irinnews.org/
Report/97463/Girl-child-soldiers-face-new-battles-in-civilian-life, consulted in February 2013.
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Additional Protocol to the CRC on the Involvement of  Children in Armed Conflicts11 
(hereinafter Protocol) was adopted and recommends increasing the minimum age for 
direct participation in conflict from 15 to 1812. The Protocol also urges the prohibition 
of  conscription, by States Parties, of  anyone under the age of  1813. The voluntary recruit-
ment of  anyone under the age of  18, albeit discouraged, is permitted, provided it fulfils 
the conditions prescribed in Article 3 of  the Protocol14. The regime applicable to “armed 
groups that are distinct from the armed forces of  a State”15, in turn, is significantly more 
rigid, prohibiting the recruitment, whether voluntary or compulsory, as can be seen by 
reading Article 4 of  the Protocol: “Armed groups distinct from the armed forces of  a State should 
not, under any circumstances, recruit or use people under the age of  18 in hostilities”. The entry into 
force of  the Protocol represents an indisputable legal advance, despite the fact that the 
number of  ratifications is considerably lower16 than those of  the CRC17.
 The Constituent Treaty of  the International Criminal Court (ICC), in turn, also 
contributed significantly to what I consider to be a civilizational leap, i.e. it recognises the 
atrocity of  the involvement of  children in armed conflict. Article 8-2b, xxvi) qualifies as 
a war crime “conscripting or enlisting children under the age of  fifteen years into the national armed 
forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities”. Furthermore, even in the case of  armed 
conflicts that are not of  an international nature, the statute also qualifies as a war crime 
“conscripting or enlisting children under the age of  fifteen years into armed forces or groups or using them 
to participate actively in hostilities”(art8-2e,vii)18.   
Despite international bans on the recruitment of  children, it is well known that chil-
dren are used in armed conflicts. In this context, children are viewed as “ideal” soldiers 
from the outset, because their small size makes them unsuspecting. However, if  this 
reasoning continues, in future all children will be suspect, as the all parties know that 
children are used in conflict.
Juvenile Justice
An issue that seems shrouded in deep complexity is the legal treatment to be given 
to cases of  children associated with armed forces and groups. There is consensus within 
11 Entry into force on 12 February 2002.
12 However, see the fragility of  Art. 1 of  the Protocol “State Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure 
that the members of  their armed forces who have not reached the age of  18 do not participate directly in 
hostilities.”
13 See Art. 2 of  the Protocol: “State Parties shall ensure that persons who have not reached the age of  18 are 
not subject to compulsory recruitment into their armed forces.”
14 Cf. Art. 38 of  the CRC.
15 V. art. 4º-1 of  the Protocol.
16 151, on 29/03/2013, in http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-11-b&chapter 
=4&lang=en
17 193, on 29/03/2013, in http://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-11& 
chapter=4&lang=en
18 The Statute of  the International Court of  Sierra Leone (2002) also describes as a “serious violation of  
international humanitarian law” in the light of  international law “conscripting or enlisting children under 
the age of  15 years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities” (Art. 4). 
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public international law19 and within much national legislation, that justice to be applied 
to children and youth in conflict with the law must be substantially different from that 
applied to adults. However, how do you meet the needs of  appeasement of  a society 
that suffered atrocities at the hands of  armed children and simultaneously give these 
children an opportunity to rebuild their life? This is precisely the crux of  the matter: how 
to convince the community that laid at the hands of  these children that deep down, they 
were victims and must be received and integrated in the same community? How do you 
reconcile the call for justice, by the community, and the removal of  child-soldiers from 
the corridors of  the judicial system? According to Graça Machel (1996), “…the dilemma 
of  dealing with children who are accused of  committing acts of  genocide illustrates the complexity of  
balancing culpability, community’s sense of  justice and the best interest of  the child.  The severity of  the 
crime involved, however, provides no justification to suspend or to abridge the fundamental rights and legal 
safeguards accorded to children under the Convention on the Rights of  the Child.” 
International law, in general, protects and gives orientations for the issue of  juve-
nile justice. It is admissible that these orientations were created for common cases of  
children who are in conflict with the law but I believe that the essence of  them should 
also be applicable in the case of  children associated with armed groups and forces who 
have participated in armed conflicts. Below, I will make a summary of  the most relevant 
orientations. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 196620, imposes in article 
6, par. 5 that “sentence of  death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below 18 years 
of  age…”. In Article 14, par. 4, of  the same legal instrument it is said: “in the case of  juvenile 
persons, the procedure shall be such as will take account of  their age and the desirability of  promoting 
their rehabilitation”. So, it entails that special considerations shall be taken in order to treat 
juveniles in a special way and, above all, promote their re-socialisation.
The Convention on the Rights of  the Child (CRC), 198921, in its Article 37 forbids 
children to be treated in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way. Capital punishment and life 
imprisonment are forbidden as well as unlawfully and arbitrary detentions. Confinement 
shall be in conformity with the law, for the shortest period of  time and as a last resort. 
When confined, her/his inherent dignity shall be respected and particular attention shall 
be given to her/his age. Except in special cases, which are in the best interest of  the child, 
he/she shall be separated from adults. A special case would be the detainment of  a whole 
family due to violation of  immigration laws. Here, it is recommended that the child stays 
with the rest of  the family. Once deprived of  liberty, the child shall be allowed to keep in 
contact with his/her relatives. Above all, the child shall have “prompt access to legal and other 
19 See the International  Pact on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 6, par. 5, Art. 14, par. 4; Convention on the 
Rights of  the Child, Arts. 37 and 40; “Beijing Rules”, UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Protection of  
Juveniles Deprived of  their Liberty; “Tokyo Rules”, “Riyadh Guidelines”. 
20 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200 A 
(XXI) of  16 December 1966. Entry into force: 23 March 1976. 
21 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 44/25 of  
20 November 1989. Entry into force: 2 September 1990.
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appropriate assistance”. Article 40 of  the same Convention appeals for the child “to be treated 
in a manner consistent with the promotion of  the child’s sense of  dignity and worth, which reinforces 
the child’s respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of  others.” To achieve this, par. 2 
gives some guidelines, such as the principles of  nullum crimen sine lege and presumption of  
innocence. The whole process shall be fast and clear and the child shall have informa-
tion on its situation and assistance to prepare its defence. The minimum age of  criminal 
responsibility must be determined, she/he shall not be compelled to give testimony or 
confess and his/her privacy must be respected.   
The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of  Juvenile 
Justice (“The Beijing Rules”) were adopted by General Assembly resolution 40/33, of  
29 November 1985. They cover juvenile justice overall, including it in a comprehensive 
social policy, whose main objective would be to prevent juvenile crime and delinquency. 
Should it be necessary for juvenile justice to intervene, “The Beijing Rules” aim to reduce 
the harmful impact of  this intervention.
The United Nations Rules for the Protection of  Juveniles Deprived of  Their Lib-
erty were adopted by the General Assembly resolution 45/113, of  14 December 1990. 
Mainly, it defends imprisonment as a last resort, for the minimum necessary period and 
to be applied in exceptional cases. Once applied, the Rules promote the protection of  the 
rights, safety, physical and mental well-being of  those juveniles caught by the corridors 
of  law. These rules are considered as minimum standards and aim at reducing the det-
rimental effects of  confinement. Conscientious on the juvenile’s return to society, they 
promote rehabilitation.
The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures (“The 
Tokyo Rules”) were adopted by General Assembly resolution 45/110, of  14 December 
1990. In consistency with the previous analysed legal document, this one promotes the 
use of  alternative sanctions to imprisonment and establishes safeguards to persons sub-
ject to them. They intend to promote a greater involvement between the community and 
offenders as a way to rehabilitation. These Rules can play a very important role when 
trying to avoid juveniles to come into contact with the malefic essence of  prisons.
The United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of  Juvenile Delinquency (“The 
Riyadh Guidelines”) were adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 
45/112, of  14 December 1990. Prevention of  juvenile delinquency is seen as fundamen-
tal in society. These guidelines call for the entire society to help and participate in the 
well-being and balanced development of  adolescents as a way of  avoiding their future 
deviant behaviours. On the other hand, it also calls for the participation of  young people 
in the development of  society by playing an active role in it. The Guidelines call for the 
non-criminalisation of  acts considered deviant, but which neither cause much damage 
to the development of  the child nor are too harmful for the society. According to the 
guidelines, it is important the non-stigmatisation of  the juvenile involved.
A growing number of  countries have modified their juvenile justice laws in order to 
guarantee children the rights reached in the above mentioned international instruments. 
In other countries, reforms are under consideration but have not yet been enacted into 
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law. Where they have taken place, legislative reforms are positive steps towards greater 
recognition of  the human rights of  children and juveniles who happen to be on the 
wrong side of  the law. Even so, the gaps between law and practice are still too frequent 
and too vast.
Transitional Justice
After the end of  an armed conflict, one of  the most pressing issues that arises is 
precisely deciding which legal treatment should be given to the people who perpetrated 
acts legally qualified as a crime and how to compensate victims, a process that is called 
the Administration of  Transitional Justice. Apart from the definition proposed in the 
conceptual framework, I also propose the following one, adopted by the International 
Center for Transitional Justice according to which “Transitional Justice refers to a field of  activ-
ity and inquiry focused on how societies address legacies of  past human rights abuses, mass atrocity, or 
other forms of  severe social trauma, including genocide or civil war, in order to build a more democratic, 
just, or peaceful future.”22
It is incumbent on those who run the country/territory in the post-war to decide 
which path to take in order to pacify the community. We will therefore start with a brief  
explanation of  the various possibilities offered in terms of  dealing with past abuses and 
violations of  international law on human rights and the international humanitarian law. 
There are two paths: the judicial and the non-judicial. The former implies the use of  
courts (national, international or mixed), responsible for the prosecution of  perpetrators. 
The latter deals mainly with aspects of  truth and forgiveness, especially through the use 
of  truth commissions, in which victims and their compensation take on a leading role. 
Still in relation to the latter, can be included aspects such as institutional reform (e.g. the 
removal of  perpetrators from power centres) and the promotion of  reconciliation, par-
ticularly through traditional and symbolic practices (e.g. the construction of  memorials) 
with the intention of  rebuilding the social fabric.
With Jónatas Machado, I would say that, regardless of  the path chosen, “at stake is 
the need to find a reasonable balance between justice, truth and peace, while we analyse the problems from 
a systemic and historical perspective, and not based on isolated cases” (2004:381).23In situations of  
post-conflict transition, the realisation of  justice takes on a particularly structural char-
acter in the replacement of  state sovereignty, the return to institutional normalcy and 
social peace. 
Transitional justice is seen as an important step towards reconciliation which, ac-
cording to Short (2005:268), “involves the creation of  a ‘social space’ where truth, justice, mercy 
and forgiveness are validated and joined together, rather than being forced into a confrontation where 
one must win out over the other”. Thus, a suitable model of  transitional justice may be 
crucial in a reconciliation process. According to Ramsbotham et alia, reconciliation is 
22 Apud The Encyclopedia of  Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity (Macmillan Reference USA, 2004), 
vol. 3, pp. 1045-1047.
23 Free translation.
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a process of  “restoring broken relationships and learning to live non-violently with radical differ-
ences” (Ramsbotham et al., 2006: 231). It is through reconciliation that we can aspire to 
lasting and sustained peace.
It should also be highlighted the particular role that women can play in reconciliation 
processes although, often, they are left outside those processes. When it comes to girl-
soldiers it is even less common that their voice is heard in reconciliation processes. So, 
once again, girl-soldiers end up being discriminated for they are girls, they are children 
and they have been soldiers and a reconciliation process which leaves them behind is an 
incomplete process, to say the least.
The Security Council Resolution 1325 (31/10/2000) on Women, Peace and Security 
calls precisely for the need of  mainstreaming a gender perspective in every moment and 
dimensions of  the prevention, management and resolution of  the conflict. In this docu-
ment, there is a perception of  the woman, not only as victim but also as a key player in 
the processes of  transformation of  the conflict. Women and girls should not only be 
seen as objects of  protection but also as active players in the peace process. The Security 
Council Resolution 1820 (2008) puts the emphasis on the protection against sexual vio-
lence during and after the conflicts and Security Council Resolution 1888 (30/09/2009) 
reinforces the idea of  the importance of  women’s participation in the mediation and 
decision-making, by introducing new measures and protection mechanisms against sex-
ual violence during and after the conflict (e.g. the creation of  a Special Representative of  
the Secretary General on Sexual Violence in Conflict). Security Council Resolution 1889 
(05/10/2009) calls also for a greater participation of  women in all phases of  the process 
and underlines the importance of  systematization regarding the gathering of  specific 
data on women and girls, namely, their specific needs and priorities, and the introduc-
tion of  indicators to check the effectiveness of  the measures adopted. All the principles 
contained in these resolutions should also be applicable to the particular case of  girls 
associated with armed groups and forces24. 
Juvenile Justice and Transitional Justice: Quid Juris? 
Once caught in the web of  Justice, it is essential to achieve a balance between the 
right of  participation of  children in matters that concern them, and their own right to 
be protected. It is necessary that the participation of  children in transitional justice proc-
esses follow procedures, in particular proceedings, which are favourable to them. And 
this applies to any of  the models that may have been followed, namely the use of  Truth 
and Reconciliation Commissions or formal mechanisms of  justice.
It is urgent to safeguard the possibility that the national judicial system may have been 
weakened or even destroyed, which hinders the treatment to be given to children associated 
with armed groups or forces, particularly with regard to the detention conditions (e.g. joint 
incarceration of  adults and children/young people), to the often non-existent mechanisms 
of  rehabilitation/diversion of  the corridors of  justice and therefore conducive to long 
24 For more information, v. Moura, Tatiana (2005).
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periods of  detention. Another recurring problem is determining the age of  the child, as, in 
some cases, the children/youths were never registered, while in others their personal and 
official documentation may have been lost due to the vicissitudes of  war.
According to a UNICEF report (2005), in the absence of  international mechanisms 
of  accountability, it is necessary to rethink the role of  national judicial systems, with re-
gard to the administration of  juvenile justice in post-conflict situations. In this regard, it 
issues several recommendations, notably respect for international standards concerning 
the rights of  the child and the adoption of  restorative justice measures, even through 
the use of  traditional practices, as long as they respect the human rights of  children and 
young people. However, this same report admits that while the use of  traditional jus-
tice mechanisms can facilitate the reconciliation process, these methods barely meet the 
needs of  accountability for the crime committed, in light of  international law.
Transversal to this whole issue is another: the implementation of  DDR programmes. 
Often the implementation of  such programmes involves negotiations that are likely to 
have consequences on the administration of  transitional justice. In fact, it is common for 
the combatants, including children associated with armed groups and forces, to be offered 
an amnesty in exchange for delivering weapons and demobilisation. But this deal may not 
solve the community needs of  justice and hence the fact that the return of  the child-soldier 
to a society that has not forgiven him/her can be extremely dangerous for the child. Even 
returning home, the problems of  the former child associated with armed groups and forces 
may not be over because the collective memory is there, ready to show up.
Therefore, I think it is necessary to offer a hybrid solution that combines aspects 
of  transitional justice, of  juvenile justice and that takes into account concepts such as 
peace and justice. Peace and justice are two fundamental pieces, sometimes representing 
tense moments in the midst of  peace negotiations and subsequently the reconstruction 
of  peace. Sometimes they appear inconsistent, as in the case we just stated above (end of  
the conflict, in exchange for amnesty), but according to Ramsbotham (2006: 236), peace 
and justice are not necessarily mutually exclusive alternatives. I share this assumption. 
Another assumption underpinning my proposal is the idea that, before they were trans-
formed into perpetrators, child-soldiers were victims, which will of  course be transversal 
to all of  the reasoning that follows.
Whilst the CRC itself  and the Tokyo Rules admit that child perpetrators are subject 
to mechanisms of  accountability for their actions, it is also true that they defend alterna-
tive measures to normal lawsuits, in particular the use of  restorative justice, the promo-
tion of  reintegration and the return to a pro-active role in society (Art. 40 of  the CRC) 
and rehabilitation (Article 14, paragraph 4 of  the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and Article 39 of  the CRC). But throughout this process, it is necessary 
that the child/youth becomes aware of  his/her nefarious conduct, so the idea of   respect-
ing the rights of  others should be strengthened (Art. 40 of  the CRC).
Having sided with UNICEF (2005), which pinpoints defects in the treatment of  ju-
venile justice within transitional justice, I raise the following inevitable questions: Should 
children associated with armed groups and forces be treated by law as perpetrators or as vic-
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tims? How should the law treat the issue, taking into account the three main concepts under 
consideration in this matter: guilt, the sense of  justice claimed by society and the best inter-
est of  the child? What special care should the law give the girl-child associated with armed 
groups and forces, assuming their triple victimisation, for being a girl, a child and a soldier?
In order to conclude this point, I think it is necessary that transitional justice appli-
cable to children associated with armed groups and forces should take into consideration 
the specificities of  juvenile justice. I therefore defend a transitional justice adapted to the 
specificities of  children associated with armed groups and forces and particularly that of  
girl-soldiers.
Challenges Ahead
Following the trend of  international legal standards, a juvenile justice system must 
cover the rights of  all children and juveniles accused of  or recognised as having infringed 
the penal law. It covers treatment from the moment an allegation is made, through inves-
tigation, arrest, charge, pre-trial period, trial and sentence. The standards require States 
to promote a distinctive justice for juveniles with specific rehabilitating aims, rather than 
punitive ones. Sometimes, what we notice is a focus on criminalisation of  juvenile of-
fenders, on violence by children rather than on violence against them, on lowering the 
age of  criminal responsibility and on giving prominence to the interest of  the community 
rather than taking into account the best interests of  the child as required by the CRC. 
Due to the gravity of  the crimes committed this is even more the tendency in post-
conflict situations. Lost in a scenario of  misery, extreme poverty, disastrous economic 
and social environment and political instability, chances are that children end up involved 
in situations of  criminality as a way of  survival, during and after the war. 
There are many challenges to be dealt with when dealing with child-soldiers in con-
flict with the law, after the war, as exemplified below: 
• Children forgotten in prison: one of  the worst problems occurs when children 
and juveniles remain in prison, after the war, without trial, accused of  having 
committed the worst atrocities, including torture, the most cruel homicides and 
even genocide. These children cannot be forgotten within the judicial system.
• Indirect participation: children/juveniles who participated indirectly, like cooks 
or carriers, sexual slaves, messengers, carriers, etc should be given even a more 
favourable treatment.
• DDR programmes: Following the international children’s rights standards, when 
dealing with child-soldiers priority should be given to their demobilisation, dis-
armament and reintegration. They must be given encouragement to leave the 
armed groups and forces and for that they must be offered real alternatives. DDR 
programmes must take into consideration these children’s psychological recovery 
as well as give them professional tools that can be used when leaving the pro-
gramme. If, when leaving those groups they know that punishment, bad treat-
ment and hunger are expecting them, it is expectable that they prefer staying 
where they are.
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• Rehabilitation: it is an essential part of  the whole process. At this point, it is highly 
recommended that restorative justice and diversion measures be adopted in order 
to avoid contact with the conventional and strict justice system (art. 40 CRC). Re-
storative justice gives prevalence to avoid detention of  juveniles, and gives prefer-
ence to the use of  juvenile justice professionals. According to this method, the 
child/juvenile should still be made aware of  the seriousness of  what he/she has 
done and should be held responsible for that, having to face some consequences. 
At this point, there should be a call for her/his right to participation and the 
child/juvenile should be involved in the decision on sanctions and compensa-
tion (Beijing rule 11.3). Family and the community play a very important role in 
the child’s rehabilitation and should also be involved (Beijing rule 11.4). Public 
opinion and justice professionals should be sensitised to the problem. If  and 
when recommendable, there can be contact between victim and offender and the 
former should try to compensate the latter. Above all, the purpose of  the process 
is not to marginalise or to stigmatise but to reintegrate. 
• Reintegration: for the purpose of  reintegration, diversion programmes (Beijing 
Rule 18.1) should be drawn up. This solution is highly recommendable as it avoids 
the contact of  the child/juvenile with the system and it involves a large number 
of  professionals, family and civil society, which somehow create protecting veils 
around the youngster. For this system to be applied, the child has to confess the 
offence and accept a non-judicial hearing. The problem is that the child might 
admit the offence just to avoid the formal procedure. Child/juvenile should never 
be pressed to confess or to accept diversion measures. The offender always has 
the right to a court hearing or judicial review. Only less serious offences are cov-
ered by the system, as it never allows deprivation of  liberty. If  no acceptable solu-
tion is reached with this method, the case should be referred to a regular court. 
As a safety clause, it should be said that also here human rights safeguards should 
be fully respected.
• Work with the children’s family and community: It is predictable that it would be 
extremely difficult to convince an entire population not to somehow “punish” 
these children and juveniles, who were seen to be committing the most hideous 
crimes. Just to let these children go freely would certainly create a situation of  re-
volt in the community and this would not help children at all in their reintegration. 
So, there should be a parallel work on children/juveniles and on the population. 
We should call the attention of  the population to the fact that most of  these chil-
dren were themselves abducted, recruited by force, abused, treated like slaves and 
trained to kill, quite often under the effect of  drugs. We have to stress that many 
times they did not have any other choice but to do what they were ordered to do. 
Other times, they did not really understand the gravity of  what they were doing. 
So, there should be a case-by-case treatment. Furthermore, awareness should be 
raised to the fact that, despite their more or less condemnable acts, these children 
have themselves been victims of  war. Punishing them severely would just make 
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them victims again. If  during the war, society did not give them a chance to have 
a proper life, at least after the war, it is the adults’ responsibility to give these chil-
dren/juveniles a second chance of  having a normal life.
• Punishment of  recruiters: those most responsible should be accused and this 
would lead us mainly to the ones who recruited, trained and commanded them. 
Recruiting children should be a crime also at national level as perhaps this way 
perpetrators would feel discouraged to use child-soldiers in the future.
• Imprisoned children: if  despite all said, the child/juvenile is imprisoned, then 
some considerations should be highlighted. With some exceptions, as mentioned 
above, the juvenile offender should be separated from adults, including as far as 
sight and earring are concerned (art.37, CRC; JDLs Rule 29). Every effort should 
be made to end with harmful detention conditions, like the lack of  information 
related with the rules in force and rights of  detainees, insufficient space, inad-
equate food and clothes, poor hygienic facilities, poor or non-existing educational 
or training assistance, deprivation of  contact with the outside and lack of  moni-
toring by qualified and motivated staff. 
• Young female detainees: special attention should be paid (Beijing Rule 26.4) to 
the specific needs of  girls, like hygiene and the consequences of  reiterated sexual 
abuse. They are more easily put in cells with other women under the justification 
that it is positive for them but there is no evidence of  that. The trend for girls to 
be more deprived of  educational opportunities should be avoided.
• Disciplinary measures: measures like solitary confinement and reduction of  diet 
should be strictly avoided and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment should be 
strictly forbidden (JDLs Rule 67). Even when deprived of  liberty, rehabilitation 
and reintegration should always be the main guidelines. 
• Death penalty: this sanction should be stopped immediately and countries should 
amend their legislation accordingly, so this sanction would never ever be applica-
ble to a child. 
• No re-victimization: it is important that a juvenile system does not victimise chil-
dren again. The perfect juvenile justice system would be one which would help Jean-
Pierre and others like him to feel the war is over when it is over, and that would help 
him to go home and go to school or find a job, according to his age, as he wishes. 
In view of  the above, and in general, respect for the following principles should 
always be taken into consideration:
• Strict respect of  the level reached in terms of  children’s rights at international 
level;
• Participation of  the child in the process and respect for her/his own protection;
• Possibility of  designing an integrated solution involving judicial and non-judicial 
mechanisms, as long as they respect children’s rights;
• Complementarity between the legal and the social process of  treating “wounds”;
• Parallel work with the family and the community in order to ease the child’s re-
integration in the community.
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Conclusion
It is true that children take part in the conflict, either directly or indirectly, as we said, 
but in either case they are exposed to deeply traumatising events. They may have entered 
the conflict willingly or unwillingly, but they should always be considered as victims of  
a History that did not spare them. So, when the war is over, former children associated 
with armed groups and forces should not be treated as former adult soldiers, they have 
to be regarded and treated in a manner consistent with the vulnerability and specificities 
of  their age. For that purpose, it is essential that the professionals responsible for them 
have the adequate training and sensitivity in order to treat differently what is different. 
I think the best solution, albeit utopian in some circumstances, would be the use of  re-
storative justice solutions involving psychosocial work, parallel to the justice system, with 
the child, as well as with her family and community. It is imperative that, when the war is 
over, children associated with armed groups and forces do not become for a second time 
victims of  fate, of  History, of  the “grown-ups”...
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Introduction
I was asked to present the topic “Women and non-state actors” in this seminar. It is 
a broad topic that raises more questions than answers. Many of  them will be dealt by the 
other guest speakers.
Given the fact that I have been studying the phenomenon of  Private Military and 
Security Companies (hereafter PMSC) for the last six years now, I will address the topic 
in this perspective, changing the title to “Women and Private Military and Security Com-
panies”. 
The topic of  PMSC has called the attention of  researchers, and it has known several 
stages of  development. However, the issue of  gender-based violence and PMSC has 
been quite absent from the literature. I had not included it in my research as well, so I 
would like to thank this opportunity to enrich the work I have done with the gender lens 
on the PMSC analysis.
This paper will be divided in three parts. The first one will introduce the phenom-
enon of  PMSC, to clearly understand what are we talking about when we pronounce the 
acronym PMSC. The second part will address two main questions: the relationship that 
has been observed between PMSC employees and civilian women, on one hand; and 
between PMSC and women as their workers, on the other. The third part will sum up the 
regulation attempts and clarify the role that gender has played on them.
As conclusion, I will defend that the time has come to take into consideration the 
gender perspective. Actually, I would go further and defend that the time has come to take 
gender seriously when we talk about armed conflicts, in general, and PMSC in particular. 
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Brief  Introduction to the Topic of  PMSC1
Although it was not the very first time2, the big happening that made possible the 
boom of  private corporations performing military functions was the end of  the Cold 
War. The collapse of  a two-headed international order, where relations between partisans 
from each side can be described as a imminent state of  quasi-aggression, provoked what 
Peter Singer calls “security gap”.3 As states did not manage to deal in a timely manner 
with the aftermath of  the Fall of  Berlin Wall, market saw an opportunity and took it.
In addition, the end of  the Cold War made a shift in war supply and demand. Now, 
there was an immense surplus not only of  weaponry, but also of  high-skilled human 
resources.
States started to cut the Defense budget. Along with this trend, the idea that only 
intrinsic military functions should remain within the exclusivity of  public powers, and 
many others could be outsourced, made possible the growth of  a powerful privatized 
military industry. 
The trade-offs were good for these new companies: they could find high-ranking 
officials available to work for those companies, with all the knowhow at a low cost. In ad-
dition, the costs for training and formation had already been supported by states. Private 
military companies would only have to benefit from their expertise.
Furthermore, it was not only because of  a human capital pool that the end of  the 
Cold War gave fertile ground to private military companies.
During the Cold War, both USSR and USA stocked a great amount of  weaponry that 
became available with the end of  the tension between them. Now, an immense supply of  
all kinds of  weapons, from light fire guns to missiles and tanks were ready to be released 
in the market.4 Private actors, including private military companies, as well as internation-
al criminal organizations and terrorist groups, started a true race to obtain the best deals.
In addition, human resources and provision of  weapons would be meaningless if  
there was no context to use them. In fact, the end of  the Cold War played a significant 
role.5 The permanent tension between the two blocks suppressed some imminent con-
flicts in several areas of  the world, namely in the African continent. The withdrawal of  
political and military support of  the superpowers left a vacuum, which also explains 
1 This section was previously written for the essay “The use of  Private Military/Security Companies and 
State Responsibility Disclaimer”, as contribution to the seminar Just & Unjust Wars seminar, taught by 
Professor Moshe Halbertal, at NYU School of  Law, Fall 2011.
2 Mini, Ltg. ITA ret Fabio (2010). An Analysis of  Private Military and Security Companies. EUI Working Papers 
AEL 2010/07 – Academy of  European Law, PRIV-WAR project. Florence, Italy: European University 
Institute, pp. 2-3.
3 P. W. Singer (2004). Corporate Warriors: The Rise of  the Privatized Military Industry. Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, p. 49.
4 Idem, pp. 53-55.
5 See also C. Prata (2009). The Role of  Martens Clause in the Legal Framework of  Private Military Companies Acting 
in International Armed Conflicts (Master’s Dissertation). Lisbon: New University of  Lisbon School of  Law, pp. 
29-30.
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some of  the bloodsheds after the end of  the Cold War.6 In those countries, once the 
respective potency had left, what was shown was a failed state, with an inexistent or mini-
mal military apparatus and the absence of  governance structure. The clusters of  power, 
major ethnic groups within the society, or a minority with access to natural resources to 
finance armed power, launched true coups to overthrow weak governments.
The armies were a mirror reflection of  the state machinery, or lack of  it. They were 
underfunded, underequipped, undermanned and undertrained. Several times, they were 
used against their own people, which goes against two of  the main ideas of  the Just War 
theory: the idea that a war is justified when it is waged to protect the people or when it 
has the fully support from it.
Private military companies saw in these scenarios two options to make profit: on one 
side, they offered their services to set up or replace national armies, in order to prepare 
them to fight internal insurgents. On the other hand, private military companies, more 
openly in the first years of  their boom, had no problem providing military training and 
weaponry to rebel and terrorist groups.
Alongside the above conditions that made possible the multiplying effect of  private 
military companies, another important factor reshaped the private and public spheres in 
military affairs.
The end of  the Cold War started a new world order, where the public opinion began 
to have a more powerful voice.
Constituencies demanded justifications about the use of  their youth in wars not re-
lated to their home affairs, and politicians always had some difficulty explaining why their 
sons were fighting in a distant country for a cause that was not theirs. 
The cuts in the military budget required a more selective choice of  battlefields, and 
the more powerful and capacitated armies, like the US army, started to choose to inter-
vene in conflicts where it could gain an economic or strategic advantage. In the first, the 
interventions in the Middle East serve as a good example, for the latter the interventions 
in several countries in Latin America.
These two aspects of  the new realpolitik opened a bracket that private military com-
panies did not hesitate to fulfill. The economic gains made it worth it.
Peter Singer also refers another aspect for the development of  privatization of  war: 
the UN inability.7 This can be understood as the disappointment that the UN system 
turned out to be regarding armed conflicts. Back in 1945, the founding fathers of  the 
UN hoped that all conflicts between states would be resolved and dealt with by peaceful 
means (Article 1, section 1 of  the Charter of  the United Nations). In the cases where 
peaceful means would not be sufficient to end disputes, a supranational organ – the 
Security Council – would have the power to determine enforcement measures and the 
use of  force as last resort (see Chapter VII of  the UN Charter). The idea was to set up a 
6 The internal conflicts in Angola, Somalia or the Balkans are some good examples of  this type of  conse-
quence of  the end of  the Cold War.
7 P. Singer (2004). Corporate Warriors, pp. 59-60.
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UN army, under the command of  the Military Staff  Committee. This would be proven 
more of  an inspiration than a reality and countries tended to take situations on their own 
hands, in accordance to their interests.
In the end of  the Cold War, the conviction that the UN would replace the stabilizing 
role from the two superpowers renewed the original conviction regarding the role of  that 
international institution.
However, great failures in crucial interventions, like the ones that happened in Bos-
nia and Rwanda, torn that belief  apart, and in the corridors of  the UN the possibility to 
contract private contractor begun to gather some support.8 
To conclude, the end of  the Cold War weakened states in their capacity to intervene 
militarily, showed the inability of  UN to act as international ruler and of  Security Council 
to act as the international commander-in-chief, and put to daylight the potential of  the 
industry of  privatized military affairs.
Notwithstanding, the end of  Cold War alone does not explain this phenomenon. The 
development of  warfare technology required the kind of  specialization that it was hard 
to find in the military. Also, this expertise became available not only to states, through 
civilians technicians working for defense departments, but also to wealthy armed groups 
which fought low-intensity conflicts, where national armies, normally from quasi-failed 
states, were not at the same level.
This phenomenon of  civilianization of  warfare, explained by the need to higher 
expertise to manage the new methods and by the civilian nature of  some of  the new ac-
tors on armed conflicts, is another cause for the expansion of  private military companies.
In the conflicts of  the end of  XX and beginning of  XXI centuries, the presence of  
private contractors was, and still is, an increasing reality.
Labeling and Typifying the Private Security Industry
One of  the first topics being discussed about the privatization of  military affairs was 
the labeling of  the legal entities operating on it. The discussion ran around three main 
labels: private military companies, private security companies and private military and 
security companies.9 Although in the most recent literature, authors continue to use dif-
ferent terminologies, the expression “private military and security companies” gained a 
general acceptance, not only among scholars, but also among institutions.
The ICRC launched in 2006 the Montreux initiative from which resulted The Montreux 
Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations 
of  private military and security companies during armed conflict in 2008.10 
8 This contrasts with the official position, one of  abolitionism of  private military companies. In 1998, the 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated: “(...) the world may not be ready to privatize Peace”. UN Doc. 
SG/SM/6613, June 26 1998.
9 For a comprehensive assessment of  the literature regarding this issue, see C. Prata (2009). The Role of  Mar-
tens Clause…, pp. 33-43.
10 Available on http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf.
IDN CADERNOS 47
The Montreux Document takes the “humanitarian approach”, in line with IHL, and 
disregarding the issue of  legitimacy.11 In line with this, it “avoids any strict delimitation 
(…) and uses the inclusive term private military and security companies (PMSCs) to encompass 
all companies (…)”.12 The reason to adopt this inclusive terminology is also explained: 
“There is no standard definition of  what is a “military” company and what is a “security” 
company. (…) in reality many companies provide a wide range of  services (…). Moreo-
ver, from the humanitarian point of  view, the relevant question is not how a company is 
labeled but what specific services it provides in a particular stance.”13
Thus, in paragraph 9 (a) of  the Preface, PMSC are defined as “private business 
entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of  how they describe 
themselves. Military and security services include, in particular, armed guarding and pro-
tection of  persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance 
and operation of  weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of  local 
forces and security personnel.” 
Although it acknowledges the importance of  defining the specific activities, the Mon-
treux Document does not go as far as to draw a typology of  PMSC, merely setting the 
general definition.
Parallel to the Montreux initiative, the United Nations started to pay attention to the 
phenomenon of  PMSC in 2005, leaving behind the official position to treat it as another 
form of  mercenary activity.14
In July 2010, the UN Working Group submitted its report to the Fifteenth session 
of  HRC, with an important Annex – a Draft of  a possible Convention on Private Military and 
Security Companies (PMSCs) for consideration and action by the Human Rights Council.15
On its article 2 – Definitions – these companies are dealt together as “(a) Private 
military and/or Security Company (PMSC)” and defined as “(…) a corporate entity which provides 
on a compensatory basis military and/or security services by physical persons and/or legal entities.” The 
following sections – (b) and (c) – of  article 2 define what military services and security services 
are. The former are “specialized services related to military action including strategic 
planning, intelligence, investigation, land, sea or air reconnaissance, flight operations of  
any type, manned or unmanned, satellite surveillance, any kind of  knowledge transfer 
with military applications, material and technical support to armed forces and other re-
lated activities.” The latter are described as “armed guarding or protection of  buildings, 
installations, property and people, any kind of  knowledge transfer with security and po-
11 Montreux Document, Explanatory Comments, pp. 39 and 41.
12 Idem, p. 38.
13 Idem.
14 In 2005, the former UN Commission on Human Rights, now Human Rights Council, replaced the Special 
Rapporteur on the use of  mercenaries and established the UN Working Group on the use of  mercenaries 
as a mean of  impeding the exercise of  the rights of  people to self-determination. Despite the naming, the 
mandate of  the working group is to study PMSC and propose legal solutions – HRC Res. 2005/2, of  7 
April 2005, E/CN.4/2005/RES/2005/2.
15 Resolution A/HRC/15/25, 2 July 2010, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/mercenaries/
docs/A.HRC.15.25.pdf, henceforth Draft Convention.
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licing applications, development and implementation of  international security measures 
and other related activities.”
Although the problems with these definitions are discussed in another work from 
the author16, for the present paper the importance is to reach a label for the industry, 
falling the choice on the term private military/security companies (PMSC). Nevertheless, 
the general definition does not help understanding the reason why the framework of  
IHL has been so poorly adapted to this new actor on the battlefield. As referred above, 
these companies provide a large range of  services, from food supply to actual fighting. 
No overall answer can be given, and it is necessary to typify the industry.
It was not easy to come up with a well-established distinction because of  the dif-
ferent criteria used on that exercise, but mostly because scholars reached the conclusion 
that the same company provided services from different natures, which made it difficult 
to include it in one group.
Peter Singer drew the taxonomy more widely accepted among scholars. Using the 
metaphor of  a spear, Singer makes the specific distinction between three types of  private 
military companies, in accordance to the proximity of  the battlefield.17 He distinguishes 
between military provider firms, military consultant firms and military support firms, being the first 
type the closest to the battle.
Singer justifies this classification by conduct it to the basics: the industry is guided 
by economic and military fundamentals, thus any typology must take this into considera-
tion. Singer tries to mirror the private military industry with the organization of  national 
armies. The armed force of  a State is divided in three type of  units: the one that operates 
within the general theater; the ones operating in the theater of  war and those operating 
in the area of  operation, meaning the tactical battlefield.
Using this geographical metaphor, Singer does not take into due consideration the 
features of  the new armed conflicts, namely the management of  weaponry from long 
distance. 
Some scholars departed from this typology to develop more comprehensive clas-
sifications.18
More recently, and departing from a functional criterion, according to which what 
must be reflected is the nature of  the activity contracted and not the general nature of  
the company itself, Tonkin divides PMSC activities into four categories: (1) offensive 
combat; (2) military and security expertise; (3) armed security; and (4) military support.19 
The first category refers to those who are contractually authorized to perform offensive 
16 See the author’s work for the International Legal Sciences thesis program “Legal Formalism meets Reality: 
a Proposal to Rethink the Notion of  “Combatant” in Light of  the Existence of  PMSC, chapter three.
17 P. Singer (2004). Corporate Warriors, pp. 91-92.
18 See, for instance, the wrap-up that it is made in the collective book by B. Sheehy, J. Maogot and V. Newell 
(2009). Legal Control of  the Private Military Corporation. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.17-26. Also see C. 
Prata (2009). The Role of  Martens Clause…, pp. 33-38.
19 H. Tonkin (2011). State Control over Private Military and Security Companies in Armed Conflict. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 40.
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attacks. Those include not only ground troops, but also those who use technological 
weapon systems and those who are distant from the frontline.20 These kinds of  contracts 
fell in disuse by the end of  the 90’s when public opinion worldwide showed a deep dis-
taste for “private offensive warfare”21. However, this type of  mission continues to be 
contracted as covert operations.22
Military and security expertise is probably the more lucrative and demanded type 
of  contract in the current situation. These contracts involve the provision of  high-level 
technical or strategic capabilities such as maintenance of  weaponry systems, gathering 
intelligence and the provision of  military/security advice and training, interrogation of  
detainees and mine clearance.23
The third category – armed security – is as much as popular as the second. These 
contracts are signed to provide physical protection of  persons and properties in areas of  
armed conflict.24 The employees performing these activities are allowed to carry specified 
weapons and to use them in case of  self-defense or defense of  the objects of  the con-
tract or to defend civilian population. Notwithstanding, when operating in the battlefield 
there is a very thin line between self-defense and combat-like situations. 
Lastly, the fourth category is military support. This category is not exclusive of  mili-
tary environment. Generally, they are contracts to provide general logistics, such trans-
port, food, laundry, repatriation of  bodies and settling and dismantle of  bases and camps. 
This category is not associated with the use of  force, but they do contribute to the suc-
cess of  military operations.25
In sum, if  one were to mirror Singer’s taxonomy with Tonkin’s, one would have the 
categories of  offensive combat and armed security in the military provider firms; the 
military and security expertise in the military consultant firms and the military support in 
the military support firms.
PMSC and Civilian Women
Despite the scarce data on the subject, some scandals involving PMSC employees 
have come to light regarding forced prostitution, human trafficking or sexual assault.
The most known is the scandal involving the employees from DynCorp Aerospace 
Technology UK Ltd in illegal prostitution and human trafficking in Bosnia.26 A former 
employee from DynCorp, who was fired afterwards, brought the case to daylight. The 
20 Idem.
21 H. Tonkin, H. (2011). State Control over…, p. 41.
22 Tonkin refers some cases reported in the press mainly related to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, involv-
ing US Government.
23  See also H. Tonkin (2011). State Control over…, p. 45-47.
24 Tonkin includes also in this category armed border and immigration control, as well as private police. 
However, these fall outside of  IHL scope.
25 See also H. Tonkin (2011). Op. Cit., p. 51.
26 See C. de la Vega and A. Beck (2006). The Role of  Military Demand in Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation 
– Commission on the Status of  Women 50th Session, Human Rights Advocates. Available at http://www.
humanrightsadvocates.org/advocacy-at-the-un/, pp. 10-13.
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publicity resulted in a lawsuit and in the dismissal of  the employees involved. However, 
the contractors were not operating alone, and there were uniformed peacekeepers in the 
set also.27 
Not surprisingly, a US Department of  Defense Office of  Inspector General report 
clearly stated “With regard to DoD contractors, we found that contract employees, 
while considered members of  the SFOR and KFOR community, are not subject to 
the same restrictions that are placed on U.S. Service members. For example, contractor 
employees are sometimes permitted to live outside U.S.-controlled military installa-
tions and, with few restrictions, to circulate in host country communities. Additionally, 
we determined that DoD contractors also employ many host country nationals, all of  
whom live in local communities and whose behavior is neither restricted nor moni-
tored by DoD authorities. As members of  SFOR and KFOR, contractor employees 
are forbidden from patronizing establishments designated by the United Nations or 
the European Union Police Mission as off-limits because of  illegal prostitution and 
human trafficking concerns. However, we found that while some contractors make an 
effort to monitor their employees’ activities and address employee misconduct, con-
tractor behavior in this regard is not uniform. Not surprisingly, anecdotal evidence 
suggested some level of  DoD contractor employee involvement in activities related to 
human trafficking in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.”28
The commission of  Human Rights violations by PMSC employees against civilian 
women does not deserve a radically different approach than the one that is made if  we 
are talking about regular armed forces, insurgent groups or peacekeepers. 
The particular feature about PMSC is the lack of  political commitment and the pres-
sure of  lobbyist groups not to address the issue of  accountability properly.29
The reasons for this shy dialogue between International Human Rights Law or Inter-
national Humanitarian Law and PMSC are due to the lack of  clarity of  the legal frame-
work that guides the activities of  the latter on the field and in the context of  conflict. 
This is not the same as to say that PMSC are not bound by Human Rights or Humani-
tarian Law; what it means is that in the decade that is now gone after the boom of  this 
industry, PMSC still have no biding regulation that create for them the same kind of  reins 
that, for instance, armed forces have.30
27 The problem with GBV and peacekeepers is not the topic of  the present paper, and it will be dealt in 
depth in another intervention of  the conference. However, it must be referred that it has been studied and 
researched comprehensively. A vast literature can be found on the topic.
28 Excerpt from the report, available on http://www.contractormisconduct.org/ass/contractors/59/cas-
es/688/768/veritas-capital-dyncorp-in-bosnia_dod-ig-report.pdf. 
29 Also C. de la Vega and A. Beck (2006). The Role of  Military Demand…, pp. 12-13. Another author sharing the 
same perspective on the subject is A. F. Vrdoljak (2011). Women and Private Military and Security Companies in 
War by Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian Law and Private Contractors. Edited by Francesco Francioni and 
Natalino Ronzitti, Oxford University Press, pp. 280-298.
30 The fact that armed forces have strict rules of  engagement and are subject to International Humanitarian 
Law does not hinder the commission of  gross Human Rights violations, known to the general public and 
to the experts.
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As Gumedze perfectly summed up, regarding the necessity for special measures 
within the military industry for sexual exploitation and abuse, “(…) before the problem 
of  sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of  women and children is addressed, there is a 
need to understand the dynamics of  the private security/military industry (…).”31
Data have shown that women and children experience high levels of  physical and 
mental violence during armed conflicts, and it is a given that they compose the higher 
mortality rate amongst civilians.32 It is also a given that, if  civilians are the highest number 
of  casualties in an armed conflict, among these, women and children also take the top. 
This has not been changed by the appearance of  PMSC on the battlefield. If  some-
thing has changed, it was for worse. Civilian casualties caused by actions from PMSC 
have been well documented and spread on the news.
Scholars are still debating whether and how PMSC and contractors fall under IHL.33 
However, while there is not a legal framework specifically designed for PMSC and their 
employees, general rules apply to them regarding protection of  women’s rights and com-
pliance with rules of  International Humanitarian Law (IHL). 
Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)34 called upon “all parties to armed conflict 
to fully respect international law applicable to rights and protection of  women and girls, 
especially as civilians, in particular the obligations applicable to them under the Geneva 
Conventions of  1949 and the Additional Protocols of  1977, the Refugee Convention od 
1951 and the Protocol thereto of  1967, the Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms 
od Discrimination against Women of  1979 and the Optional Protocol thereto of  1999 
and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of  the Child of  1989 and the two 
relevant Optional Protocols thereto of  25 May 2000, and to bear in mind the relevant 
provisions of  the Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court”35
To sum up this topic, PMSC do not bring a new set of  considerations regarding the 
civilian women as victims in armed conflicts. They suffer the same violations whether 
committed by a member of  regular armed forces or by an employee from a PMSC. Actu-
ally, they often act together when committing those atrocities.
The novelty is the lack of  clarity of  the applicable Law beyond general rules, the 
secrecy surrounding their activities and the non-existence of  the so awaited mechanisms 
of  accountability that would end, once for all, the suspicious of  impunity that is linked 
with the industry.
31 S. Gumedze (2007). Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse: the Need for Special Measures within the Private Se-
curity/Military Industry. Institute for Security Studies. Available at http://www.issafrica.org/pgcontent.
php?UID=14854. 
32 See also A. F. Vrdoljak (2011). Women and Private…, p. 282.
33 For a general discussion see the LL.M Thesis presented to complete the International Legal Sciences thesis 
program from NYU School of  Law, from the author C. Prata (2012). Legal Formalism…
34 Available at http://www.un.org/events/res_1325e.pdf. 
35 SC Res. 1325 (2000). para. 9. For a detailed description of  the several provisions on the mentioned treaties, 
please see A. F. Vrdoljak (2011). Women and Private…, pp. 288-290.
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PMSC and Female Employees
The considerations to draw on the present topic relate to the dynamics between 
PMSC and the women they hire, or not. 
It would be dishonest to say that the discourse and the mental images one has when 
talking about PMSC are gender neutral. The military universe continues to have a strong 
masculine aura, which grounds strongly the macho subcultures within, including the pri-
vate military industry.36
Macho subcultures are found in the military. It is almost a necessary conclusion to 
draw to say that that same environment is reproduced in PMSC. Not only because their 
employees are in its majority former male armed forces members, but also because these 
companies do not distinguish themselves, in human relations, from the regular armed 
forces. The scenario is the same; the functions are the same; the uniforms; weaponry, 
in sum, the experience of  being a PMSC employee resembles too much to that of  be-
ing a member of  the armed forces. Other thing in common is that they do not provide 
a friendly environment for women. One study showed that men test their masculinity 
against each other, and one of  the methods is to objectify, to sexualize or to diminish 
women. Usually, men make considerations of  this nature relating to the women close to 
the other man’s circle: his wife, mother, sister.37 When these men have females as col-
leagues the masculinity test turns to them. Then, it takes form of  sexual harassment. 
Despite the obvious effects of  sexual harassment within a team of  workers that usually 
have to spend 24/7 together, a study has shown that high incidence of  sexual harassment 
strongly affects combat readiness and leadership.38 As accountability is concerned, the 
conclusion to draw is the same as the aspects related to PMSC: absence of  accountability 
and high levels of  impunity, which lead to lack of  credibility to the public opinion.
This remains as true as the problems it brings. Data show that gender-based vio-
lence happens also between co-workers from the same PMSC. The US Department 
of  Defense (DoD) opened an inquiry at request of  the Congress to evaluate how the 
DoD was processing the complaints of  sexual assault involving DoD contractors. This 
came in sequence of  the complaint from a former contractor female employee. In 
2005, a former Kellogg, Brown, and Root Services, Inc. (KBR) contractor employee 
alleged that she was sexually assaulted by other KBR employees while working on a 
contract at Camp Hope, Baghdad. Subsequently, the former KBR employee filed a 
complaint arguing that KBR had improperly managed the company’s investigation into 
the sexual assault allegations.39 
36 On the topic of  PMSC masculinities, see the working paper by P. Higate (2012). Aversions to Masculine Excess 
in the Private Military and Security Company and their Effects: Don’t Be a “Billy Big Bollocks” and beware the “Ninja!”. 
Working Paper No. 08-12 – School of  Sociology, Politics and International Studies – University of  Bristol, 
available at http://www.bristol.ac.uk/spais/research/workingpapers/wpspaisfiles/higate-08-12.pdf. 
37 See also, S. Schulz and C. Yeung (2008). Private Military and Security Companies and Gender. Gender and Security 
Sector Reform Toolkit. Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW. Available at http://www.dcaf.ch/
Publications/Private-Military-and-Security-Companies-and-Gender-Tool-10 (henceforth Toolkit), p. 4.
38 Idem.
39 See US Department of  Defense (DoD), Office of  Inspector General (2010) Efforts to prevent sexual assault/
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The plaintiff  claimed that she encountered a sexually-charged, alcohol-fuelled at-
mosphere. Moreover, women were consistently demeaned and solicited for sex, despite 
the reports of  harassment to their superiors.40 In the declarations the plaintiff  made, one 
can read, “This attack never would have occurred but for the ‘boys will be boys’ attitude 
that permeated the environment that the defendants first created, then failed to warn (the 
women) about – an environment that was excused, if  not encouraged, and of  which the 
defendants had ample prior notice.”41
The problems with women working to PMSC are not only related to improper sexual 
conduct. Gender trends in this sector follow the ones in general labor market. The value 
that skilled women could have to the success of  PMSC mandates is dangerously under-
mined. Women usually enter to PMSC with uneven status as men, and they often are 
relegated to secondary functions, viewed as suitable for their gender.
Altogether, these trends decrease effectiveness and increases friction both within the 
company and in the operating environment. To reduce gender discrimination and harass-
ment would reduce existing macho occupational cultures. This would make employment 
in the private military industry more appealing to women, thus bringing benefits for both 
parties: the company itself  and the community where they operate in.42
Gender Perspective on the Attempts of  Regulation of  PMSC
It is important to understand how gender is perceived in PMSC to address the at-
tempts to regulate the industry. At a first glance, the perspectives are not encouraging. 
Gender is absent in the most important initiatives so far, at a regulative level, of  PMSC. 
Albeit they are non-legally binding instruments, they are the best proof  of  what States 
and stakeholders are willing to compromise.
These documents are a reflex of  international practice. It is important to include 
them in the present work to demonstrate the trends from practitioners, and how super-
ficially they are dealing with essential questions, like the one in discussion here: gender-
based violence towards civilian women and towards female colleagues. 
The PMSC phenomenon has been a difficult matter to the international community. 
On one hand, the privatization of  military and security affairs is a fact and it is a steadily 
growing reality. On the other hand, the fluid nature of  this industry is such that the stabil-
ity that Law requires does not always give the best feedback.43 
harassment involving DoD contractors during contingency operations, Report No. D-2010-052 (10 April, 2010), p. 1. 
The Report is available at http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports/fy10/10-052.pdf. 
40 See also Schulz, S. and Yeung, C. (2008). Private Military…, p. 13. 
41 Idem.
42 Idem. The solution on how this could work in practice will be dealt in the last part of  the present paper.
43 See also J. Hansen (2011). “Rethinking the Regulation of  Private Military and Security Companies under 
International Humanitarian Law.” Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 35. Avalibale at http://ford-
hamilj.org/articles/rethinking-the-regulation-of-private-military-and-security-companies-under-interna-
tional-humanitarian-law/.
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The Montreux Document
The first international approach is known as the Montreux process, from which re-
sulted the Montreux Document.44 The Montreux Document does not aspire to become hard 
law.45 It is an international effort, under the authoritative umbrella of  ICRC, to remind 
States their obligations once they have taken the decision to put in private hands what is 
considered one of  the distinctive features of  national sovereignty: military affairs.46  
In its two parts – Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices 
relating to PMSC – the gender-based violence or the special problematic of  women in 
armed conflicts are absent, and are referred in very general terms among other sensitive 
issues, like religion and cultural relativism. On legal obligations relating to contracting 
parties, for instance, it is acknowledged simply that these states have an obligation (…) to 
ensure respect for international humanitarian law by PMSC they contract”.47 It is also recognized 
the due diligence obligation to all other states. Once again, this obligation is not specific 
to gender and sexual violence, but in general terms of  IHL.48 As for PMSC and their per-
sonnel is concerned, the obligation to comply with IHL and International Human Rights 
Law is again put in very broad terms. Although one can argue that women are also cov-
ered by these general mention to those branches of  Law, it is not difficult to understand 
why there is a need to deal with women’s right separately, within the framework of  IHL 
and Human Rights. The authors of  the Montreux Document were well aware of  this reality, 
and chose to not go deep into specific international legal obligations.
Only in Part Two – Good practices – references to gender and sexual violence begin to 
be expressed. As an introductory note, Part Two disclaims “good practices are intended, inter alia, 
to assist States to implement their obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law.”49 
In this sense, contracting states, when analyzing the activities of  a PMSC they are planning 
to hire, they must look to past records, both of  the company and its personnel. Moreover, 
contracting states must confirm that the PMSC has no reliably attested record of  involvement in 
serious crimes (including (…) sexual offences (…)).50 The Montreux Document also recommends to 
contracting states to PMSC be sufficiently trained to respect relevant national and interna-
tional law, and could include specific training to prepare personnel for performance under 
the specific contract and in specific environment, such as religious, gender, and cultural issues, 
and respect for the local population.51 Finally, Montreux Document acknowledges as good practice 
to consider how PMSC manages labor issues, like preventing unlawful discrimination employment.52 
The Montreux Document makes identical considerations for territorial states, and the 
criteria they should consider for granting authorization for a PMSC to operate in their 
44 See supra Note 10.
45 Montreux Document, Preface (3) and (4).
46 Montreux Document, Preface (1) and (2).
47 Montreux Document, Part One, A – 3.
48 Montreux Document, Part One, D.
49 Montreux Document, Part Two, Introduction.
50 Montreux Document, Part Two, A – III 6a.. 
51 Montreux Document, Part. Two, A – III 10c..
52 Montreux Document, Part. Two, A – III 1e..
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territory53; and for home states when considering to grant authorization for PMSC to 
operate at all.54
The International Code of  Conduct for Private Security Service Providers
The Montreux process led to the development of  a code of  conduct within the in-
dustry. In 2010, 58 PMSC signed up to the International Code of  Conduct for Private 
Security Service Providers (ICoC)55, a project sponsored by the Swiss government. The 
ICoC derives from the Montreux Document, but it takes upon the “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” framework.56
However, the ICoC is much more detailed on gender and sexual violence. On the 
Preamble, the signatory PMSC declare “The Signatory Companies affirm that they have a respon-
sibility to respect the human rights of, and fulfill humanitarian responsibilities towards, all those affected 
by their business activities, including Personnel, Clients, suppliers, shareholders, and the population of  the 
area in which services are provided. The Signatory Companies also recognize the importance of  respecting 
the various cultures encountered in their work, as well as the individuals they come into contact with as 
a result of  those activities.57 As a General Commitment, signatory PMSC agree not to contract with, 
support or service any government, person, or entity in a manner that would be contrary to United Na-
tions Security Council sanctions. Signatory Companies will not, and will require that their Personnel do 
not, participate in, encourage, or seek to benefit from any national or international crimes including but 
not limited to (…) sexual or gender-based violence, human trafficking, (…).”58
These general considerations take a sharper form in the set of  specific principles 
regarding the conduct of  personnel. It is interesting to notice that the same working envi-
ronment that surrounded the Montereux process and the ICoC drafting led to such different 
taken on the gender-based and sexual violence issues. 
Notwithstanding the silence in the Montreux Document about those issues, the ICoC 
has three sections that deal specifically with gender-based and sexual violence, right be-
low a specific principle on general conduct that provide the commitment to “require 
[themselves and] their Personnel to, treat all persons humanely and with respect for their dignity and 
privacy and will report any breach of  this Code.”59 
53 Montreux Document, Part Two, B – IV 32a. and 35c..
54 Montreux Documento, Part Two, C – IV 60a and 63c..
55 Text available at http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/INTERNATIONAL_CODE_OF_CONDUCT_Fi-
nal_without_Company_Names.pdf.
56 See section 2 of  the Preamble and N. D. White (2012). “Regulatory Initiatives at the International Level” 
in C. Bakker and M. Sossai (eds), Multilevel Regulation of  Military and Security Contractors – The Interplay between 
International, European and Domestic Norms. Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, pp. 13-14. 
57 ICoC, Preamble, section 4.
58 ICoC, General Commitments, section 22. On section 24, signatory PMSC agree on “report, and (…) 
require their personnel to report, known or reasonable suspicion of  the commission of  any of  the acts 
identified in paragraph 22 of  this Code to the client and (…) the competent authorities (…)”.
59 ICoC, Specific principles regarding the conduct of  personnel, General Conduct – section 28.
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In that regard, the ICoC, on its section 3860, makes the statement that they “will not 
benefit from, nor allow their personnel to engage in or benefit from, sexual exploitation (including, for 
these purposes, prostitution) and abuse or gender-based violence or crimes, either within the Company 
or externally, including rape, sexual harassment, or any other form of  sexual abuse or violence. Signa-
tory Companies will, and will require their Personnel to, remain vigilant for all instances of  sexual 
or gender-based violence and, where discovered, report such instances to competent authorities.” This 
was a clear response from the industry to the cases that undermined (even more) the 
credibility of  PMSC in the awakening of  so many scandals, including the one in Bosnia 
with DynCorp.61 
Section 39 on human trafficking is broader but it is designed having in mind women 
and children trafficking, although human trafficking in its whole shall not be disregarded. 
It states that PMSC and their personnel will not engage in trafficking in persons. They 
assume the obligation to remain vigilant for all instances of  trafficking in persons and, where dis-
covered, report such instances to Competent Authorities. It also clarifies that, “[F]or the purposes of  
this Code, human trafficking is the recruitment, harbouring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of  
a person for (1) a commercial sex act induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced 
to perform such an act has not attained 18 years of  age; or (2) labour or services, through the use of  
force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of  subjection to involuntary servitude, debt bondage, or slavery.”62
Lastly, the ICoC has a non-discrimination clause, typical in Human Rights Law 
instruments. The non-discrimination clause is included here but it is turned to inside, 
meaning that it rules how the industry shall act when hiring. It states PMSC and their per-
sonnel will “not discriminate on grounds of  (…) sex, (…) or sexual orientation when hiring Personnel 
and will select Personnel on the basis of  the inherent requirements of  the contract.”63
The UN Draft Convention on PMSC64
The previous attempts for regulation are examples of  soft law, while the project cur-
rently under construction in Human Rights Council represents a classical move to use 
hard law, in this case treaty law, to address the topic.65 
The purpose of  the draft convention “is not the outright banning of  PMSCs but to estab-
lish minimum international standards for States parties to regulate the activities of  PMSCs and their 
personnel”.66 One of  the principles that guide the Draft Convention is that it is “the State 
60 ICoC, Specific principles regarding the conduct of  personnel, Sexual exploitation and abuse or gender-
based violence – section 38.
61 Cfr. supra Part II, I PMSC and civilian women.
62 ICoC, Specific principles regarding the conduct of  personnel, Human Trafficking – section 39.
63 ICoC, Specific principles regarding the conduct of  personnel, Discrimination – section 42.
64 See supra Note 15. 
65 See also N. D. White (2012). “Regulatory Initiatives at the International Level” in C. Bakker and M. Sossai 
(eds). Multilevel Regulation of  Military and Security Contractors – The Interplay between International, European and 
Domestic Norms. Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, p. 16.
66 See para. 39 of  the Report of  the Working Group on the use of  mercenaries as a means of  violating 
human rights and impeding the exercise of  the right of  peoples to self-determination, Resolution A/
HRC/15/25, 2 July 2010 (supra Note 64).
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party’s obligation to prohibit PMSCs from directly participating in hostilities (…)”67. However, the 
outcome molded in the Draft Convention can be anecdotally summarized as “the denial 
of  reality” both of  the political and economic dynamics that are at stake, and of  what 
PMSC are actually doing.68
Two of  the biggest concerns for the drafters of  the convention were the erosion 
of  the monopoly of  force by States and the lack of  accountability for violations of  hu-
man rights and international humanitarian law.69 The answer they provided was, on the 
former, to prohibit that certain activities could be contracted to PMSC, using the concept 
of  “inherently governmental functions”.70 Regarding the latter, they focused on national-
based regulatory model, accompanied with an international oversight mechanism, similar 
to the ones existing in the UN Human Rights Law treaty-based bodies.71
This promising beginning to a UN draft convention on PMSC soon gave space to 
disappointment. In the entire text of  the draft convention there is not even the word 
gender or the expressions gender-based violence, sexual violence or others related to the topic. It 
is not surprising that there is no reference to conduct of  PMSC towards their employees, 
once the scope of  application are states and not PMSC themselves.
In fact, para. 14 of  the Preamble emphasizes “the responsibility to protect all persons af-
fected by the activities of  PMSCs, whether civilians or military personnel, including the employees of  these 
companies, from abuses of  their human rights by the actions or omissions of  non-State actors including 
PMSCs”. As it was interpreted for the Montreux Document, one can draw a whole frame-
work of  legal protection for women, once they are human beings and Women’s Rights 
Law is a specialized branch of  Human Rights Law.72
On the following paragraph, the draft convention includes trafficking in persons as one 
example of  violations of  IHL and Human Rights, that if  committed by the personnel of  
PMSC, there is an obligation to provide the victim’s right to a comprehensive and effec-
tive remedy in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Gross Violations of  International Human 
Rights Law and Serious Violations of  International Humanitarian Law.73
Also, in the dispositive part of  the Draft Convention, the Part II – General Princi-
ples, article 7 (Respect and protection of  international human rights and humanitarian 
67 Para. 53 of  the Report of  the Working Group.
68 Other authors are critical of  the Draft Convention. See, for instance, N. D. White (2012). “Regulatory Ini-
tiatives…”, pp. 17-20; from the same author (2011). “The Privatisation of  Military and Security Functions 
and Human Rights: Comments on the UN Working Group’s Draft Convention”. Human Rights Law Review, 
n.º 1, pp. 133-151. A more general critic regarding the notion of  “inherently governmental functions” 
can be found on the Report of  the Working Group itself, on para. 82: “A number of  experts and States 
stressed that there is no agreed definition in international law on what constitutes inherently governmental 
functions and considered that defining such functions could prove difficult.”
69 See paragraphs 9, 21 and 22 of  the Draft Convention.
70 See article 1, 1a) and b) of  the Draft Convention.
71 See Part III and Part V of  the Draft Convention.
72 See supra subpart II in the current Part.
73 See Draft Convention, Preamble – Para. 15.
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law) only refers that states have the responsibility to take the measures as may be necessary to 
ensure that PMSCs and their personnel are held accountable in accordance with this Convention and to 
ensure respect for and protection of  international human rights and humanitarian law. In that regard, 
the Convention acknowledges international criminal responsibility of  PMSC, as well as 
state responsibility under the rules of  International Law Commission Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility (DASR).74
The viability of  this draft convention to ever see daylight as a treaty is currently 
compromised, due to lack of  political will to address in a operative manner the big issues 
around PMSC, not to speak the topic in question. It is not that gender-based violence or 
sexual violence are not fundamental to PMSC and their regulation, but until the proper 
legal existence of  this PMSC is fixed in clear terms, it will be fruitless to deal with more 
specific problems.75
The Gender and SSR Toolkit: Private Military and Security 
Companies and Gender76
This is the most comprehensive non-binding document regarding the topic on gen-
der and PMSC.
This tool on PMSC and gender is part of  the Gender and SSR Toolkit is not an initia-
tive to regulate the industry, but it is designed to provide practical information on gender 
issues for practitioners and policy-makers that have the function of  framing it. Given 
this, one can say that it has not pretension to provide any legal guidelines or to propose 
any legal regulation framework. Instead, the aim of  the toolkit is to integrate gender aspects 
into all operations and to explain why gender is important (…) and can be developed and implemented 
in operations involving PSCs and PMCs (…).77 The toolkit addresses the issue on three dif-
ferent perspectives: men and women as contractors within the private security industry; 
men and women as stakeholders in SSR processes; and men and women as victims of  
gender-based violence.78
Regarding regulation of  PMSC, section 5 of  the Toolkit gives a fine overview of  
the achievements and shortfalls of  how gender is being integrated in both national and 
international regulatory initiatives. The conclusion that one must make upon reading this 
section is that it is necessary to draw attention to this type of  toolkits to strengthen with 
a real chance to become binding International Law, the national and international initia-
tives that are currently under the table.
Section 3 explains why gender is important to PMSC, and it gives four reasons: to 
improve effectiveness; to improve staffing procedures and employment standards; to cre-
ate an institutional culture that prevents misconduct and human rights violations; and to 
improve coordination among agencies in peace support operations.
74 Available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_6_2001.pdf. 
75 See supra Note 31.
76 See supra Note 37.
77 See Toolkit, 1. Introduction, p. 1.
78 Idem.
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Regarding the first reason, to integrate gender, PMSC could benefit because men and 
women have different experiences, needs and understandings.79 To have and to provide 
gender training would adjust them to the host community, and would prevent the growth 
and/or to diminish the macho subcultures.80 The Toolkit also presents the benefits of  
recruiting women into PMSC, focusing on the better utilization of  resources when en-
gaging with local host communities. Scholars are starting to look more into the issues of  
gender and security in the private industry share this view.81
The second reason was discussed infra regarding the relationship between PMSC 
and their female employees.82 A non-discriminatory working environment, with no 
sexual-charge leading daily routines of  employees can only contribute to a better provi-
sion of  service from employees to the company and to the company to the entity that 
contracted it.
The Toolkit stresses the fact that every time a PMSC is involved in human rights 
violations, it loses credibility. The third reason is closely connected to what was said 
about PMSC and civilian women.83 The cases that have been to public have not led to any 
substantive consequence, punitive enough to make the industry and policy/law-makers 
to address the issue as it deserves.84 The Toolkit concludes, in this regard, that to have 
“operators involved in sexual assault, abuse or the exploitation of  local women” not only consists in 
human rights violations, but it also increases “security risks for their clients and for themselves.”85 
Finally, the fourth reason relates to a better coordination between agencies in the 
SSR. Although all the actors agree that good cooperation leads to greater achievements, 
it is known how difficult this is to put in practice. A good networking basis, grounded 
on gender training, and clarification on to whom to report gender-violence instances can 
improve the ultimate success of  an operation.
Conclusion
As it was shown throughout the present paper, it is patent that international com-
munity and national institutions feel the urging need to clarify what legal framework is 
applicable to PMSC. The scandals surrounding the industry, the trace of  impunity that 
has come with it, and the lack of  effective responses, due to the lack of  regulation cover-
ing PMSC, have justified the timid initiatives.
Particularly regarding women and PMSC, scholars have recently started to research 
on the subject, and to present concrete solutions. Putting everything altogether, there are 
79 See Toolkit, 3. Why is gender important to PMSCs?, p. 3.
80 See also, J. R. Bennett (2009). The Softer Side of  Security. ISN, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich, 
Switzerland. Available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Security-Watch/Articles/Detail/ ?ots591=4888caa0-
b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4&lng=en&id=102726. 
81 See, for instance, A. Reeves (2012). “Gender and Private Military and Security Companies”. Journal of  
International Peace Operations nº4. Available http://web.peaceops.com/archives/1887. 
82 Vide Part II, II and Notes 37 and 38.
83 Vide Part II, I.
84 See also Toolkit, 3. Why is gender important to PMSCs?, p. 5.
85 Idem.
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four areas requiring urgent action: vetting personnel, education and ongoing training of  
personnel, reporting, and investigation and accountability.86 87
It is of  the most importance that gender issues are included in contractual obliga-
tions and quality control processes. This is especially relevant to contracting states, when 
they assess if  a determined PMSC is suitable to contract. 
To recruit more women, at the same time that internal policies on sexual harassment 
and abuse are implemented is another angle fro which international community should 
tackle the issue of  gender and PMSC.
Perhaps, the aspect that connects all the particular measures that can be taken is 
training on gender and gender-based violence. This has to focus not only in respect to 
civilian women, but also, and importantly, to female contractors working for PMSC.
Finally, gender must be present in all regulation initiatives, both national and inter-
national. There is room to grow and know-how to grow well, making possible to achieve 
a private military industry that understands the value and importance of  gender in its 
operations. 
Along with inserting gender perspective into regulation, efficient mechanisms to 
investigate, prosecute and decide on gender-based violence violations must exist and 
work properly. The better acceptance of  PMSC depends greatly on how efficient are the 
accountability mechanisms.
In sum, the time has come to allow gender to enter PMSC universe through the 
front door.
86 See A. F. Vrdoljak (2011). Women and…, pp. 295-296.
87 See also Toolkit, 4. How can gender be integrated into PMSCs?, pp. 6-10.
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Gender, Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration and Violent Masculinities
Irma Specht 
Is an anthropologist with a broad experience in transitions from war to peace and a proven expertise 
in Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Processes, especially in Africa. She is currently 
the Director of  the Transition International and has seven years of  field and headquarters experience 
at the ILO Crisis Response and Reconstruction Program. She has a broad understanding of  key 
transition elements such as vocational and business training, labour market analyses, small business 
set-up, private sector development, capacity building and training, context analyses, program design 
and monitoring. In 2004 she published a book called “Young Soldiers, Why They Choose to Fight”.1
Introduction
This chapter explores how gender roles change during and after conflict, with partic-
ular attention to the importance of  masculine and feminine identities and how these can 
change in conflict contexts, as well as the influence of  DDR on changing or cementing 
these identities. This exploration of  changing gender roles in conflict and post-conflict 
settings is crucial for helping us to understand the prevalence of  Gender Based Violence 
(GBV) in much conflict but also post-conflict societies. This chapter is analysing the fol-
lowing ideas, namely that: (1) the level of  engagement of  women in conflict is linked to 
pre-war gender roles; (2) that in some circumstances conflict can actually create oppor-
tunities for women’s empowerment but that this creates additional challenges in gender 
dynamics; and (3) that the identity loss experienced by demobilized men is a crucial factor 
in explaining the prevalence of  GBV after Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegra-
tion programmes. Whilst it is inevitably difficult to make conclusions about global trends, 
this chapter uses a range of  pertinent case study examples, from Liberia to Afghanistan, 
to analyse and illustrate these concepts. 
Gender and Conflict
Within the development discourse the concept of  gender has multiple definitions 
and understandings. Two key definitions used by the international community are de-
scribed below:
The Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (ID-
DRS) of  the UN refers to gender as socially constructed norms around roles, behaviours and at-
tributes associated with being male and female and the relationships between women, men, girls and boys 
1 Special thanks go to Isabelle Ploumen, John Bosco Mubiru and Anna Tomson for their contributions. 
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as well as within same-sex groups (IDDRS 2006). The UN further reports that the attributes, 
opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and learned through socialization 
processes and that they are context/time-specific and changeable. Gender determines 
what is expected, allowed and valued in a woman or in a man in a given context (UNDP 
& UN Women 2011: 7).
PeaceWomen add the issue of  power relations between the sexes: The political, social and cultural 
significance attached to biological differences between men and women, boys and girls. A focus on gender 
not only reveals information about women and men’s different experiences, it also sheds light on in-
grained assumptions and stereotypes about men and women, the values and qualities associated with each, 
and the ways in which power relationships can change (http://www.peacewomen.org/pages/
about-1325/key-gender-terms, 2.01.2013).
Based on the above definitions, the term gender used in this chapter refers to the 
social, economic and political relationships, identities and values attributed to men and 
women in any given society. In addition to an understanding the term gender, it is also 
helpful to introduce the terms masculinity and femininity at this juncture. The term mascu-
linity refers to the socially constructed roles for man, specifically ideals about how men 
should or are expected to behave in a given setting.  Similarly, femininity refers to (ex-
pected) female gender identities, roles and behaviour.  
Gender roles vary greatly within, and between, cultures and are dynamic and flexible, 
particularly when the social fabric is under high pressure, such as in conflict situations. Mas-
culinities and femininities and the relations between the two therefore change over time. 
In conflict and post-conflict contexts, gender dynamics and roles undergo substantial 
change. A number of  issues can contribute to these changes in gender dynamics, including: 
women being directly involved in armed conflict, absence of  men in the household, impact 
of  men who leave and later return to the community, men’s extensive involvement in vio-
lence, increase in economic activities by women, increase in female-headed households, etc. 
Men and women undertake different roles and responsibilities in conflict and consequently 
armed conflict impacts men and women differently which, highlights the need for gender-
responsive and conflict sensitive programming.  In this chapter, the changes in masculinities 
and femininities during and after conflict will be further explored.
Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)
The United Nations (2006:6) defines the concept of  Disarmament Demobilisation 
and Reintegration as “A process that contributes to security and stability in a post-con-
flict recovery context by removing weapons from the hands of  combatants, taking the 
combatants out of  military structures and helping them to reintegrate socially and eco-
nomically into society by finding civilian livelihoods”. The UN (2006: 4-5) explains that 
reintegration is essentially a socio-economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place at 
community level. It forms part of  a wider process of  development and security provision which is a nation-
al responsibility, and often necessities sustained external assistance. DDR has increasingly become 
a normative element of  post-conflict statebuilding processes since the mid 1980s (Lamb, 
2008 and Nezam and Marc, 2009: 1), report that over the last twenty years, there have 
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been DDR programs in more than 30 countries, of  which two-thirds have been in Africa.
It is widely assumed within the international community that males present the pri-
mary threat to post-conflict security and that they therefore should be main focus of  
DDR programmes. However, often females are also likely to have been involved in vio-
lence, and may have participated in every aspect of  the conflict, whether in voluntary or 
forced capacities (IAWG 2006:2). The DDR process experienced by men and women can 
have a significant impact on how masculine and feminine identities are (re)constructed. 
Gender-specific needs [and ambitions] must therefore be taken into account in DDR 
programming after conflict has ended (IAWG 2012: 9). 
Gender responsiveness therefore became a priority element of  the design and im-
plementation of  DDR programmes. The UN Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) rec-
ognizes the importance of  gender responsive DDR programming, which is outlined in 
module 5.10 (UNDP & UN Women 2011: 7-8). This includes the disarmament, demo-
bilisation and reintegration of  all armed groups, including female combatants, as well as 
women associated with armed forces and groups (WAAFG). Awareness of  the need to 
improve gender responsiveness of  UN-supported disarmament, demobilization and re-
integration (DDR) programmes has improved dramatically over the past years. However, 
often the growing commitment to address the different vulnerabilities and capacities of  
women and men, girls and boys in DDR programmes is still not met by sufficient levels 
of  knowledge, skills, resources and coordination during planning and implementation. 
The sex and age disaggregated data which DDR programmes have been collecting in 
recent years is often left unanalyzed, or if  analyzed, is often disregarded, particularly 
during the crucial planning and design of  reintegration. Therefore a piecemeal approach 
to gender still prevails. Addressing the specific needs of  WAAFG, female ex-combatants 
and dependents often becomes less relevant, is considered too costly, is added very late in 
the process or is disregarded to reduce cost with the argument that DDR is about reduc-
ing insecurity and that women are less of  a security threat (UNDP, 2011). 
More importantly, insufficient attention is paid to the fact that men and boys may 
also have special needs and ambitions, especially in terms of  transforming their identi-
ties based upon violent masculinities, developed during their roles in the conflict, which 
if  unattended easily results into self-directed violence (suicide, drug and alcohol abuse) 
and interpersonal violence (gender-based violence towards women and girls) (IWAG & 
UNDP, 2011).
Gender Based Violence (GBV)
There are multiple definitions of  Gender-Based Violence (GBV).  Although not exclu-
sive to women and girls, GBV principally affects them across all cultures. Violence may be 
physical, sexual, psychological, economic, or socio-cultural. Categories of  perpetrators may 
include family members, community members, and those acting on behalf  of  or in propor-
tion to the disregard of  cultural, religious, state, or intrastate institutions (Ward 2009).
Men and women experience gender-based violence during conflict and in periods 
of  transition from war to peace, but also during the post-conflict phase. GBV can thus 
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be understood as is a continuum of  violence that varies in form and intensity depending 
on the dynamics of  conflict (Sigsworth, 2008). GBV during conflict and post-conflict 
situations takes many forms including: rape, slavery, forced impregnation/miscarriages, 
female genital mutilation, kidnapping/trafficking, forced nudity, and disease transmission 
(Bott, Morrison and Ellsberg, 2004). Sexual abuse and rape tend to be the most common 
forms of  GBV during conflict. 
Research indicates that conflict worsens existing patterns of  GBV in different ways. 
Firstly in terms of  ‘everyday violence’ (particularly domestic violence) and second the 
escalation of  violence in the context of  masculine and militarized conflict situations, for 
example through the use of  rape as a weapon of  war (El Jack, 2003).The United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) 1820 recognizes that there is a direct relationship between the 
widespread and/or systematic use of  sexual violence as an instrument of  conflict and the 
maintenance of  international peace and security. 
Furthermore, Rachida and Calleigh (2010) report that in recent years there has been a 
strong rise in domestic violence, sex trafficking, and forced prostitution in post-conflict ar-
eas, and that women and girls remain the most vulnerable to such forms of  GBV. The UN 
General Assembly Security Council (2012) reveals that although both The Central African 
Republic and Chad are emerging from conflict following the signing of  peace agreements 
and legislative elections, there are reports of  continued sexual violence against women and 
girls. The primary perpetrators of  violence are civilians, although current and former armed 
groups and continued presence of  armed individuals are also implicated. For example, In 
the Central African Republic, the Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix and road bandits, 
known as “Zaraguinas” or “coupeurs de route”, who operate in the north and east of  the 
country, have been implicated in sexual violence crimes. In the south-east, the abduction of  
women and girls by LRA for use as sex slaves was reported by several victims, often teenage 
girls, who were able to escape, sometimes after years of  captivity. 
The variable causes and manifestations of  GBV in conflict and post-conflict settings 
are explored in more depth later in the chapter.
Gender Roles before Conflict
Accumulated feminist analyses prove that, while male oppression of  women is uni-
versal, there are variations in gender ideologies in different societies (Farr, 2002). Al-
though it is unrealistic to generalise gender roles across all cultures in the world, several 
common trends do emerge. Handrahan argues that ‘women’s disadvantageous location 
within global and local power structures combine to put women at risk, while simulta-
neously providing little room for them to voice their security problems’ in situations 
of  conflict (Farr, 2004: 429). As a general rule women’s unequal relationship to men in 
global, national and local structures is evident in periods of  conflict. 
However, the extent to which women are able to change and influence gender roles 
in conflict contexts varies hugely across the globe. These trends allows us to present the 
following hypothesis; the formation of  pre-conflict gender roles shape the extent to 
which gender roles can change during periods of  conflict. In other words, the more equal 
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gender relations are prior to conflict the more scope there is for a substantial change in 
gender roles during the conflict period. In order to illustrate this hypothesis several case 
studies are explored throughout this chapter. 
In pre-conflict Liberia Specht found that gender roles were largely representative 
of  much of  West Africa in that men were typically heads of  households (Specht 2006). 
However, Liberian women are traditionally given more of  a voice in the social and politi-
cal arenas than in other parts of  Africa, which has resulted in women taking an active 
role in traditional government structures in some parts of  the country. This, combined 
with the influence of  American culture, meant that pre-war gender roles in Liberia were 
significantly more equal than those in many neighbouring countries. The ensuing civil 
war presented an opportunity for women to [further] prove their equality, and in some 
cases gain independence (Fuest, 2009).
On the other hand, in Afghanistan, where space for women to speak out in pub-
lic and demand for change has been extremely limited for several generations, the war 
did provided much more limited opportunities for change in independence or equality. 
Ahmed-Gosh (2003: 1)argues that ‘there is a history over the centuries of  women’s sub-
jugation’ in Afghanistan, particularly exacerbated by the presence of  the Mujahideen and 
the Taliban. Furthermore ‘the issue of  women’s right in Afghanistan has been histori-
cally constrained by the patriarchal of  gender and social relations deeply embedded in 
traditional communities’ (Moghadam 1997: 76). This goes some way to explain why the 
existing gender division became stronger during the most recent conflict, as men actively 
kept women away from the public (conflict) spheres in the name of  protection. So in 
contrast to the opportunities war provided for women in Liberia, conflict in Afghanistan 
went some way to solidify, and even worse, unequal gender relations. 
CASE Afghanistan: ‘Honour and shame’: gender roles in Afghanistan
Whilst the strong patriarchal values of  the Taliban were a significant factor in ce-
menting the subordination of  women during the Afghan civil war, the history of  
unequal gender relations in the country provided the basis for the ongoing division 
of  gender roles in conflict. ‘Public and private spheres have always been demarcated 
by a well entrenched kinship system that is based on honour and prestige vested in 
the women of  the family’ (Ahmed-Gosh, 2008: 4). During conflict Afghan mascu-
linities were manipulated by the continued presence of  violence and repeated subor-
dination of  women through the control of  their bodies (ibid). Traditional concepts 
of  ‘honour’ and ‘shame were intensified by the conflict leading some scholars to 
suggest that bringing honour was increasingly the role of  the man, through his abil-
ity to protect and attack, whilst ‘shame’ became more inherently linked to women 
and their vulnerability to dishonourable activities such as rape and adultery (Enloe, 
2000). Men are able to gain honour by engaging in war, but women would bring 
shame by emulating this perceived ‘masculine’ behaviour. (Ahmad, 1992; Weidman 
2003; Wikan, 1984)
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The contrast between the examples of  Liberia, DRC and Afghanistan suggests the 
important influence that pre-war gender roles can have in creating space for a shift in 
gender relations during conflict. The above cases indicate the importance of  taking pre-
conflict gender roles into account when trying to understand how, and to what extent, 
gender roles may shift during conflict, and what change is maintained as part of  the post-
conflict societal change. 
Gender Roles and Relations during Conflict
The dynamic and high-pressure conditions that conflict creates, can instigate chang-
es to the socio-economic and political make-up of  societies, as communities adapt to 
unusual and difficult circumstances. Shifts in gender roles often happen as a part of  this 
change. The differentiation of  gender roles is a key indication of  the community’s dis-
tribution of  power and means of  social stability, both of  which are often compromised 
during armed conflict. While it’s important to understand each conflict on a case-by-case 
basis, there are some general trends to recognise.
The Construction of Violent Masculinity
A particular feature of  changing gender dynamics is the shift in cultural norms over 
what constitutes masculinity. During conflict the main social feature of  a “good man” is 
his ability to protect, attack, to be violent. Uniforms and guns become features of  hero-
ism and girls and women often actively reconfirm this desired role of  men. 
Research on masculinities during conflict has indicated that men in highly militarized 
environments, such as protracted conflict or insurgency, experience a heightened emphasis 
on their (violent) masculinity. Men are the majority in the armed groups and are expected to 
be able to be violent, especially with possession of  guns. This ‘construction’ of  masculinity 
is evident in the way in which ‘cultures develop gender roles that equate ‘manliness’ with 
toughness under fire’ (Goldstein, 2001: 9). In contexts of  conflict men feel pressure to be-
come violent in order to attack the enemy and protect their community. ‘Being a man’ thus 
becomes inherently linked to violent behaviour; men may be forced to ‘prove’ their mascu-
linity by adopting a violent and aggressive persona. This is what Mazuri (1977: 69) refers to 
as the link between masculinity and martial prowess’. This was for example the case in Li-
beria, where many of  the boys joined armed groups in order to protect the female members 
of  their community from sexual abuse (Specht, 2006: 45). In addition, GTZ (2009: 4) adds 
that in some societies affected by conflict, young men are forced to kill. In these situations 
commanders refuse to accept other models of  masculinity; ridicule non-violent conflict 
resolution or negotiating skills as typically feminine characteristics and uphold militarism as 
the standard for masculinity. In general, during conflict violence and aggression are used as 
ways of  asserting masculinity. Militarised masculinity in Eastern DRC is particularly visible 
as “weapons are used as status symbols and tools to achieve economic and social gains to 
wielding power over unarmed males and females” (Lwambo, 2011: 19). 
The construction of  masculinities in Afghanistan was largely exacerbated by the rise 
of  the Taliban in 1994, which enforced relations between the sexes by law where previ-
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ously they were monitored by tradition and kinship groups (Kandiyoti, 2007). In this 
way men were encouraged to prove their role as protectors by restricting the movement 
of  women, for example it became illegal for women to travel outside the home without 
being accompanied by a male family member (ibid).   It is important to recognise that 
war is inherently gendered (Goldstein, 2011) and that violence prevailing in conflict-torn 
societies affects men in disproportionate numbers. Multiple cultural norms across the 
globe ascribe a ‘warrior’ status to men and a ‘caregiver’ status to women (Basow, 1992). 
It is important to note that not all men appreciate this change in masculinity and 
refuse to participate. One example is the refugees from South Africa during the apart-
heids regime that came to the Netherlands. These young white males refused military 
service which was strongly related to perpetration of  violence, and achieved status of  
political refugees in the Netherlands as refusing to take the required masculine role in the 
white South African society was unaccepted and even resulted in imprisonment.
War Time Feminism
As explained above, during conflict gender roles can change dramatically, both in the 
household but also in the wider social sphere. As previously mentioned, the mobilisation 
of  men into armed groups increases violent masculinities and “deepens the differentia-
tion of  men and women, masculinity and femininity, preparing men to fight and women 
to support them in doing so” (Corey, 2011: 9). However, the impact of  conflict on wom-
en’s roles and position is more complex. In some cases, there can be an expansion of  
women’s freedom. So, whilst the shift in roles often has negative consequences, especially 
in terms of  increased violence against women, the upheaval of  traditional gender rela-
tions can create space for women to gain social, economic and political power. 
Women may also take on more “masculine” roles during the conflict, such as becom-
ing armed combatants. Women in conflict situations often find there that they can only 
gain status through their association with the new prevailing identity of  violence; either 
through militarizing themselves or through forming relationships with men in power. 
Interviews with girls and young women in Liberia, DRC and Nepal all point to the same 
direction: becoming a combatant is the best way to show that you are equal to men. 
Women have been actively involved as fighters in a large number of  conflicts, and 
are part of  fighting forces in 55 countries and in 38 involved in actual conflict including 
in Sri Lanka’s LTTE (one third); El Salvador’s Farabundo Martí National Liberation 
Front (one quarter); Sandinista National Liberation Front in Nicaragua(30%); Eritrean 
People’s Liberation Front (34%); Liberia (38%), East Timor underground resistance 
(more than 50%); Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, South Sudan, DRC and CAR 
(about 25%) and in the latest DDR programme in Nepal 33% were females (Transition 
International, 2010). 
While some girls are forcefully recruited in conflict, many join without physical 
force and for reasons that may or may not be connected to the conflict situation. High-
lighting the complexity of  girls’ experience in the armed forces, Denov explains that in 
Sierra Leone ‘girls were simultaneously victims and perpetrators and continually drifted 
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between committing acts of  violence and being victims of  violence perpetrated by oth-
ers’ (Denov, 2007: 12). The violations committed against women and girls within the 
armed forces include, amongst others: forced recruitment, brutal training, verbal abuse, 
acts of  cruelty, sexual violence, forced marriage and bearing witness to extreme acts of  
violence, intended as public displays of  horror, against other combatants and civilians. 
It appears that many  girls who join fighting forces have previously been victims of  
physical, verbal or psychological harassment and violence. As a way of  coping with such 
abuses, Denov pointed out that girls adopted several strategies not only to ensure their 
own safety (such as owning and using small arms, ‘marriages’ to powerful command-
ers, and the perpetration of  severe acts of  violence), but also to enact both subtle and 
bold forms of  resistance to their situation, such as resistance to sexual violence, forming 
forbidden bonds with other female combatants, refusal to kill during battle and escape 
(Sigsworth, 2008). 
However, it must be highlighted that not all girls and women fighters experience this 
form of  violence. Girls in Nepal expressed that they have been well treated in the Maoist 
party, actually better and with more respect than at home. Within Liberians United for 
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) in Liberia, girls were treated with respect and 
operated in a girls-only unit under the command of  a female commander (Specht, 2006).
CASE Colombia: Joining the FARC due to Domestic Violence 
In Colombia, Specht and Brett found that girls actually joined the rebels in order 
to escape from domestic violence and saw this as a way to gain protection and self-
determination: 
“No, the day that my mom beat me was when, I mean, when I made that decision. […] I joined 
the FARC because I was fed up with my mom…well, my mom had already told me off, and she’d 
told me that she was going to hit me again, and so I thought that she was going to beat me again, 
and so these, these guerillas appeared, to do guard duty, and I met up with them on the corner. I 
talked to one of  them and they said, OK, they would pick me up in a park at eight o’clock that 
night, they told me to pack up a bag with blanket and nothing else, they said that there they would 
give me everything else, and so I went there and they took me with them.” Carolina, Colombia 
(Brett and Specht 2004: 69-70)
When girls join armed groups and gain powerful positions as leaders or higher com-
manders of  the rest of  the combatants, they express violent masculinities similar to those 
of  men. For example, the Centre for Rights and Democracy found that in Sierra Leone 
the ‘wives’ of  rebel RUF commanders were given responsibility as commanders of  small 
boys units. Female combatants also perpetrated acts of  extreme violence and committing 
atrocities (Sigsworth, 2008). 
In addition, in situations where females possess guns, there seems to be a form of  
increased equality between men and women (Specht, 2006). In Liberia, increased gender 
equality between sexes also existed amongst the wives and husbands who had the same 
higher status and rank in the fighting forces. This implies that girls with higher military 
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structure ranks are the more likely have equal relationships with their husbands, which 
may not be the case with non-fighting girls who would generally be in an inferior posi-
tion and passed from one commander to another. 
CASE Liberia: ‘if you are a fighter you can be equal’ – Female Combatants  
in Liberia
In Liberia, girls reported that they took up guns for a number of  reasons that in-
cluded; protecting themselves, revenging against their enemies but also to prove they 
were equal to men. One of  the Liberian girls interviewed said that: “if  you are equal 
as a girl to a boy depends on where you find yourself. If  you are a fighter you can be equal. If  you 
are a non-fighter, you can never be equal. These girls are always less”. 
Most of  the girls received some basic military training, covering maintenance and 
use of  weapons, combat tactics, fitness and drill. The training was intended to 
toughen the girls, and for some involved regular beatings. A smaller proportion of  
girl combatants had to go to the frontline immediately, learning the “job” as they 
went. The girl combatants used different coping strategies to deal with fear given the 
requirement “to be strong”. 
Many female combatants expressed that they wanted to prove that women were as 
strong as men and defy common notions of  femininity in Liberia, which described 
women as peaceful, obedient, fearful and weak people. Many of  them derived a 
certain pride from being part of  an activity that was typically preserved for men, and 
felt driven to prove their equality with men. Several of  them encountered scepticism 
from male comrades: You know, sometimes the remarks they used to make were that men are 
braver than women. And men can even do better than women. So the answer I used to give them 
“what men can do, women can do. In fact, women can even do better than men”. And most of  the 
time when I used to go [to the front] with my girls, we actually used to prove to them that we could 
even do more than men. 
The phrase “women can even do better than men” became one of  the slogans of  
the girls within LURD, as its female members enjoyed some visible successes in their 
struggle to demonstrate gender equality. While girls had initially been instructed to 
stay behind their male comrades when heavy fighting occurred, some girls simply 
broke these rules, earning the respect of  their male comrades. Proving women’s 
toughness was one of  the recurrent themes in interviews with girl combatants, moti-
vating them to take considerable risks: Sometimes we, the girls, will volunteer. We say yes we 
want to go. Sometimes we forced it, we said we have to go and then we went and slept in the bush. 
Sometimes we went a whole week in the ambush with them, rain beating on us. We were there with 
them, so they began to know that yes women were more than men. (Specht, 2006)
In other circumstances the empowerment of  women may actually be one of  the 
aims of  the conflict. For example in Eritrea women were actively encouraged to join the 
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) to fight for their freedom. 
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CASE Eritrea: Fighting for Women’s Liberation in Eritrea 
In 1991, 30 years of  liberation war for Eritrean independence ended when the EPLF 
defeated the Ethiopian army forces. Female fighters had made up at least 25 to 30 percent 
of  the total forces during the war. Women were first allowed to join the EPLF in 1973 
and were thereafter encouraged to do so throughout the war (Klingebiel et al, 1995). Many 
female fighters joined quite young and without their parents’ permission. According to 
the ideology of  the EPLF, women’s liberation and new alternative roles for women were 
important factors and part of  the overall struggle for a liberated Eritrea (Barth, 2002). This 
ideology of  the EPLF, and the opportunity to expand existing gender roles, could have 
been one of  the most important reasons for the decision of  these young Eritrean women 
and girls to join the movement (Coulter, Persson and Utas, 2008).
These examples illustrate the concept that by joining armed groups women are able to 
prove their strength in a situation of  conflict, where the avenue to achieving social recognition 
is through ability to protect and fight. If  you join as a girl however, you need to prove yourself  
more than the boys, the same as when joining any job that is regarded as a typical men’s job. As a 
female car mechanic you need to prove yourself  all the time, and each small mistake will be ex-
plained using a gender lens. The same seems to be the case in joining armed struggle as a wom-
an. In short, in conflict the main way for women to prove their equality to men is joining armed 
groups and become equally tough, masculine and violent, in other words: war-time feminism.
Conflict as an Opportunity
Conflicts lead to absence, migration and displacement of  men which results in the cre-
ation of, at least temporally, female-headed households. This creates new roles for women 
both inside and outside the household as they assume responsibilities previously undertak-
en by men before conflict. Bouta, Frerks and Hughes (2005) report, that in such situations 
women are forced to acquire new skills and new responsibilities. In the absence of  men 
women become the principle providers of  education, healthcare, income and so on, both in 
homes and in the wider community. Conflict furthermore increases the need for women to 
work outside their homesteads, thereby often enlarging their social networks and exposure.
CASE Uganda: Women’s Increased Mobility and Public Presence in Uganda
The LRA conflict threw the traditional division of  economic roles and market segments into 
disarray. People were forced to flee to camps, others were abducted and some were killed. Fam-
ily survival came to depend heavily on women, as large numbers of  men were caught up in the 
conflict through recruitment in Local Defence Units (militia in Acholi and amuka in Lango), 
by joining the Uganda People’s Defence Forces or being abducted by the LRA. The conflict 
forced women out of  their households to search for other means of  survival, increasing their 
mobility and public presence. The shift in roles has continued into the post-war period which 
witnessed a further expansion of  cash-related activities by women, as circumstances contin-
ued to propel them to the head of  family survival strategies. (International Alert, 2010: 19).
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Changes to the social role of  women can also take place, which can be empowering. 
In many cases, conflict itself  also accentuates resourcefulness in adoption of  coping and 
survival strategies with progressive and empowering gender role changes (Barth, 2002). 
For example, during the Liberian war in the 1990s, women were, in some regions, in less 
danger than men when travelling and able to pass roadblocks more easily. In such cases, 
men stayed home looking after children, while women took responsibility for trading 
over long distances (Specht, 2006).
Although in some examples conflict provided space for the socio-economic em-
powerment of  women through the rise of  female-headed households, the case is quite 
different in Afghanistan:
CASE Afghanistan: Secret Solidarity 
There are approximately 35,000 female-headed households in Afghanistan as 
a result of  the protracted civil conflict. These households are known by the 
derogatory term zanane bee sarparast meaning ‘unprotected women’ and often 
constitute the poorest of  the poor (Povey , 2003). Additionally there is specu-
lation that the rise of  female-headed households is synonymous with a rise in 
sex-workers as women struggle to provide food for their families (Bennet et al, 
2004). This contributes to the negative image of  female-headed households as 
being ‘shameful’. 
However, despite the increased gender inequality of  war-time Afghanistan, 
some women found mechanisms of  resistance and solidarity through the crea-
tion of  secret organisations. One of  the largest of  these is the Women’s Voca-
tional Training Centre which was active during the war. The centre has offered 
women in Kabul courses in English and German as well as computer skills 
courses. Its activists have also created income generating activities making in 
rural areas outside Kabul. Shafiqa Moaber, the director, stated, ‘we had 6000 
students from seven to 35 years of  age. When Taliban came to power, they 
closed down our institution. But we continued our underground activities in 
our homes. Many times we were threatened with imprisonment and torture, but 
we continued.’ (Povey, 2003: 269). This example illustrates a different way in 
which conflict can change gender relations; whilst the opportunities of  women 
in Afghanistan were far smaller than those of  their counterparts in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, the dynamic social pressure that conflict creates can still provide 
space for alternative relationships and roles to form.
As indicated above, conflict situations also often force women to organize them-
selves in solidarity groups in order to safeguard their basic necessities and to carry out 
activities related to education, healthcare, food distribution and care for family. Due to 
the (temporary) absence of  men, women also assume political responsibilities (Bouta and 
Frerks, 2002). This implies that conflict offers windows of  opportunities for women’s 
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emancipation and for the establishment and flourishing of  women’s groups. Women’s or-
ganizations such as in Liberia are known for being at the forefront of  peace movements.
Despite women’s role in campaigning for peace in circumstances like Liberia, the 
percentages of  female participation in formal peace processes worldwide are far from 
equal. UNIFEM (2010) provides evidence that only a small number of  women actually 
participate in formal peace negotiations. In 24 major peace processes since 1998 only 
2.5% of  signatories, 3.2% of  mediators, 5.5% of  witnesses and 7.6% of  negotiators were 
or are women. For example, women were completely absent from the Dayton peace pro-
cess that ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Rehn and Sirleaf, 2002). These re-
sults are therefore questioning if  women’s increase in civic participation during conflict is 
actually leading to more equality in post-conflict political processes.  Female combatants 
are often sent home by their seniors when political negotiations start and generally speak-
ing women in post conflict societies remain at the margins of  political, economic and 
social power; their voices and experiences often diminish  when the peace processes start.
However, different sources seem to indicate that the increasing number of  women 
participating in political leadership in post-conflict African countries is remarkable. In 2010 
Rwanda, South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, Uganda and Burundi were all post-conflict 
African countries ranking in the top 30 countries worldwide with more than 30% of  women 
in their parliaments. It is significant that conflict has increasingly enhanced the legitimacy of  
CASE Liberia: The Liberian ‘Stand-off ’
The Liberian Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET) is widely credited for 
its role in ending Liberia’s civil conflict. In 2003 the warring government of  Liberia 
and rebel Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) party met in 
Ghana to begin peace talks. A delegation of  WIPNET travelled to Ghana to con-
tinue campaigning for peace. 
‘Six weeks into the peace talks, the women had tired of  the slow progress, the intense 
shelling and bombing of  Monrovia and other regions, and news of  approximately 
200 deaths per day. Over 200 Liberian women staged a sit-in at the entrance of  the 
conference hall, locking arms to block the exit of  delegates and demanding that the 
leaders of  warring factions sign the peace agreement to put an end to the hostility. 
During the sit-in, the women also demanded that no Liberian delegate would be al-
lowed to leave the conference room for any reason until the agreement was signed. 
The women said their actions were intended to show to the world that they had 
finally had enough of  the war in Liberia and were taking a stand to safeguard what 
was left of  their society and communities. The standoff  lasted for about two hours, 
during which the Chief  Mediator and other diplomats pleaded with the women to 
disengage. The women agreed on the condition that the peace agreement would be 
signed within two weeks or the women would barricade the hall again. Two weeks 
later the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed, marking the end of  
the Liberian civil war.’ (Gbowee, 2009: 51)
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women in leadership. Women in post-conflict states have increasingly presented themselves 
as political leaders at both national and local levels (Fuest, 2008). Bouta and Frerks (2002) 
stress that women bring diverse conflict experiences; they represent different interest groups 
and set other priorities than men. Their participation in the actual peace talks often fosters 
a wider popular mandate for peace, making it more sustainable, such as in South Sudan. 
The above cases explain the complexity of  the change in gender relations during 
conflict. On one hand female often become victims of  gender based violence during war, 
or are pushed in the domestic fields while men ‘play war’ such as in Afghanistan. On the 
other hand the societal changes that conflict creates can provide space for more equal 
gender relations to form, both through the recruitment of  females as combatants, and 
greater socio-economic responsibilities at the household level. 
Woman’s Roles in Instigating Violence
Ideas about women and femininity form an essential part of  the process of  con-
structing a male identity that is deemed appropriate for a warring society (Farr, 2002). 
Even if  they do not enlist as soldiers, women can, and do, participate in conflict through 
supporting and maintaining guerrilla forces. They supply the essentials of  war: informa-
tion, food, clothing and shelter. They nurse soldiers back to health. Mohammed (2003: 
85) writes of  a Somali saying about the role of  women in the times of  conflict: ‘An army 
with women cannot be easily defeated’. 
In addition to the direct role that women can play in supporting armed groups and 
forces also referred to as “violent femininities”, women can also play a part in encour-
aging men to go to war. Barth (2002: 3) argues that ‘women are often as central to the 
roots and perpetuation of  an armed conflict as men’. They praise those who join conflict 
without hesitation and at the same time they also ridicule, nag and abuse those who are 
reluctant to fight. During conflict, women have the power to initiate and give moral sup-
port to their husbands, fathers, sons and brothers for example through singing songs to 
CASE South Sudan: Political Freedom in South Sudan
The coming together in Juba of  diverse population groups with different life ex-
periences has meant, in the words of  one woman, that there is now greater ‘social 
freedom’ and acceptance of  differences in traditions and cultural norms, and greater 
opportunities for learning from each other.
Women’s greater economic role was pointed out by both men and women as a 
positive development, and an example of  the attitudinal change in society as a result 
of  urbanisation and people’s experiences during displacement. Since Juba became 
the capital of  South Sudan, women are playing a much more visible role in poli-
tics, and international actors have actively promoted the participation of  women in 
government. Some women who previously were very active within the SPLM/A or 
civil society groups hold ministerial posts, and campaign and work within the town. 
(Martin, 2010: 4)
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give courage to men (De Pauw, 2000). It is therefore important to take into account when 
planning DDR programmes that woman can also contribute to on-going insecurity.
Rape Camps and Brave Fighters: Gender Based Violence during Conflict
Gender based violence has increasingly become a key element of  ‘new wars’ (Kaldor, 
2007) in the last half  century. GBV during conflict is present both as a tactic and a re-
sponse to violence. Whilst GBV comes in multiple forms during conflict, rape is one of  
the most prevalent and damaging examples. 
In the analysis of  recent conflicts, rape is commonly described as a weapon of  war. 
Card (1996) argues that using rape as a weapon is a form of  terrorism which has two 
targets- first the victim or ‘sacrificial target’ who is raped (usually a civilian), and second 
the wider enemy community that the victim belongs to. Whilst women are generally the 
primary target, rape can also be seen as an attack on masculinity as men are unable to 
protect their wives/sisters/daughters. Dolan (2002: 12) refers to this as ‘a direct attack 
on the most fundamental basis of  adult masculine identity’ whilst Baaz and Stern (2009: 
500) argue that mass rape can be ‘an effective means to humiliate (feminize) enemy men 
by sullying “his” women, nation and homeland’. Furthermore rape can be employed as a 
tool for broader forms of  violence such as ethnic cleansing. The ‘rape camps’ established 
by Serbian forces in the Bosnia and Herzegovina conflict are described as a deliber-
ate weapon of  war to fulfil the policy of  ethnic cleansing through forced impregnation 
(Diken and Laustsen, 2005). 
CASE Karamoja: Cattle Raiding and Women in Uganda
The role of  women in instigating violence in Karamoja, Uganda, was highlighted 
at the ACTED conference as an under-researched area (Knaute and Kagan, 2008). 
Dolan and Okello (2007) raise the issue of  women as unseen instigators of  vio-
lence, who apply pressure on men to prove their manliness by going on raids. The 
inability of  most men to meet this expectation is seen as a source of  ‘psycho-social 
problems’ which can manifest themselves in domestic violence and substance abuse 
(Powel, 2010). 
Jabs (2007: 1498), believes that cultural gender norms now perpetuate conflict and 
are ‘leading to increased intractability’ in Uganda. In 2007, she reported the current 
bride price to be between 60 and 100 heads of  cattle, an amount which, according 
to focus groups, is difficult to obtain without raiding (Powel, 2010). In 2002, Halder-
man et al estimated the figure at 50–200 heads of  cattle, up from around 25 heads 
of  cattle during the previous generation (Powel, 2002: 42), although they had trouble 
explaining why this inflation has taken place. Furthermore, marriage must be ratified 
by cows or there is a risk of  a woman leaving for another man of  higher status and 
cattle wealth. The increased pressure to meet this elevated bride price is an instigat-
ing factor in the prevalence of  cattle raiding.
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Issues of  violent masculinities are often heavily interlinked with the presence of  GBV 
in conflict, particularly rape. The masculine heterosexuality of  ‘brave fighters’ necessitates 
regular sexual relief  to prevent soldiers from being ‘distracted’ by their sexual urges (Baaz 
and Stern, 2009). Furthermore rape can be viewed as an inherent expression of  masculine 
dominance over women. However, women are not the exclusive victims of  rape. Sivaku-
maran (2007) argues that male sexualised violence during conflict is also extremely impor-
tant in understanding the construction, and deconstruction, of  violent masculinities. Male 
rape, forced nudity and masturbation, and genital violence including sterilisation are all 
forms of  GBV towards men which can occur during conflict. Similarly to GBV towards 
women, often sexual and gender based violence towards men is about power and domi-
nance (Jones 2006, Sivakumaran, 2007). GBV therefore becomes a means to reinforce the 
masculinity of  the perpetrator whilst simultaneously emasculating the victim. 
Conflict can also lead to an increase in prostitution and sex trafficking as women in 
single-headed households are unable to support themselves so are forced into survival sex, 
making them increasingly vulnerable to sexualised violence (Mukwege and Nangini, 2009). 
Furthermore, numerous reports have also shown that internally displaced people (IDPs) 
and refugees fleeing a conflict area, especially women and children, are more vulnerable to 
violence, both by members of  armed forces and by civilian populations (UN, 1998). GBV 
acts, such as rape, can occur at every stage of  the refugee cycle, not only during conflict, 
but also in refugee camps and during reintegration process. Internally displaced women 
face additional dangers as they are often invisible to the international community within 
the context of  violent conflict. Violence against women by an intimate partner or husband 
is reportedly common in refugee and internally displaced camps. In these settings, many 
CASE DRC: The Rape Capital of the World
The Democratic Republic of  Congo has repeatedly been described as ‘the rape 
capital of  the world’. During the civil conflict rape was so common that some report 
that it became a ‘normalised’ form of  violence (Baaz and Stern, 2009). The violence 
particularly in the east of  the country is ‘exemplary of  the use of  rape not only to 
terrorise, displace and demoralise, but also to deliberately incur severe sexual trau-
ma’ (Mukwege and Nangini, 2009). Extraordinary high levels of  extremely violent 
rape coupled have characterised a significant part of  the conflict in DRC. In a study 
of  rape survivors in Eastern Kivu Mukwege & Nangini found that ‘72% of  women 
reported that they were tortured during the rape itself  (beaten, wounded with machetes, genitally 
mutilated/burned by drops of  plastic melted by flame), and 12.4% had had objects inserted into 
their vaginas (sticks, bottles, green bananas, pestles coated in chili pepper, rifle barrels); some wom-
en, after being raped, were killed by shots fired into their vaginas. Many women interviewed also 
believed that the rapes were aimed at destroying women’s identity by means of  “ethnic cleansing,” 
and that spreading HIV/AIDS and impregnating women are also deliberate acts’ (Mukwege 
and Nangini, 2009: 2). 
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women also face the threat of  violence when they engage in basic survival daily tasks such 
as fetching water or gathering firewood. 
According to Sigsworth (2008: 22) and Women War Peace (2012), specific challenges 
faced by female displaced persons include increased vulnerability to human rights abuses 
including sexual harassment, and severe sex discrimination, among which are reasons many 
women and girls flee their homes in the first place. Abducted women and girls are often 
forced to serve as sex slaves, porters or soldiers in enemy militias and are therefore seen as 
accomplices and rejected by the community once the conflict is resolved.
In addition, many conflict settings lack legal frameworks, and/or safe and effective 
reporting mechanism for GBV. “Reporting wartime abuses was often frowned upon and 
risked bringing shame to households or communities” (Bangura and Specht, 2012: 55).
Gender Roles after War
We have seen the different ways in which gender dynamics change during conflict. 
These relations change again after conflict and its dynamics need to be taken seriously 
throughout the conflict transformation period. Women’s participation in conflict-related 
work can be overlooked because stereotypical notions of  gender-appropriate labour, and 
are often re-mobilized after conflict when a society strives to return to “normal”. However, 
an exploration of  the extent to which there is a lasting shift in the role of  women, building 
on changes triggered by conflict shows a complexity of  factors. 
During the War I Was a Man: Identity Loss after Demobilisation
If  conflict cements traditional gender roles of  men being warriors, then disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration goes some way to deconstruct them, particularly in terms 
of  their feelings of  masculinity. Men can thus lose their identity as ‘fighter’ or protector 
once the conflict ends. The importance of  a violent masculinity, which was valued and 
encouraged during the war, is no longer relevant once open conflict begins to subside and 
peace and reconciliation begin to be promoted. 
Feelings of  emasculation can further be intensified for men whose families have been 
negatively affected by conflict. The prevalence of  rape, death and injury of  family members 
during conflict stresses the failure of  men to exert their role of  protector. In addition the 
harsh living conditions faced by male soldiers make it difficult for them to fulfil their role 
as the ‘provider’ in the family sphere, thus further emasculating them both during conflict, 
when they are fighting, and when the conflict ends (Baaz and Stern, 2009).
Furthermore armed groups that return home defeated face an additional loss 
of  masculine identity as ‘defeat in war is seen as inherently feminizing’ (Jones, 2006: 
454). Combatants who are perceived to have ‘lost’ face social stigma for failing to 
uphold the ‘brave fighter’ identity constructed during conflict. These men have failed 
to both attack and protect the essential characteristics of  a violent masculinity. 
Men may also feel threatened and emasculated by women who took on more “mascu-
line” roles during the conflict, such as those that participated in the armed conflict groups. 
This tension over loss of  status can lead to an increase in violence against women as men 
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struggle to reassert their previously held power and control. This reassertion may be exac-
erbated by the violent militarized masculinities during the conflict which normalise violence 
and can lead to a higher prevalence of  SGBV (Cockburn, 1999). As gender roles are chal-
lenged and subsequently re-established, the risk of  SGBV heightens in a post-conflict setting 
(Corey, 2011). Furthermore the increasingly central role in the socio-economic sphere that 
women can play during conflict can lead to further feelings of  emasculation among men. 
Specht (2008) reveals that prior to the war in Liberia men were always the principle 
wage earner in the household, but because of  the conflict many became unemployed. After 
the conflict, many men expected their wives to (also) contribute to the family income and 
in several cases forced them to engage in criminal activities such as smuggling, prostitution 
and drug dealing or in badly remunerated work in the informal sector. Bouta and Frerks 
(2002) report that because of  great need for human resources in post-conflict rehabilita-
tion activities, formal employment opportunities for women initially increase, although later 
they often decrease because of  the return of  men and the re-introduction of  traditional 
labour divisions that existed in the pre-conflict period. Adaptation to the “new old life” 
is difficult for many men, as well as for their families who had to survive for a long time 
without their support. The loss of  social status becomes more pressing if  combined with 
trouble to find new jobs after conflict.
Finally the experiences of  conflict can leave lasting psychological damage which may 
mean men find it challenging to shift away from violent masculinities ascribed to them during 
conflict. The lack of  social and practical life skills both limits vocational opportunities and also 
contributes to low self-esteem and inability to manage disputes non-violently (UNDP, 2011).
CASE South Africa: the Challenge of Internalised Violence
Gear (2002), in her study of  on ex-combatants in post-apartheid South Africa, il-
lustrates how one ex-combatant’s attempt to adapt and re-adapt to civilian life in be-
tween periods of  combat contributed to his violence: “These types of  experiences bring 
about a type of  rage – a temper that is so hard to resist. I am sometimes faced with situations and 
have to physically walk away with hands and arms rigid in case I let go and hurt someone. It took 
me three years or so (with help from other mates that have been on the same situation) to cool down 
the aggression and nightmares…..My wife tells me that I get a ‘look’ and she knows that she is 
now dicing with death- that if  she pushes a few more buttons, the consequences may be serious. On 
a few occasions she ended up against the wall with a pistol in her mouth, once on the floor, bleed-
ing. There are no excuses for this type of  behaviour. My wife being an ex-PF has seen this before 
and understood that it wasn’t the loving man that she married but another person. That is why I 
don’t drink in excess…..because of  the possible explosion that lack of  control caused by alcohol 
brings. I cannot risk that I lose control. The blow-out that could occur may be terrible. Hence I 
always must watch my temper, a temper that I never had before army.” (Sigsworth, 2008: 27)
Many ex-combatants never learn how to manage social relationships constructively 
from their parents, community members and educators because they spend a significant 
portion of  their lives with armed forces and groups which can eventually limit their 
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ability for self-expression, increasing the likelihood of  expressing violent anger and frus-
trations, including in the form of  GBV. DDR programmes insufficiently assist men in 
obtaining alternative and constructive masculinities.
Alternative Peace Time Masculinities
As explained above, men tend to prove their masculinity through violent and aggres-
sive behaviour during times of  conflict or protracted armed violence. However, follow-
ing the end of  conflict, violent behaviour is no longer the norm and men can face a loss 
of  identity as they are forced to reconceptualise what it means to be a man. 
CASE Afghanistan: ‘Being a Man’ in Afghanistan 
For at least the last ten years, “being a man” in Afghanistan has been linked to violent 
behaviour and the motivation to protect the honour of  their women. As Afghanistan 
now makes the transition to democracy, Afghan women have been able to exercise a 
greater capacity for participation in the political sphere, an area that is generally consid-
ered to be masculine (Dudink et al, 2004: 4). Furthermore, women’s organisations that 
have moved into Afghanistan have been industriously providing women with increased 
opportunities to participate in the workforce, but have done little by the way of  provid-
ing the same opportunities for men. This has resulted in a great deal of  resentment 
among Afghan men (Abirafeh, 2007: 8-9). Masculinities are threatened under these 
conditions as traditional gender roles begin to shift and men stop being the sole eco-
nomic provider of  the family. One particularly interesting illustration of  how men are 
attempting to challenge this threat to their masculinity is by their efforts to preserve 
their sense of  pride by refusing food assistance despite having concerns about family 
income (Gilani, 2008: v60).
Possession of  employment opportunities provides an alternative to the violent 
masculinities amongst the ex-combatants. UNDP (2011) reports that jobs or liveli-
hoods are not only important as a source of  income, but also represent a source of  
respect, identity and purpose in post-conflict settings. However, in some contexts, ex-
combatants may perceive available jobs and income-generation opportunities as lack-
ing in comparison with the status, prestige and easy access to resources associated 
with being a combatant. For example in Liberia ex-combatants expressed resistance to 
jobs they deemed as ‘unmanly’ or ‘women’s work. UNDP (2011) adds that particularly 
younger men may reject work in ‘traditional’ sectors such as agriculture in favour of  
more ‘modern’ mechanical or technical jobs, even if  market demands are limited and 
they lack necessary skills. They may prefer trades that are perceived to provide quick 
gains. 
In contrast to the above, ex-combatants in other contexts are willing to accept lower 
paid jobs that will provide them dignity, respect and security. Male ex-combatants ex-
pressed a strong desire for jobs that would provide a sustainable alternative to violent or 
criminal activities or to work with private security companies, even if  these jobs were less 
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lucrative (UNDP, 2011). If  ex-combatants are unable to access these forms of  livelihood 
then adopting criminality as an alternative masculine identity is at high risk. 
CASE Colombia: Criminality and Masculinity in Colombia
For over 40 years, Colombia has been affected by continuing cycles of  armed con-
flict and violence involving paramilitary, guerrilla and criminal groups. Following a 
ceasefire in 2002, a total of  53,141 combatants from both guerrilla and paramilitary 
groups (87% men and 13% women) went through the DDR process. However, 
the expansion of  illegal drug cultivation and trade, targeted assassinations of  ex-
combatants, emergency of  a wide spread gang culture, and the circulation of  small 
arms and light weapons have led many ex-combatants to join gangs and emerging 
criminal groups for security, economic and social reasons.  According to a report by 
the office of  the Presidential High Counsellor for Reintegration, 7% of  those de-
mobilized (3,582 ex-combatants, among them 30 women) have re-entered criminal 
activities, and another 1,921 participants in the reintegration process are at high risk 
of  re-entering criminal activities. (UNDP & IAWG, 2012: 56).
Additionally it is important to understand that DDR is not experienced by all men 
in the same way. The UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (2012) reports that 
among young able-bodied males, DDR may lead to a masculinity crisis which in turn 
increases the pervasiveness of  violent behaviour. For example in some cases, young 
ex-combatants may be perceived as a threat to elders or authorities when they return to 
their communities which may lead to their rejection if  reintegration is not supported. 
The youth may perceive that power has been returned to old male elite and thus feel 
excluded from decision making. This is often compounded by a loss of  trust in youth 
from elder members of  the community, who experienced violence and humiliation 
from combatants during the conflict. On the other hand, for elderly and disabled men 
the process may create opportunities to renegotiate their masculinities vis-à-vis the 
existing hegemonic ideal of  manhood.
No Way Back: Crossing the Line of Femininity
Similarly to the experiences of  male combatants who are demobilized, DDR can also 
represent a loss of  identities amongst female ex-combatants. Their newly ascribed status, 
gained through their roles in armed groups, and the degree of  equality and social recog-
nition achieved by their military ranks is often rapidly removed. In processes of  DDR 
it is often women, both combatants and WAAFG, who are first to be demobilized. The 
challenge for women is that they are forced to return to the narrower, more restrictive 
roles as caretakers or mothers (UNDP, 2011: 1). 
In addition, female combatants often experience significant problems with stigma 
during socio-economic reintegration, because they have “crossed the line of  feminin-
ity”; behaviour that might have been appreciated during conflict, but retrospectively is 
often regarded as inappropriate. De Pauw argues that historically women who have been 
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actively involved in armed conflict are categorised as either ‘dykes’ or ‘whores’ (2000: 4), 
both terms with negative connotations. In addition to this stigma, the main challenges 
faced by female ex-combatants include: finding income for themselves and dependents; 
gaining access to and supporting themselves during education; feeling dependent/ loyal 
to former units/ commanders; adjusting to new social status and returning to depend-
ence on male providers; negative perception of  the receiving community and from their 
(potential) employees. 
CASE Liberia: Female Combatants Never Existed
In Liberia ex-combatant girls struggle with roles ascribed to them by society and 
face a society that neither recognizes their past achievements nor leaves women 
space to prove equality to men. The stigma attached to women who have fought 
in the bush can be particularly problematic during reintegration; “Targeting female 
soldiers is a problem when women do not want to be recognized as combatants after 
a war is over because of  stigma attached to this. In Liberia many women wanted to 
hide the fact that they had been soldiers. Such women are hard to find - ‘You can’t 
find them, it is like they never existed’ - and consequently they never received any 
benefits after the war.” (Bennett 1995).
In addition to the stigmatisation of  female ex-combatants, Specht (2006) reports 
that girls may also face the stigma of  being classified as a rape victim which may diminish 
her chance of  getting married or make her feel weak or dependent. In many post-conflict 
societies it may be difficult for a girl who has been raped to find a partner for marriage. 
Rachida and Calleigh (2010) report that over 25% of  married rape victims in Liberia were 
divorced by their husbands following their rape, of  which 15% resulted in unwanted 
pregnancies. Unwanted pregnancies from rapes may lead to further stigmatization by the 
community, as well as economic and emotional consequences for mothers who are un-
able to support their children. 
Jeannie and Moriah (2009) reported that returning mothers in Northern Uganda 
with difficult family situations were forced to look for husbands. However, instead of  
relieving them, these new husbands often compounded their problems. For example, 
Adule, who was abducted for five years by the LRA, explained, “I was mistreated by my aunt 
and so I decided to get a man because I couldn’t bear the conditions. If  I didn’t get married, no one could 
help me or advise me. But then I got married and there is no proper care like I thought. My husband 
allows me to stay with my child from the LRA and gives me some money for feeding, but he doesn’t help 
at all with gardening. He helps his other wife. When I ask him to help, he says that he has never been 
to the bush [with the LRA] so he doesn’t want someone from the bush disturbing him” (Jeannie and 
Moriah 2009: 156). This example suggests that the stigma attached to ex-combatants can 
be debilitating, both socially and economically. 
While DDR programmes become more and more gender responsive in terms of  
addressing specific needs of  women and girls, they are less geared toward women em-
powerment. The recently closedown of  the Nepalese DDR programme presented the 
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following conclusion on the gender responsiveness of  the programme: The programme 
has done an outstanding job in attracting and maintaining a high percentage of  women 
in the programme and providing outstanding gender specific support, but has missed 
opportunities to assist the girls and young women to build on their freedom, knowledge 
and strengths. The programme  did not have a strong transformative gender impact (al-
though some in economic spheres) but the focus has been on RE-integration, assisting 
women to find back their place in the traditional society of  Nepal and less to become 
agents of  change.
Gender Based Violence after Conflict
As previously stated, rates of  domestic violence tend to rise following the end of  
conflict. A reason suggested for this is that as people return to their communities and 
the prevalence of  open violence falls, GBV begins to manifest itself  in the private rather 
than the public sphere. The following three dimensions should be taken into account to 
understand and address this issue:
Firstly, as previously mentioned economic, political and social challenges prevailing 
after conflict can lead men to feel disempowered and emasculated (Page, 2009). Domestic 
violence can therefore constitute a means for men to reaffirm their power over women. 
There are strong indications that the loss of  identity, the frustration and uncertainty of  
men about their undefined new role, results in an increase in domestic violence, including 
Sexual GBV (SGBV). Unemployed, demobilised frustrated and aggressive young men 
and soldiers socialized to violence and brutality during war may form gangs, particularly 
in urban areas and can pose a constant threat to the security of  women and children (Va-
vra, 2005). The multiple forms of  emasculation that the end of  conflict can trigger, for 
example through disarmament, loss of  employment and status, and defeat, can result in 
the formation of  an ‘even more volatile hyper-masculinity’ (Jones, 2006: 454). This new 
expression of  masculinity forms as a response to the deconstruction of  original violent 
masculinities during conflict and is particularly manifested in domestic violence as men 
seek to regain their dominance. Alongside the need to reassert male dominance, Manjoo 
and Mcraith (2011) and ICTJ (2008), relate post-conflict increases in domestic violence 
to the availability of  small arms, an increased tolerance of  violence within society and the 
fact that heads of  households have previously been engaged in military violence. Fur-
thermore research suggests that the ‘presence of  a gun in the home increases the likeli-
hood that domestic violence will result in death’ (Schroeder, Farr and Schnabel, 2005: 6).
Secondly, militarization combined with wide-spread availability of  small weapons in 
communities, is a significant factor in the increased incidence GBV during and at the end 
of  the conflict.  The failure to ensure accountability through investigation, prosecution 
and punishment for these crimes allows sexual violence acts to persist in most post-
conflict societies characterised by a weak security sector. Most perpetrators of  sexual 
violence have not been charged with a criminal offence even when a complaint has been 
registered with the police. Also, in the absence of  rights to confidentiality, victim sup-
port mechanisms and positive examples of  the system being able to resolve such cases, 
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victims are generally reluctant to seek legal remedy. This implies that the breakdown or 
failures of  the justice systems in post-conflict countries can play a part in protracting the 
incidence of  GBV in post-conflict circumstances.
Thirdly, as previously discussed, women’s economic role can increase as a result of  
the absence of  men during conflict. This often gives women space to assume greater sta-
tus and take on roles during and after conflict that were previously undertaken by men in 
the pre-conflict period. This kind of  economic empowerment can result in women tak-
ing a more central role in decision-making within the household. In these circumstances 
women invariably have to bear greater responsibility for their children, elderly relatives 
and often wider community. When conflict ends often women are thus no longer in-
clined to return to their pre-war position in the household. Hamber et al, explain (2006: 
298) that ‘economic security is crucial to women’s re-imaginings of  the concept [of  secu-
rity], because it is regarded as a key factor in ensuring their independence. In post-conflict 
situations, however, women’s empowerment can emasculate men who are used to provid-
ing materially for their families, resulting in increased tension between genders that can 
ignite domestic violence’. According to Hamber et al. (2006), some South African women 
respondents expressed concern that male resentment towards the equality agenda often 
manifests itself  in violence against women. This is especially true for husbands going 
through a self-confidence crisis and not accepting the new assertiveness of  their wives 
and their leadership capacities (Vavra, 2005).
Although often present in different forms, GBV is still a serious issue in post-conflict 
contexts. With the reduction of  open violence, the persistence of  rape and overt forms 
of  GBV tend to reduce whilst more ‘private’ forms of  GBV, such as domestic violence, 
often rise. The changing gender roles and relations that come as a result of  conflict have 
significant impact on the increasing rates of  GBV during and in post-conflict contexts. 
This is triggered by both by the women’s more central economic role as household heads 
which threatens men, and the deconstruction of  violent masculinities of  demobilised 
men. DDR programmes should explicitly work on these two dimensions and also link to 
broader SSR programmes that can work on strengthening legislative and reinforcement 
capacities to stop cultures of  impunity.
Conclusions: Gender DDR and Violent Masculinities
From an exploration of  changing gender roles during and after conflict we can draw 
several conclusions.  Firstly that the ascribed social characteristics of  men and women, 
and specifically what is masculine and feminine, are dynamic and that the conditions of  
conflict create space for gender roles to change substantially. We furthermore saw that 
these the extent to which gender roles shift and the way they change during conflict is 
partially determined by the nature of  pre-war gender relations.
Conflicts create social, economic and political space for girls and women but the extent to 
which these changes create lasting results is not uniform. While in some countries the conflict 
really transformed traditional gender roles, elsewhere these changes where only of  tempo-
rally nature. In some countries gender divisions actually become stricter due to the conflict.
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During conflict men are pressurised by society, both by fellow men and also by 
women, to adopt violent masculinities in order to be effective protectors of  the family, 
community, region, nature or honour.
In a number of  countries the feature of  war-time feminism can be observed where 
women take up arms to prove their equality to men. They proof  that they can be as ef-
fective in protecting, attacking and violent behaviour and thereby gain status in societies 
where violent masculine behaviour is the highest valued identity.
Economic, political and social challenges prevailing after conflict can lead men to 
feel disempowered and emasculated and GBV can therefore constitute a means for men 
to reaffirm their power over women. There are strong indications that the loss of  identity, 
the frustration and uncertainty of  men about their undefined new role after demobilisa-
tion, results in an increase in domestic violence. 
When men are demobilised finding their wives and daughters back in the communi-
ties this creates a sensitive process of  re-balancing and re-determining gender relations. 
Several cases show increased tensions between empowered women and frustrated men 
that come home without a job and loss of  social status. Increase in domestic violence can 
at least partly be ascribed to these tensions. 
The link between DDR and GBV requires more attention in the design and imple-
mentation of  DDR programmes. Gender responsive DDR should go much beyond at-
tracting women into DDR processes and addressing their immediate needs, such as sepa-
rate lodging in demobilisation camps, child care support etc. Programmes should try to 
address issues of  identity loss of  both male and female combatants and should attempt 
to stimulate a transformative impact, building on changed gender roles and dynamics, 
instead of  trying to RE-integrate combatants into their old pre-conflict roles. The ma-
jority of  the combatants worldwide are youth, and DDR programmes should stimulate 
the agency of  these young men and women, who often had the courage to break out of  
traditional roles and where at the forefront of  movements demanding for social change.
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Introduction
“It is now more dangerous to be a woman than a soldier in modern wars.”
Major General Patrick Cammaert, Former Deputy Force Commander, 
MONUC2 
“In no other area is our collective failure to ensure effective protection for civilians more 
apparent – and by its very nature more shameful – than in terms of  the masses of  women 
and girls, but also boys and men, whose lives are destroyed each year by sexual violence 
perpetrated in conflict.”
Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of  the United Nations3
1 The author would like to thank Caroline Roy and Paola Robotti for their help.
2 Quoted in the Background document: Session II (“Sexual Violence against Women and Children in Armed 
Conflict”), Parliamentary Hearing at the United Nations, New York, 20-21 November 2008. Available at 
http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/unga08/s2.pdf  
3 Statement by Ban Ki-moon presenting the Report of  the Secretary-General on the Protection of  Ci-
vilians in Armed Conflict (S/2007/643). Available at  http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/
cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Civilians%20S2007643.pdf. UN SG’s 
Statement available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=24631&Cr=civilians&Cr1=
conflict 
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“We are like snowflakes. One alone will melt, but together, we can stop traffic.” 
Laura Liswood, Secretary-General, Council of  Women World Leaders4
Women are affected in many ways by war, some of  them are very specific to women. 
Their plight does not receive the attention it deserves. The law which protects them is too 
frequently not observed. In many ways, they are “tools of  war”. The level of  protection 
and assistance they receive is all too often inadequate. 
Women have specific instruments and provisions of  international and domestic law to 
protect their rights in time of  armed conflict. A better respect for them is urgently needed.
Women in war are both victims and actors. Even if, in history, women were at times 
playing an active role in combat,5 international humanitarian law deals with women most-
ly as victims. One example is the “Lieber Code” (1863).6 Another more recent example is 
the “Responsibility to Protect” (2001).7 In both cases, the only reference to women is about 
rape. Today, women are increasingly acknowledged as actors of  international humani-
tarian law and action. They were pioneers of  humanitarian action and codification on 
behalf  of  war victims: the women of  Lombardy (Solferino), Clara Barton (founder of  
the American Red Cross), Florence Nightingale, Harriet Beecher Stowe (Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin), Eleanor Roosevelt (one of  the drafters of  the Universal Declaration of  Human 
Rights), Carla Del Ponte (former Prosecutor of  the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Former Yugoslavia - ICTY), Navi Pillay (United Nations High Commissioner for Hu-
man Rights - OHCHR), Valerie Amos (Head of  OCHA), the Directors of  UNICEF, 
UNESCO, as well as Graça Machel,8 Sadako Ogata,9 Gro Brundtland,10 Louise Arbour, 
Jody Williams (1997 Nobel Peace Prize) and also many other women who did play im-
portant roles away from the limelight.11
4 Quoted by Zainab Hawa Bangura, Special Representative of  the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence 
in Conflict, in her Keynote speech on the occasion of  the 30th Anniversary of  the Committee on the 
Elimination of  Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). “Protecting Women from Sexual Violence in 
Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations”, Geneva, Palais des Nations, 18 October 2012. Available at http://
www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/30anniversary/StatementByMs.ZainabHawaBangura.pdf  
5 See the Irène Hermann and Daniel Palmieri (2010). “Between Amazons and Sabines: a historical approach 
to women and war”. International Review of  the Red Cross n.º 877, pp. 19-30.
6 Instructions for the Government of  Armies of  the United States in the Field, prepared by Francis Lieber, 
LL.D., Originally Issued as General Orders nº100, Adjutant General’s Office, 1863. Available at http://
avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp 
7 The Responsibility to Protect: Report of  the International Commission on Intervention and State Sover-
eignty. paragraphs 2.29 and 4.20. Available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org. 
8 Available at www.theelders.org/elders/graca-machel.
9 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (1990-2000), President of  the Japan International Co-
operation Agency (2003-2012) and Chairperson of  the World Economic Forum Japan (2012). Available at 
http://www.weforum.org/news/mme-sadako-ogata-becomes-chairperson-world-economic-forum-japan. 
10 Available at www.theelders.org/gro-brundtland.
11 See the movie The Whistleblower (2010) based on the true story, the experience of  Kathryn Bolkovac, a Lincoln, 
Nebraska police officer who served as a peacekeeping post-war Bosnia and criticized the UN for cover-
ing up a sexual slavery and human-trafficking scandal. See all the International Conventions: International 
IDN CADERNOS 93
Women Protected by a Two-tiered Approach: General and Specific Protection
Women in war are protected by International Humanitarian Law (IHL), also called 
Law of  Armed Conflicts (LOAC), not only by written rules but also by customary rules, 
especially peremptory norms (“jus cogens”) such as Common Art. 3 of  the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions12 and non-derogable human rights.13 These fundamental rules should be 
be the basis for protection war victims against gender-based violence in allsituations of  
armed conflicts. They, as all war victims, could also be protected by Human Rights on 
the regional and universal level14., as well as by Refugee Law on the regional and universal 
level15,, and by domestic law (including Military Manuals and Rules of  Engagement – 
ROE), and, in all civilizations, by religious and traditional values as well as by ethics (mili-
tary, medical), and by the “public conscience” (embodied in the “Martens Clause” since 
the 1899 Hague Regulations).16 Women in War are protected by a two-tiered approach: 
they are protected by general protection for all war victims, women and men, provided 
by the 1949 Geneva Conventions and by both 1977 Additional Protocols.17 Women are 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
1966, International Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Racial Discrimination (ICERD) in 1965, 
International Covenant on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 
1979, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) 
in 1984, Convention on the Rights of  the Child (CRC) in 1989, International Convention on the Protection 
of  the Rights of  All Migrant Workers and Members of  their Families (ICRMW) in 1990, International Con-
vention for the Protection of  All Persons from Enforced Disappearance(CPED) in 2006.
12 See Jelena Pejic (2011). “The Protective Scope of  Common Article 3: More than Meets the Eye”. Interna-
tional Review of  the Red Cross n.º 881. Available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/
review-2011/irrc-881-pejic.htm 
13 See the Geneva Academy on International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights. Rule of  Law in Armed 
Conflicts Project. Available at www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/derogation_from_human_rights_trea-
ties_in_situations_of_emergency.php 
14 International Legal Protection of  Human Rights in Armed Conflicts United Nations Human Rights. New 
York and Geneva, 2011. Available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HR_in_armed_
conflict.pdf  
15 UNHCR Handbook for the Protection of  Women and Girls, and Resolution 1925 SC (2000) Part 12 “Calls 
upon all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of  refugee camps and 
settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of  women and girls, including in their design, and 
recalls its resolutions 1208 (1998) of  19 November 1998 and 1296 (2000) of  19 April 2000”
16 On the Martens Clause, see Theodor Meron (2000). “The Martens Clause, Principles of  Humanity, and 
Dictates of  Public Conscience”. American Journal of  International Law, vol. 94, pp. 78-89. Available at http://
users.polisci.wisc.edu/kinsella/martens%20clause.pdf.  S. Miyazaki (1984). “The Martens Clause and in-
ternational humanitarian law” in Swinarski (ed.), Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and 
Red Cross principles in Honour of  Jean Pictet. Geneva : ICRC, pp. 433-444. R. Ticehurst (1997). “The Martens 
Clause and the Laws of  Armed Conflict”. International Review of  the Red Cross n°317, pp. 125-134. Michel 
Veuthey (2004). “Public Conscience in International Humanitarian Law Today” in Horst Fischer, Ulrike 
Froissart, Wolff  Heintschell von Heinegg (eds), Krisensicherung und Humanitärer Schutz – Crisis Management 
and Humanitarian Protection. Festschrift für Dieter Fleck. Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag pp. 611-642. 
Available at www.droit-international-humanitaire.org/telechargements/pictures/veuthey_public_con-
science_fleck.pdf  
17 1949 Wounded and Sick (GC I), 1949 Shipwrecked (GC II), 1949 Prisoners of  War (GC III), 1949 Civilians 
(GC IV), 1977 AP I & II, all available (texts and commentaries) on the ICRC’s website: www.icrc.org/ihl. 
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also protected by some 40 provisions of  the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 
Additional Protocols: those are specific protections for women. 
Within this specific protection for women, we again have a two-tiered approach: 
• A General Protection for All Women:
 Women enjoy a general protection according to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
Among others, let us mention Article 12, 4 of  both First and Second Conven-
tions: «Women must be treated with all consideration due to their sex.” and Ar-
ticle 27 of  the Fourth Convention: «Women must be especially protected against 
any attack on their honor, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any 
other form of  indecent assault».
• Specific Protection for Certain Women:
 Certain women, such as expectant women, mothers of  children under sev-
en years of  age and women in detention benefit from a special protection.18 
Here are the specific protections for women in the Third Geneva Conven-
tion: «Women shall be treated with all the regard due to their sex and shall in 
all cases benefit by treatment as favourable as that granted to men. (Art. 14, 2). 
Taking into consideration the provisions of  the present Convention relating to 
rank and sex, and subject to any privileged treatment which may be accorded to 
them by reason of  their state of  health, age or professional qualifications, all pris-
oners of  war shall be treated alike by the Detaining Power, without any adverse 
distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief  or political opinions, or any 
other distinction founded on similar criteria (Art. 16).
In any camps in which women prisoners of  war, as well as men, are accommodated, 
separate dormitories shall be provided for them (Art. 25, last paragraph). Prisoners of  war 
shall have for their use, day and night, conveniences which conform to the rules of  hygiene 
and are maintained in a constant state of  cleanliness. In any camps in which women prison-
ers of  war are accommodated, separate conveniences shall be provided for them (Art. 29, 
paragraph 2). A woman prisoner of  war shall not be awarded or sentenced to a punish-
ment more severe, or treated whilst undergoing punishment more severely, than a woman 
member of  the armed forces of  the Detaining Power dealt with for a similar offence (Art. 
88, 2). In no case may a woman prisoner of  war be awarded or sentenced to a punishment 
more severe, or treated whilst undergoing punishment more severely, than a male member 
of  the armed forces of  the Detaining Power dealt with for a similar offence (Art. 88, 3).
Women prisoners of  war undergoing disciplinary punishment shall be confined in 
separate quarters from male prisoners of  war and shall be under the immediate supervi-
sion of  women (Art. 97, paragraph 4).
A woman prisoner of  war on whom such a sentence has been pronounced shall be 
confined in separate quarters and shall be under the supervision of  women. (Art. 108, 
18 See Julie Ashdown and Mel James (2010). “Women in Detention”, International Review of  the Red Cross, 
vol. 92, n.º 877, pp. 123-143. Available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-877-ashdown-
james.pdf  
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paragraph 2) Here are the specific protections for women in the 1949 Fourth Geneva 
Convention: In time of  peace, the High Contracting Parties and, after the outbreak of  
hostilities, the Parties thereto, may establish in their own territory and, if  the need arises, 
in occupied areas, hospital and safety zones and localities so organized as to protect from 
the effects of  war, wounded, sick and aged persons, children under fifteen, expectant 
mothers and mothers of  children under seven (Art. 14).
The wounded and sick, as well as the infirm, and expectant mothers, shall be the 
object of  particular protection and respect (Art. 16). The Parties to the conflict shall en-
deavour to conclude local agreements for the removal from besieged or encircled areas, 
of  wounded, sick, infirm, and aged persons, children and maternity cases, and for the 
passage of  ministers of  all religions, medical personnel and medical equipment on their 
way to such areas (Art. 17).
Persons regularly and solely engaged in the operation and administration of  civilian 
hospitals, including the personnel engaged in the search for, removal and transporting 
of  and caring for wounded and sick civilians, the infirm and maternity cases shall be 
respected and protected (Art. 20, par. 1).
Convoys of  vehicles or hospital trains on land or specially provided vessels on 
sea, conveying wounded and sick civilians, the infirm and maternity cases, shall be 
respected and protected in the same manner as the hospitals provided for in Article 
18, and shall be marked, with the consent of  the State, by the display of  the distinctive 
emblem provided for in Article 38 of  the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of  
the Condition of  the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of  12 August 
1949, Art.22. Aircraft exclusively employed for the removal of  wounded and sick ci-
vilians, the infirm and maternity cases or for the transport of  medical personnel and 
equipment, shall not be attacked, but shall be respected while flying at heights, times 
and on routes specifically agreed upon between all the Parties to the conflict concerned 
(Art. 21).
Each High Contracting Party shall allow the free passage of  all consignments 
of  medical and hospital stores and objects necessary for religious worship intended 
only for civilians of  another High Contracting Party, even if  the latter is its adversary. 
It shall likewise permit the free passage of  all consignments of  essential foodstuffs, 
clothing and tonics intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and ma-
ternity cases (Art. 23). Women shall be especially protected against any attack on 
their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of  inde-
cent assault (Art. 27, 2).
Children under fifteen years, pregnant women and mothers of  children under seven 
years shall benefit by any preferential treatment to the same extent as the nationals of  the 
State concerned (Art. 38, paragraph 5).
The Occupying Power shall not hinder the application of  any preferential measures 
in regard to food, medical care and protection against the effects of  war which may have 
been adopted prior to the occupation in favour of  children under fifteen years, expectant 
mothers, and mothers of  children under seven years (Art. 50, last paragraph). Women 
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shall be confined in separate quarters and shall be under the direct supervision of  women 
(Art. 76, paragraph 4).
Whenever it is necessary, as an exceptional and temporary measure, to accommodate 
women internees who are not members of  a family unit in the same place of  internment 
as men, the provision of  separate sleeping quarters and sanitary conveniences for the use 
of  such women internees shall be obligatory. (Art. 85, last paragraph). Expectant and 
nursing mothers and children under fifteen years of  age, shall be given additional food, 
in proportion to their physiological needs (Art. 89, last paragraph).
Maternity cases and internees suffering from serious diseases, or whose condition 
requires special treatment, a surgical operation or hospital care, must be admitted to any 
institution where adequate treatment can be given and shall receive care not inferior to 
that provided for the general population (Art. 91, paragraph 2).
A woman internee shall not be searched except by a woman. (Art. 97, paragraph 4). 
Women internees undergoing disciplinary punishment shall be confined in separate quar-
ters from male internees and shall be under the immediate supervision of  women (Art. 
124, last paragraph). Sick, wounded or infirm internees and maternity cases shall not be 
transferred if  the journey would be seriously detrimental to them, unless their safety im-
peratively so demands (Art. 127, paragraph 3). The Parties to the conflict shall, moreover, 
endeavour during the course of  hostilities, to conclude agreements for the release, the 
repatriation, the return to places of  residence or the accommodation in a neutral country 
of  certain classes of  internees, in particular children, pregnant women and mothers with 
infants and young children, wounded and sick, and internees who have been detained for 
a long time (Art. 132, paragraph 2).
Here are the specific protections for women in the First 1977 Additional Protocol 
applicable in international armed conflicts:
For the purposes of  this Protocol: a) “wounded” and “sick” mean persons, whether 
military or civilian, who, because of  trauma, disease or other physical or mental disorder or 
disability, are in need of  medical assistance or care and who refrain from any act of  hostility. 
These terms also cover maternity cases, new-born babies and other persons who may be 
in need of  immediate medical assistance or care, such as the infirm or expectant mothers, 
and who refrain from any act of  hostility (Art. 8). This Part, the provisions of  which are 
intended to ameliorate the condition of  the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, shall apply 
to all those affected by a situation referred to in Article 1, without any adverse distinction 
founded on race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria (Art. 9, 1). If  
the civilian population of  any territory under the control of  a Party to the conflict, other 
than occupied territory, is not adequately provided with the supplies mentioned in Article 
69, relief  actions which are humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without 
any adverse distinction shall be undertaken, subject to the agreement of  the Parties con-
cerned in such relief  actions. Offers of  such relief  shall not be regarded as interference in 
the armed conflict or as unfriendly acts. In the distribution of  relief  consignments, priority 
shall be given to those persons, such as children, expectant mothers, maternity cases and 
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nursing mothers, who, under the Fourth Convention or under this Protocol, are to be ac-
corded privileged treatment or special protection (Art. 70, 1).
Women whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related to the armed conflict 
shall be held in quarters separated from men’s quarters. They shall be under the immedi-
ate supervision of  women. Nevertheless, in cases where families are detained or interned, 
they shall, whenever possible, be held in the same place and accommodated as family 
units (Art. 75, paragraph 5). Chapter II (Articles 76 to 78) explicitly adresses the protec-
tion of  women and children:
Art 76. Protection of  women:
• Women shall be the object of  special respect and shall be protected in particular 
against rape, forced prostitution and any other form of  indecent assault ;
• Pregnant women and mothers having dependent infants who are arrested, de-
tained or interned for reasons related to the armed conflict, shall have their cases 
considered with the utmost priority;
• To the maximum extent feasible, the Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to 
avoid the pronouncement of  the death penalty on pregnant women or mothers 
having dependent infants, for an offence related to the armed conflict. The death 
penalty for such offences shall not be executed on such women.
Here are the specific protections for women in the Second 1977 Additional Proto-
col, applicable in non-international armed conflicts:
• This Protocol shall be applied without any adverse distinction founded on race, 
colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria (hereinafter 
referred to as “adverse distinction”) to all persons affected by an armed conflict as 
defined in Article 1 (Art. 2) (a) except when men and women of  a family are accom-
modated together, women shall be held in quarters separated from those of  men 
and shall be under the immediate supervision of  women (Art. 5, paragr. 2, letter a).
• The death penalty shall not be pronounced on persons who were under the age 
of  eighteen years at the time of  the offence and shall not be carried out on preg-
nant women or mothers of  young children (Art. 6, paragr. 4).
Gender-based violence is included in the definition of  grave breaches of  the four 
1949 Geneva Conventions19 and of  the war crimes in the Statutes the International Crim-
inal Court (ICC),20 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yougoslavia (ICTY),21 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).22 On 9 January 1997, the ICTR 
19 “Wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suf-
fering or serious injury to body or health and taking of  hostages are grave breaches. “ See also GC I, Art. 
50; GC II, Art. 51; GC III, Art. 130; GC IV, Art. 147. All States Parties to the Geneva Conventions have a 
universal jurisdiction to prosecute or extradite war criminals.
20 Available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf  
21 Available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf  (Updated Statute)
22 Available at http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English/Legal/Statute/2010.pdf   See also http://hrbrief.
org/2010/10/security-council-amends-ictr-statute-to-promote-fulfillment-of-completion-strategy/ (UN 
Security Council amends ICTR Statute)
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held its first trial, one of  the most momentous cases in international law: The Prosecutor v. 
Jean-Paul Akayesu.23 During the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, Jean-Paul Akayesu served as the 
mayor of  Taba, a city in which thousands of  Tutsis were systematically raped, tortured 
and murdered. At the start of  his trial, Akayesu faced 12 charges of  genocide, crimes 
against humanity and violations of  Common Article 3 of  the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions in the form of  murder, torture and cruel treatment. In June 1997, the Prosecutor 
added “three counts of  crimes against humanity and violations of  Common Article 3 
and Additional Protocol II for rape, inhumane acts and indecent assault” (Report of  
the ICTR (S/1997/868). These additional counts marked the first time in the history of  
international law that rape was considered a component of  genocide.24 Legal provisions 
are not sufficient. We would like to emphasize the seven stages in the struggle for the 
respect of  legal norms protecting human life and dignity in war: codification, ratification, 
application, implementation (for instance training),25 sanction of  violations, reparation 
and rehabilitation, and reconciliation.26 We should include all of  them in considering how 
23 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T 
2, 2 september 1998. Available at www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ICTR/AKAYESU_ICTR-96-4/
AKAYESU_ICTR-96-4_Index.html 
24 Available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/ictr/ictr.html 
25 UN SC Resolution 1888 (2009), 19. «Encourages Member States to deploy greater numbers of  female 
military and police personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and to provide all military and 
police personnel with adequate training to carry out their responsibilities»
26 UN SC Resolution 1325 (2000), 13. «Encourages all those involved in the planning for disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of  female and male ex-combatants and 
to take into account the needs of  their dependants», UN SC Resolution 1325 (2000) 16. «Invites the 
Secretary-General to carry out a study on the impact of  armed conflict on women and girls, the role of  
women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of  peace processes and conflict resolution, and fur-
ther invites him to submit a report to the Security Council on the results of  this study and to make this 
available to all Member States of  the United Nation», UN SC Resolution 1888 (2009) « Reaffirming that 
ending impunity is essential if  a society in conflict or recovering from conflict is to come to terms with past 
abuses committed against civilians affected by armed conflict and to prevent future such abuses, drawing 
attention to the full range of  justice and reconciliation mechanisms to be considered, including national, 
international and “mixed” criminal courts and tribunals and truth and reconciliation commissions, and 
noting that such mechanisms can promote not only individual responsibility for serious crimes, but also 
peace, truth, reconciliation and the rights of  the victims», UN SC Resolution 1888 (2009)1. « Reaffirms 
that sexual violence, when used or commissioned as a tactic of  war in order to deliberately target civilians 
or as a part of  a widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations, can significantly exacerbate 
situations of  armed conflict and may impede the restoration of  international peace and security; affirms 
in this regard that effective steps to prevent and respond to such acts of  sexual violence can significantly 
contribute to the maintenance of  international peace and security; and expresses its readiness , when 
considering situations on the agenda of  the Council, to take, where necessary, appropriate steps to address 
widespread or systematic sexual violence in situations of  armed conflict». But also UN SC Resolution 
1888 (2009)13. «Encourages States, with the support of  the international community, to increase access to 
health care, psychosocial support, legal assistance and socio economic reintegration services for victims 
of  sexual violence, in particular in rural areas ; [...]» 15. «Encourages leaders at the national and local level, 
including traditional leaders where they exist and religious leaders, to play a more active role in sensitizing 
communities on sexual violence to avoid marginalization and stigmatization of  victims, to assist with their 
social reintegration, and to combat a culture of  impunity for these crimes;”, 
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to improve the implementation of  international humanitarian law without forgetting the 
role of  women in all stages, at the international and local levels. 
A good example of  codification through a woman is Jody Williams’ role for the 
Ottawa Convention (1997). Jody Williams is the founding coordinator of  the Inter-
national Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL),27 which was formally launched by six 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in October 1992. The ICBL is a network 
of  like-minded Governments, International Organizations like UNICEF, the ICRC as 
well as Red Cross/Red Crescent National Societies, and NGOs. The ICBL achieved its 
goal of  an international treaty banning antipersonnel landmines during the diplomatic 
conference held in Ottawa in September 1997. Jody Williams’ approach was imitated 
by the adoption of  the ICC Rome Statute in 1998 and for the Convention on the Clus-
ter Munitions adopted in Oslo in 2008. 28
Today, the trend is more to adopt soft-law instruments (Code of  conduct for 
Private-Military Security Companies,29 Declarations, “Deeds of  Commitment” for 
armed non-State actors, Documents, such as the “Montreux Document”,30 “Plans 
of  Action”,31 Guidelines,32 “Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights”,33 
etc.) rather than hard treaty law (Conventions or Protocols), especially in relation with 
Non-State Actors (parties to armed conflicts, PMSCs, private business, civil society at 
large). The Geneva Call (“Appel de Genève”)34 was founded in 2000 by Elisabeth Decrey 
27 Available at http://www.icbl.org/ 
28 Kenneth Anderson (2000). “The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of  International Non-
Governmental Organizations and the Idea of  International Civil Society”. EJIL, vol. 11, nº1. Available at 
http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/11/1/91.full.pdf  
29 See «The International Code of  Conduct for Private Security Service Providers». Available at http://www.
icoc-psp.org and http://www.dcaf.ch/Event/Working-Towards-an-International-PMSC-Code-of-Conduct 
30 “Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States related 
to Operations of  Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict”. Available at www.eda.
admin.ch/psc
31 See the OHCHR’s (2002). Handbook on National Human Rights Plans of  Action. Professional Training Se-
ries n.º 10, Geneva. Available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training10en.pdf. UN 
WOMEN (2012). Handbook for National Action Plans on Violence against Women. New York. Available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/vaw/handbook-for-nap-on-vaw.pdf. USAID (2012). Implemen-
tation of  the United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security. Washington, D.C. Avail-
able at http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/wid/peace/US_NAP_WPS_Im-
plementation.pdf  
32 See Women’s Initiative for Gender Justice (2005). Gender in Practice. Guidelines & Methods to Address Gender 
Based Crimes in Armed Conflict. The Hague. Available at http://www.iccwomen.org/whatwedo/training/
docs/Gender_Training_Handbook.pdf  
33 The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPs), established in 2000 by the British Foreign 
& Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the US State Department, provide advice to oil, gas and mining 
companies on how to engage with public and private security providers, so as to ensure that their security 
operations do not lead to human rights abuses or exacerbate conflict. See http://fcohrdreport.readan-
dcomment.com/human-rights-in-promoting-britains-prosperity/promoting-responsible-business-prac-
tice/voluntary-principles-on-security-and-human-rights/. See the English text available at http://www.
voluntaryprinciples.org/files/voluntary_principles_english.pdf.
34 The Geneva Call is a neutral and impartial humanitarian organization dedicated to engaging armed non-
Gender Violence in Armed conflicts100
Warner. It has concluded many “Deeds of  Agreements” with armed Non-State Actors 
(NSAs) including provisions on the protection of  women and children in situations of  
armed conflict.35
As the Ottawa Convention and the ICC Statute have clearly demonstrated, codifi-
cation is not enough: we need ratification and application in order to achieve a better 
implementation.
We need also to sanction violations: three pioneers in that field are Louise Arbour, 
Carla Del Ponte and Navi Pillay. Louise Arbour was the Chief  Prosecutor for the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda from 1996 until 
1999. She then was UN High Commissioner for Human Rights from 2004 until 2008. 
Carla Del Ponte was the ICTY’s and ICTR’s Prosecutor for more than eight years, from 
1999 to 2007. During her mandate, almost 100 accused persons were brought to the Tri-
bunal’s custody.36 Navanethem Pillay, now UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
since September 2008, was a judge on the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
where she served a total of  eight years, the last four (1999-2003) as President. She played 
a critical role in the ICTR’s groundbreaking jurisprudence on rape as genocide, as well 
as on issues of  freedom of  speech and hate propaganda. In 2003, she was appointed 
as a judge on the International Criminal Court in the Hague, where she remained until 
August 2008.37
Implementation and Proposals for a Better Protection of  Women 
For a better protection of  women in time of  armed conflict, we would like to make three 
proposals: first reinforce existing mechanisms of  international humanitarian law, then make 
a better use of  mechanisms of  other legal systems, and be more creative in using remedies. 
Reinforce Existing Mechanisms of International Humanitarian Law
The mechanisms provided for in the 1949 Geneva Conventions are: 
(1) The States Party, which undertake to “respect and ensure respect” for the Conven-
tions in all circumstances.”38 “Respect” clearly refers to the individual obligation 
to apply it in good faith from the moment that it enters into force.39 “To ensure 
respect”, according to the ICRC Commentary to the 1949 Conventions, “demands 
in fact that the States which are Parties to it should not be content merely to ap-
ply its provisions themselves, but should do everything in their power to ensure 
State actors (NSAs) towards compliance with the norms of  international humanitarian law (IHL) and 
human rights law (IHRL). Available at http://www.genevacall.org. 
35 Available at www.genevacall.org/Themes/Gender/gender.htm.
36 On 11 August 1999 the UN Security Council appointed her to the position of  Prosecutor of  the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. She was re-appointed to the position of  
ICTY Prosecutor for a second four-year term in September 2003 http://www.icty.org/sid/101 
37 Available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/aboutus/pages/highcommissioner.aspx 
38 Common Article 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
39 ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols, Geneva, ICRC, 1987, p. 35, para. 39
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that it is respected universally.”40 This collective responsibility to implement in-
ternational humanitarian rules41 often takes the form of  bilateral or multilateral 
measures by States Party. Leaving aside the exceptional meeting provided for in 
Article 7 of  Protocol I of  197742 States Party to international humanitarian law 
treaties have used bilateral or multilateral meetings, at the United Nations,43 the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), regional organizations (OAS, AU, OSCE, the 
European Parliament, the Council of  Europe) as well as the Inter-Parliamen- 
tary Union (IPU), to manifest their concern that humanitarian law should be respect-
ed.44 In all circunstances means in time of  armed conflict, as well as in time of  peace, 
taking preventive steps, in the form of  training45 or evaluation,46 and prose- 
40 ICRC Commentary III, p. 18 (Art. 1). See Luigi Condorelli and Laurence Boisson de Chazournes (1984). 
“Quelques remarques à propos de l’obligation des Etats de «respecter et faire respecter» le droit interna-
tional humanitaire «en toutes circonstances » in Christophe Swinarski (ed), Studies and Essays on International 
Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles. Geneva: ICRC, pp. 17-35; Umesh Palwankar (1994). “Measures 
available to States for fulfilling their obligation to ensure respect for international humanitarian law”. IRRC 
n.º 298, pp. 9-25; Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Luigi Condorelli (2000). “Common Article 1 of  
the Geneva Conventions revisited: Protecting collective interests“. IRRC n.º 837, pp. 67-87. Available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jqcp.htm 
41 The 1949 Geneva Conventions as well as Additional Protocol I, for the States Party to this Protocol. See 
the ICRC Commentary on the Protocols, ad Art. 1 of  Protocol I, p. 35-38
42 Article 7 (« Meetings »): « The depositary of  this Protocol [Switzerland] shall convene a meeting of  the 
High  Contracting Parties, at the request of  one or more of  the said Parties and upon the approval of  the 
majority of  the said Parties, to consider general problems concerning the application of  the Conventions 
and of  the Protocol ». Such a meeting was convened by Switzerland on 5 December 2001 in Geneva. (« 
Conference of  the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention»).
43 Especially since the adoption of  Art. 89 («Co-operation») of  the First 1977 Additional Protocol which 
states: «In situations of  serious violations of  the Conventions or of  this Protocol, the High Contracting 
Parties undertake to act, jointly or individually, in co-operation with the United Nations and in conformity 
with the United Nations Charter».
44 ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols, p. 36, paragr. 43.
45 Training is an obligation according to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions: Article 47 of  the First Conven-
tion states the following: «The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of  peace as in time of  war, to 
disseminate the text of  the present Convention as widely as possible in their respective countries, and, in 
particular, to include the study thereof  in their programmes of  military and, if  possible, civil instruction, 
so that the princi ples thereof  become known to the entire population, in particular to the armed fighting 
forces, the medical personnel and the chaplains.» The Second Convention contains a similar provision 
(Article 48). Article 127 of  the Third Convention adds the following paragraph: « Any military or other 
authorities, who in time of  war asume responsibilities in respect of  prisoners of  war, must possess the text 
of  the Convention and be specially instructed as to its provisions.» Article 144, 2 of  the Fourth Convention 
reads as follows: «Any civilian, military, police or other authorities, who in time of  war assume responsibili-
ties in respect of  protected persons, must possess the text of  the Convention and be specially instructed 
as to its provisions. » Additional Protocol I reaffirms the duty to disseminate (Article 83 – Dissemination); 
and adds the obligation to ensure that legal advisers are available (Art. 82 Legal Advisers in armed forces). 
Additional Protocol II, applicable in non-international armed conflicts, simply states that « This Protocol 
shall be disseminated as widely as possible.» (Art. 19 – Dissemination).
46 Article 36 (New Weapons) of  Protocol I reads as follows: «In the study, development, acquisition or adop-
tion of  a new weapon, means or method of  warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to 
determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or 
by any other rule of  international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.»
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cution.47 According to Common Article 1 to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions 
and to Article 1 of  Additional Protocol I, all States Parties to these instruments 
have the obligation «to respect and ensure respect » for them «in all circumstances». This 
wording has been widely understood as implying a double responsibility for every 
State Party: for its own individual duties as well as a collective responsibility for 
the behavior of  other States Parties.48 The International Court of  Justice held that 
Article 1 had turned into customary law: the Nicaragua Case stresses the duty of  
States Parties to abstain from promoting violations;49 the 2004 Advisory Opinion 
on the Wall 50 goes further: States Parties should act in order to ensure compli-
ance:  «Given the character and the importance of  the rights and obligations 
involved, the Court is of  the view that all States are under an obligation not to 
recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of  the wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem. They are 
also under an obligation not to render aid or assistance in imaintaining the situ-
ation created by such construction. It is also for al1 States, while respecting the 
United Nations Charter and international law, to see to it that any impediment, re-
sulting from the construction of  the wall, to the exercise by the Palestinian people 
of  its right to self-determination is brought to an end. In addition, al1 the States 
parties to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of  Civilian Persons 
in Time of  War of  12 August 1949 are under an obligation, while respecting the 
United Nations Charter and international law, to ensure compliance by lsrael with 
international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention».
47 The four 1949 contain common provisions on the «Repression of  Abuses and Infractions »: First Conven-
tion: Art. 49-51; Second Convention: Art. 50-52; Third Convention: Art. 129-131; Fourth Convention: Art. 
146-148. Article 85 of  Additional Protocol I reaffirms those provisions, adds a few acts to be considered as 
grave breaches (specially attacks against civilians and civilian objects), and classifies grave breaches of  the 
1949 Conventions and Protocol I as war crimes. See on grave breaches and war crimes Maria Teresa Dutli 
and Cristina Pellandini (1994). “The International Committee of  the Red Cross and the Implementation of  
a System to Repress Breaches of  International Humanitarian Law”. IRRC n.º 300, pp. 240-254; Marko Divac 
Öberg (2009). “The Absorption of  Grave Breaches into War Crimes Law”. IRRC nº873, pp. 163-183. Avail-
able at www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/review/review-873-p163.htm; Manual for Courts-
Martial United States (2012). Available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/MCM-2012.pdf  
48 Jean S. Pictet (ed) (1958). The Geneva Conventions of  12 August 1949. Commentary. IV. Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of  Civilian Persons in Time of  War. Geneva: International Committee of  the Red Cross, 
pp. 15-17.
49 International Court of  Justice, Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nica-
ragua (Nicaragua v. United States of  America), Judgement of  27 June 1986 (Merits), vol. 114, Para. 220. See 
Antonio Cassese (2005). International Law. London: Oxford University Press, pp. 6-8 (“Collective Respon-
sibility”), p. 182. (“State Responsibility”) and especially pp. 207-210 and p. 419. In the Nicaragua Case, the 
International Court of  Justice noted that under common Art. 1, the United States was under “an obligation 
not to encourage persons or groups engaged in the conflict in Nicaragua to act in violation of  the provisions 
of  Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions […]”. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of  America), Merits, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 115.
50 Legal Consequences cf  the Construction of  a Wal1 in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opin-
ion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136. Available at www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf  
IDN CADERNOS 103
A practical example of  this collective responsibility of  States Parties to “respect 
and ensure respect” for the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional 
Protocols are the 2005 European Union Guidelines on promoting compliance with interna-
tional humanitarian law.51 The first paragraph of  these 2009 “Updated Guidelines” de-
serves quotation: The purpose of  these Guidelines is to set out operational tools 
for the European Union and its institutions and bodies to promote compliance 
with international humanitarian law (IHL). They underline the European Union’s 
commitment to promote such compliance in a visible and consistent manner. The 
Guidelines are addressed to all those taking action within the framework of  the 
European Union to the extent that the matters raised fall within their areas of  
responsibility and competence. They are complementary to Guidelines and other 
Common Positions already adopted within the EU in relation to matters such as 
human rights, torture and the protection of  civilians.52
(2) The Protecting Power,53 which was widely used in Europe during WW II54 and 
much less therafter.55 Additional Protocol I defines the Protecting Power in inter-
51 First published in the Official Journal C 327 of  23.12.2005, updated in the Official Journal C 303 of  15.12.2009 
(«Updated European Union Guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law»). Avail-
able at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:303:0012:0017:EN:PDF 
52 See EU Guidelines on Human Rights Dialogues (approved by the Council on 13 December 2001, updated 
on 19 January 2009); Guidelines for EU Policy towards Third Countries on Torture and other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Punishment or Treatment (approved by the Council on 9 April 2001, updated on 29 
April 2008); EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict (approved by the Council on 8 December 
2003, updated on 17 June 2008); EU Guidelines on the Promotion and Protection of  the Rights of  the 
Child (approved by the Council on 10 December 2007); Guidelines on Violence against Women and Girls 
Combating all Forms of  Discrimination against Them (approved by the Council on 8 December 2008) and 
Council Common Position 2003/444/CFSP of  16 June 2003 on the ICC (OJ L 150, 18.6.2003, p. 67)
53 See G.I.A.D. Draper (1979). “The Implementation and Enforcement of  the Geneva Conventions of  1949 and 
of  the Two Additional Protocols of  1977”. Recueil des Cours. The Hague, pp. 1-54. George A.B. Peirce (1980). 
“Humanitarian Protection for the Victims of  War: the System of  Protecting Powers and the Role of  the ICRC”. 
Military Law Review, pp. 89-162. David P. Forsythe (1976). “Who Guards the Guardians: Third parties and the 
Law of  Armed Conflict”. American Journal of  International Law, pp. 41-61. Improving the Compliance with Inter-
national Humanitarian Law. Proceedings of  the Bruges Colloquium 11-12 September 2003. Bruges: Collegium 
of  Europe. Available at http://www.coleurope.eu/content/publications/pdf/Collegium30.pdf  
54 See H. Coulibaly (1989). “Le rôle des Puissances protectrices au regard du droit diplomatique, du droit 
de Genève et du droit de La Haye” in F. Kalshoven and Y. Sandoz (eds), Implementation of  International Hu-
manitarian Law. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 69-78. See also C. Dominicé, J. Patrnogic (1979). “Les 
Protocoles Additionnels aux Conventions de Genève et le Système des Puissances Protectrices”. Annales 
de Droit International Médical, pp. 24-50. J. P. Knellwolff, Die Schutzmacht im Völkerrecht unter Besonderer 
Brücksichtigung der Schweizerischen Verhältnisse, Dissertation Bern. Bern, Ackermanndruck, 1985. B. 
Laitenberger (1978). “Die Schutzmacht”. German Yearbook of  International Law, vol. 21, pp. 180-206.
55 It was used in Suez in 1956, in Goa in 1961 and between India and Pakistan in 1971. For a more recent 
example, see the State Department Press Briefing, Thursday, April 1, 1998 p.m.: «The United States Gov-
ernment is contacting authorities in Belgrade through our Protecting Power, Sweden, in regard to the 
illegal abduction of  three American servicemen who were serving in non-combatant status in Macedonia. 
There is no basis for their continued detention by the Belgrade authorities. We insist that they be provided 
any necessary medical assistance and treated humanely and in accordance with all prevailing international 
agreements and standards. We will hold Belgrade authorities responsible for their safety and treatment.» 
Available at http://www.hri.org/news/usa/std/1999/99-04-01.std.html. 
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national humanitarian law as: “a neutral or other State not a Party to the conflict 
which has been designated by a Party to the conflict and accepted by the adverse 
Party and has agreed to carry out the functions assignated to a Protecting Power 
under the Conventions and this Protocol.”56
The role of  the Protecting Power is to maintain the liaison between two States at 
war, to bring relief  assistance to the victims and protection to prisoners of  war 
and civilian internees. It could be used, formally or informally, to promote the 
protection of  women in today’s conflicts, international or even non-international.
(3) The International Committee of  the Red Cross (ICRC), which received mandates 
from the international community in the 1949 Geneva Conventions: to visit and 
interview prisoners of  war57 and civilian internees58 ; to provide relief  to the pop-
ulation of  occupied territories59 ; to search for missing persons and to forward 
family messages to prisoners of  war60 and civilians61 ; to offer its good offices to 
facilitate the institution of  hospital zones62 and safety zones63 ; to receive applica-
tions from protected persons64 ; to offer its services in other situations65 and es-
pecially in time of  non-international armed conflicts.66 The First 1977 Additional 
Protocol mentions two additional mechanisms of  implementation:
(a) The United Nations, “in situations of  serious violations of  the Conventions or of  this 
Protocol” (Art. 89 of  Protocol I). As we shall see, this provision is a very important de-
velopment in the implementation and enforcement of  international humanitarian law.
(b) The optional “International Fact-Finding Commission” (Art. 90 of  Protocol I).67 
To this day, Article 90 of  Protocol I has not been invoked. We should not exclude 
its use in the future. The implementation mechanisms of  international criminal 
law68 was significantly developed as the United Nations Security Council estab-
lished the ad hoc Tribunals on Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda69 and with the 60th 
56 Protocol I, Art. 2, letter C
57 Third Geneva Convention, Article 126
58 Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 143
59 Fourth Geneva Convention, Articles 59 and 61
60 Third Geneva Convention, Article 123
61 Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 140
62 First Geneva Convention, Article 23
63 Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 14
64 Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 30
65 Article 9 of  Conventions I, II and III ; Article 10 of  the Fourth Convention 
66 Common Article 3 to the 1949 Conventions.
67 The website of  the Commission is http://www.ihffc.org
68 See “International Criminal Law“ by Patrick Healy and Kimberly Prost. McGill University Faculty of  Law. 
Available at  http://www.law.mcgill.ca/academics/coursenotes/healy/intcrimlaw/ and the following links 
mentioned there. The Nuremberg Trials London Agreement of  August 8th 1945 (http://www.yale.edu/
lawweb/avalon/imt/imt.htm). Charter of  the International Military Tribunal (http://www.yale.edu/law-
web/avalon/imt/imt.htm), Judgment of  the IMT for the Trial of  German Major War Criminals (http://
www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imt.htm)
69 See the following links, quoted by Patrick Healy and Kimberly Prost: Jurisdiction of  the Yugoslavian and 
Rwandan Ad Hoc Tribunals, Security Council Resolution 827(1993), 25 May 1993 (http://www.un.org/
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ratification of  1998 Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court70 on 11 
April, and its entry into force on 1 July 2002 The International Criminal Court is 
a milestone in the international community’s fight to end impunity for war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity. 
The International Criminal Court will be able to punish war criminals and perpetra-
tors of  genocide or crimes against humanity in cases where national criminal justice 
systems are unable or unwilling to do so. It is vital for the Court’s effective functioning 
that tall States ratify the Rome Statute and that the States Parties rapidly adopt com-
prehensive implementing legislation in order to be able to cooperate with the Court.71 
Make a Better Use of Mechanisms of Other Legal Systems
• Human rights, universal and regional; 
• Refugee law, universal72 and regional;
Docs/sc.htm), Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), 8 November 1994, (http://www.un.org/Docs/
sc.htm), Statute of  the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), Arts. 6, 8, 9. 
(http://www.un.org/icty/basic.htm), Statute of  the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), 
Arts. 5,7,8 (http://www.ictr.org), ICTY, Rules of  Procedure and Evidence, Rules 7-13 (http://www.un.org/
icty/basic.htm), ICTY, Prosecutor V. Dusko Tadic a/k/a “Dule”, Appeals Chamber Decision on the Juris-
dictional Motion, 2 October 1995, ss. 9-48, 9-64. (http://www.un.org/icty/cases-ae2.htm), Substantive Law 
and the Ad Hoc Tribunals, Statute of  the ICT Y, Arts 2-5, 21 (http://www.un.org/icty/basic.htm), Statute 
of  the ICTR, Arts 2-4, 20 (http://www.ictr.org), ICTY, Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, Appeals Chamber, 
Joint separate opinion of  Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, ss. 32-58, 66, 73-91, Separate and dissenting 
opinion of  Judge Cassese, ss. 11-12, 40-51 (http://www.un.org/icty/cases-ae2.htm), ICTR, The Prosecutor 
v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Trial Chamber, Summary of  the Judgment. (http://www.ictr.org), ICTR, The Prosecu-
tor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Trial Chamber, Judgment, ss. 5.5 and 7. (http://www.ictr.org), Evidence, Procedure, 
and the Ad Hoc Tribunals , ICTY, Rules of  Procedure and Evidence, Rules 39-43, 54-61, 89-98 http://www.
un.org/icty/basic.htm), ICTY, Prosecutor V. Dusko Tadic a/k/a “Dule”, Judgment on evidentiary matters. 
(http://www.un.org/icty/cases-te.htm), Judgment on Corroboration in section V(c), Judgment on Hearsay 
in section V(h), ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgment on the request of  The Republic of  Croatia for review 
of  the decision of  Trial Chamber II of  18 July 1997, ss. 25-60. (http://www.un.org/icty/blaskic/ace14.htm) 
70 See Jurisdiction of  the ICC: Trigger Mechanisms and the Exercise of  the Court’s Jurisdiction (http://www.
un.org/icc/backinfo.htm) Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court, Arts 11-15, 17-18. (http://www.
un.org/icc). Substantive Law and the ICC: Crimes within the Court’s Jurisdiction (http://www.un.org/icc/
backinfo.htm). Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court, Arts 5-9, 21, 22-33, 55, 67, 69 (http://www.
un.org/icc). Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court: results of  working groups on ICC 
rules of  procedure and evidence. Most recent laws (http://www.un.org/law/icc/prepcomm/docs.htm)
71 International Criminal Court: A Reality at Last. Geneva: ICRC, 11 April 2002. Available at http://www.
icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/59cmvr.htm 
72 See the UNHCR’s: Note on international protection. Report of  the High Commissioner. A/AC.96/1110. 
Executive Committee of  the High Commissioner’s Programme. Geneva, 1-5 October 2012. See especially 
paragraphs 24, 29-32 («Preventing and Responding to Sexual and Gender-based Violence»). E. Feller, V. 
Türk and F. Nicholson (eds). (2003). Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on 
International Protection. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; UNHCR (2003). Handbook on Procedures 
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and the Guidelines on International Protection. Available at http://www.
unhcr.org/4a1ba1aa6.html. UNHCR (2012). Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration: the 10-Point Plan 
in Action. Available at http://www.unhcr.org/50ab86d09.html 
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• The prohibition of  torture,73 universal and regional (European);74
• The prohibition of  genocide;75
• The protection of  the natural environment;
• The protection of  cultural objects;
• Disarmament and arms control76 (including arms transfers);
• The prohibition of  illicit trafficking77 (arms, diamonds, drugs, human beings);78
• Labor law conventions, especially protecting women and children against forced 
labor;79
73 See Cordula Droege (2007). «In Truth the Leitmotiv: the Prohibition of  Torture and other Forms of  Ill-treat-
ment in International Humanitarian Law». International Review of  the Red Cross n.º 867, pp. 515-541. Available 
at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-867-droege.pdf. Jamie Mayerfeld (2008). «In Defense of  
the Absolute Prohibition of  Torture». Public Affairs Quarterly n.º 2, pp. 109-128. Available at http://faculty.
washington.edu/jasonm/4 – Mayerfeld.indd.pdf. REDRESS (2006). Bringing the International Prohibition 
of  Torture Home. National Implementation Guide for the UN Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. London. Available at www.redress.org/downloads/
publications/CAT%20Implementation%20paper%2013%20Feb%202006%203.pdf  
74 See Aisling Reidy (2003). The prohibition of  torture. A guide to the implementation of  Article 3 of  the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Strasbourg : Council of  Europe (Human rights handbooks, No. 6). Availa-
ble at http://echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/0B190136-F756-4679-93EC-42EEBEAD50C3/0/DG2EN-
HRHAND062003.pdf
75 On 17 July 2012, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed Adama Dieng of  Senegal as his Special 
Adviser on the Prevention of  Genocide. See www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/. See also http://
www.genocidewatch.org. 
76 IRCC (2011). Protecting Civilians and Humanitarian Action through an Effective Arms Trade Treaty. Available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-4069.pdf  
77 Report of  Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Joy Ngozi 
Ezeilo, Human Right Council, Twentieth Session, agenda item 3. Available at http://daccess-dds ny.un.
org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G12/138/05/PDF/G1213805.pdf?OpenElement, Resolution 1653 (2006), 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 5359th meeting, on 27 January 2006 «Aware that the link between 
the illegal exploitation of  natural resources, the illicit trade in those resources and the proliferation and 
trafficking of  arms is one of  the factors fuelling and exacerbating conflicts in the Great Lakes region of  
Africa, and especially in the Democratic Republic of  the Congo». Women in War are also protected by the 
Convention for the Suppression of  the Traffic in Persons and of  the Exploitation of  the Prostitution of  
others, March 21, 1950.
78 The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by General Assembly reso-
lution 55/25 of  15 November 2000, is the main international instrument in the fight against transnational 
organized crime. It opened for signature by Member States at a High-level Political Conference convened 
for that purpose in Palermo, Italy, on 12-15 December 2000 and entered into force on 29 September 2003. 
The Convention is further supplemented by three Protocols, which target specific areas and manifestations 
of  organized crime: the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children; the Protocol against the Smuggling of  Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and the Protocol against 
the Illicit Manufacturing of  and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition.
79 See the ILO Convention No 182 on the worst forms of  child labor (1999). Art. 3, letter a) includes « forced 
or compulsory recruitment of  children for use in armed conflict ». The ILO and the IPU published in 2002 
a Handbook for Parliamentarians and Eliminating the Worst Forms of  Child Labour: a Practical Guide to 
ILO Convention. Available at http://www.ilo.org/ipecinfo/product/viewProduct.do?productId=1200 as 
well as Combating Child Trafficking. Handbook for Parliamentarians. Available at http://www.unicef.org/
publications/files/IPU_combattingchildtrafficking_GB(1).pdf. See also generally, ABC of  Women Work-
ers’ Rights and Gender Equality. Second edition (2007). Available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/
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• Compensation and reparation (civil liability);80
• Reconciliation and reconstruction (role of  women!).81 
In addition to the formal mechanisms of  implementation of  international hu-
manitarian law and human rights, there is an increasing role for informal mechanisms, 
on the international as on the national level: good offices82 ; media, local, regional 
and international83 ; NGOs such as Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International ; 
engaging non-State actors84 to abide by humanitarian rules and principles85 ; civil so- 
public/---dgreports/---gender/documents/publication/wcms_087314.pdf  and more specially: ILO helps 
Sri Lankan war victims pick up the pieces (2 January 2013). Available at http://www.ilo.org/global/about-
the-ilo/newsroom/features/WCMS_195979/lang--en/index.htm 
80 See Ryan S. Lincoln (2012). “Too Rough a Justice: the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission and Interna-
tional Civil Liability for Claims for Rape under International Humanitarian Law ». Tulane Journal of  Inter-
national and Comparative Law, Vol. 20, issue 2, p. 385-419. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2073878. John F. Murphy (1999). “Civil Liability for the Commission of  International 
Crimes as an Alternative to Criminal Prosecution” Harvard HRJ, vol. 12, pp. 1-56. Michael Matheson 
(2012). International Civil Tribunals and Armed Conflict. Leiden : M. Nijhoff, p. 382.
81 See Camille Pampell Conaway (2006). The Role of  Women in Stabilization and Reconstruction. Washington,DC, 
USIP, August, 22 p. Online at: http://www.usip.org/files/resources/srs_three.pdf. See also Jeanne Iza-
biliza “The Role of  Women in Reconstruction: the Experienceof  Rwanda” on the UNESCO website 
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/SHS/pdf/Role-Women-Rwanda.pdf  and 
Harriette E. Williams. Women and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa. Durban: ACCORD. Available 
at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24 
a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=104552 
82 The ICRC can offer its good offices to facilitate the establishment of  hospital zones (according to Arti-
cle 23 of  the First 1949 Convention) and safety zones (Art. 14, First Convention). Other institutions or 
persons could offer their good offices. See B.G. Ramcharan (1983). Humanitarian Good Offices in International 
Law: The Good Offices of  the United Nations Secretary-General in the Field of  Human Rights. The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff. See also Michel Veuthey (2011). “Diplomatie Humanitaire: Préserver les Chances de la Diplomatie 
Humanitaire au Moment où elle est la plus Nécessaire”. DiploWeb. Available at http://www.diploweb.
com/Diplomatie-humanitaire.html and “Humanitarian Diplomacy: Saving It When it is Most Needed” in 
Alexandre Vautravers and Yvita Fox (eds.) (2012). Humanitarian Space. Webster University Geneva 16th Humani-
tarian Conference. Geneva: Webster University, pp. 195-208
83 See Roy W. Gutman (1998). “Spotlight on Violations of  International Humanitarian Law: the Role of  the 
Media”. IRRC n.º 325, pp. 619-625. Urs Boegli (1998). «A Few Thoughts on the Relationship between Hu-
manitarian Agencies and the Media». IRRC n.º 325, pp. 627-631. More generally, Yael Daniel (ed) (2002). 
Sharing the Front Line and the Back Hills. International Protectors and Providers: Peacekeepers, Humanitarian Aid Workers 
and the Media in the Midst of  Crisis. Amityville, NY: Baywood Publishing.
84 See Rainer Hofmann (ed). Non-State Actors as New Subjects of  International Law. International Law – From the 
Traditional State Order towards the Law of  the Global Community. Proceedings of  an International Symposium 
of  the Kiel Walther-Schücking-Institute of  International Law, March 25 to 28, 1998. Berlin: Duncker und 
Humblot. Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau and David Brannan (2001). Trends 
in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. Santa Monica: RAND.
85 See the «Guidelines for Engaging Non-State Actors in a Landmine-Ban». Available at http://www.icbl.org/
wg/nsa/library/draft%20guidelines.html. Claude Bruderlein (2000). “The Role of  Non-State Actors in 
Building Human Security: The Case of  Armed Groups in Intra-State Wars.” Policy Paper for the Centre for 
Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva, Switzerland (prepared for the Ministerial Meeting of  the Human Security 
Network in Lucerne), May 2000. Available at www.hdcentre.org/NewsEvents/1999/Policy%20paper.doc.
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ciety86 ; individuals (journalists and writers like Samantha Power,87 artists like Angelina 
Jolie, for years Goodwill Ambassador and now Special Envoy of  the UN High Com-
missioner for Refugees,88 and Barbara Hendrix, longest serving UNHCR Goodwill 
Ambassador. The world-famous classical singer has met with refugees and policy-mak-
ers in Africa, Asia and Europe over the last 25 years. Having been on a number of  field 
missions, Hendricks is committed to making a real difference for refugees and carries 
her advocacy to the highest diplomatic and governmental levels. She is particularly 
concerned about the plight of  refugee women)89 ; ad hoc independent monitors, agreed 
upon by all parties90 ; private diplomacy, including private economy (multinational as 
well as local); spiritual leaders.91
Use Remedies More Creatively 
• Asking for compensation by way of  civil liability claims92;
• Introducing claims against private companies supporting groups that commit vio-
lations93;
86 Safeguarding human rights is not only the concern of  Governments and international organizations. Rep-
resentatives of  other international and local players, like human rights defenders, drawn from civil society, 
have also felt committed to this issue for a long time. See the « Human Security Network » Commitments 
at the Second Ministerial Meeting in Lucerne, Switzerland, May 11-12. Available at http://www.humanse-
curitynetwork.org/commit-e.asp 
87 See her ground-breaking article in the September 2001 issue of  The Atlantic Monthly. «Bystanders to Geno-
cide: Why the US let the Rwandan Tragedy Happen». Available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/ 
88 http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c56.html (Angelina Jolie)
89 http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c50.html (Barbara Hendrix) 
90 See the recent Human Rights Watch appeals on Colombia, the Congo (DRC), Côte d’Ivoire and Syria: Ending 
the cycle of  abuse in Congo (January 2, 2013); EU: Provide Protection for Syrian Refugees (Dec. 23, 2012); 
Syria: Strong Coalition Message against Targeting Civilians (Dec. 21, 2012); Living Up to the Nobel: EU Must 
Act on Syria (Dec. 10, 2012); Colombia: Obstacles to Care for Abused, Displaced Women (Nov. 14, 2012); A 
Long Way from Reconciliation. Abusive Military Crackdown in Response to Security Threats in Côte d’Ivoire 
(November 14, 2012). All above mentioned documents are available at www.hrw.org.
91 See Daniel L. Smith-Christopher (ed) (1998). Subverting Hatred: The Challenge of  Nonviolence in Religious Tradi-
tions. New York: Orbis Books.
92 On civil claims see Christine Evans (2012). The Right to Reparation in International Law for Victims of  Armed 
Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Won Kidane (2008). «Civil Liability for the Violations 
of  International Humanitarian Law : the Jurisprudence of  the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission in 
The Hague». Wisconsin International Law Journal nº1, pp. 23-87, available at http://hosted.law.wisc.edu/
wordpress/wilj/files/2012/02/kidane.pdf, and Ryan S. Lincoln (2012). “Too Rough a Justice: the Ethio-
pia-Eritrea Claims Commission and International Civil Liability for Claims for Rape under International 
Humanitarian Law». Tulane Journal of  International and Comparative Law nº2, p. 385-419, as well as John F. 
Murphy (1999). “Civil Liability for the Commission of  International Crimes as an Alternative to Criminal 
Prosecution”. Harvard HRJ (Spring), pp. 1-5.
93 See Julia Graff  (2004). «Corporate War Criminals and the International Criminal Court: Blood and Profits 
in the Democratic Republic of  Congo». Available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/11/2graff.pdf  
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• Using traditional customary mechanisms («gacaca») 94;
• Restaurative justice («Truth and Reconciliation Commissions»)95;
Make the Protection of the UN Concerning Gender-based 
Violence More Credible
The 8 March 2007, On International Women’s Day, ten United Nations agen-
cies came together to form the joint initiative, U.N. Action against Sexual Violence 
in Conflict. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of  
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Office for the Coordination of  Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), 
the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), 
and the Department of  Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) have joined forces to im-
prove the quality of  programming to address sexual violence, to increase the coordina-
tion of  efforts for comprehensive prevention and response services, and to improve 
accountability.96 
In today’s international community, the United Nations Security Council is the 
only international mechanism with enforcement capabilities. Unfortunately, the Security 
Council Resolutions adopted for the protection of  women in armed conflicts remain to 
this day largely ineffectual. And this failure is not for the lack of  good ideas – some of  
them are excellent - but for not dedicating adequate resources and big and small Powers 
committing political will.
The first resolution on women, peace and security, Security Council Resolution 1325, 
was unanimously adopted by United Nations Security Council on 31 October 2000. This 
resolution marked the first time the Security Council addressed the disproportionate and 
unique impact of  armed conflict on women, recognized the under-valued and under-uti-
lized contributions women make to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution 
and peace-building. It also stressed the importance of  women’s equal and full participa-
tion as active agents in peace and security. 97
Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security is the first to link women’s experi-
ences of  conflict to the international peace and security agenda, focusing attention on 
the impact of  conflict on women, and calling for women’s engagement in conflict resolu-
94 See Laura M. Olson (2002). «Mechanisms Complementing Prosecution». International Review of  the Red Cross 
n.º 845, pp. 173-189. Available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/173-190-olson.pdf  
95 See the excellent publications by Priscilla Hayner (among others: Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State 
Terror and Atrocity (London: Routledge, 2001) and Toni Pfanner (2006). «Cooperation between Truth 
Commissions and the International Committee of  the Red Cross». International Review of  the Red Cross n.º 
862, pp. 363-373. See this special issue of  the International Review of  the Red Cross on Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commissions on line at www.icrc.org/eng/resources/international-review/review-862-truth-
reconciliation-commissions/index.jsp
96 http://www.un-ngls.org/article.php3?id_article=255 
97 http://www.peacewomen.org/themes_theme.php?id=15&subtheme=true 
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tion and peacebuilding. Two follow-up resolutions (Resolution 1820 and 1888) identify, 
for the first time, sexual violence as a tactic of  warfare and call for political and security 
responses to prevent its use as a means of  fighting98. UNSC Resolution 1888 (2009)99 lists 
several concrete measures of  implementation for all armed forces.100
On 30 September 2009, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 
1888 that aims to further strengthen the efforts of  the international community to com-
bat sexual violence in armed conflict. The resolution, co-sponsored by more than 60 
Member States, calls on the UN Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative to 
intensify efforts to end sexual violence against women and children in conflict situations 
and who should engage on a high level with military and civilian leaders101.
Two Women have been Special Representatives of  the Secretary 
General (SRSG) on Sexual Violence in Conflict (SVC)
Mrs. Margot Wallström, a Swedish diplomat, became the first-ever Special Repre-
sentative of  the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict on 2 February 2010. 
Her portfolio was global and multifaceted, focused overall on leading and coordinating 
efforts to end conflict-related sexual violence against women and children. 102 
Mrs. Zainab Hawa Bangura of  Sierra Leone was appointed by the United Na-
tions Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on 22 June 2012 as his Special Representative 
on Sexual Violence in Conflict at the level of  Under-Secretary-General. Ms. Bangura 
replaced Margot Wallström. She was the Minister of  Health and Sanitation for the 
Government of  Sierra Leone, brings to the position over 20 years of  policy, diplomatic 
and practical experience in the field of  governance, conflict resolution and reconcilia-
tion in Africa.103 
The last Annual Report of  the Secretary-General to the Security Council on women 
and peace and security (S/2012/732, of  2 October 2012)104 on the implementation of  
Resolution 1325 (2000) is based on the contributions of  27 entities of  the United Na-
tions system,105 including field missions and country offices, and eight regional and sub-
98 http://www.unifem.org/campaigns/1325plus10/1325-highlights/index.html 
99 UN Resolution 1888, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9753.doc.htm 
100 See Amy Barrow (2010). “UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and 1820: constructing gender in armed 
conflict and international humanitarian law”. International Review of  the Red Cross n.º 877. Available at http://
www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-877-barrow.pdf  
101 http://www.un-ngls.org/spip.php?page=article_s&id_article=1627 
102 http://www.un.org/apps/news/newsmakers.asp?NewsID=26 
103 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sga1354.doc.htm 
104 Available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/732&referer=http://www.
un.org/en/sc/documents/sgreports/2012.shtml&Lang=E 
105 Department of  Field Support, Departement of  Peacekeeping Operations, Departement of  Political Af-
fairs, ECLA, ESCAP, ESCWA, FAO, IFAD, OCHA, Office for Disarmament Affairs, Office of  the Special 
Adviser on the Prevention of  Genocide, , Office of  the Special Representative of  the Secretary-General 
on Children and Armed Conflicts, Office of  the Special Representative of  the Secretary-General on Sexual 
Violence and Conflict, UNCTAD, OHCHR, UNHCR, Peacebuilding Support Office, UNICEF, UNDP, 
UNESCO, UN-Women, UNEP, UNODC, UNFPA, UNRWA, WHO and World Bank.
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regional organizations.106 The report gives a list of  37 Member States which have adopted 
national action plans, adding that “[T]he capacity to implement, monitor, cost and fi-
nance those plans varies significantly.”107 The Secretary-General then mentions that, in 
the past decade, “the international community has firmly expressed its aspiration to move 
from a culture of  reaction to a culture of  prevention, as demonstrated by the inclusion 
of  the protection of  civilians in the mandates of  8 out of  16 peacekeeping missions.”108 
The following sentence of  the same paragraph nevertheless mentions the mass rape 
perpetrated in Walikale (DRC) in 2010 and intercommunal violence in the Republic of  
South Sudan in 2011 and 2012. And the annex to his Report on conflict-related sexual 
violence (S/2012/33) contains a list of  parties to conflict that are credibly suspected of  
committing or being responsible for patterns of  rape and other forms of  sexual violence 
in situations of  armed conflict in Africa, in Asia, in the Balkans, in the Middle East, in 
Latin America. The Secretary-General has to acknowledge that “Women and girls con-
tinue to be affected by violations of  international human rights, humanitarian and refu-
gee law, including forced displacement, constraints on humanitarian access, and sexual 
and gender-based violence. During the past year, sexual violence and the threat of  sexual 
violence continued to be employed as a tactic of  conflict across a range of  contexts, 
including in Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of  Congo, Libya, the Syrian Arab 
Republic and northern Mali. In Afghanistan, the United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan reported an increase in the number of  women and children killed in conflict-
related violence in 2011 compared to 2010.”109
The keynote speech by the Special Representative of  the Secretary-General on Sexu-
al Violence in Conflict, Mrs Zainab Hawa Bangura, on the occasion of  the 30th Anniver-
sary of  the Committee on the Elimination of  Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 
“Protecting Women from Sexual Violence in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations” (Ge-
neva, Palais des Nations, 18 October 2012) offers more concrete considerations and 
proposals. Allow me to quote a few sentences. This paragraph stresses the global context 
of  violence against women and children in armed conflicts: “An attack on women and 
children during or post-conflict is more than an attack on an individual; it is an attack on 
families, communities, on the rule of  law, and an assault on the belief  in your government 
to protect you. In short, it is an attack on dignity and humanity.” She then outlines a five 
point agenda (developed by her predecessor, Margareta Wahlström):
“First, we believe that there must be an end to impunity for perpetrators and 
justice for victims. Rape during war must be taken seriously and condemned as a 
war crime, not written off  as an inevitable by-product of  war. Ultimately, pros-
ecution is also prevention – because it sends a clear message to perpetrators that 
there is no hiding place, that wherever you go we will go after you to make sure 
106 ASEAN, Council of  Europe, League of  Arab States, Organization of  American States, Organization of  
Islamic Cooperation, OSCE, NATO and Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
107 S/2012/732, paragraph 6.
108 Ibid., paragr. 10.
109 Ibid., paragr. 31.
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that you are prosecuted, and it can also serve as a deterrent to would-be perpe-
trators. Second, protection and empowerment are twin pillars of  the solution 
to sexual violence. This means that sexual violence must be treated as a serious 
peace and security issue that warrants a security response, and women must not 
be seen just as victims but as stakeholders who will be included in all measures 
taken to combat sexual violence.
Third, we must engage political leaders to strengthen the implementation of  the 
Security Council resolutions that are the foundations of  our mandate. To make 
this a reality, we need active scrutiny from the Security Council to ensure that these 
resolutions are being implemented by Member States and they are held account-
able for their commitments. It is time that rape is treated as a security issue with 
real consequences, not a second-class crime that happens to second-class citizens.
Fourth, there is a need for consistency and coordination in the response from the 
international community to this crime. A rape victim doesn’t know – and should 
not have to know – about Security Council resolutions. She simply knows whether 
their country and the UN are providing the security they need and the justice they 
deserve. There also needs to be a holistic response to victims of  sexual violence as 
the crime affects every aspect of  their lives. Ultimately, we need to have standard-
ized best practices that are used in responding to sexual violence and its aftermath.
Fifth, the world needs to recognize rape as a tactic of  war. It is important to 
understand what it means when rape is used as a tool of  war and peoples’ bodies 
are used for military gain or political advantage. This war tactic is as effective as 
any bomb and as destructive as any mine, and it needs to be addressed with the 
same determination as any other deadly weapon used in war.110
Lastly, I have added to this agenda a sixth point – the emphasis on national 
ownership, leadership and responsibility. Solutions cannot be imposed from the 
outside. What is required more than anything else is a change in the attitudes of  
everyone from political leaders, to activists, to journalists, to citizens. Every sec-
tor of  society needs to understand the devastating impact of  this scourge, and 
be determined to end it.”111
Conclusion
Legal tools (treaty law and customary rules, as well as UN Security Council ground-
breaking Reports, Presidential Statements and Resolutions) are at hand for a better pro-
tection against gender-based violence, for the protection of  life and dignity of  women 
and children in armed conflicts.
110 On this see also Carly Brown (2012). «Rape as a Weapon of  War in the Democratic Republic of  the Con-
go». Torture n.º 1, pp. 24-37. Jennifer Park (2007). “Sexual Violence as a Weapon of  War in International 
Humanitarian Law”. International Public Policy Review n.º 1, pp. 13-18. Available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/
ippr/journal/downloads/vol. 3-1/Park.pdf  
111 Available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/30anniversary/StatementByMs.Zaina-
bHawaBangura.pdf
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Mechanisms are available, beginning with Governments, international organizations, 
international courts. Nevertheless, violations still abound.112 What is urgently needed is 
a real political will by Governments and other actors at the international and local levels 
to press violators – including UN peacekeepers, national armies and militias - to change 
behavior. A shift in public conscience is needed. For too many years, we have been silent, 
and, when vocal, largely ineffective. We must get serious113 about ending the ongoing 
tragedies: mobilizing awareness114 and taking effective steps to protect the life and dignity 
of  women and children in war.
Instruments of  International Law
Some Instruments Protecting Women in Armed Conflicts
• 1945 United Nations Charter.
• 1947 Nuremberg Principles (UN General Assembly Res, 177 21 November 1947).
• 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of  the Crime of  Geno-
cide.
• 1949 Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of  the Condition of  the Wound-
ed and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field.
• 1949 Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of  the Condition of  Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of  Armed Forces at Sea.
• 1949 Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of  Prisoners of  War.
• 1949 Geneva C. IV Relative to the Protection of  Civilian Persons in Time of  War.
• 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of  Cultural Property in the Event of  
Armed Conflict.
• 1977 United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of  Military or Any Other 
Hostile Use of  Environmental Modification Techniques.
• 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of  12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of  Victims of  International Armed Con-
flicts.
• 1977 Geneva Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of  12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of  Victims of  Non-International Armed 
Conflicts.
• 1978 Red Cross Fundamental Rules of  International Humanitarian Law Applica-
ble in Armed Conflicts.
• 1980 United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of  
112 See the Appeal on Kivu published in Le Monde of  25 December 2012 («“Au Kivu, on viole et massacre 
dans le silence”»). Available at http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2012/12/25/au-kivu-on-viole-et-
massacre-dans-le-silence_1810191_3232.html 
113 R. Feeley and C. Thomas-Jensen (2008). “Getting Serious about Ending Conflict and Sexual Violence in 
Congo. Enough Project”. Strategy Paper n.º 15.
114 See the interesting online symposium organized by the Harvard Law School Human Rights Law Journal 
on “Avoiding the Trap: Aspirations, Anxieties, and the Appropriateness of  Mass-Mobilization Awareness 
Campaigns”. Available at http://harvardhrj.com 
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Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injuri-
ous or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW).
• 1980 Protocol I on Non-Detectable Fragments.
• 1980 Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of  Mines, Booby-
Traps and Other Devices.
• 1980 Protocol III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of  Incendiary Weap-
ons.
• 1995 Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons.
• 1996 Amended Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of  Mines, 
Booby-Traps and Other Devices.
• Protocol on Explosive Remnants of  War (Protocol V to the 1980 Convention), 
28 November 2003, entered into force on 12 November 2006.
• 1994 ICRC/UNGA Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Pro-
tection of  the Environment in Time of  Armed Conflict.
• 1994 UN Convention on the Safety of  United Nations and Associated Personnel.
• 1996 The International Court of  Justice Advisory Opinion on the Legality of  the 
Threat or Use of  Nuclear Weapons.
• 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of  the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of  Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa).
• 1998 Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court entered into force on 1 
July 2002.
• 2000 Optional Protocol on the Involvement of  Children in Armed Conflict, en-
tered into force on 12 February 2002.
• Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of  Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indis-
criminate Effects. Geneva, 10 October 1980. Amendment Art. 1, 21 December 
2001.
• Agreement for and Statute of  the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 16 January 
2002.
• Protocol on Explosive Remnants of  War (Protocol V to the 1980 Convention), 
28 November 2003.
• Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of  12 August 1949, and relating 
to the Adoption of  an Additional Distinctive Emblem (Protocol III), 8 Decem-
ber 2005.
• Convention on Cluster Munitions (Oslo Convention), 30 May 2008.
• Convention for the Suppression of  the Traffic in Persons and of  the Exploitation 
of  the Prostitution of  Others; March 21, 1950.
IDN CADERNOS 115
References
Abi-saab, Georges (1984). “The Specificities of  Humanitarian Law” in C. SwinarskI (ed), 
Etudes et Essais sur le Droit International Humanitaire et sur les Principes de la Croix-Rouge en 
l’Honneur de Jean Pictet. Geneva: ICRC, pp. 265-280. 
Adachi, Sumio (1985). “Traditional Asian Approaches: the Japanese View”. Australian 
Yearbook of  International Law, pp. 158-167
Aldrich, George (1977). “Establishing Legal Norms through Multilateral Negotiations: 
the Laws of  War”. Journal of  International Law nº1. 
Anderson, Kenneth (2000). “The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of  
International Non-Governmental Organizations and the Idea of  International Civil 
Society”, pp. 91-120. Available at http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/11/1/91.
full.pdf  
Anderson, Kirsten (2006). “How Effective is the International Convention for the Pro-
tection of  all Persons from Enforced Disappearance Likely to be in Holding In-
dividuals Criminally Responsible for Acts of  Enforced Disappearance?». Melbourne 
Journal of  International Law, pp. 245-277. Available at http://www.ediec.org/filead-
min/user_upload/reports/Criminal_responsibility_and_Convention.pdf  
Audet, François (2011). “What Future Role for Local Organizations? A Reflection on 
the Need for Humanitarian Capacity-building». International Review of  the Red Cross 
n.º 884, pp. 1151-1164. Available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/re-
view/2011/irrc-884-audet.pdf  
Beah, Ismael (2007). A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of  a Boy Soldier. New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux.
Bellamy, Alex J. (2012). «Massacres and Morality: Mass Killing in an Age of  Civilian Im-
munity». Human Rights Quarterly n.º 4, pp. 927-958 
Bello, Emmanuel (1980). African Customary Law. Geneva: ICRC.
Bennett, Elizabeth, Virginia Gamba and Deidré Van der Merwe (eds) (2000). ACT against 
Child Soldiers in Africa: a Reader. Pretoria: ISS. See an extract on reintegration of  child 
soldiers online at http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/ACTblurb.html 
Bergsmo, Morten, Alf  Butenschon Skre and Elisabeth J. Wood (eds) (2012). Understanding 
and Proving International Sex Crimes. Beijing: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher. Avail-
able at http://www.fichl.org/fileadmin/fichl/documents/FICHL_12_Web.pdf  
Best, Geoffrey (1980). Humanity in Warfare: The Modern History of  the International Law of  
Armed Conflicts. London: Weidenfels and Nicolson.
Best, Geoffrey (1994). War and Law since 1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bianchi, Andrea (ed) (2009). Non-State Actors and International Law. London: Ashgate.
Biehler, Anke (2008). «Protection of  Women in International Humanitarian Law and Hu-
Gender Violence in Armed conflicts116
man Rights Law» in Roberta Arnold and Noëlle Quenivet (eds), International Humani-
tarian Law and Human Rights Law: Towards a New Merger in International Law. Leiden: 
Brill, pp. 355-382.
Bock, Joseph G. (2012). The Technology of  Nonviolence: Social Media and Violence Prevention. 
Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
Bouchet-Saulnier, Françoise (2013). The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law. Lanham: 
Rowan & Littlefield, (third english language edition). 
Bothe, Michael, Karl Josef  Partsch and Waldemar A. Solf  (1982). New Rules for Victims 
of  Armed Conflicts. Commentary on the Two Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of  
1949. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Braeckman, Colette (2012). L’Homme qui Répare les Femmes: Violences Sexuelles au Congo - le 
Combat du Docteur Mukwege. Bruxelles: André Versaille. Available at http://www.grip.
org/sites/grip.org/files/LIVRES_DU_GRIP/E-BOOKS/av03-extrait-_lhomme_
qui_repare.pdf  
Breslin, Andrea (2010). “Ensuring Respect: The European Union’s Guidelines on Pro-
moting Compliance with International Humanitarian Law”. Israel Law Review, vol. 43, 
pp. 381-412. Available at http://law.huji.ac.il/upload/Breslin.pdf
Brown, Carly (2012). “Rape as a Weapon of  War in the Democratic Republic of  the 
Congo”. Torture: Journal on Rehabilitation of  Torture Victims and Prevention of  Torture, 
vol. 22, n.º 1, pp. 24-37. Available at http://www.irct.org/Files/Filer/TortureJour-
nal/22_1_2012/Rape-as-weapon-war-1-2012.pdf  
Campbell, Colm (2000). “Peace and the Laws of  War: The Role of  International Hu-
manitarian Law in the Post-Conflict Environment”. International Review of  the Red 
Cross n.º 839, pp. 627-651. Available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/docu-
ments/misc/57jqq7.htm 
Carden-Coyne, Ana (ed) (2012). Gender and Conflict since 1914: Historical and Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Child Soldiers International (2012). Louder than Words: an Agenda for Action to End State use 
of  Child Soldiers: Report published to mark the tenth anniversary year of  entry into 
force of  the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of  Children in Armed Conflict. 
Available at http://www.child-soldiers.org/global_report_reader.php?id=562 
Child Soldiers International (2012). Child Soldiers: A Handbook for Security Sector Actors. 
London: CSI. Available at http://www.childsoldiers.org/files/handbook.pdf  
Cohn, Carol (ed) (2013). Women and Wars. Cambridge: Polity Press.
De las Casas, Bartolomé (1992). A Short Account of  the Destruction of  the Indies. Nigel Grif-
fin (ed. and transl.), London: Penguin. Available at http://www.gutenberg.org/eb-
ooks/20321 or at http://www.amstudy.hku.hk/PDF/eng50_kj_delascasas_indies.
pdf  
IDN CADERNOS 117
Deng, Francis (2001). “The Challenge of  Global Displacement”. Journal of  Law & Policy, 
vol. 5, pp. 141-154.
Desforges, Allison (1999). Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. New York, Hu-
man Rights Watch. Available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/rwanda/ 
or at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/rwanda/10years.htm (Ten Years 
Later, April 2004).
Destexhe, Alain et al. (1996). Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century. New York: New 
York University Press. 
Detter, Ingrid (2000). The Law of  War. (2nd ed). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Diallo, Yolande (1976). “Humanitarian Law and African Traditional Law”. International 
Review of  the Red Cross, vol 16, n.º 179. Geneve: International Committee of  the Red 
Cross.
Dörmann, Knut, Louise Doswald-Beck, and Robert Kolb (2003). Elements of  War Crimes 
under the Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court. Sources and Commentary. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Doswald-beck, Louise and Sylvain Vité (1993). “International Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights.” International Review of  the Red Cross n.º 293, pp. 94-119 
Dunant, Henry (1939). A Memory of  Solferino (english translation of  Un Souvenir de Solféri-
no). Washington, D.C., American National Red Cross, 1939. Available at http://www.
icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0361.htm
Durham, Helen and Tim McCormack (eds) (1999). The Changing Face of  Conflict and the Ef-
ficacy of  International Humanitarian Law. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
Eboe-Osuji, Chile (2012). International Law and Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts. Leiden: 
Boston M. Nijhoff.
Evans, Christine (2012). The Right to Reparation in International Law for Victims of  Armed 
Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ferrao, Ranjana (2009). “Prohibition on the Use of  Child Soldiers: How Real?”. ISIL 
Yearbook of  International Humanitarian and Refugee Law, vol. 9, pp. 279-299.
Global Protection Cluster Working Group Handbook for the Protection of  Inter-
nally Displaced Persons (2007). Available at http://www.globalprotectioncluster.
org/en/news-and-publications/publications.html Protection of  Conflict-Induced 
IDPs: Assessment for Action. Protection Cluster Working Group Early Recov-
ery Cluster Working Group (2008). Available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/47eba3c62.html  Handbook for Coordination Gender – Based Violence In-
terventions in Humanitarian Settings (2010). Available at http://www.humansecuri-
tygateway.com/documents/GPC_HandbookforCoordinatingGenderbasedViolen-
ceInterventionsinHumanitarianSettings.pdf  
Gender Violence in Armed conflicts118
Geneva Call (2010). Improving the Protection of  Women and Girls during Armed Conflicts. Work-
shop Report. Geneva, 6-9 December.
Geneva Call (2012). Engaging Nonstate Armed Groups on the Protection of  Children: Towards 
Strategic Complementarity. Geneva: International Peace Institute. Available at http://
www.genevacall.org/resources/research/f-research/2001-2010/IPI_E_Pub_EN-
GAGING_NONSTATE.pdf  
Geneva Call (2012). Iranian Kurdish Armed non-State Actors Commit to a Prohibition on Sexual 
Violence in Armed Conflict and to Improving Child Protection. Geneva. Available at http://
www.genevacall.org/news/press-releases/f-press-releases/2001-2010/2012_GC_
COM_DOC_CANSA_GENDER_IRAN.pdf  
Geneva Call. Online Directory of  Armed Non-State Actor Humanitarian Commitments. Available 
at http://theirwords.org
Greenwood, Christopher (1996). “International Humanitarian Law and the Tadic Case”. 
EJIL n.º 7, pp. 265-283. Available at http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/7/2/1365.pdf
Hayner, Priscilla B. (1994). “Fifteen Truth Commissions – 1974 to 1994: A Comparative 
Study”. Human Rights Quarterly n.º 16, pp. 597-655. 
Hayner, Priscilla B. (2011). Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity. New 
York: Routledge.
Haynes, Jeffrey (2012). Religious Transnational Actors and Soft Power. Farnham Burlington: 
Ashgate
Huber, Max (1945). The Good Samaritan: Reflections on the Gospel and Work of  the Red Cross. 
London: Gollancz.
Huizinga, Johan (1995). Homo Ludens: A Study of  Play-Element in Culture. Boston: The 
Beacon Press.
Human Rights Watch
A Long Way from Reconciliation. Abusive Military Crackdown in Response to Security Threats 
in Côte d’Ivoire (2012). Available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
cotedivoire1112webwcover.pdf  
Rights Out of  Reach: Obstacles to Health, Justice, and Protection for Displaced Victims of  Gender-
Based Violence in Colombia (2012). Available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/
files/reports/colombia1112forUpload.pdf  
Under Siege: Indiscriminate Bombing and Abuses in Sudan’s Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile 
States (2012). Available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/sudan-
1212webwcover_0.pdf  
Ignatieff, Michael (1998). The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience. New 
York: Viking.
IDN CADERNOS 119
International Committee of  the Red Cross (ICRC) 
Addressing the Needs of  Women Affected by Armed Conflicts: An ICRC Guidance Document. 
Available at http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/ICRC_women_war.pdf
Women Protected under International Humanitarian Law: Overview (2010). Available at www.
icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/protected-persons/women/overview-women-protected.
htm 
Health Care in Danger: the Responsibilities of  Health-care Personnel Working in Armed Conflicts 
and other Emergencies (2012). Geneva: ICRC.
Guide for Police Conduct and Behaviour: International Human Rights Law and Humanitarian 
Principles for Professional Policing (2012). Geneva: ICRC.
Mini Exploring Humanitarian Law: the Essence of  Humanitarian Law (2012). Geneva: ICRC.
Marco Sassòli, Antoine A. Bouvier and Anne Quintin (2011). How Does Law Protect in 
War ? Cases, Documents and Teaching Material on Contemporary Practice in International Hu-
manitarian Law (n.d.). Geneva: ICRC, 3 vols. Available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/
resources/documents/publication/p0739.htm 
Marco Sassòli, Antoine A. Bouvier, Anne Quintin and Juliane Garcia (2012). Un Droit 
dans la Guerre? Genève, CICR, 3 vols. 
Women Facing War (n.d.).
Annex to the Guidance Document. General and Specific Protection of  Women under 
International Humanitarian Law. 
Interparliamentary Union (IPU) Respect for International Humanitarian Law (2007). Hand-
book for Parliamentarians n.º 13 with the ICRC. Confronting Discrimination: The Conven-
tion on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Discrimination against Women and its Optional Protocol 
(2003). Handbook for Parliamentarians. Eliminating the Worst Forms of  Child Labour: A 
Practical Guide to ILO Convention (2002). Handbook for Parliamentarians n.º 3 with 
ILO. Child Protection (2004). Handbook for Parliamentarians n.º 7 with UNICEF. 
Human Rights (2005). Handbook for Parliamentarians n.º 8 with OHCHR. Combating 
Child Trafficking (2005). Handbook for Parliamentarians n.º 9 with UNICEF. Making 
Reconciliation Work: The Role of  Parliaments (2005). Handbook for Parliamentarians n.º 
10 with IDEA. Nationality and Statelessness (2005). Handbook for Parliamentarians 
n.º 11 with UNHCR. Missing Pieces: A Guide for Reducting Violence through Parliamentary 
Action (2005). Handbook for Parliamentarians n.º 12 with the Centre for Humanitar-
ian Dialogue. Eliminating Violence against Children (2007). Handbook for Parliamentar-
ians n.º 13 with UNICEF. Combating Trafficking in Persons (2009). A Handbook for 
Parliamentarians n.º 16 with UNODC. Refugee Protection (2001). A Guide to Inter-
national Refugee Law with UNHCR. A Guide to Parliamentary Practice. A Handbook 
with UNESCO.
Mobilizing Parliamentary Support for the Brussels Programme of  Action for the Least Developed 
Countries. A Guide to Parliamentary Practice, with the UN Office of  the High Repre-
Gender Violence in Armed conflicts120
sentative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developed Countries and 
Small Island Developing States (UNOHRLLS). Improving the Protection of  Chil-
dren in Conflict with the Law in South Asia (2007). Regional Parliamentary Guide 
n.º 1 with UNICEF.
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) IASC Policy Statement Gender Equality in Hu-
manitarian Action (2008). Gender Handbook in Humanitarian Action. Women, Girls, Boys 
and Men. Different Needs: Equal Opportunities (2007).
Guidelines for Gender-Based Violence Interventions in Humanitarian Settings (2006). 
Guidelines on Inter-Agency Contingency Planning for Humanitarian Assistance (2007). 
IASC Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings (2007).
Protection of  Conflict-Induced IDPs: Assessment for Action (2008). With UNHCR, the Protec-
tion Cluster Working Group, and the Early Recovery Cluster Working Group. 
Protecting Persons Affected by Natural Disasters (2006). IASC Operational Guidelines on 
Human Rights and Natural Disasters. Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displace-
ment.
International Crisis Group (ICG)
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/key-issues/thematic/gender-and-
conflict.aspx
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/Beyond%20Vic-
timhood%20Womens%20Peacebuilding%20in%20Sudan%20Congo%20and%20
Uganda.pdf
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/commentary/steinberg-the-united-
nations-and-women-walking-the-walk-on-empowerment.aspx
International Labour Organization (ILO)  ILO’s Role in Conflict and Disaster Settings - Guide 
and Toolkit (1st Edition) (2010). Available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/
files/resources/240F6FBAF82AD4AA4925779300253D7A-ILO_Aug2010.pdf 
Kaelin, Walter (2008). Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Annotations. Washington 
D.C.: ASIL. Available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/stlp.pdf  
Kaelin, Walter (2001). “Flight in Times of  War.” International Review of  the Red Cross n.º 
843, pp. 629-649. Available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-843-
kalin.pdf  
Kalshoven, Frits and Liesbeth Zegveld (2001). Constraints on the Waging of  War: An Intro-
duction to International Humanitarian Law. Geneva: ICRC. Available at http://www.loc.
gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Constraints-waging-war.pdf  
Kisangani, Emizet François (2012). Civil Wars in the Democratic Republic of  Congo, 1960-
2010 Boulder: L. Rienner. Krill, Françoise (1985). “The Protection of  Women in 
IDN CADERNOS 121
International Humanitarian Law”. International Review of  the Red Cross n.º 249.
Lincoln, Ryan S. (2012). “Too Rough a Justice: the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission 
and International Civil Liability for Claims for Rape under International Humanitar-
ian Law». Tulane Journal of  International and Comparative Law, vol. 20, n.º 2, pp. 385-419. 
Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2073878 
Lindsey, Charlotte (n.d.). «Women and War: An Overview». International Review of  the 
Red Cross n.º 839. Available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/
misc/57jqq3.htm 
Machel, Graça (2000). The Impact of  Armed Conflict on Children: A Critical Review of  Progress 
Made and Obstacles Encountered in Increasing Protection for War-affected Children. Winnipeg, 
Canada, International Conference on War-Affected Children, September. Available 
at http://www.unicef.org/graca/ 
MacKenzie, Megan H. (2012). Female Soldiers in Sierra Leone: Sex, Security, and Post-conflict 
Development. New York, London: New York University Press.
Matheson, Michael (2012). International Civil Tribunals and Armed Conflict. Leiden, Boston: 
M. Nijhoff.
Mani, Rama (2002). Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of  War. Cambridge: 
Polity Press.
Meron, Theodor (1989). Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Meron, Theodor (1993). “Rape as a Crime Under International Humanitarian Law”. 
American Journal of  International Law, vol. 87, n.º 3, pp. 424-428. Available at http://
www.jstor.org/stable/2203650
Meron, Theodor (2000). “The Humanization of  Humanitarian Law”. American Journal of  
International Law, vol. 94, n.º 2, pp. 239-278. Available at http://www.asil.org/ajil/
ajilapril2000.pdf  
Moir, Lindsay (2002). The Law of  Internal Armed Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Moore, Jonathan (ed) (1998). Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention. 
New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Murphy, John F. (1999). “Civil Liability for the Commission of  International Crimes as 
an Alternative to Criminal Prosecution”. Harvard HRJ, vol. 12 (Spring), pp. 1-56.
NATO (NATO Documents on Women)
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2010/Women-Security/UNSCR1325/EN/index.
htm 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2011/Arms-control/201103-TextArt2/EN/index.
htm
Gender Violence in Armed conflicts122
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2010/Women-Security/Congo-Women/EN/in-
dex.htm
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2010/Women-Security/Women-soldiers-without-
guns/EN/index.htm
Ni Aolian, Fionnuala, Dina Francesca Haynes and Naomi Cahn (2011). On the Frontlines: 
Gender, War, and the Post-conflict Process. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Palwankar, Umesh (1994). «Measures Available to States for Fulfilling their Obligation to 
Ensure Respect for International Humanitarian Law». IRRC n.º 298, pp. 9-25.
Park, Jennifer (2007). “Sexual Violence as a Weapon of  War in International Humanitar-
ian Law”. International Public Policy Review, vol. 3, n.º 1, pp. 13-18. Available at http://
www.ucl.ac.uk/ippr/journal/downloads/vol3-1/Park.pdf  
Pommier, Bruno (2011). “The Use of  Force to Protect Civilians and Humanitarian Ac-
tion: the Case of  Libya and Beyond». International review of  the Red Cross, vol. 93, 
n.º 884, pp. 1063-1083. Available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/re-
view/2011/irrc-884-pommier.pdf  
Ratner, Steven R. (n.d.). “War Crimes, Categories of ”. Available at http://www.crimes-
ofwar.org/a-z-guide/war-crimes-categories-of/ 
Rieff, David (2003). A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis. New York: Simon & 
Schuster.
Roberts, Adam and Richard Guelff  (eds) (2000). Documents on the Laws of  War (3rd edi-
tion). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Robinson, J.A. (2012). “The Right of  Child Victims of  Armed Conflict to Reintegration 
and Recover». Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, vol. 15, n.º 1, pp. 46-101. Avilable 
athttp://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2012/3.pdf  
Rodley, Nigel S. (2000). The Treatment of  Prisoners under International Law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Sakina Frattina, Katy (2011). «Le Droit International Humanitaire Protège-t-il assez la 
Dignité des Femmes?: L’exemple du Conflit Israélo-Palestinien». Revue Canadienne 
Droit et Société, vol. 26, n.º 1, pp. 51-67.
Salter, Michael and Maggi Eastwood (2011). “Post-war Developments of  the Martens 
Clause: the Codification of  “Crimes against Humanity” Applicable to Acts of  Geno-
cide». Journal of  International Humanitarian Legal Studies, vol. 2, n.º 2, pp. 250-280. 
Sassoli, Marco (2002). «State Responsibility for Violations of  International Humanitarian 
Law». International Review of  the Red Cross, vol. 84, n.º 846, pp. 401-434. Available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/401_434_sassoli.pdf  
Schmitt, Michael N. (2011). “Investigating Violations of  International Law in Armed 
Conflict». Harvard National Security Journal, vol. 2, n.º 1, pp. 31-84.
IDN CADERNOS 123
Shelton, Dinah (ed) (2000). Commitment and Compliance: The Role of  Non-Binding Norms in 
the International Legal System. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shraga, Daphna (2000). “UN Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of  International 
Humanitarian Law and Responsibility for Operations-Related Damage”. AJIL, vol. 
94, n.º 2, pp. 406-412. Available at www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2555303?uid=3
737760&uid=2134&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=21101640124007
Skjelbaek, Inger (2012). «Responsibility to Protect or Prevent?: Victims and Perpetrators 
of  Sexual Violence Crimes in Armed Conflicts». Global Responsibility to Protect, vol. 4, 
n.º 2, pp. 154-171. 
Solangon, Sarah and Preeti Patel (2012). «Sexual Violence against Men in Countries Af-
fected by Armed Conflict». Conflict, Security and Development, vol. 12, n.º 4, pp. 417-442. 
St. Germain, Tonia and Susan Dewey (eds) (2012). Conflict-related Sexual Violence: Interna-
tional Law, Local Responses. Sterling: Kumarian Press. 
Teitel, Ruti G. (2010). Transitional Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Teitel, Ruti G. and R. Howse (2010). “Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why Interna-
tional Law Really Matters». Global Policy, vol 1, nº2.
Teitel, Ruti G. (2011). Humanity’s Law. Oxford : Oxford University Press.
Thürer, Daniel (2011). International Humanitarian Law: Theory, Practice, Context. The Hague: 
Hague Academy of  International Law.
Tillion, Germaine (1960). Les Ennemis Complémentaires. Paris: Ed. De Minuit.
Tuchman, Barbara W. (1984). The March of  Folly. From Troy to Vietnam. New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf.
United Nations (UN) (2012). Report of  the Secretary-General on women and peace and security. 
S/2012/732. 2 October. Available at http://reliefweb.int/report/world/report-sec-
retary-general-women-peace-and-security-s20021154
United Nations Secretary-General Database on Violence against Women: http://sgdata-
base.unwomen.org/home.action
United Nations (UN) (2007). Report of  the Secretary-General on the protection of  civilians in 
armed conflict. S/2007/643. 28 October.
UN High-Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Available at www.ohchr.org/
EN/Issues/Women/SRWomen/Pages/Documents.aspx (Documents on violence 
against women)
UN High-Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)  
Women and Girls Fleeing Conflict: Gender and the Interpretation and Application of  the 1951 
Refugee Convention (2012). Geneva: UNHCR.
Note on International Protection: Report of  the High Commissioner. A/AC.96/1110 (4 
July 2012), especially paragraphs 24, 29-32, available at http://www.unhcr.
Gender Violence in Armed conflicts124
org/501fc18d9.pdf  and A/AC.96/1110/Add. 1, paragr. 16, available at http://www.
unhcr.org/501fd0739.pdf  
UNDP/GROOTS
Leading Resilient Development: Grassroots Women Priorities, Practices and Innovations (2011). 
New York. Available at http://reliefweb.int/report/bolivia/leading-resilient-devel-
opment-grassroots-womens-priorities-practices-innovations 
USIP 
David R. Smock and Daniel Server (eds) (2012). Facilitating Dialogue: USIP’s Work in 
Conflict Zones. Washington D.C. 
Kelvin Ong (2012). Managing Fighting Forces. DDR in Peace Processes. Washington D.C. 
Kathleen Kuehnast, Chantal de Jonge Ourast and Helga Hernes (eds) (2011). Women 
and War : Power and Protection in the 21st Century. Washington D.C.
Veuthey, Michel (1993). “The Contribution of  International Humanitarian Law to the 
Restoration of  Peace” in  Kevin M. Cahill (ed), A Framework for Survival : Health, Hu-
man Rights, and Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters. New York: Routledge, 
pp. 41-51
Veuthey, Michel (2006). «Implementing International Humanitarian Law. Old and New 
Ways» in Bertrand G. Ramcharan (ed), Human Rights Protection in the Field. Leiden/
Boston : Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 87-117
Veuthey, Michel (2008). «Religions et Droit International Humanitaire: Histoire et Actu-
alité d’un Dialogue Nécessaire» in Anne-Sophie Millet-Devalle (ed), Religions et Droit 
International Humanitaire. Paris: Pedone, pp. 9-45. 
Veuthey, Michel (2012). “Humanitarian Diplomacy: Saving It When it is Most Needed” 
in Alexandre Vautravers and Yvita Fox (eds), Humanitarian Space. Webster University 
Geneva 16th Humanitarian Conference. Geneva, Webster University, pp. 195-208.
Walzer, Michael (1977). Just and Unjust Wars. New York: Basic Books.
Williams, Jody (2012). Devastating Remnants of  War: the Impact of  Armed Conflict on Women 
and Girls. New York: Seven Stories Press, pp. 109-116. 
Wilmshurst, Elizabeth, Steven Haines et al. (eds) (2012). International Law and the Classifica-
tion of  Conflicts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Women’s Initiative for Gender Justice Gender in Practice: Guidelines and Methods to Address 
Gender Based Crimes in Armed Conflict. The Hague. Available at http://www.iccwomen.
org/whatwedo/training/docs/Gender_Training_Handbook.pdf
Zehfuss, Maja (2012). “Killing Civilians: Thinking the Practice of  War”. The British Journal 
of  Politics and International Relations, vol. 14, n.º 3, pp. 423-440. Available at http://
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2011.00491.x/asset/bjpi491.pd
f?v=1&t=hbl5xtew&s=b216543d00b34bea56b2c9afc73aa5c34e8e1d90 
IDN CADERNOS 125
Websites
www.icrc.org (ICRC) http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/
p0739.htm (How Does Law Protect in War?) http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/
documents/publication/p4082.htm (Children)
www.unwomen.org (UN Women) http://sgdatabase.unwomen.org/home.action 
https://peaceorganizations.unwomen.org (Global Database of  Women’s Peacebuilding 
Organizations) http://nobelwomensinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/
UN_Strategic_Framework.pdf  (Stop Rape Now – UN Action Against Sexual Vio-
lence in Conflict) 
www.securitycouncilreport.org (Security Council Report)
www.whatsinblue.org (Insights on the work of  the UN Security Council)
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N12/526/64/PDF/N1252664.
pdf?OpenElement (Annual Report)
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43804#.UNXgCKXoGQs (DRC, 
December 2012)
http://www.un.org/apps/news/newsmakers.asp?NewsID=73 (Michelle Bachelet)
http://www.un.org/apps/news/newsmakers.asp?NewsID=72 (Margareta Wahlström)
www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43723&Cr=sexual+violence&Cr1=#.
UNXjJKXoGQs (Z. Bangura)
www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43766&Cr=violence+against+women&
Cr1=#.UNXjyKXoGQs 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43781&Cr=ivoire&Cr1=#.UNXi-
YaXoGQs (Ivory Coast)
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/ (MONUSCO)
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/  (UNAMID)
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmiss/ (UNMISS)
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/ (UNOCI)
http://unama.unmissions.org/ (UNAMA)
http://www.unocha.org
http://www.unocha.org/top-stories/all-stories/cerf-life-saving-aid-pregnant-women-
syria
http://www.unocha.org/top-stories/all-stories/cerf-supporting-moves-prevent-gender-
based-violence-colombia
www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Women/
Gender Violence in Armed conflicts126
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Women/SRWomen/Pages/Documents.aspx
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Civilians%20S2007643.pdf  
http://www.unicef.org/hac2012/index.html (UNICEF Humanitarian Action for Chil-
dren 2012)
http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/en/news-and-publications/publications.html
www.unhcr.ch (UNHCR Global Report) 
https://itunes.apple.com/en/app/learn-connect/id500709403?mt=8 (Learn & Connect 
App)
www.reliefweb.int (OCHA)
http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/ (Inter-Agency Standing Committee - IASC)
http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org (Global Protection Cluster – IASC)
www.globalprotectioncluster.org/en/areas-of-responsibility/gender-based-violence.
html
IDN CADERNOS 127
Gender Based Violence in Armed Conflicts: 
Women’s Rights and International Law
Teresa Pizarro Beleza
Full Professor and Dean, Faculdade de Direito, Universidade Nova de Lisboa. tpb@fd.unl.pt
“(…) If  women were human, would we be a cash crop shipped from Thailand in containers into New 
York’s brothels? Would we have our genitals sliced out to purify us (of  what?) and to bid and define 
our cultures? Would we be used as breeders, made to work without pay our whole lives, burned when 
our dowry money wasn’t enough or when men tired of  us, starved as widows when our husbands died 
if  we survived his funeral pyre, forced to sell ourselves sexually because men won’t value us for anything 
else?   (…)”1  
Women’s Rights: Why Do We Still Have to Talk about Them? 
Is ‘Equality’ Not Enough?
Human Rights (HR) belong to all humans. This could be considered today as a 
simple truism. But the apparently obvious truth is not very old, totally universal or even 
consensual.
There is a relatively common wisdom according to which the problem is ‘simply’ to 
attain Gender Equality. And that this is a goal for and about Women. On the other hand, 
many believe that Gender Equality problems no longer exist, because sex discrimination 
has been outlawed in virtually the whole world (in fact, not quite) and the vast majority of  
countries have signed international conventions that enshrine sex equality as a major ob-
jective and a positive obligation of  States. The most conspicuous and the most relevant 
is CEDAW, the Convention Against All Forms of  Discrimination Against Women (UN, 1979). 
But if  one opens a newspaper, either on paper or online, and reads news like this 
one from Kabul, it becomes clear that the disrespect for the human rights of  women 
has special or particular dimensions, in the sense that often the violation of  women’s hu-
man rights is directly connected with their sex or, better put, with the dominant gender 
relations in the society where they live. Some such news is not totally understandable in 
terms of  equality versus discrimination, because the violation of  fundamental rights in 
extreme situations is often beyond the reasoning of  ‘equality’, anyway. Would violence 
be acceptable if  equally distributed? The answer of  course is ‘No’; although one can say 
1 Catharine MacKinnon (1999). Are Women Human?. Available at http://www.nostatusquo.com/ACLU/
mackinnon/mackin1.html
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that violence is also a means of  fostering or perpetuating inequality, because it hinders 
its victims of  a fully enjoyed and lived public or private life. Sometimes it deprives its 
victims of  life altogether.
“KABUL, Afghanistan — When she refused to prostitute herself  or have sex 
with the man she was forced to marry when she was about 13, officials said, 
Sahar Gul’s in-laws tortured her and threw her into a dirty, windowless cellar for 
months until the police discovered her lying in hay and animal dung.”2 
On the other hand, if  one reads about the millions missing women in China and In-
dia due to systematic “Gendercide”, or “Femicide”, new words for an old phenomenon, 
one has to accept that there is in fact a strange discrimination dimension in the most basic 
and literally lethal ways of  violating human rights: sex-related abortion and infanticide or 
slow, selective starvation of  girls that lead to distorted sex ratios of  the general popula-
tion in such countries and are invariably connected with the inferior status of  women in 
those societies.
Gender based violence in armed conflicts is another common and widespread ex-
ample of  gross violation of  human rights, more often than not directed against women, 
often civilians and or refugees, caught in the midst of  armed conflict. There is of  course 
also a gender dimension in many violations of  men’s human rights in armed conflicts. 
The obvious example is the common practice of  sexualised acts of  torture practiced 
on men, or even the indirect attack on their ‘honour’ by raping or otherwise mistreating 
their female next of  kin, in order to subdue or humiliate them. Even if  the primary direct 
victims obviously are the women in such cases, men’s traditional role as such is often in-
tentionally put into question in those situations. But the usual meaning of  the expression 
‘Gender based violence in armed conflicts’ points in particular towards the suffering of  
women, often civilians, in the context of  war, of  whatever kind. And that is why there is 
a strong and important connection between the struggles against Gender based violence 
in armed conflicts and ‘Women’s Rights in International Law’3.
Human Rights, Women’s Rights: ‘Women’ and ‘Gender’
The history of  (“Western”) Human Rights embodies a non linear, fragmentary 
inclusion of  large groups of  people that were excluded from various Declarations 
or social and political practices. A major and obvious such group is formed by the 
people we describe as women. The United Nations (UN) have long pursued in various 
ways a deliberate policy of  advancing the status of  women. From the beginnings of  the or-
2 Graham Bowley (2012). “Wed and Tortured at 13, Afghan Girl Finds Rare Justice”. The New York Times, 
12th August. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/world/asia/wed-and-tortured-at-13-
afghan-girl-finds-rare-justice.html?pagewanted=2&src=recg
3 From the Program of  the Seminar: “Violence based on gender is considered the worst form of  cruelty that 
seriously inhibits the individual ability to enjoy rights and freedoms and seriously harms the transition from 
armed conflicts to peace. Moreover, it affects deeply women, men, girls and boys across the world not only 
during armed conflicts but also long time after the cessation of  armed hostilities. Therefore, gender based 
violence protracts armed conflicts even after the arms lay down, undermining the link between security 
and development. GBV is, indeed, considered the ultimate generational form of  violence.”
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ganization, it became clear to some that human rights have a particularly strong gender 
dimension. The more obvious side is women’s subordination or, as more commonly put, 
discrimination against women.
The UN Charter of  1945 and later, to this day, all major International HR docu-
ments promised gender equality, or at least non discrimination. Yet, the UN itself  fails to 
fulfil the obligation to have a fair percentage of  women in its top posts, and the first time 
that a woman opened the debates in the GA happened only very recently, in 2011, with 
the President of  Brazil, Dilma Roussef.
Vienna, 1993 (UN Conference on Human Rights) is a date to remember: Women’s 
rights are human rights. Apparently, this was a not so obvious truism that needed to be said4.
But “Gender Issues” is of  course a much broader concept that reflects the progres-
sive awareness of  the fact that both men and women can be limited or victimized by the 
imposition of  gender roles, be it by law or by custom. Child soldiers (and soldiers in gen-
eral) are predominantly male, and one of  the more obvious associations with masculinity 
is the triad violence/weapons/war. While female genital mutilation has been condemned 
by all sorts of  HR texts, documents and in all sorts of  international fora, male children cir-
cumcision is also being questioned on the grounds of  a right to body integrity. So is early 
surgical intervention on ‘intersex’ newborn children. Some male athletes were dismayed 
when they found that the Olympic authorities barred them from competing as synchro-
nized swimmers, considered too ‘feminine’ a modality.  Parental leave has been extended 
to fathers in many countries and child custody is being fought for by fathers who demand 
that their parental role be considered as seriously as mothers’ role traditionally has been, 
etc. Sexual orientation or preference has come to the fore as a HR issue in recent years, 
with courts and laws changing dramatically in some countries (from decriminalization of  
same sex activities to the possibility of  formal marriage5). So has the supposed immuta-
bility of  sexual or gender identity, with more and more countries allowing a legal change 
of  sex and the UN or the European Court of  Human Rights (ECHR) stating sexual 
identity as a right and including the possibility of  change as protected6. 
Nonetheless, it is fair to accept that the issue of  gender in human rights instruments and 
4 “The human rights of  women and of  the girl-child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of  universal 
human rights. The full and equal participation of  women in political, civil, economic, social and cultural life, at 
the national, regional and international levels, and the eradication of  all forms of  discrimination on grounds 
of  sex are priority objectives of  the international community.” UN Conference on Human Rights (1993).
5 In 2010, Portugal altered its Civil, Code to include same sex marriage. The law had recognized “de facto 
unions” between two people of  same or different sex since 2001. The Constitution included “sexual ori-
entation” as an explicit forbidden ground of  discrimination in 2005 – and the lawyers have ever since been 
discussing its implications. Adoption or artificial insemination is still legally forbidden to same sex couples.
6 UN, Human Rights Council: ‘A resolution submitted by South Africa requesting a study on discrimination 
and sexual orientation (A/HRC/17/L.9/Rev.1) passed, 23 to 19 with 3 abstentions, in the Human Rights 
Council on June 17, 2011. This is the first time that any United Nations body approved a resolution affirm-
ing the rights of  LGBT people. The resolution calls on the office of  United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights Navi Pillay to draw up the first U.N. report on challenges faced by gay people worldwide.’ 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sexual_orientation_and_gender_identity_at_the_United_Nations#UN_
Human_Rights_Council_Resolution (for a good overview) - acc. 12 September 2012.
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discourse arose from the awareness of  the absence or limited protection of  women. This is 
also true about Gender Studies in general. Masculinities studies followed on Women Studies. 
The research on the social, economic, political, legal situation of  women as a lower caste (see 
Cass Sunstein) entailed the investigation of  the social construction of  gender relations. And 
the social system of  gender relations is most deeply marked by an imbalance of  power in 
various spheres of  life that, on the whole, predominantly favours men against women - some 
men against some women, of  course. The gender system is not isolated from class, race or any 
other basis or ‘pretext’ of  domination. Imbalance of  power, domination, and discrimina-
tion are functions of  many variables, intertwined and mutually influential. The official Eu-
ropean Union (EU) policy on discrimination has notably been insisting on the need to con-
sider multiple discrimination a major fundamental rights problem. Things become even more 
complicated when it comes to intersectional discrimination (e.g., discrimination against ‘black 
women’, or ‘immigrant women’, or ‘Muslim men’, or any such combination of  factors).
Gender Identity, Gender Relations, Gender System 
It is important to notice that the various social and legal changes that have taken 
place in recent years have not in general challenged the identification-by-gender (as op-
posed to what happened with race, most notoriously) or its dual nature, even if  biologists 
as Fausto-Sterling or writers as Virginia Woolf  have considered that two sexes are too 
few for human variation and richness. For common sense as well for the hegemony in 
scientific and other discourses (legal, most obviously!) two is the only possible number. 
Now, the history of  law and custom suggest that the deviation of  the supposedly natu-
ral behaviour in gender terms has always been more or less severely repressed, which 
questions any simple belief  in the sheer basis on nature – and finally the inevitability of  
categorization by gender and its stern dual persistence. 
In fact, people do not ‘belong’ to a gender. They live in a gender relations system which 
associates imbalances of  power with natural sex differences. The Law has been a major 
actor, together with religion, custom, science in the building of  a hierarchy, an imbalanced 
difference, between men and women – just as it did (and still does, for sure) in many places 
and centuries with race or religion.
Gender is not only about individual identity or what a society teaches us a man or 
woman, boy or girl should be like or how they should behave. Gender is also a way of  
structuring relations of  power - whether that is within families, where the man is often 
considered the head of  the household, or in societies at large, where men tend to be the 
ones in whose hands political, economic, and religious and other forms of  cultural power 
are concentrated.
Women Treated in an Inferior Way to Men: Exclusion, Oppression, 
and Discrimination
In most if  not all societies in the world as we know it, women are considered and treat-
ed as inferior to men, or have been so in the very recent past. The ways and manners that 
such inferiority is rationalized or practiced vary immensely, but Anthropology has noted 
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both this variation and its constancy. This can be observed in all spheres of  life, including 
the public arena (political participation, rules of  nationality, Armed Forces), the so called 
private life (family, personal relationships, codes of  behaviour) and the mixed area of  work 
and employment. The division of  such spheres is in itself  problematic from the point of  
view of  Women’s Rights, precisely because the most traditional way of  submitting women is to pri-
vatise them – mostly through their husbands (and before that, by their fathers). On the other 
hand the “private life” is strongly regulated by legal norms of  a compulsory, non-optional 
nature (Family Law, most obviously; but also Criminal Law about sex crimes), which shows 
the problematic nature of  the division between “public” and “private”.
Public Arena (Public Sphere): Nulla Mulier in Ecclesia
In the so-called Public Arena, women have been barred from political participation, 
discriminated against by the legal rules of  nationality, and totally or partially excluded 
from the Armed Forces. This means that their link to the State, their statehood, is indirect 
(through Father and Husband). Rules of  propriety, or appropriate behaviour, reinforce 
the private, secluded realm of  women’s lives that seem to perpetuate for many centuries 
the Greek tradition of  the confinement of  women to the Gynaecium. So called Victo-
rian morals and the absolute creed in the appropriate nature of  different spheres is but 
an extreme recent example of  such survival of  the centuries old doctrine. The tradition 
of  Roman Family Law, coupled with Greek Classical Philosophy – Aristotle most par-
ticularly in De Generatione Animalium – seem to be the distant but persistent roots of  the 
Western sexist Civilization.
Nulla mulier in ecclesia: Women should be silent in public. The Seneca Falls Conven-
tion, 1848, that proclaimed the Declaration of  Sentiments, the somewhat belated feminist 
replica to the Declaration of  Independence of  1776, has its origin in the reaction of  two 
Women Activists in the Anti-Slavery Movement. They attended the London Conference 
on Abolition, being major activists, but were not allowed to speak due to their sex. They 
had to stay in the gallery and shut up. 
In France, the revolutionary Declaration des Droits de l´Homme et du Citoyen (1789) was 
quickly followed by the prohibition of  women’s political clubs and Olympe de Gouges al-
ternative Declaration des Droits de la Femme et de la Citoyenne (1791) had to wait almost 200 years 
to become a reality in French law and politics. Women’s suffrage only arrived in the home 
of  the French Revolution in 1948. Olympe herself  was executed under Robespierre in the 
guillotine, giving a chilling (in)consistency to her claim of  uniting the access to the scaffold 
and to the tribune7. The republican concept of  citizenship is – was born as – “male”.
Often women’s participation in revolutionary movements is not ‘rewarded’ when the 
change in the political regime consolidates itself. The most recent and clear example of  
such phenomenon is probably the ‘Arab Spring’.
7 Benoîte Groult (2013). Ainsi Soit Olympe de Gouges. Paris : Grasset. Isabel do Carmo e Lígia Amâncio (2004). 
Vozes Insubmissas. Lisboa: D. Quixote.
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Paid Work: Employment
At work, all over the world women earn less, they do not easily reach the top of  pro-
fessional careers, they carry the burden of  double or triple work (paid professional work; 
unpaid care work at home, doing housework, and taking care of  children, other relatives 
and also in-laws); they will often have to interrupt work or work part time because of  ma-
ternity, suffering setbacks in their professional careers or being made to make and carry 
on “impossible choices”; they can be stopped from getting a job (or even be thrown out 
from school) because they are pregnant; they can suffer from sexual harassment that is 
not taken seriously. 
Private Sphere: Family, Sexuality and Reproduction
In the family, their share of  care work is unfair, and home authority is traditionally 
the man; laws protect that authority until did so until very recently; some customary laws 
still do; some confessional laws (Islamic, e.g.) still do; domestic violence compounds the 
subordination. 
Sexuality: Women are portrayed as objects of  pleasure for men. Their “autonomous” 
sexuality is often denied; repression of  homosexual relations – also in the case of  women 
- is connected with gender inequality, because lesbian relationships question the male 
hegemony in sexual and social terms. Pornography (or even seemingly ‘harmless’ sexist 
advertisements) can be harmful to women. The exploitation of  the female body as an 
enticement to multiple products has become endemic in countries like Italy. The general 
context of  representations of  sexuality and in particular certain forms of  pornography 
have evolved towards what can be described as rape culture. Rape is the crime tradition-
ally most underreported and under-repressed, making the shame fall uncritically on the 
victims. Rape and connected acts have only very recently been recognized as serious 
crimes against Humanity by International Law, mostly by the Rome Statute (ICC, 1998) 
and in the case law of  ad hoc criminal courts (Rwanda, ex-Jugoslavia). And yet they have 
been the staple diet of  invading armies everywhere.
Reproduction, a process that affects women in a most obvious way, both in terms 
of  pregnancy and motherhood, has in most places and in many ways traditionally been 
controlled by men. Legislation, religious restrictions or medical practices related to birth 
control and abortion have in many ways been out of  women’s hands. And so is artificial 
insemination, because authority in the legislative, religious, and medical spheres is still 
largely in the hands of  men.
Equality, Discrimination and Rights
Societies all over the world are marked by imbalanced gender relations. The phenom-
enon takes quite different shapes and sizes. Anthropology has noticed both its variation 
and its ubiquity.
In “modern”, developed countries, the hegemonic legal and political way of  deal-
ing with the perceived imbalance of  “Gender” is the framework of  an inseparable pair: 
Equality and Discrimination. This presupposes that people are naturally men (male) and 
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women (female), that somehow an imbalance has been established between these catego-
ries and that Law – and to some extent Politics, including legislation – has to be called 
upon to correct the asymmetries.
For historical and political reasons, this path has been particularly resorted to in the 
context of  the labour market. The original version of  Art. 119 of  the Treaty of  Rome 
1950 (European Economic Community, later European Union) – drafted for fighting 
unfair competition based on cheap female labour – partly dictated a sharp concentration 
of  EEC policies and directives on (paid) work, employment, salaries and similar issues.
This traditional way of  dealing with inequality forgets, among other things:
(1) That Law was to a large extent complicit in creating the very inequality that it is 
supposed to fight;
(2) That the very concepts of  men and women are historically – and also legally – 
created by a plurality of  discourses, and are normatively endowed with expecta-
tions and presuppositions that must be deconstructed;
(3) That the philosophical tradition (of  Aristotelian origin) that correlates equality 
and difference does not question the perception of  difference (who says what is differ-
ent and why, and on whose authority) and mixes difference with submission;
(4) It also fails to see that the problem is not difference, but subordination, domina-
tion, exclusion; to put it another way: hierarchical difference;
(5) Nor does it question the assumption that its reasoning tends to equate male=norm 
and female=deviance; the ‘false neutral’ is male;
(6) It tends to consider all men and all women as two homogeneous groups, there-
fore assuming an essence (‘Das ewig Weiblich’) in their nature and features, which is 
empirically and historically untenable; 
(7) The concentration on paid work is short sighted and inefficient.
Difference, like beauty, is largely in the eye of  the beholder.
What one sees, the beholder’s vision, is shaped by power relations, stereotypes, he-
gemonic discourse, and common sense. Prejudice and habits, traditions, and personal or 
common held beliefs – prejudicial conceptions, preconceptions – determine what he/she 
is able to see and how to interpret it, to give meaning to it.
Discursive power, like all power, is unevenly distributed and complex. The power to 
determine, to define, to label, to establish difference (the existence and meaning thereof) 
belongs to few. So does the power to be heard and to establish patterns or rules. 
So, treating the “similar” alike and the “dissimilar” (different) unalike (Aristotle) begs 
the question of  what is similar or dissimilar, of  who says so and based on what. 
It is at best a self-fulfilling prophecy. The same remain the same, the different remain 
different. At worst, it will create, justify or reaffirm/reinforce power hierarchies that can 
be extremely harmful to the ones at the bottom, the so called “different”: Jews; Women; 
Blacks; Gays and Lesbians; Foreigners; the Old; the Poor; the Immigrants; the Sick; the 
Other.
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The French philosopher Simone de Beauvoir8, was one of  the best theorizers of  
woman seen and treated as ‘the other’; to this day we can see how that idea is persistent; 
it is always ‘women’s difference’ that is supposed to need explanation or justification, 
even if  they are the majority of  the world population; whether we are dealing with 
pregnancy or with female judges or politicians, the question is always: what is the 
equivalent in men – for pregnancy? Or: do women do it differently from men? Are they 
better, more moral, more compassionate – as judges and politicians? The question is 
never asked the other way round.
Human Rights Declarations: Universality and Exclusion 
“The International Bill of  Human Rights, combined with related human rights treaties, thus lays down 
a comprehensive set of  rights to which all persons, including women, are entitled. However, the fact of  
women’s humanity proved insufficient to guarantee them the enjoyment of  their internationally agreed 
rights…”9
Universal in their language, the Declarations of  Rights always seem to leave some 
people out. As a matter of  fact, most humans were left out of  the circle of  the ‘protected’ 
happy few. In some cases, this happened in an explicit way: “the merciless indian savages” 
were considered out of  the ‘All Men are born equal…’ of  the American Declaration of  
Independence, 1776. More often than not the exclusion happened in an implicit way, and 
sometimes it would later become explicit: the women, the slaves or the colonial peoples, 
the poor, the disenfranchised (United States of  America, 1776; France, 1789)
Sometimes the implicit exclusion needed to be made explicit: the Portuguese elec-
toral republican law of  1911 was changed in 1913 after the medical doctor and widow 
Carolina Beatriz Ângelo had managed to be admitted to the vote in the elections for the 
Constituent Assembly of  1911, claiming to be the head of  the family (being a widow and 
a mother). The wording of  the law was changed to ‘male heads of  family’.
Women’s Rights in International Law
But the fine words of  these documents and of  the Vienna Declaration in 1993 and the declaration of  
Beijing in 1995 stand in sharp contrast to the daily reality of  life for millions of  women.  Of  the 1.3 
billion people living in poverty, 70 per cent are women; the majority of  the world’s refugees are women; 
female illiteracy is invariably higher than male illiteracy. Women and girl-children are treated as com-
modities in cross-border prostitution rackets and the pornography industry. 
Mary Robinson, HCHR, 2000
8 See Simone de Beauvoir (1947). Le Deuxième Sexe. Paris: Gallimard.
9 Acc. March 2009. Available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/history.htm
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Most international and regional Organizations have fostered Conventions or created 
structures to fight against sex discrimination, as it happened with other discrimination 
factors, most notably ‘race’. 
The most obvious change has perhaps been from some sort of  chivalrous respect 
(as with the Geneva Conventions: “respect due to their sex”) to the idea of  Equality 
(many UN Conventions on Women’s rights and all the various non discrimination 
clauses) and finally the beginning of  the questioning of  natural roles and divisions of  
labour and spheres. This last step happens most obviously with CEDAW and its insist-
ence on challenging the division of  roles and tasks between men and women as one 
major condition for changing gender relations. Considering that the Convention dates 
form 1979, the idea is quite ahead of  its time and the common belief  on a natural and 
to a large extent immutable division of  male and female roles lingers in all societies as 
a persistent and …
The United Nations were the first major international organization to vouch for 
the prohibition of  sex discrimination and the creation of  organizational structures to 
promote the status of  women. All its major texts, from the Charter to the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR, 1948) and the International Covenants on Civil 
and Economic Rights (ICCPR and ICSECR, 1966) contain clauses on sex discrimination. 
Various Conventions on Women’s Rights (political participation, nationality of  married 
women, etc) were amalgamated into a general Women’s Convention in 1979 (CEDAW). 
The fact that these Conventions were created reveals the awareness that the ‘equality 
clauses’ were far from being enough to protect the rights of  women. The World Confer-
ences on women often verified that the Conventions themselves are not strong enough 
against centuries old habits and prejudices (Mexico, 1975; Nairobi, 1980 Copenhagen, 
1985; Beijing, 1995).
The European Union and the Council of  Europe (CoE) have been two major actors 
on European territory. A major comment on the role of  law on the part of  the latter is 
quite clear. Law is important, but insufficient. The fight against discrimination is a slow 
social and political process.
[CE, Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)17]
“While formal gender equality can be achieved quite rapidly by enshrining this principle 
into constitutions, laws or specific norms, the same does not happen in regard to sub-
stantive gender equality. Its achievement is a complex process which must be regularly 
monitored and evaluated. 
As a first step it requires an in-depth knowledge of  women’s and men’s real situation in all 
areas of  life, and of  the obstacles and barriers that stand in the way of  gender equality. A 
second step consists in the devising of  strategies, plans and programs to overcome these 
obstacles and barriers. A third step is the implementation of  these strategies and plans 
and their regular assessment and evaluation, a process that requires adequate tools and 
instruments to measure progress.”
And so have the Organization of  African Unity and the Organization of  American 
States on their respective continents.
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As in other parts of  the world, in Africa the idea won that the African Charter 
on Human Rights an Peoples’ Rights, 1981, was not ‘enough’ to protect women. The 
Maputo Protocol on the Rights of  Women in Africa – a most advanced text was signed in 
2003 to create this extra protection.
In the Americas, the American Convention on Human Rights, 1969, has been sup-
plemented by, among others, the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punish-
ment and Eradication of  Violence against Women (Belém do Pará, 1994).
In all three continents the case law of  some courts, both national and international, 
has contributed in a significant manner to the definition of  the legal protection of  wom-
en and the fight against discrimination – most notably, the European Court of  Justice, 
the ECHR, the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights some domestic courts like the 
Constitutional Court of  South Africa.
More recently, the ad hoc Criminal Courts for ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the 
International criminal Court (ICC) have made significant progress in giving international 
visibility to serious violations of  women’s rights in situations of  extreme violence and 
total disrespect for HR in general.
Looking at the paraphernalia of  texts, structures, committees, courts, rapporteurs, spe-
cial missions and proclamations in International Law and Organizations, one has the 
contradictory feeling that everything has changed and that nothing (or almost nothing) 
has changed10. Certainly some rules of  European Directives on Equality and Discrimina-
tion (EU), or some articles of  the latest Council of  Europe Convention on Preventing 
and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (CoE, Istanbul, 2011) 
would seem quite impossible not so many years ago. Even some clauses of  CEDAW and 
some opinions of  its Committee on concrete cases of  complaints seem quite impossibly 
advanced, in social and political terms. But when one looks at persistent forms of  Gender 
Inequality, particularly when associated with poverty and continuous insecurity or war, 
the wealth of  legal rules seems powerless to contradict the whims of  economic power or 
of  authoritarian rulers, often in some kind of  mutual association and interdependence.  
But so is the plight of  International Law – and maybe of  Law in general.
10 A very interesting and recent comment can be read at The New York Times of  16th February, 2013: “Why 
Gender Equality Stalled”, by Stephanie Coontz. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/17/opin-
ion/sunday/why-gender-equality-stalled.html?pagewanted=3&_r=0&smid=fb-share 
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Introduction
To what extent is gender integrated into the EU’s Common Security and Defense 
Policy (CSDP)? This paper first addresses why it is important to address gender, as an 
aspect in the EU Foreign and Security Policy in general and in CSDP in particular. Sec-
ondly, it describes the various EU commitments and policy documents that are seeking 
to advance its implementation of  the key UN Security Council Resolutions on Women, 
Peace and Security. These are divided into three main objectives: (A) UNSCR 1325 as a 
political objective; (B) CSDP and – to be addressed only briefly – (c) humanitarian as-
sistance and development co-operation. Thirdly, the paper analyses to what extent the 
EU has been making a difference in advancing the cause of  women in peace and security 
– particularly through CSDP – and outlines a number of  challenges. Finally, a way ahead 
towards “1325 + 25” is suggested so that – hopefully – by 2025 “gender, peace and secu-
rity” will have become common place in EU crisis management.
1 This article is written on a personal basis and does not necessarily reflect any institutional positions. The 
author is a Dutch national who works as an official for the European External Action Service, as of  1 
January 2013 for the Security Policy and Conflict Prevention Directorate. She previously worked for the 
General Secretariat of  the Council of  the European Union in various capacities and directorates, namely 
from 2001-2003 on development co-operation, from 2003-2006 on human rights and from 2006 to 2012 
on Common Security and Defense Policy. She holds a PhD from the European University Institute and 
Master Degrees from the University of  Chicago and the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
Gender Violence in Armed conflicts138
Why Gender and CSDP?
The resolutions on Women, Peace and Security adopted over the years by the UN 
Security Council (UNSCRs), starting with the adoption of  UNSCR 1325 in 2000, where a 
recognition of  the fact prior, during and post conflict more had to be done to strengthen 
the protection of  women and girls, to prevent violence against them and to promote 
their participation in peace building and reconstruction.2 A particular role was seen for 
the United Nations and its Member States, especially in the context of  peacekeeping 
operations. 
Over time there was an increasing recognition of  the role of  women as active par-
ticipants in conflict in various roles – hence not only as victims – but also of  the often 
neglected impact on men and boys, particularly also as victims of  sexual violence. Hence, 
the use of  the term “gender” that aims to capture and make explicit the particular impact 
of  conflict on both men and women. Major General (ret) Patrick Cammaert – today 
one of  DPKO’s prominent trainers of  peacekeepers on countering sexual and gender 
based violence, famously said at Wilton Park in 2008: “it is perhaps more dangerous 
to be a woman than a soldier in armed conflict”.3 Atrocities documented during and 
after conflicts around the world testify to the biting truth of  that statement. There are 
many reasons as to why – 12 years after the adoption of  UNSCR 1325 and its successor 
resolutions – it remains important to integrate gender into the EU’s CSDP.  The Force 
Commander of  the second EU military operation in the DRC during the 2006 elections 
quoted the gender advisor of  his team as one of  the 10 key factors contributing to the 
success of  the mission.4 The Force Commander of  one of  the few EU operations with 
a protection element in its mandate, EUFOR Tchad (2008-2009) admitted that “We ini-
tially thought ‘gender issues’ were only about the behavior of  troops... not realizing the 
operational interest, the added value to the effectiveness of  the mission of  integrating 
gender perspectives”.5 Despite this recognition at senior level, both planners in Head 
Quarters and staff  in the field need to be constantly reminded of  the importance of  gen-
der aspects when planning new missions, reviewing ongoing ones and when conducting 
operations in theatre. Why is this the case? The 2010 UN inventory and others point out 
that sexual violence as an instrument of  war remains the least condemned war crime.6 
The notion that it is somehow a cultural or inevitable trait of  conflict has contributed 
to sexual violence not being condemned as a crime. A public/private divide in security 
2 1325 focused on increased participation and representation of  women and on mainstreaming a gender per-
spective in programming, training and peacekeeping. Follow-up resolutions to UNSCR 1325 strengthened 
the protection pillar: 1820 (focus on sexual violence), 1888 (introduced inter alia a Special Rapporteur and 
Expert Teams of  Women Protection Officers), 1889 and 1960 (set up a mechanism for compiling data and 
listing perpetrators sexual violence for sanctions).
3 Quoted in the UN analytical inventory of  peacekeeping practice, page 10. New York, June 2010.
4 Lessons identified EUFOR RDC 2006, doc. xxx/06
5 Brig. General Jean-Philippe Ganascia, former Force Commander of  EUFOR Chad, at EU Seminar in 
Brussels, 9 July 2009. Quoted in UN analytical inventory, page 18, New York, June 2010.
6 UN Inventory June 2010, Kvinna to Kvinna Report 2012, UNSG Report on 1325/1829 dated October 
2012
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policy has kept rape off  the radar screen. Public security issues receive more attention 
than what are considered “private” security concerns, even though the crime goes to the 
core of  protecting the safety of  citizens and their social fabric in all countries. Also sexual 
and gender based violence (SGVB) remains particularly invisible in a male dominated 
security sector – where women are afraid to report crimes to men with arms who they 
tend to see as a threat. Moreover, women and men play varying roles during conflict as 
early warners, victims, activists, peacebuilders, providers, combatants... but also as nego-
tiators? This turns out not to be the case.7 The term sexual violence is usually not even 
mentioned in the body of  the text of  such agreements even though there is no conflict in 
which it is not used as a tactic of  war. This is counter effective as impunity and gender-
blind peace agreements impede sustainable peace and security. Moreover, international 
law and Programmes of  Action clearly recognize that SGBV is not a women’s issue but 
a human rights issue that concerns us all.8
In 2012, the EU started to deploy new missions in the Horn of  Africa, South Sudan, 
Niger and is planning new deployments in Libya and Mali. Many of  these countries are 
listed by the October 2012 report on 1820 by the UN Secretary General as conflicts 
where parties perpetrate sexual violence as a tactic of  war. It is thus an impediment for 
the EU to ensure that it finds ways to effectively address gender aspects in the planning, 
conduct and review of  its missions and operations – as it has said it will in numerous 
policy statements and documents. To what extent then is gender an integral part of  EU 
external action?
The EU Approach towards Implementing the Key UN Security 
Council Resolutions
The adoption of  UNSCR 1325 coincided with the start of  the EU’s CSDP. Its very 
first deployment in the DRC in 2003 EU deployed staff  was immediately confronted 
with the different impact of  conflict on men and women. By 2012, with a total of  25 
civilian missions and military operations of  which 15 ongoing, the EU developed a 
comprehensive approach towards integrating gender aspects into CSDP encompassing 
foreign policy instruments such as diplomacy and CSDP as well as development and 
humanitarian assistance.
UNSCR 1325 as a Political Objective
The EU tries to adopt a holistic approach towards the implementation of  UNSCR 
1325 by gearing all its instruments towards the same objective, which is to ensure a gen-
der perspective to all EU activities. 
A number of  policy documents embody and set out this approach, of  which the 
7 A UNIFEM study points out that of  the major peace processes since 1992 women represented only 2,5% 
of  signatories, 3,2 % mediators, 5.5% witnesses, 7.6% negotiators - little has improved since 2000.
8 Geneva Conventions (protection civilians) 1977, Vienna Declaration and Programme of  Action 1993, Bei-
jing Platform for Action 1995, CEDAW (1981) and OP (2000) on elimination of  violence against women, 
ICC Rome Statute.
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most encompassing is the 2008 “Comprehensive approach to the EU Implementation 
of  the UNSCRs 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security”. The comprehensive ap-
proach is a cross-pillar which is still very relevant in today’s post-Lisbon Treaty context. 
It spans from conflict prevention to reconstruction and institution building. It calls for 
policy dialogue with local partners about women, peace and security issues as well as gen-
der mainstreaming in crisis management and long-term development strategies. It also 
lists specific activities to protect, support and empower women. Furthermore, it insists 
that indicators should be developed to verify implementation of  UNSCR 1325/1820. 
These were subsequently adopted and reported on in 2010, thus establishing a baseline 
for future comparison. The second report is now due mid 2013.
Other relevant documents include the 2003 EU Guidelines on Children and 
Armed Conflict which were revised in 2008, the 2008 EU Guidelines on Violence 
and Discrimination Against Women and Girls and the Guidelines on International 
Humanitarian Law from 2005 that were revised in 2009. These guidelines aimed to 
strengthen the EU’s human rights policy in this field and listed EU tools to combat 
violence and discrimination. 
The 2009 EU concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities 
has set a policy goal of  promoting the representation of  women and the availability 
of  adequate resources for dedicated mediation gender expertise from an early stage 
of  mediation processes onwards. Operational support has been given to a number of  
priority countries (including Libya, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen, Nigeria, Mali, Zimbabwe 
and DRC) as well as work on two thematic issues (security sector reform and the role 
of  women in peace processes). In all this work, the aim is to strengthen capacities and 
provide guidance for staff  as well as mainstreaming prevention throughout the EU’s 
work. Close cooperation with multilaterals and also, thanks to the Instrument for Sta-
bility, with a number of  NGOs, including those under the umbrella organization of  the 
European Peacebuilding Liaison Office. Most recently, in June 2012, the EU adopted 
a “Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy” where 
women are placed at the centre of  the EU’s relations with all third countries and in all 
areas of  its external action. The Human Rights country strategies also include report-
ing on women’s rights.
Finally, the so-called Copenhagen criteria remain of  relevance. In 1993 the European 
Council identified the economic and political requirements candidate countries will need 
to fulfill to join the EU. It also concluded that accession could take place as soon as 
they were capable of  fulfilling them. The political criteria include stability of  institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of  law, human rights, and respect for and protection 
of  minorities. A recent visit by a group of  women leaders from Kosovo to the EU Head 
Quarters stressed that this is a major leverage the EU should use to force partner and 
candidate countries to make progress on gender indicators and legislative reform to en-
sure equal treatment of  women and men. 
Now who is implementing the EU’s commitments on UNSCR 1325 as a political 
objective? 
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Internally, the EU has instituted a inter-service Task Force that includes staff  from 
across the EU institutions with many dedicated individuals - men and women - trying to 
make a difference in the various areas they work on - both inside the EU and outside the EU. 
Member States play an important role, more than half  of  the 27 Member States now 
have a National Actions Plans and some others are in the process of  developing one. 
Their representatives can raise gender related issues in all Council Working Parties and at 
Ambassadorial level whenever they feel that draft EU policy documents did not properly 
take into account gender aspects. 
The European Parliament is an active promoter of  UNSCR 1325 and its successors 
and adopted its own resolutions in 2000, 2006, 2009 and 2010.
The EU also actively works with Civil Society – in terms of  policy exchanges, fund-
ing, seminars and for instance studies.
In the external relations of  the EU, the High Representative / Vice-President Lady 
Catherine Ashton sees promoting the role of  women in peace and security as one of  her 
key priorities, particularly in countries in transition. She thus raises this issue regularly in 
her diplomatic contacts and public speeches and meets women human rights defenders 
where she can during her travels, such as recently in Egypt and Tunisia. She appointed 
in July 2012 a Special Representative on Human Rights, Mr. Stavros Lambrinidis, who is 
also on record as seeing this as one of  his priority issues to advance. The EU’s regional 
special representatives also have in their mandate to advance human rights issues and 
regularly report specifically on women’s rights. 
Of  course the EU Delegations play an important role in carrying out local dialogues 
with their counterparts and in co-ordination with other actors on the ground. The 2010 
indicators report found that women, peace and security related concerns were raised dur-
ing political dialogue with over 70 countries in 2010. 
The EU also raises gender related issues with its multilateral partners, such as the 
UN, AU, OSCE, NATO (at stafft-to-staff  level) and G8 and seeks to advance the imple-
mentation of  UNSCR 1325 together with them. This is done through exchanging best 
practice during for instance the EU-UN Steering Committee on Crisis Management or 
pledging concrete commitments, for instance during the Equal Partnerships Initiative 
that was launched in the margins of  the UN General Assembly in September 2012. 
Representatives of  international organizations are invited at the annual EU meeting on 
UNSCR 1325 which was originally meant to promote the adoption of  National Action 
Plans by Member States. 
Finally, promotion of  this political objective is funded in a variety of  ways. The EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security budget supports with about EUR 200 million a year the 
development and the implementation of  national action plans, funding for non-gov-
ernmental organizations and training for governmental agencies outside the EU. Some 
projects are financed through the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR), for example UN Women carrying out a project entitled “Women Connect 
Across Conflicts: Building Accountability for Implementation of  UN SCRs 1325” which 
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is implemented across South Asia, Southern Caucasus and Central Asia.9 The Instrument 
for Stability also has a special gender focus. It funds for instance UN Women and UNDP 
in promoting the implementation of  UNSCR 1325 in Liberia, Timor Leste and Kosovo 
(2 Mio Euros).10 
Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)
To what extent has the EU implemented its commitments under UNSCR 1325 and 
its successor resolutions in its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)? Over the 
past decade, a series of  guidelines and checklists has sought to address various aspects 
of  these resolutions.
In 2003 the EU adopted Guidelines on Protection of  Civilians in CSDP Missions 
and Operation. They were reviewed in 2010. Also in 2003 Generic Standards of  Behav-
ior for ESDP operations were adopted. Nowadays these standards – which amount to 
a zero tolerance policy – are included in the operational plans of  CSDP missions and 
operations.
In 2005 a checklist and in 2006 operational guidance on mainstreaming Gender into 
CSDP were developed. These documents intend to provide concrete operational guid-
ance to planners. 
Originally compiled in 2007, in 2008 all relevant documents were published in a 
kind of  handbook, entitled “Mainstreaming of  Human Rights and Gender into ESDP – 
Compilation of  Documents”. This compilation also provides numerous practical exam-
ples of  how the various EU commitments on human rights and gender can be concrete 
translated into job descriptions, pocket cards, planning documents and reviews. 
Also in 2008, the EU agreed on a further guiding document, titled “Implementation 
of  UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 1820 in the context of  CSDP”, which was reviewed and 
updated in March 2012. 
In 2010 lessons and best practice were identified on the extent to which these various 
documents had been implemented in practice and recommendations were formulated to 
seek further improvement. 
Finally, over time, training efforts increased: the European Security and Defense 
College started to include presentations on human rights and gender mainstreaming in 
its courses on CSDP (taught mainly by experts from within the External Action Service, 
previously Council Secretariat and Commission) and a number of  Member States devel-
oped more specific training sessions for future CSDP staff. In 2010, the EU decided that 
standard training modules should be developed. These are expected to be ready for use 
in 2013.
Apart from CSDP staff  in missions, obviously the planners in Head Quarters as well 
as the Heads of  Mission and Operation Commanders have to sensitized on the gender 
9 EIDHR totals 472 Mio Euros from 2011-2013
10 The IFS has a budget of  € 2.062 billion for 2007-2013, allocated as follows: short-term component: €1,487 
million (72% of  the total); long-term component: €484 million (23% of  the total). The remaining funds are 
allocated for administrative expenses.
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aspects of  their work. To that end, regular training sessions and meetings with experts 
have been set held and attempts are made to brief  new Heads of  Mission prior to their 
deployment. 
One of  the biggest contributions to mainstreaming has however been the decision 
to start deploying Human Rights and Gender Advisors to CSDP missions and opera-
tions. As shown in the graph below, starting with the EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh 
in 2005, this has now become common practice. Today, almost all CSDP missions and 
operations have a human rights and gender advisor (often the position is double hatted) 
or – in the case of  training missions – include specialized trainers on these issues as part 
of  the curriculum (e.g. EUTM Somalia, EUTM Mali).11
The work of  these human rights and gender advisors varies depending on the man-
date of  the missions/operations they work for. The point of  departure of  the work is 
typically the international human rights obligations and the national legal framework and 
institutions of  the host state. Examples include the following: 
• EUFOR Tchad: provided training, developed a comprehensive structure for 
monitoring and reporting, set up protection system around IDP camps;
• EUPOL Afghanistan: set up a hotline for female police officers under threat;
• EULEX Iraq: trained 450 female police/justice/penitentiary staff, improved de-
tention facilities separating women and children from men;
• EUPOL COPPS: installed a Gender Award, set up a pilot Female Police Corps 
Unit, established a cross-Ministerial coordination mechanism on gender;
• EULEX Kosovo: stepped up investigation and prosecution of  war rapes as well 
as the fight against trafficking, a Human Rights Panel was established in view of  
the executive mandate of  the mission;
• EUPOL RD Congo: a team of  experts on sexual violence was deployed in the 
East, gender training and advice is provided to police and military;
• EUMM Georgia: the gender advisor contributes to monitoring, training and re-
porting;
• EUTM Somalia: training of  soldiers includes human rights and gender aspects.
Another indicator to measure to what extent the EU is implementing UNSCR 1325 
is by analyzing whether over time more women have participated in CSDP missions (see 
figure 1 below). Thus far, these data have been compiled for civilian missions only, from 
2006 onwards. Although over the past 6 years, on average, the number of  women has 
almost remained constant, the number of  internationally deployed women has more than 
doubled (from 7,6% in 2006 to 15,6% in 2012). This indicates that more female police of-
fers, judges and other rule of  law experts have worked for EU civilian missions across the 
globe. The EU compares favorably to female expert staff  in UN missions in this regard.
11 At the moment EUAVSEC South Sudan does not have a human rights/ gender advisor. For statistics, 
see Hazelzet 2012, in “Human Rights in EU Crisis Management Operations: A Duty to Respect and to 
Protect?”, Aurel Sari and Ramses A. Wessel (eds), CLEER Working Papers 2012/6, pages 11-20.
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Figure 1 – Women deployed in civilian CSDP missions (data compiled by author on 
the basis of  statistics provided by EEAS/Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability).
Humanitarian Assistance and Development Co-operation
A third instrument through which the EU is mainstreaming gender, in addition from 
diplomacy and security, is through development co-operation and humanitarian assis-
tance. It is through these instruments that the EU is funding projects that aim to make a 
difference on the ground and where the EU and its Member States have potentially large 
leverage over beneficiaries. 
In 2007, the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid was adopted which indi-
cated the particular importance of  gender mainstreaming. That same year, a Commu-
nication and Council Conclusions were adopted by Ministers on Gender Equality and 
Women’s Empowerment in Development Cooperation.
An EU Action Plan on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Develop-
ment was adopted for the years 2010-2015. The most recent report on progress was 
finalized in December 2012.
Examples of  projects financed by the EU with a specific gender focus include the 
safe distribution of  food following natural disasters, financing of  advocacy tools, protec-
tion and support of  victims in DRC, training of  African Union troops in the UN Mission 
to Sudan as well as the financing of  special fire wood patrols to protect female refugees. 
Over time, the recognition of  the nexus between security and development has 
clearly grown within EU institutions. This is evidenced by the European External Action 
Services’ objective to ensure a “comprehensive approach” across EU policies and instru-
ments to any given situation. The nexus between security, development and human rights 
could still be further strengthened.12 
12 See Hazelzet 2012 in Sari ad Wessel.
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Challenges
Is the EU Making a Difference?
The EU’s publicly stated and repeated commitment to UNSCR 1325 and its succes-
sor resolutions is clear, and it has been followed by action at various levels: diplomacy, 
security, development and humanitarian assistance. 
There are certain limits to what can be done in the area of  CSDP as the activities of  
such missions depend on their mandates. The majority of  these missions and operations 
focus on training and advise – particularly in the domain of  justice and security sector 
reform – rather than on protection. Therefore, mainstreaming of  gender aspects has to 
be tailored to the tasks of  the mission/operation. 
The fact that the EU now has gender advisors in almost all its missions is a great sign 
of  its commitment and these experts are making a difference on the ground as the ex-
amples show. That said, their position - as well as that of  their counterparts at Headquar-
ters - could be strengthened at a strategic level as well as in terms of  human resources 
dedicated to this task. The fact that the latest report by the UN Secretary General on 
the implementation of  the various UN resolutions on Women, Peace and Security lists 
parties to conflict that use sexual and gender based violence as a tactic of  war in various 
countries where the EU is deploying CSDP missions (e.g. Mali, Libya) underscores the 
importance of  ensuring that expertise is included at the appropriate level.13
Strong coalitions have helped to advance gender mainstreaming both at Headquar-
ters and on the ground. A recent innovation that has started to bear fruit on the ground 
has been the result of  the EU Memorandum of  Understanding with UN Women. 
Projects have focused on sharing best practice between the UN, the EU and countries 
across the world in for instance drafting national action plans (e.g. Kosovo, Liberia and 
Timor Leste). The network of  NGOs brought together by the European Peacebuilding 
Liaison Office (EPLO) has been very active in providing additional expertise and insights 
to EU policy makers. There is still more to learn across international organizations (UN, 
NATO, OSCE, others), NGOs and others.
In terms of  mediation - an important pillar of  the resolutions on Women, Peace 
and Security – the EU has been financing the gender advisor in the UN mediation team. 
Some – particularly women groups from the Balkans – have argued that more could be 
done in this respect about including gender advisors (not just women) in EU mediation 
teams. 
An important geographical area where the impact on the ground of  the work on 
women, peace and security remains to be closely watched is Afghanistan, Iraq and the 
countries in transition following the Arab Spring. Whereas women human rights defend-
ers have been at the forefront of  transition, women’s rights could disturbingly easily be 
used as currencies in peace talks or post-transition arrangements as well as constitutional 
reform.
13 October 2012
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A Number of Challenges Stand Out
There is still a wide-spread perception or misunderstanding that gender is a women’s 
issue and that human rights are a “soft” security issue - not core to security and defense. 
When trying to counter this perception, for instance through training, it is difficult to 
broaden the audience and preach beyond the converted - especially if  such training is not 
mandatory. It is unclear how many of  the over 5300 currently deployed staff  members 
in 15 CSDP missions and operations were trained on gender. Of  those that were, the 
question is whether they were prepared for what they encountered. Although we noted 
a doubling of  female staff  deployed to civilian missions, the figures for the military op-
erations are not known but they are certainly lower. The question is what steps could be 
taken by the EU as well as by its Member States to increase female participation in CSDP. 
There is no lack of  instruments in place at the EU to help address gender main-
streaming: but it remains a challenge to actually deliver on this potential. The next indica-
tors report is due mid-2013 which would help to start identifying trends, gaps and best 
practice.
Finally, increasing public representation of  women is an important focus of  the 
work on Women, Peace and Security. Also here, the EU could make more headway. For 
instance, although the EEAS’s first head is a woman as is one of  her deputies, only 19% 
of  EU Heads of  Delegation are women and there are no female Heads of  Mission/ Op-
eration Commanders of  CSDP missions/operations.14 The first two female EU Special 
Representatives are in office today.
Way Ahead: 1325 + 25
Thanks to persistent lobbying work by women organizations and individuals across 
the globe over 12 years, today UNSCR 1325 is one of  most well-known UNSCRs. Does 
the EU stand out as an example for championing this resolution? It has the instruments, 
political will and guidelines in place to make a difference in practice. This article sought 
to show examples of  best practice as well as identify gaps and challenges. In 2012, the 
EU won the Nobel Peace Price – this comes with responsibility. There were no women 
around the table when the EU was created, today there are.
This article addressed only gender mainstreaming in the EU’s foreign and security 
policy, particularly in the field of  security and defense. Yet, gender based violence is a 
universal issue, that occurs also within the EU.15
If  we imagine the year 2025, the year in which UNSCR 1325 will be 25 years old. 
We are half  way, so there is still a lot that could be done to accomplish the objectives set 
out in the resolutions on Women, Peace and Security. Perhaps by 2025, we will speak of  
“Gender”, Peace and Security” highlighting the fact that these themes concern women 
14 Only one of  the very first civilian CSDP missions had a female Head of  Mission, namely EUJUST Themis 
in Georgia. All other missions were headed by men.
15 The European Institute for Democracy and Human Rights aims at publishing a report on this in 2013.
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and men alike. Perhaps by 2025, we will see a changing role of  peace mediators, peace ne-
gotiators, peace builders and peace keepers - both with more women amongst them and 
with more men aware of  the gender aspects of  their work. We can train, monitor and ad-
vice justice, police and military for another 12 years, if  we do it in a gender-blind manner, 
it will not be sustainable. Let’s thus hope that the remaining time will be time well-spend 
so that in 2025 there will be many reasons to celebrate the anniversary of  UNSCR 1325. 
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Gender Based Crimes as “Tools of  War”
in Armed Conflicts1
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“I do not fear the shells and bombs that may fall on my house. They do not ask for my name. I fear the 
foot soldiers who break into my house and kill and wound in a very personal way and commit atrocities 
in front of  my children”2.
“In the darkness of  war, women were excluded from protection of  the law and abandoned. Their bodies 
were permitted to all, without impunity”3.
Setting the Scene
“The least condemned war crime”. 
Radhika Coomaraswamy4
Since the humanity wages wars, sexual violence has been there. For many genera-
tions of  combatants, acts of  sexual violence in armed conflicts5 were largely ignored, 
1 This essay is an update of  a study presented as a lecture delivered by the author, in June 2012, at CESED-
EN (Madrid) to the Gender in Operations Course organized under the aegis of  the European Security 
Defense College.
2 A Muslim woman (Bosnia-Herzegovina) – Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, case N.º IT-95-16-T (ICTY, 14 January 
2000) - Transcript 12970 to 12971.
3 Alona Hagay-Frey (2009). Sex and Gender Crimes in the New International Law. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff  
Publishers, p. xiii.
4  United Nations (1994). The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes 
and Consequences, 263, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/42 (Nov 22). 
5 Nowadays, two main legal definitions of  armed conflicts are at stake. The first was provided by the United 
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tolerated, blanketed, consider as a symbolic side effect, a mark of  victory, and sometimes 
even taken as a “bonus or a compensation” for regular soldiers and mercenaries. For 
many years it has been perceived as essential to preserving the troops’ morale. Some-
times, it was perceived as “part of  the game”. In fact, only in 1945 rape was recognized 
as an international crime6, despite of  the fact that the crime elements remained indeter-
minate until 19987. In this context women were considered property of  unrestricted ac-
cess. Likewise, for many generations, the international criminal law turned a blind eye to 
the accountability of  perpetrators of  sexual crimes in armed conflicts. Consequently, the 
purpose of  this essay is to study how the International Humanitarian Law (IHL), the Law 
of  Armed Conflicts (LOAC) and the International Criminal Law (ICL) are equipped to 
fight against impunity of  gender-based crimes in armed conflicts each time they are per-
petrated as a tool of  war, while gender-based violence has recently emerged as a salient 
topic in the human security dimension. Recognizing that gender-based crimes in armed 
conflicts are neither a legal concept, nor a largely accepted and consensual designation, 
Nations International Law Commission in the report on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties: an 
“armed conflict” means a state of  war or a conflict which involves armed operations which by their na-
ture or extent are likely to affect the operation of  treaties between State parties to the armed conflict or 
between State parties to the armed conflict and third States, regardless of  a formal declaration of  war or 
other declaration by any or all of  the parties to the armed conflict. The same report mentions the follow-
ing: contemporary armed conflicts have blurred the distinction between international and internal armed 
conflicts. The number of  civil wars has increased. In addition, many of  these “civil wars” include “external 
elements”, such as support and involvement by other States in varying degrees, supplying arms, providing 
training facilities and funds, and so forth. Internal armed conflicts could affect the operation of  treaties 
as much as, if  not more than, international armed conflicts. The second definition was delivered by the 
Jurisprudence of  International ad hoc tribunals in the following cases: ICTY Duško Tadić (1996) - “… 
an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed 
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within 
a State; and ICTR Jean-Paul Akayesu (1998) - 619. …The Appeals Chamber in the Duško Tadić deci-
sion on Jurisdiction held “that an armed conflict exists whenever there is [...] protracted armed violence 
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. 
International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of  such armed conflicts and extends beyond the 
cessation of  hostilities until [...] in the case of  internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is reached”.
6 Rape as an international crime was introduced as a crime against humanity through the Control Council 
Law 10 in 1945: Article II, 1.(c) Crimes Against Humanity - Atrocities and offenses, including but not lim-
ited to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane 
acts committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds 
whether or not in violation of  the domestic laws of  the country where perpetrated - Berlin, 20 December 
1945. Later the IV GC of  1949 (article 27) and the Additional Protocols of  1977 included rape as an inter-
national war crime. In 1993 and 1994 both ad hoc tribunals incorporated the crime of  rape.
7 Historical precedent set by the ICTR’s judgment in the Jean-Paul Akayesu case (1998). §688. The Tribunal 
defines rape as a physical invasion of  a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which 
are coercive. The Tribunal considers sexual violence, which includes rape, as any act of  a sexual nature 
which is committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence is not limited to 
physical invasion of  the human body … §731. … Rapes resulted in physical and psychological destruction 
of  Tutsi women, their families and their communities. Sexual violence was an integral part of  the process 
of  destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their destruction and to 
the destruction of  the Tutsi group as a whole.
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this study attempts to discover whether, currently, International Humanitarian Law and 
International Criminal Law incorporate the notion of  gender-based violence as a tool of  
war, as a legal stand included into a larger concept of  war crimes, as a constitutive act 
with respect to genocide8 and as a crime against humanity.
As mentioned by Alex Obote-Odora sex-based crimes are not easily identifiable9, 
like gunshot wounds or amputated limbs. Likewise, this sort of  violence tends to protract 
armed conflicts, while it is likely to produce an unacceptable level of  human suffering 
and, of  upmost importance, is being spread day-by-day as the cheapest weapon to pro-
duce the largest scars of  human outrage and indignity.
Alona Hagay-Frey refers to the history of  sex-based crimes in three different phases: 
the Era of  Silence, the Era of  Honor and a new direction. The first Era stood for more than 
200 years and the sex crimes in time of  conflict were “perceived as lesser crimes and per-
haps even excused, as compared to other crimes against the rules of  war… as the CCL 
10 authorized the prosecution of  any war criminal, an opportunity was created to bring 
many rapists to justice. After the conclusion of  Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials (major 
and subsequent trials) the allied forces began the “lesser war crimes” accountability. These 
trails were performed in national military courts, governed by CCL 10. Yet the crime of  
rape was not included in even one indictment”10. Nowhere in the IMT Charter could the 
crime of  “rape” or any other crime of  sexual nature be found… in the last two weeks 
of  the WWII, 100.000 rapes were committed in Berlin alone… all the victims – women, 
men and children – were ordered to remove their clothing during the march to their 
death, but it was the women who were selected for an additional humiliation – sexual 
violence11. The second Era started with the signature of  Geneva Conventions in 1949, in 
which sex crimes were recognized. But the “honor paradigm” introduced as a standard to 
analyze sexual offences “perpetuated the historical patriarchal baggage that sex offences 
carry as inferior crimes, as crimes of  property, torts and plunder, and as crimes against 
society’s honor, rather than crimes against the body and dignity of  the woman who has 
been attacked12”. Finally the third Era, the new direction has began with the establish-
ment of  the ad hoc tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the entry into force 
of  the Rome Statute. Sex crimes are no longer a matter of  honor but recognized as 
“physical and psychological injuries”13. 
This essay acknowledges the existence of  relevant issues related to the biological 
8 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgement, Trial Chamber (2 September 1998), Case No. ICTR-96-4-T 
§507 and §508. The incorporation of  the crime of  rape into the realm of  Genocide represents a sig-
nificant advance in international jurisprudence. Nicholas A. Jones (2010). The Courts of  Genocide. London: 
Routledge, p. 143.
9 ICTR (2005). Rape and Sexual Violence in International Law. ICTR Contribution, p. 140.
10 Alona Hagay-Frey (2009). Op. Cit., pp. 66-67.
11 Kelly Dawn Askin (1997). War Crimes against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals. The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers, pp. 52-56.
12 Alona Hagay-Frey (2009). Op. Cit., p. 77. 
13 Alona Hagay-Frey (2009). Op. Cit., p. 107.
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sex of  each individual such as sexual orientation, gender, sexual and gender identity14, 
and establishes a departing point. Nevertheless, it is important to differentiate between 
the various forms of  sexual violence, each one with different dynamics. The following 
table illustrates and details the parity between the three types of  crimes mentioned be-
fore, bearing in mind the framework definition of  sexual violence. In fact, our common 
reference is the general definition of  sexual violence provided by the Special Rapporteur 
on systematic15 rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like practices during armed conflict. Sexual 
violence was defined as “any violence, physical or psychological, carried out through sexual means or 
by targeting sexuality”, thus including “both physical and psychological attacks directed at a person’s 
sexual characteristics, such as forcing a person to strip naked in public, mutilating a person’s genitals, 
or slicing off  a woman’s breasts’ as well as situations in which two victims are forced to perform sexual 
acts on one another or to harm one another in a sexual manner”16. Additionally, the Statute of  the 
International Criminal Court provides (Article 7(1)(g)) that “[r]ape, sexual slavery, en-
forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of  sexual 
violence” is a crime against humanity. It is clear, then, that sexual violence includes but is 
not limited to rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and enforced 
sterilization17. In fact, our point of  departure distinguishes three types of  biological sex-
related crimes in the context of  armed conflicts. Actually, International Humanitarian 
Law (IHL), Law of  Armed Conflicts (LOAC) and International Criminal Law (ICL) 
apparently organize criminal acts dealing with biological sex-related violence in three dif-
ferent groups as the following table illustrates: 
14 Sex – In a dichotomous scheme, the designation of  a person at birth as either “male” or “female” based on 
their anatomy (genitalia and/or reproductive organs) and/or biology (chromosomes and/or hormones). 
Sometimes “sex” and “gender” are used interchangeably. For clarity, it is better to distinguish sex, gender 
identity, and gender expression from each other. Gender identity – A person’s innate, deeply-felt psy-
chological identification as a man, woman, or something else, which may or may not correspond to the 
person’s external body or assigned sex at birth (i.e., the sex listed on the birth certificate). “Sexual identity” 
should not be used as a synonym for, or as inclusive of, “gender identity”. Sexual orientation – A person’s 
enduring physical, romantic, emotional, and/or spiritual attraction to another person. May be lesbian, gay, 
heterosexual, bisexual, pansexual, polysexual, or asexual. Sexual orientation is distinct from sex, gender 
identity, and gender expression. A person’s sexual orientation should not be assumed based on the per-
ceived sex of  that person’s partner(s). For example, a man who identifies himself  as heterosexual may 
have sexual relationships with men and women. “Affectional orientation” is sometimes used as a more 
encompassing term. Gender or Gender role – Refers to the traditional or stereotypical behavioral differ-
ences between men and women, as defined by the culture in which they live, in terms of, among other 
things, their gender expressions, the careers they pursue, and their duties within a family. Glossary of  Gender 
and Transgender Terms, 2010, page 3-11.
15 The word “systematic” stands for something neat, orderly, organized, regular, methodical, coherent, and 
systematized.
16 Final report submitted by Ms Gay J McDougall, Special Rapporteur, Contemporary forms of  slavery: 
systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like practices during armed conflict, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13, 
§21 – 22.
17 Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Case SCSL-04-16-PT, Decision on prosecution request for leave 
to amend the indictment (6 May 2004), §8, §15 (Forced marriage is included in this category).
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GROUPS OF CRIMES BASED ON SExUAL, BIOLOGICAL SEx, AND GENDER VIOLENCE
CONCEPT
METHODS  
OF VIOlENcE
RELATION WITH THE ARMED CONFLICT  
AND HARM ExTENSION
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Involving isolated, and non-
systematic criminal acts, perpe-
trated by individuals (or small 
groups of  individuals) belong-
ing to regular armed forces 
or to armed groups directly 
participating in an armed con-
flict. This sort of  crime tends 
to occur randomly based on a 
single or individual initiative. 
War crime of  sexual violence
It was traditionally seen as related to uncon-
trolled sexual instincts resulting from a long 
individual lack of  sexual satisfaction. They 
have a link with the armed conflict but are 
neither systematic nor organized as such. 
They generally take place using the armed 
conflict as a blanket to hide the individual 
criminal behavior.
It has a link with the 
armed conflict. The com-
mission of  such crimes 
neither intent to directly 
and effectively contribute 
to military action, nor 
impacts out of  the lim-
ited circle of  the victim(s) 
direct personal relations.
War crime of  rape
War crime of  outrages upon 
personal dignity
War crime of  sexual slavery
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This kind of  criminal violence 
displays a minimal level of  
organization and it exploits 
a biological feature of  an in-
dividual to produce a result 
relevant to the armed conflict 
or as part of  a widespread at-
tack. This sort of  crime tends 
to occur in an organization 
framework.
War crime of  murder 
– Biological Sex Selective 
Massacres
Perpetrated with the intent to reduce the adversary’s ability to wage wars, 
by destroying an important source of  their potential combat power, 
which is the non-combatant male (men, children, youth, and elders) 
population. It has a link with the armed conflict, being also systematic 
and organized.
War crime of  enforced 
sterilization & enforced 
sterilization as a crime against 
humanity
Contribution to control or destroy an iden-
tified group. Male and female sterilization.
It has a link with the 
armed conflict and is sys-
tematic and organized. In 
the case of  crimes against 
humanity they are wide-
spread or systematic.
War crime of  enforced 
prostitution & enforced 
prostitution as a crime against 
humanity
The perpetrator or another person ob-
tained or expected to obtain pecuniary or 
other advantage in exchange for or in con-
nection with the acts of  a sexual nature.
War crime of  forced 
pregnancy & forced 
pregnancy as a crime against 
humanity
Biological sex specific crime. Affecting the 
ethnic composition of  any population or 
carrying out other grave violations of  IHL. 
It is also an instrument to increase domina-
tion over an identified group.
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Gender-based crimes in armed 
conflicts are perpetrated 
against men, women, children 
and elders, as a result of  an or-
ganized and systematic exploi-
tation of  socially constructed 
roles, to produce an intended 
effect, as a tool of war, which 
directly contributes to military 
action of  one of  the warring 
factions or are widespread or 
systematic.
War crime of  rape & rape as a 
crime against humanity
Might also be perpetrated with the intent 
of  collecting information as torture18. Like-
wise, rape of  women might be performed 
as psychological torture of  men19
The usage of  individuals 
with the purpose of  a di-
rect contribution to mili-
tary action of  significant 
scale. It has a link with 
the armed conflict and is 
systematic, organized or 
largely spread. In the case 
of  crimes against human-
ity they are widespread or 
systematic20.
War crime of  outrages upon 
personal dignity
The perpetrator humiliated, degraded or oth-
erwise violated the dignity of  one or more 
persons. The physical harm or contact is not 
a requirement in this type of  crime.
War crime of  sexual slavery & 
sexual slavery21
as a crime against humanity
The perpetrator exercised any or all of  the 
powers attaching to the right of  ownership... 
and caused such person or persons to engage 
in one or more acts of  a sexual nature.
War crime of  mutilation
Disfiguring the person or persons, or by 
permanently disabling or removing an or-
gan or appendage with the intent of  pre-
venting an individual of  sexual fulfillment. 
Consent is not a defense to this crime.
War crime of  enforced 
prostitution & enforced 
prostitution as a crime against 
humanity
The perpetrator or another person ob-
tained or expected to obtain pecuniary or 
other advantage in exchange for or in con-
nection with the acts of  a sexual nature.
War crime of  sexual violence 
& sexual violence 
as a crime against humanity
The perpetrator uses sexual violence to ex-
ercise power and domination.
War crime of  using, 
conscripting or enlisting 
children  
The perpetrator conscripted or enlisted 
one or more persons into an armed force 
or group or used one or more persons to 
participate actively in hostilities.
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18 Article 8 (2) (a) (ii)-1 defines the war crime of  torture (ICC) imposes the purpose of  obtaining information or a confession, 
punishment, intimidation or coercion…
19 R. Charli Carpenter (2006). Gender-Based Violence against Men and Boys. London:  SAGE, p. 96. 
20 International Crime Court Status, Article 7(1) (g). “[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of  sexual violence” is a crime against humanity.
21 Sexual slavery and enforced prostitution though at first sight seemingly specific in practice to women, may 
well turn out to be inflicted on men as well were further investigation undertaken. Sandesh Sivakumaran 
(2007). “Sexual Violence against Men in Armed Conflict”. The European Journal of  International n.º 2, p. 
263.22 The additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions recognize (article 43 1. – API ) organ-
ized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct 
of  its subordinates… subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance 
with the rules of  international law applicable in armed conflict. Likewise the AP II (article 1 1.) recognizes 
the scope of  application to its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups 
which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of  its territory as to enable them to 
carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.
23 The expression “directly and effectively contribute to military action” is understood in the context of  GBV 
and recalling the definition of  military objective provided by the article 52 of  the AP I. In fact, article 52(2) 
(AP I) sets out two cumulative conditions for an object to constitute a military objective: (A) that it makes 
an effective contribution to the military action of  the enemy by virtue of  its nature, location, purpose or use, 
and (B) that its capture, destruction or neutralization provides the attacking party with a definite military 
advantage… The first part of  the test established in article 52(2) is itself  divided into two components: 
that the objective makes an effective contribution to military action; and that this contribution be linked to 
the nature, location, purpose or use of  the objective in question. It has been written that the “requirement 
of  effective contribution relates to military action in general, and [that there need not be a] ‘direct connec-
tion’ with specific combat operations.” Alexandra Boivin (2006). “The Legal Regime Applicable to Targeting 
Military Objectives in the Context of  Contemporary Warfare.” Research Paper Series/Collection des Travaux de 
Recherche n.° 2, p. 15 and 18. Furthermore, the effective contribution calls for the “existence of  a proximate 
nexus to military action”, Y. Dinstein (2004). The Conduct of  Hostilities under the Law of  International Armed 
Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 87. The Trial Chamber understands that such an object 
shall not be attacked when it is not reasonable to believe, in the circumstances of  the person contemplating 
the attack, including the information available to the latter, that the object is being used to make an effec-
tive contribution to military action - ICTY, Prosecutor v. Galić, IT-98-29-T, Judgment of  5 December 2003, 
§51. Nevertheless, the expression “effective contribution” is used with some degree of  flexibility that might 
Group I
The first group comprises all acts of  ordinary sexual violence (SV) involving isolated 
and non-systematic criminal acts perpetrated by individuals (or small groups of  individu-
als) belonging to regular armed forces or to armed groups22 directly participating in an 
armed conflict. This type of  sexual violence is related to the sexual orientation of  the 
perpetrators, and it was traditionally seen as a manifestation of  uncontrolled sexual in-
stincts resulting from a long individual lack of  sexual satisfaction. If  there exists any form 
of  organization its purpose is strictly limited to the perpetration of  an act of  sexual inter-
course for the sake of  sexual satisfaction. No other effects are intended. This first group 
includes the crimes established by the provisions of  the Geneva Conventions of  1949 
and their Additional Protocols of  1977, namely article 12 (GC I, II); article 14 (GC, III); 
article 27 (GC, IV); article 75(2)(b), article 76 (AP, I); and article 4(2)(e) (AP, II). The com-
mission of  such crimes neither intends to directly and effectively contribute to military 
action23, nor impacts out of  the limited circle of  the victim(s) direct personal relations. 
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According to Alona Hagay-Frey24 International Law sees it as an attack o honor and that 
fact gave sex crimes an inferior status. In fact the notion of  gender-based violence also 
exists in this group due to the fact the notion of  honor and chastity reinforces the posi-
tion of  women as property of  men. However, nowadays International Law recognizes 
these crimes as crimes against the body and the dignity of  women as such. Furthermore, 
the organization requirement as not parity when compared with gender crimes.
Group II
The second group includes Biological Sex-Based Violence or violence based on bio-
logical sex (BSBV), also known as selective massacres. This kind of  criminal violence dis-
plays a minimal level of  organization with the intent to reduce the adversary’s ability to 
wage the war, by destroying an important source of  their potential combat power, which 
is the non-combatant male (men, children, youth, and elders) population. It exploits a bio-
logical sex feature of  an individual to produce a result relevant to the conflict. This second 
group consists of  the crimes established by the Geneva Conventions of  1949 and their Ad-
ditional Protocols of  1977, namely, article 51 (GC, I), 32 (GC, IV), article 72(2)(a)(i) (AP, I).
Group III
Finally, the third group deals with gender-based violence (GBV). Gender-based 
crimes in armed conflicts are perpetrated against men, women, children and elders, as a 
result of  an organized and systematic exploitation of  socially constructed roles, to pro-
duce an intended substantial effect25, as a method of  war (using humans as tools of  war), 
which directly contributes to military action of  one of  the warring factions. This sort of  
violence in neither incidental nor randomly perpetrated. In certain cases, it might be used 
as widespread, systematic or as a constitutive act with respect to genocide. Nevertheless, 
GBV in armed conflicts goes further beyond SV and BSBV in terms of  requirements. 
We shall resume this issue later on.
include “indirectly but effectively support and sustain the enemy’s war-fighting capability” as mentioned by 
A.R. Thomas and James C. Duncan (eds) (1999). “Annotated Supplement to The Commander’s Handbook 
on the Law of  Naval Operations.” Naval War College’s International Law Studies, §8.1.1. As mentioned by Marco 
Sassòli, “to include “war-sustaining capability” means to abandon the limitation to military objectives, and to 
admit attacks on political, financial (e.g. the main export industry, the stock market or taxation authorities) and 
psychological targets, as long as they influence the possibility or the decision (which are two different things) 
of  the enemy to continue the war”. Marco Sassòli (2003). “Legitimate Targets of  Attacks under International 
Humanitarian Law.” Background Paper prepared for the Informal High-Level Expert Meeting on the Reaffirmation and 
Development of  International Humanitarian Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
24 Alona Hagay-Frey (2009), Sex and Gender Crimes in the new International Law, Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers, 
page xii.
25 Humiliations, abuse, cruelty, injury, unfit for marriage, glorify the attackers, and raise the moral stigmatiza-
tion…
26 Available at http://www.who.int/gender/whatisgender/en/index.html; http://www.med.monash.edu.
au/gendermed/sexandgender.html
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Gender-based Violence in Armed Conflicts
“Gender crimes are the cheapest weapon and the most available ammunition… 
they are crimes of  domination… committed to shatter resistance… and the capacity to lead...”
Procurator Moreno O. Campo (Verbal indictment in Jean-Pierre Bemba case)
Actors involved in the protection of  non-combatants have recently begun to under-
stand the need to fight against gender-based violence, both during an armed conflict and 
in post-conflict situations. As mentioned before, gender is not a fully accepted interna-
tional legal concept. However, we need to define gender before we look into the concept 
of  gender-based violence in armed conflicts. Thus, we will consider the definitions of  
the following perspectives: World Health Organization (WHO), Organization for Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), United Nations (UN), Democratic Control of  
Armed Forces (DCAF), and theoretical perspectives and feminist views. Let’s look for 
common grounds learning from their definitions. 
Firstly, the World Health Organization defines gender as the result of  socially con-
structed ideas about the behavior, actions, and roles a particular sex performs… The 
beliefs, values and attitudes taken up and exhibited by them is as per the agreeable norms 
of  the society and the personal opinions of  the person is not taken into the primary 
consideration of  assignment of  gender and imposition of  gender roles as per the as-
signed gender. Thus, “sex” refers to the biological and physiological characteristics that 
define men and women and “gender” refers to the socially constructed roles, behaviors, 
activities, and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for men and women… 
or to put it another way: “male” and “female” are sex categories, while “masculine” and 
“feminine” are gender categories26. Secondly, gender refers to socially constructed roles27 
and relationships between men and women. Rather than being determined by biology, 
gender is learned. In other words, men and women are taught certain roles and appropri-
ate behaviors according to their sex28 and gender refers to the roles and relationships, 
personality traits, attitudes, behaviors and values that a society ascribes to men, women, 
boys and girls. Gender is not only about women. It is about the specific needs and con-
cerns of  girls, men, boys and marginalized groups29.
27 A role is the expected behavior associated with a status. Roles are performed according to social norms, 
shared rules that guide people’s behavior in specific situations. Social norms determine the privileges and 
responsibilities a status possesses. Females and males, mothers and fathers, and daughters and sons are 
all statuses with different normative role requirements attached to them. The status of  mother calls for 
expected roles involving love, nurturing, self-sacrifice, home-making, and availability. The status of  father 
calls for expected roles of  breadwinner, disciplinarian, home technology expert, and ultimate decision 
maker in the household. Society allows for a degree of  flexibility in acting out roles, but in times of  rapid 
social change, acceptable role limits are often in a state of  flux, producing uncertainty about what appropri-
ate role behavior should be. The Sociology of  Gender: Theoretical Perspectives and Feminist Frameworks, Key Concepts 
for the Sociology of  Gender Distinguishing Sex and Gender, page 2.
28 Kristin Valasek, “Security Sector Reform and Gender” in Megan Bastick and Kristin Valasek (ed.), Gender 
and Security Sector Reform Toolkit, Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW, 2008, page 3.
29 Sector Security Reform Foundation Course, DCAF/ISSAT, Lesson 2, point 2.2, page 8.
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Thirdly, sex refers to the biological characteristics distinguishing male and female. 
This definition emphasizes male and female differences in chromosomes, anatomy, 
hormones, reproductive systems, and other physiological components. Gender refers 
to those social, cultural, and psychological traits linked to males and females through 
particular social contexts30. Sex makes us male or female; gender makes us masculine 
or feminine. Sex is an ascribed status because a person is born with it, but gender is an 
achieved status because it must be learned31. Nevertheless, biology does not produce 
purely “male” or “female” human beings, especially in terms of  psychology. Likewise, 
gender inequality itself  is not damaging if  is used to promote well being through the en-
forcement of  fundamental rights. The problem seems to be the intentional exploitation 
of  social constructed inequalities to produce harm, and that leads to our main concern: 
gender-based violence in the context of  an armed conflict.
Biological Sex
Biological characteristics based on anatomy.
Gender
Socially constructed roles, behaviors, activities and 
relations considered appropriate by a given society.
Physical and physiological differences and charac-
teristics.
Social, cultural and psychological traits in a particu-
lar context. 
Subordination Status and discrimination.
Male & female. Masculine & feminine.
Determined by biology. Learned.
Ascribed status. Achieved status.
Side-by-side with gender concept stands the gender-based violence notion. Again, 
neither the former nor the latter are largely well accepted legal concepts. However, we 
take as reference the following definition: Gender-based violence is “… [A]n umbrella 
term for any harmful act that is perpetrated against a person’s will, and that is based on 
socially ascribed (gender) differences between males and females,” which includes harm-
ful acts based on sexual orientation or gender identity”32… “that has a negative impact 
on the physical or psychological health, development and identity of  the person, and that 
30 In the social sciences, the term ‘gender’ has been introduced to refer to differences between women and men 
without strictly biological connotations – socially constructed differences that correspond to the two sexes 
although they are not caused by biological sexual differences. Gender relations are the rules, traditions and 
social relationships in societies and cultures that determine what is considered ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’, and 
how power is allocated between, and used differently by, women and men. Gender refers to a social construc-
tion of  femininity and masculinity that varies over time and place and is enacted through learned, rather than 
innate, behavior. “Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice”, (2005). Gender in Practice, p. 2.
31 The Sociology of  Gender: Theoretical Perspectives and Feminist Frameworks, Key Concepts for the 
Sociology of  Gender Distinguishing Sex and Gender, p. 4, available at http://www.pearsonhighered.com/
assets/hip/us/hip_us_pearsonhighered/samplechapter/0132448300.pdf
32 Inter-Agency Standing Committee (2005). Guidelines for Gender-Based Violence Interventions in Humanitarian 
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is the result of  gendered power inequities that exploit distinctions between males and fe-
males, among males, and among females33. Gender-based violence has also been defined 
by the Convention on the Elimination of  all forms of  Discrimination against Women 
Committee as: “violence that is directed at a person on the basis of  gender or sex. It 
includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threat of  such acts, 
coercion and other deprivations of  liberty”. There are many definitions of  GBV34. In the 
large majority of  them, GBV in armed conflicts is associated with a systematic exploita-
tion of  socially learned roles in order to contribute directly to military action and eventu-
ally to obtaining military advantage, departing from a planned or at least an organized 
effect, in which are included but not limited to harmful sexual offences. Consequently, 
GBV in armed conflicts have a propensity to be perpetrated at large scale, mostly com-
mitted by dominating men35, against other men, women, children or elders in a weak posi-
tion. Their actions of  exploitation of  social learned roles are likely to be based on taking 
the weak non combatants as trophies, objects, instruments, and goods. Their attitudes are 
massive, organized, systematic, and they constitute long lasting acts of  humiliation, public 
shame, psychological degradation, physical pain, destruction, terror, and moral break down. 
Gender-based Crime Requirements   
“GBV crimes in the context of  an armed conflict entail a double requirement”.
Taking into consideration the definition of  gender-based crimes it is important to 
establish the context of  this sort of  crimes. As aforesaid these acts might be perpetrated 
in the scope of  an armed conflict as a war crime, as instruments of  genocide36 as acts of  
contribution to genocide, and as crimes against humanity out of  the direct context of  
an armed conflict. The same base method or form of  violence might be categorized as a 
different crime, depending upon the crime requirements at stake. 
War crimes require a linkage to an armed conflict. As mentioned by the jurisprudence 
in Mucić et al. (IT-96-21) “Čelebići Camp” (Delalić) §193, 194, 19537, Duško Tadić Decision 
Settings: Focusing on Prevention of  and Response to Sexual Violence in Emergencies (Field Test Version). Geneva: 
Inter-Agency Standing Committee. Miranda Gaanderse and Kristin Valasek (eds) (2011). The Security Sec-
tor and Gender in West Africa: A Survey of  Police, Defense, Justice and Penal Services in ECOWAS States. Geneva: 
DCAF, p. 5.
33 Jeanne Ward (2002). If  Not Now, When: Addressing Gender-Based Violence in Refugee, Internally Displaced, and 
Post-Conflict Settings. NY: Reproductive Health for Refugees Consortium, pp. 8-9.
34 Gender-based violence refers to violence targeted to persons because of  their gender, or that affects them 
because of  their special roles or responsibilities in the society (Benjamin and Khadija, 1998); the descrip-
tion ‘gender-based violence’ clarifies that reference is made to violence rooted in prescribed behaviors, 
norms and attitudes based upon gender (Lang, 2002); Gender-based violence is violence directed at an 
individual, male or female, based on his or her specific gender role in society (Human Rights Watch, 2002).
35 Or in an instant position of  power which is driven by their chain of  command.
36 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgement, Trial Chamber (2 September 1998), Case No. ICTR-96-4-T 
§507 and 508.
37 §193. It is axiomatic that not every serious crime committed during the armed conflict in Bosnia and Her-
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on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October, 1995 §7038, 
Opinion and Judgment, 7 May 1997, IT-94-1-T §57339, and 22 February 2001, Prosecutor 
v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic §56840. In what concerns the 
crimes against humanity, the Trial Chamber, IT-94-1-T, 14 July 1997, Prosecutor v. Duško 
Tadić §7341 and the ICC Statute elements of  the crimes (article 7)42, clearly identify two 
important requirements: they need to be widespread or systematic. Finally, on the sub-
ject of  the crime of  genocide it is relevant to mention the genocide by causing serious 
bodily or mental harm (ICC Statute article 6 (b)), in which the perpetrator caused serious 
zegovina can be regarded as a violation of  international humanitarian law. There must be an obvious link 
between the criminal act and the armed conflict. Clearly, if  a relevant crime was committed in the course 
of  fighting or the take-over of  a town during an armed conflict, for example, this would be sufficient to 
render the offence a violation of  international humanitarian law. Such a direct connection to actual hostili-
ties is not, however, required in every situation. Once again, the Appeals Chamber has stated a view on 
the nature of  this nexus between the acts of  the accused and the armed conflict. §194. This re-emphasizes 
the view expressed above that there need not have been actual armed hostilities in the Konjic municipality 
in order for the norms of  international humanitarian law to have been applicable. Nor is it required that 
fighting was taking place in the exact time-period when the acts alleged in the Indictment occurred. §195. 
This Trial Chamber shares the view of  Trial Chamber 11 in the Tadić Judgment, where it stated that it is 
not necessary that a crime “be part of  a policy or of  a practice officially endorsed or tolerated by one of  
the parties to the conflict, or that the act be in actual furtherance of  a policy associated with the conduct 
of  war or in the actual interest of  a party to the conflict”. Such a requirement would indeed serve to detract 
from the force of  the concept of  individual criminal responsibility.
38 §70. On the basis of  the foregoing, we find that an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed 
force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed 
groups or between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation 
of  such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of  hostilities until a general conclusion of  peace 
is reached; or, in the case of  internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, inter-
national humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of  the warring States or, in the case of  
internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of  a party, whether or not actual combat takes place 
there. Applying the foregoing concept of  armed conflicts to this case, we hold that the alleged crimes were 
committed in the context of  an armed conflict. Fighting among the various entities within the former Yugo-
slavia began in 1991, continued through the summer of  1992 when the alleged crimes are said to have been 
committed, and persists to this day. Notwithstanding various temporary cease-fire agreements, no general 
conclusion of  peace has brought military operations in the region to a close. These hostilities exceed the 
intensity requirements applicable to both international and internal armed conflicts. There has been pro-
tracted, large-scale violence between the armed forces of  different States and between governmental forces 
and organized insurgent groups. Even if  substantial clashes were not occurring in the Prijedor region at the 
time and place the crimes allegedly were committed - a factual issue on which the Appeals Chamber does not 
pronounce - international humanitarian law applies. It is sufficient that the alleged crimes were closely related 
to the hostilities occurring in other parts of  the territories controlled by the parties to the conflict. There is 
no doubt that the allegations at issue here bear the required relationship. The indictment states that in 1992 
Bosnian Serbs took control of  the Opstina of  Prijedor and established a prison camp in Omarska. It further 
alleges that crimes were committed against civilians inside and outside the Omarska prison camp as part of  
the Bosnian Serb take-over and consolidation of  power in the Prijedor region, which was, in turn, part of  the 
larger Bosnian Serb military campaign to obtain control over Bosnian territory. Appellant offers no contrary 
evidence but has admitted in oral argument that in the Prijedor region there were detention camps run not by 
the central authorities of  Bosnia-Herzegovina but by Bosnian Serbs (Appeal Transcript; 8 September 1995, 
at 36-7). In light of  the foregoing, we conclude that, for the purposes of  applying international humanitarian 
law, the crimes alleged were committed in the context of  an armed conflict. 
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bodily or mental harm to one or more persons, taking into consideration that this con-
duct may include, but is not necessarily restricted to, acts of  torture, rape, sexual violence 
or inhuman or degrading treatment. As mentioned by Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 
Case No. ICTR-96-4-t, 2 September 199843 rape and sexual violence… they are constitutive 
acts with respect to genocide in the same way as any other act as long as they were commit-
ted with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such.
39 §573 … For an offence to be a violation of  international humanitarian law, therefore, this Trial Chamber 
needs to be satisfied that each of  the alleged acts was in fact closely related to the hostilities. It would be 
sufficient to prove that the crime was committed in the course of  or as part of  the hostilities in, or occupa-
tion of, an area controlled by one of  the parties. It is not, however, necessary to show that armed conflict 
was occurring at the exact time and place of  the proscribed acts alleged to have occurred, as the Appeals 
Chamber has indicated, nor is it necessary that the crime alleged takes place during combat, that it be part 
of  a policy or of  a practice officially endorsed or tolerated by one of  the parties to the conflict, or that the 
act be in actual furtherance of  a policy associated with the conduct of  war or in the actual interest of  a 
party to the conflict; the obligations of  individuals under international humanitarian law are independent 
and apply without prejudice to any questions of  the responsibility of  States under international law. The 
only question, to be determined in the circumstances of  each individual case, is whether the offences were 
closely related to the armed conflict as a whole.
40 §568. The Trial Chamber is also satisfied that the underlying crimes with which the Indictments were con-
cerned were closely related to the armed conflict. Not only were the many underlying crimes made possible 
by the armed conflict, but they were very much a part of  it. Muslim civilians were killed, raped or otherwise 
abused as a direct result of  the armed conflict and because the armed conflict apparently offered blanket 
impunity to the perpetrators. It is irrelevant that the actual fighting had shifted from Foca town once it 
was safely in Serb hands to the surrounding areas by the time the events charged occurred, because the 
criterion of  a nexus with the armed conflict under article 3 of  the Statute does not require that the offences 
be directly committed whilst fighting is actually taking place, or at the scene of  combat. Humanitarian law 
continues to apply in the whole of  the territory under the control of  one of  the parties, whether or not 
actual combat continues at the place where the events in question took place. It is therefore sufficient that 
the crimes were closely related to the hostilities occurring in other parts of  the territories controlled by the 
parties to the conflict. The requirement that the act be closely related to the armed conflict is satisfied if, 
as in the present case, the crimes are committed in the aftermath of  the fighting, and until the cessation 
of  combat activities in a certain region, and are committed in furtherance or take advantage of  the situa-
tion created by the fighting. These requirements are squarely met by the offences under both Indictments, 
insofar as the Trial Chamber finds the evidence to be sufficient to establish those offences.
41 §73. A prohibited act committed as part of  a crime against humanity, that is with awareness that the act formed 
part of  a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population is, all else being equal, a more serious offence 
than an ordinary war crime. This follows from the requirement that crimes against humanity be committed on 
a widespread or systematic scale, the quantity of  the crimes having a qualitative impact on the nature of  the of-
fence which is seen as a crime against more than just the victims themselves but against humanity as a whole.
42 Page 5: Crimes against Humanity are among the most serious crimes of  concern to the international 
community as a whole… The last two elements for each crime against humanity describe the context in 
which the conduct must take place. These elements clarify the requisite participation in and knowledge of  
a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.
43 §731. With regard, particularly, to the acts described in paragraphs 12(A) and 12(B) of  the Indictment, 
that is, rape and sexual violence, the Chamber wishes to underscore the fact that in its opinion, they 
constitute genocide in the same way as any other act as long as they were committed with the specific 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such. Indeed, rape and sexual violence 
certainly constitute infliction of  serious bodily and mental harm on the victims and are even, according 
to the Chamber, one of  the worst ways of  inflict harm on the victim as he or she suffers both bodily and 
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CRIME REqUIREMENTS
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• The crime was committed in the course of  or as part of  the hostilities in, or oc-
cupation of, an area controlled by one of  the parties;
• The crimes were made possible by the armed conflict;
• The act be closely related to the armed conflict… the crimes are committed in the 
aftermath of  the fighting, and until the cessation of  combat activities in a certain 
region;
• The crimes were committed in furtherance or take advantage of  the situation cre-
ated by the fighting;
• The acts were a direct result of  the armed conflict and because the armed conflict 
apparently offered blanket impunity to the perpetrators.
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• §644 (Duško Tadić)44 – Instead the “population” element is intended to imply 
crimes of  a collective nature and thus exclude single or isolated acts which, al-
though possibly constituting war crimes or crimes against national penal legisla-
tion, do not rise to the level of  crimes against humanity… Isolated offences did 
not fall within the notion of  crimes against humanity. As a rule systematic mass 
action, particularly if  it was authoritative, was necessary to transform a common 
crime, punishable only under municipal law, into a crime against humanity. Only 
crimes which either by their magnitude and savagery or by their large number or by 
the fact that a similar pattern was applied at different times and places endangered 
the international community…
• §645 - … attack against a relatively large victim group, as distinct from isolated or 
random acts against individuals;
• §648. It is therefore the desire to exclude isolated or random acts from the notion 
of  crimes against humanity… This requirement excludes an isolated inhumane 
act committed by a perpetrator acting on his own initiative and directed against a 
single victim.
• §96 (Tihomir Blaškć)45 as part of  a widespread or systematic attack and not as just 
a random act of  violence.
• §101 “widespread” refers to the large-scale nature of  the attack and the number of  
targeted persons, while the phrase “systematic” refers to the organized nature of  
the acts of  violence and the improbability of  their random occurrence. Patterns 
of  crimes, in the sense of  the non-accidental repetition of  similar criminal conduct 
on a regular basis, are a common expression of  such systematic occurrence. Only 
the attack, not the individual acts of  the accused, must be widespread or system-
atic…
G
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a group
• (ICC Statute, elements of  the crimes, article 6(b)) – The conduct took place in 
the context of  a manifest pattern of  similar conduct directed against that group 
or was conduct that could itself  effect such destruction…
• (ICC Statute, elements of  the crimes, article 6(b)) – The perpetrator intended to 
destroy, in whole or in part, that national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as 
such…
Consequently, GBV crimes in the context of  an armed conflict entail a double re-
quirement. On the one hand, they require a link with the conflict, or display a widespread 
or systematic character, or they are perpetrated as a contribution to destroy a group; on 
the other hand, they are required a minimal level of  organization to carry out acts of  
exploitation of  social learned roles to obtain a relevant contribution to military action or 
to achieve a campaign objective. GBV crimes are neither a result of  a single individual 
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mental harm. In light of  all the evidence before it, the Chamber is satisfied that the acts of  rape and sexual 
violence described above, were committed solely against Tutsi women, many of  whom were subjected to 
the worst public humiliation, mutilated, and raped several times, often in public, in the Bureau Communal 
premises or in other public places, and often by more than one assailant. These rapes resulted in physical 
and psychological destruction of  Tutsi women, their families and their communities. Sexual violence was 
an integral part of  the process of  destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically contribut-
ing to their destruction and to the destruction of  the Tutsi group as a whole.
44 Opinion and Judgment of  7 May 1997.
45 ICTY, Judgment of  29 July 2004.
46 Women, war and peace: the Independent experts’ assessment of  the impact of  armed conflict on women 
and women’s role in peace-building 149 (United Nations Development Fund for Women, 2002), http://
www.unifem.org/index.php 
47 In War as in Peace: Sexual Violence and Women’s Status, available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k4/15.htm
48 Bulent Diken, Becoming Abject: Rape as a Weapon of  War. Available at http://www.staff.amu.edu.
pl/~ewa/Diken%20and%20Lausten,%20Becoming%20Abject.pdf
49 Claudia Card (1996). “Rape as a Weapon of  War”. Hypatia n.º 4, p. 223.
50 Akayesu Judgment, 2 September 1998, §687. The Tribunal considers that rape is a form of  aggression and 
that the central elements of  the crime of  rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description of  objects and 
initiative, nor accidental or occasional capable of  producing harm, based on sexual desire. 
GBV crimes are motivated on the grounds of  constructed stereotypes shared among a 
group of  people, and perpetrated in a systematic manner.
A Possible Legal Meaning to the Expression “Tool of  War”
“It is critical as the bodies of  women of  all ages, races, religions, and ethnicities continue to be used as 
envelopes to send messages to the perceived enemy. The harm, silence and shame women experience in war is 
pervasive, but their redress is almost non-existent.”
Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen Sirleaf  Johnson46
LaShawn R. Jefferson mentioned in an article published in 200447 that “[M]ore than 
ten years after the commencement of  wars in the former Yugoslavia, and almost a decade 
after the Rwandan genocide conflicts notorious for attacks on women and girls combat-
ants continue to use sexual violence as a tactic of  war to terrorize and control civilian 
populations”… “[S]ome theorists have posited that rape be classified as “asymmetric” 
warfare, which focuses less on gaining territory and more on inflicting trauma on the 
victim”. Both authors emphasized precisely the deliberate uses of  sexual violence to 
produce terror and to control civilian population, and that seems to be an intentionally 
selected method of  war, or at least a tool of  war. Bulent Diken details as follows: “In war 
rape, the enemy soldier attacks a civilian (not a combatant), a woman (not another male 
soldier), and only indirectly with the aim of  holding or taking a territory. The prime aim 
of  war rape is to inflict trauma and thus to destroy family ties and group solidarity within 
the enemy camp”48… is to frighten and intimidate the opponent into submission49.
Likewise, by “recognizing that rape harms the personal dignity of  the victim, the 
ICTR50 in effect held that rape is a form of  torture, and it broadened the recognition that 
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there is o requirement for physical contact in order to prove a sexual assault. The Tribu-
nal emphasized that, although the crime of  rape is traditionally defined under State law as 
“non-consensual sexual intercourse” this definition is too narrow51… Thus, the Akayesu 
Judgment significantly enhanced the potential for bringing criminal to justice for sex 
crimes under international law – not only because this is the first time that international 
law recognized “rape” as a form of  genocide. It was also the first time that an interna-
tional tribunal recognized the possibility of  convicting an international sex criminal for 
the crime of  rape and other sex offences that cause mental harm to the victims, and not 
just physical harm. Consequently, the decision formally recognized for the first time that 
gender crimes were used as a tool of  war and terror and these crimes had an impact that 
was far more extensive in its impact than the effect on the immediate victims. In its deci-
sion, the tribunal recognized the impact of  gender crimes on the victims’ families, their 
community, all of  the groups involved in the conflict and the entire society”52. 
As a general principle the international humanitarian law prohibits means and methods 
that cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. As a result the selection of  means (in 
the sense of  the prohibition to employ weapons, projectiles and materials) and methods53 
(understood as attacks and other activities designed to adversely affect the enemy’s military 
operations or military capacity... In military terms, methods of  warfare consist of  the various 
general categories of  operations, such as bombing, as well as the specific tactics used for at-
tack, such as high altitude bombing54). Effectively, the expression “methods of  warfare” pre-
sumes a certain level of  organization, capable of  identifying an objective, able to draw a plan, 
and having the resources to put the assets in motion to obtain an intentional consequence. In 
the light of  AP I, article 35 sets the fundamental principles applicable to methods of  warfare. 
body parts. The Tribunal also notes the cultural sensitivities involved in public discussion of  intimate matters 
and recalls the painful reluctance and inability of  witnesses to disclose graphic anatomical details of  sexual 
violence they endured. The United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and De-
grading Treatment or Punishment does not catalogue specific acts in its definition of  torture, focusing rather 
on the conceptual framework of  state-sanctioned violence. The Tribunal finds this approach more useful in 
the context of  international law. Like torture, rape is used for such purposes as intimidation, degradation, 
humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control or destruction of  a person. Like torture, rape is a violation 
of  personal dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture when it is inflicted by or at the instigation of  or with 
the consent or acquiescence of  a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 
51 Akayesu Judgment, 2 September 1998, §688. The Tribunal defines rape as a physical invasion of  a sexual 
nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. The Tribunal considers sexual 
violence, which includes rape, as any act of  a sexual nature which is committed on a person under circum-
stances which are coercive. Sexual violence is not limited to physical invasion of  the human body and may 
include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact…
52 Alona Hagay-Frey (2009). Op. Cit., p. 99.
53 Article 54 (AP I) prohibits the use of  methods of  warfare designed to endanger the survival of  the civilian 
population. Paragraph 1 states the principle that ‘Starvation of  civilians as a method of  warfare is prohibited.’
54 Manual on International Law applicable to air and missile warfare, Bern, Program on Humanitarian Policy and 
Conflict Research at Harvard University, 15 May 2009, p. 5.
55 Such as the unlawful use of  perfidy (article 37).
56 Such as the legal obligation to provide quarter (article 49).
57 Tactics is the employment of  units in combat… 1-4. The tactical level of  war is the level of  war at which 
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Expressly, (article 35(1) mentions that the right of  the parties to choose methods or means of  
warfare is not unlimited. Furthermore, (article 35(2) prohibits the employment of  weapons… 
and methods of  warfare of  a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. Ad-
ditional Protocol I established a legal exclusion of  certain activities55 and a compulsory legal 
obligation of  behavior addressed to combatants engaged in armed conflicts56. Both examples 
envisage avoiding unnecessary suffering when attempting to affect the enemy’s ability to con-
duct operations. Therefore, the IHL establishes limits to methods of  warfare.
Taking into consideration the context of  GBV the expression “tool of  war” is currently 
being associated with the use of  gender violence to affect adversely the enemy’s capacity to 
wage the war as an expression of  the organized character of  such acts of  violence. Likewise, 
it is linked to the unlawful idea of  willful and organized action employed as tactics57 or a 
technique to produce an intended consequence as an effective contribution to military action, 
capable of  providing the party with a definite military advantage. If  we accept to equal the 
expression “tool of  war” and the expression “means of  warfare” in the context of  GBV in 
armed conflicts, we also recognize the use of  non-combatants as weapons, capable of  pro-
ducing harmful consequences, as a part of  the implementation of  a warfare method. Nicholas 
A. Jones emphasizes the widespread use of  rape as a “tactic of  destruction” within the con-
text of  armed conflict58. Gender-based violence, when used as method of  warfare, more than 
a breach of  the golden limits of  violence in waging wars, namely the universal duty to protect 
non-combatants, it also represents the most brutal attempt to obtain a direct participation of  
non-combatants, seriously bodily and mentally harmed, to produce an effective contribution 
to military action. Taking as reference articles 57 and 35 (AP, I), GBV targets directly non-
combatants and indirectly the opposing parties, produces unnecessary and avoidable suffer-
ing, is often widespread and generates long-term harming effects. Besides, as mentioned by 
EU/ESDP instruments, sexual violence when used and commissioned as a tactic of  war 
(understood in the context of  GBV) constitutes an important factor contributing to exacer-
bation of  conflict situations and obstructs the restoration of  enduring peace and security59.
The Evolution of  Gender-based Crimes in Armed Conflicts 
and Customary Law
“The regret takes a long time to heal… I was like a wild best”.
Documentary “Weapon of  War confessions of  rape in Congo” (2009)60
The State practice established the prohibition of  rape and other forms of  sexual 
violence in armed conflicts as a norm of  customary international law applicable in both 
battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical 
units or task forces. US Field Manual, 3-90, page 1-1 and 1-4, 2001.
58 Nicholas A. Jones (2010). The Courts of  Genocide, Politics and the Rule of  Law in Rwanda and Arusha. London: 
Routledge, p. 143.
59 Implementation of  UNSCR 1325 in the context of  ESDP, 3 December 2008, page 3.
60 Available at http://www.iwannawatch.net/2011/02/weapon-of-war-confessions-of-rape-in-congo-2009/
61 Lieber Code (1863), article 44 - All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded country, all 
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international and non-international armed conflicts. The prohibition of  rape under in-
ternational humanitarian law was already recognized in the Lieber Code61, side by side with 
numerous military manuals stating rape, enforced prostitution and indecent assault are 
prohibited and many of  them specify that these acts are war crimes. 
The legislation of  many States provides that rape and other forms of  sexual violence 
are war crimes. National case-law has confirmed that rape constitutes a war crime, as 
Instrument legal reference Content
Geneva 
Conventions 
(1949)
Article 3
common to all GC
• It does not explicitly mention rape or other forms of  sexual violence, it prohibits “violence 
to life and person” including cruel treatment and torture and “outrages to personal dignity”.
Article 12, GC I,II • Wounded and Sick… Women shall be treated with all consideration due to their sex. 
Article 14, GC III • The third Geneva Convention provides that prisoners of  war are in all circumstances enti-
tled to “respect for their persons and honor”… “Women shall be treated with all the regard 
due to their sex ...”
Articles 24 and 27, 
GC IV Articles 
76(1) and 77, AP I
 Require the protection for women and children against rape, enforced prostitution or any 
other forms of  indecent assault.
• Children shall be the object of  special respect and shall be protected against any form of  
indecent assault.
• The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that children who have not 
attained the age of  fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, in particular, they 
shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons 
who have attained the age of  fifteen years but who have not attained the age of  eighteen 
years the Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest.
Articles 75(2)(b), 
(5), AP II. 1977
• Establishes as a fundamental guarantee the prohibition of  “outrages upon personal dignity”, 
and specifies that this prohibition covers in particular “humiliating and degrading treatment, 
enforced prostitution and any other form of  indecent assault”.
Article 4(2), and 
4(3) AP II, 1977
• Establishes as a fundamental guarantee the prohibition of  “outrages upon personal dignity”, 
and specifically adds “rape” to the provision of  “humiliating and degrading treatment, en-
forced prostitution and any other form of  indecent assault”.
Ad hoc 
Tribunals
Article 4(e) ICTR 
(War Crimes) 
Article 3(g) ICTR 
(Crimes Against 
Humanity) Article 
5(g), ICTY (Crimes 
Against Humanity)
• 4(e) ICTR - Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treat-
ment,
• 3(g) ICTR - Rape
• 5(g) ICTY - Rape
Special Court 
for Sierra 
Leone
Article 2(g) (Crimes 
Against Humanity) 
Article 3(e) (War 
Crimes)
• 2(g). Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of  
sexual violence;
• 3(e). Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, 
rape, enforced prostitution and any form of  indecent assault;
International 
Criminal 
Court
Article 8(2)(b)
(xxi), (xxii) and (e)
(vi) (War Crimes) 
Article 7(1)(g) 
(Crimes Against 
Humanity)
• “Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy… enforced 
sterilization or any other form of  sexual violence” also constituting a grave breach of  the 
Geneva Conventions or also constituting a serious violation of  common article 3 of  the 
Geneva Conventions constitutes as war crime in international and non-international armed 
conflicts respectively.
• Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treat-
ment.
• “Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any 
other form of  sexual violence of  comparable gravity”, constitutes a crime against humanity.
Violations of  the prohibition of  rape 
and other forms of  sexual violence 
have been condemned by States and 
International Organizations.
• Namely: German, The Netherlands and United States;
• UNSR62, UNGA and UN Commission on Human Rights;
• European Parliament, Council of  Europe and Gulf  Cooperation Council;
• Committee on the Elimination of  Discrimination Against Women;
• European Court of  Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
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destruction of  property not commanded by the authorized officer, all robbery, all pillage or sacking, even 
after taking a place by main force, all rape, wounding, maiming, or killing of  such inhabitants, are prohib-
ited under the penalty of  death, or such other severe punishment as may seem adequate for the gravity of  
the offense. A soldier, officer or private, in the act of  committing such violence, and disobeying a superior 
ordering him to abstain from it, may be lawfully killed on the spot by such superior; article 47 - Crimes 
punishable by all penal codes, such as arson, murder, maiming, assaults, highway robbery, theft, burglary, 
fraud, forgery, and rape, if  committed by an American soldier in a hostile country against its inhabitants, 
are not only punishable as at home, but in all cases in which death is not inflicted, the severer punishment 
shall be preferred.
62 Specially the UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000) and the UNSC Resolution 1820 (2008). The UNSC Resolution 
1820 (2008) - §1. stresses that sexual violence, when used or commissioned as a tactic of  war in order to deliber-
ately target civilians or as a part of  a widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations, can significantly 
exacerbate situations of  armed conflict and may impede the restoration of  international peace and security, af-
firms in this regard that effective steps to prevent and respond to such acts of  sexual violence can significantly 
contribute to the maintenance of  international peace and security, and expresses its readiness, when considering 
situations on the agenda of  the Council, to, where necessary, adopt appropriate steps to address widespread or 
systematic sexual violence; §4. notes that rape and other forms of  sexual violence can constitute a war crime, 
a crime against humanity, or a constitutive act with respect to genocide, stresses the need for the exclusion of  
sexual violence crimes from amnesty provisions in the context of  conflict resolution processes, and calls upon 
Member States to comply with their obligations for prosecuting persons responsible for such acts, to ensure that 
all victims of  sexual violence, particularly women and girls, have equal protection under the law and equal access 
to justice, and stresses the importance of  ending impunity for such acts as part of  a comprehensive approach to 
seeking sustainable peace, justice, truth, and national reconciliation… 
63 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (2009). Customary International Law, Volume I. Geneva: 
ICRC, pp. 323-326.
64 Understood as sexual assault.
65 Available at http://www.icty.org/sid/10314
66 §6. The definition of  discrimination includes gender-based violence, that is, violence that is directed against 
early as 1946 in the Takashi Sakai case before the War Crimes Military Tribunal of  the 
Chinese Ministry of  National Defense. In the John Schultz case in 1952, the US Court 
of  Military Appeals held that rape was a “crime universally recognized as properly pun-
ishable under the law of  war”63. The table depicts the evolution of  the most important 
instruments and the related national and international practice.
The domestic and international practice regarding the acts of  outrages to personal 
dignity, rape, and other forms of  sexual violence, seems to establish its general prohibi-
tion, a rule of  customary nature, closed to the crimes included into Group I. In fact, 
through the analysis of  table 4 allows to draw the conclusion that not only the measures 
of  protection provided by the GC and by the AP are directed to children and women, 
but also that the blameworthy of  the crimes are directly related to the protection from 
“indecent assault64” to the individual as such. Furthermore, the link to an armed conflict 
is established mainly based on the blanket of  opportunity offered by the conflict. If  
complementarily we look at the methods of  combat provisions of  GC (article 54, GC 
I – Survival of  Population, article 51, GC I – Terror, and article 40, AP I and H IV 23 – 
threat or order to take no prisoners), we find no reference of  use of  sexual related crimes 
to produce relevant effect as a contribution to military action. The turning point seems 
to be the Statute and jurisprudence of  the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC.
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Conversely, the practice of  the ad hoc and hybrid international tribunals indicates 
that “rape ceased to be perceived as the unrestrained sexual behavior of  individuals and 
was recognized as a powerful tool of  war, used to intimidate, persecute and terrorize the 
enemy”65. In line with this idea are standing several UNSCR, namely Resolution 1325 
(2000) and UNSC Resolution 1820 (2008), recognizing that sexual violence is used or 
commissioned as a tactic of  war in order to deliberately target civilians. Furthermore, 
article 21 of  the Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Discrimination against 
Women empowers the Committee on the Elimination of  Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) to make suggestions and general recommendations based on the examina-
tion of  reports and information received from States parties. Thus, the General Recom-
mendation No. 19, violence against women66 adopted the expression “gender based vio-
lence”, and acknowledged it as a form of  discrimination that seriously inhibits women’s 
ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of  equality with men… It includes acts 
that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of  such acts, coercion and 
other deprivations of  liberty. 
The most recent international practice appears to be more and more gender sensi-
tive. I would like to underline few examples:
• The provision of  the crime of  rape established by the CCL 10 (Control Council 
Law No. 10 – 1945) had been included in the crimes against humanity. In fact, 
only 50 years later it was finally included into the statutes of  the ad hoc tribunals 
(1993 and 1994);
• Unfortunately, the crime of  rape was included by the ad hoc tribunals in the 
category of  crimes against humanity (article 5 (g)) and not as a war crime. In this 
context it is important to mention the Historical precedent set by the ICTR’s 
a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately. It includes acts that inflict 
physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of  such acts, coercion and other deprivations of  
liberty. Gender-based violence may breach specific provisions of  the Convention, regardless of  whether 
those provisions expressly mention violence. §11. Traditional attitudes by which women are regarded as 
subordinate to men or as having stereotyped roles perpetuate widespread practices involving violence 
or coercion, such as family violence and abuse, forced marriage, dowry deaths, acid attacks and female 
circumcision. Such prejudices and practices may justify gender-based violence as a form of  protection or 
control of  women. The effect of  such violence on the physical and mental integrity of  women is to deprive 
them the equal enjoyment, exercise and knowledge of  human rights and fundamental freedoms. While this 
comment addresses mainly actual or threatened violence the underlying consequences of  these forms of  
gender-based violence help to maintain women in subordinate roles and contribute to the low level of  po-
litical participation and to their lower level of  education, skills and work opportunities. §12. These attitudes 
also contribute to the propagation of  pornography and the depiction and other commercial exploitation 
of  women as sexual objects, rather than as individuals. This in turn contributes to gender-based violence. 
Article 21 of  the Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Discrimination against Women empow-
ers the Committee on the Elimination of  Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) to make suggestions 
and general recommendations based on the examination of  reports and information received from States 
parties. General Recommendation No. 19 (ll Session, 1992), Violence against Women.
67 §686. …extent to which acts of  sexual violence constitute crimes against humanity under Article 3(g)… 
Tribunal must define rape, as there is no commonly accepted definition of  the term in international law… 
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judgement in the Jean-Paul Akayesu case (ICTR-96-4-T, 1998)67, in terms of  defi-
nition of  the crime of  rape and sexual violence as an integral part of  the process 
of  destruction of  a group. Likewise in Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case ICTR-
95-1B-T Trial Chamber III re-expanded the definition of  rape under international 
criminal law as an act of  genocide and a crime against humanity68;
• The ad hoc tribunals and the hybrid or special tribunals have given and enormous 
contribution to the definition of  sexual violence and GBV related crimes. Among 
them is the issue of  consent in the case of  rape. The following idea deserves to 
be underlined: in Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-
T, Judgment, ruled the following: §437–438 (22 February 2001) “…The specific 
elements of  the crime of  rape, which are neither set out in the Statute nor in 
international humanitarian law or human rights instruments, were the subject of  
consideration by the Trial Chamber in the Furundžija case. There the Trial Cham-
ber noted that in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda judgement in 
the Akayesu proceedings the Trial Chamber had defined rape as “a physical inva-
sion of  a sexual nature, committed under circumstances which are coercive”… 
The Trial Chamber found that, based on its review of  the national legislation of  
a number of  states, the actus reus of  the crime of  rape is: the sexual penetration, 
however slight (a) of  the vagina or anus of  the victim by the penis of  the perpe-
trator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or (b) of  the mouth of  the vic-
tim by the penis of  the perpetrator; by coercion or force or threat of  force against 
the victim or a third person… The chamber went on (§46069) to say that consent 
§687. Like torture, rape is used for such purposes as intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimina-
tion, punishment, control or destruction of  a person. Like torture, rape is a violation of  personal dignity 
… §688. The Court defines rape as a physical invasion of  a sexual nature, committed on a person under 
circumstances which are coercive. The Tribunal considers sexual violence, which includes rape, as any 
act of  a sexual nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. Sexual 
violence is not limited to physical invasion of  the human body … §731. …Rapes resulted in physical and 
psychological destruction of  Tutsi women, their families and their communities. Sexual violence was an 
integral part of  the process of  destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically contributing 
to their destruction and to the destruction of  the Tutsi group as a whole; and also Prosecutor v. Musema 
ICTR-96-13-A, 2000, Judgment and Sentence, 226–229. The essence of  rape is . . . the aggression that 
is expressed in a sexual manner under conditions of  coercion… [T]here is a trend in national legislation 
to broaden the definition of  rape and a “conceptual definition is preferable to a mechanical definition of  
rape” because it will “better accommodate evolving norms of  criminal justice.” Prosecutor v. Semanza, 
Case ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment and Sentence. §346.The Chamber held that the mens rea of  rape as a crime 
against humanity is the intent “to effect the prohibited sexual penetration with the knowledge that it occurs 
without the consent of  the victim.”
68 Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case ICTR-95-1B-T Trial Chamber III re-expanded the definition of  rape under in-
ternational criminal law, 15-21. The Chamber found the accused guilty of  rape as both an act of  genocide and a 
crime against humanity. In terms of  genocide, the chamber found the accused to have personally targeted Tutsi 
civilians by shooting and raping Tutsi women with the intent to destroy the Tutsi people. Under the charge of  
rape as a crime against humanity, and in light of  peculiar evidence showing the disembowelment of  a victim 
by using a machete to cut her from her breasts to her genitals, the chamber reassessed its definition of  rape. 
69 §460. In light of  the above considerations, the Trial Chamber understands that the actus reus of  the crime 
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for these purposes must be voluntarily given (of  the victim’s free will), as assessed 
in the context of  the surrounding circumstances. Furthermore, the charge of  
enslavement in Kunarac was coddled in the descriptions such as the women and 
girls being personal property, detained, and divided among men (§157).
• The provisions of  the ICC statute included for the very first time this type of  
crimes70, namely rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, enforced sterilization, 
forced pregnancy (which had been used in the Bosnia-Herzegovina as a method 
of  ethnic modification of  the population composition71) as a crime against hu-
manity (article 7(1)(g)) and as a crime of  war (articles 8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi));
• The provisions of  the ICC statute also included other forms of  sexual violence, 
in which no physical contact is required to humiliate the victims. The expression 
“any other form of  sexual violence of  comparable gravity” included in article 7(g) 
in fine is an important achievement, bearing in mind crimes such as the use of  
nudity with the purpose of  public humiliation;
• Furthermore, the provisions went even further by recognizing GBV related 
crimes in international and non-international armed conflicts;
• Finally, it is important to recall the words of  Patricia Viseur-Sellers saying that 
the “ICC will expand sexual violence jurisprudence72 even further”73, side-by side 
with the new mechanisms to support and protect sexual and GBV victims. 
of  rape in international law is constituted by: the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of  the vagina or 
anus of  the victim by the penis of  the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or (b) of  
the mouth of  the victim by the penis of  the perpetrator; where such sexual penetration occurs without 
the consent of  the victim. Consent for this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a result of  the 
victim’s free will, assessed in the context of  the surrounding circumstances. The mens rea is the intention to 
effect this sexual penetration, and the knowledge that it occurs without the consent of  the victim.
70 Paula Escarameia (2005). Integração da Perspetiva de Género no Estatuto de Roma: Direitos Humanos das Mulheres. 
Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, p. 54.
71 Women were enforced to be pregnant and then were detained to avoid intentional miscarriages.
72 Mr. Lubanga Dyilo was convicted of  committing, as co-perpetrator, war crimes consisting of: Enlisting and 
conscripting of  children under the age of  15 years into the Force Patriotique pour la Libération du Congo 
[Patriotic Force for the Liberation of  Congo] (FPLC) and using them to participate actively in hostilities in 
the context of  an armed conflict not of  an international character, and Mr. Bemba is allegedly criminally 
responsible, as military commander: Two counts of  crimes against humanity: murder (article 7(1)(a) of  the 
Statute ) and rape (article 7(1)(g) of  the Statute ); Three counts of  war crime: murder (article 8(2)(c)(i) of  the 
Statute); rape (article 8(2)(e)(vi) of  the Statute); and pillaging (article 8(2)(e)(v) of  the Statute). 
73 Emerging Jurisprudence on Crimes of  Sexual Violence, America University International Law review, 
1998, Volume 13, issue 6 - There are many cases currently before the court that will expand sexual vio-
lence jurisprudence even further. The cases of  Akeyesu, as I stated before, will construe sexual violence 
in terms of  genocide. The case of  Kayishemna looks at sexual violence that caused death. The case of  
Furundzija, which soon will be before the Yugoslav court, will look at the act of  a commander charged 
with conducting an interrogation while the victim was being raped. In addition, with Mr. Kunarac, part 
of  the Foca indictment, we will be able to look at an accused in a position of  authority as a direct sexual 
assault perpetrator. The importance of  our jurisprudence has not been lost on either the ICJ or the Euro-
pean Court for Human Rights; they have already cited to us. I believe that the judges at the Rwanda and 
Yugoslav Tribunals should be very proud of  the work to date on sexual violence jurisprudence.
74 Cited in Ruth Ojiambo Ochieng, the Consequence of  Armed Conflicts to Women’s Health; The Case of  
Africa. Forum Barcelona, 2004
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Consequently, assuming that these violations are war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity, the most recent jurisprudence goes even further, recognizing their linkage to an 
armed conflict as a part of  it (war crimes) and its widespread or systematic nature (crime 
against humanity). Besides, the recognition as a war crime the usage of  the gender-based 
violence as a tactic of  war, in order to deliberately target non-combatants, seems also 
to have started making room within the legal international practice, closer to crimes in-
cluded into the after mentioned Group II and III.
Gender-based Violence in Armed Conflicts against Young Girls and Women
“During the war army men made my father sleep with me and when he refused they tied him up with ropes 
and put a pistol to his head and made him lie down on me. He tried to penetrate me but he could not as the 
army men pierced me down below with a pistol and he saw the blood and lost desire. They took my father 
aside and shot him with a bullet in his chest and he died”.
Woman from Kasana Parish, Northern Uganda74
The common and well-accepted definition of  child soldiers75 also includes girls re-
cruited for sexual proposes and forced marriage – the so-called “bush wives”. This phe-
nomenon creates a completely different problem when compared to the use of  rape and 
other forms of  sexual violence as a “tool of  war” by the same armed groups. The latter 
emphasizes the extensive abuse of  women, young girls, and even men not belonging to 
the armed group with a humiliating intent in order to destroy the morale of  the enemy or 
to stop the regular pace of  the reproduction process by harming the heart of  factory of  
life: the families and their social roles. The immediate impact might be the psychological 
trauma but in the long term affects the reduction of  labor force in dysfunctional commu-
nities, the acceptance by humiliation of  a “superior group”, becomes a tactic of  war. The 
goal is clearly and is addressed to cause indiscriminate losses and moral breakdown in the 
enemy ground, through the practice of  horrendous acts of  unlimited suffering. The for-
mer refers to process (forced or not) to bring young and juvenile girls into armed groups 
with the intent of  using them to the “benefit” of  the members of  the armed group and 
the performance of  the armed group as such, as a direct contribution to the military ac-
tion. The purpose is to gain a situational advantage (mainly tactical) by reinforcing the 
combatants’ skills, to increase the numbers of  bodies in arms, to save combat power, and 
to contribute to the “sexual satisfaction” of  the regular soldiers76. 
75 Cape Town Principles and best practices (1997) – ‘Child soldier’ in this document is any person under 18 
years of  age who is part of  any kind of  regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, 
including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other 
than family members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and for forced marriage. 
It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms. http://www.unicef.org/
emerg/files/Cape_Town_Principles(1).pdf  
76 Francisco Leandro, Generic Guidelines for the Use of  Force Against Child Soldiers in Peace Operations, 
NATO Legal Gazette, 27, p. 24.
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In fact, in both situations one of  the key elements of  sexual violence is rape and 
other forms of  sexual abuse. Although both men and women can be and are raped, caus-
ing severe injury for both, in terms of  numbers rape is essentially (but not exclusively) a 
crime committed against women. Further, women suffer from particular after-effects in 
rape that are not shared by men77. Christine Chinkin78 states that rape in war is not merely 
a matter of  chance, of  women victims being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Nor is 
it a question of  sex79. It is rather a question of  power and control which is ‘structured by 
male soldiers’ notions of  their masculine privilege, by the strength of  the military’s lines 
of  command and by class and ethnic inequalities among women80. Rape has also been 
directed as an instrument of  war81. In the former Yugoslavia rape has been “massive, 
organized and systematic”82. It was perceived by the Special Rapporteur appointed by the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights not only as “an instrument of  war” but 
as a method of  ethnic cleansing “intended to humiliate, shame, degrade and terrify the 
entire ethnic group”83. Notions of  power and dominance are present in constructions of  
chastity and virility. In some cultures, women are considered to represent the chastity of  
the family and the community.  Accordingly, sexual violence against female members of  
a community is intended to suggest that the men of  the community have failed in their 
duty to protect “their” women. This idea is sometimes stretched to the point of  taking 
the victim to think that the only remedy is to love her rapist, due to her “inability” to 
marry somebody else. In this way, female rape is a form of  communication between men. 
It reinforces the conquered status of  masculine impotence84.
We believe that each time an act of  rape and other forms of  sexual violence are a 
matter of  chance or an act of  satisfying the perpetrator’s sexual desire (based on his own 
biological sex), they belong to category of  sexual violence (Group I). Even if  these acts 
have a clear link to the conflict, the perpetrators are merely taking advantage of  the situ-
ation created by the fighting or because the conflict offers a blanket to impunity. Most of  
the time, these sort of  acts are neither widespread, nor systematic, and tend to be random 
and isolated criminal acts. Furthermore, on the contrary, if  these acts are committed in 
the context of  power and control, in a massive, organized and systematic way they might 
be included in the BSBV and GBV categories (Groups II and III). 
77 Christine Chinkin (1994). “Rape and Sexual Abuse of  Women in International Law”. EJIL n.º 5, p. 326.
78 Christine Chinkin (1994). Op. Cit., pp. 328-329.
79 Feminists have different views on whether rape should be analyzed primarily as a crime of  violence or as a 
sex crime; R. Graycar and J. Morgan, The Hidden Gender of  Law, 1990, pages 342-347. In armed conflict 
rape occurs in the overall context of  violence; rape which may not be associated with violence… 
80 Enloe, The Gendered Gulf, in C Peters, (ed.), The ‘New World Order’ at Home and Abroad Collateral Damage, 
1992, pages 93-97.
81 This idea is also acknowledged by the documentary “weapon of  war confessions of  rape in Congo, 2009” 
in which the following sentence is pronounced: “prendre votre femme pour vous demoralizer”.
82 United Nations Security Council 820 (1993), A§6.
83 Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of  the Commission on Human Rights. Report Pursuant to Com-
mission Resolution 1992/S-l/l of  14 August 1992, ECN.4/1993/50 (10 February 1993).
84 Sandesh Sivakumaran, Sexual Violence against Men in Armed Conflict, The European Journal of  International 
Law Vol. 18 no. 2, EJIL 2007, page 268.
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Gender-based Violence in Armed Conflicts against Civilian 
Young Boys and Men
“Male rape has been labelled “the forgotten method of  torture”.
UN OCHA Research Meeting85
Men are more vulnerable to getting killed. That’s a pretty big deal. Getting sick, get-
ting raped, getting attacked are all pretty bad things but dead is dead and they are much 
more vulnerable to getting killed than women86. Dealing with gender-based violence against 
female juveniles and women in armed conflicts is inseparable from sexual forms of  vi-
olence to which civilian young boys and men are specifically vulnerable. However, with 
rare exceptions, international efforts to address gender-based violence in conflict situa-
tions, and documents and reports advocating for and evaluating such efforts, have so far 
tended to focus primarily on the kinds of  gender-based violence to which women are 
exposed. Although adult civilian men and older boys are sometimes acknowledged as vic-
tims of  wartime sexual violence, as well as other forms of  gender-based abuse, these kinds 
of  harm have not generally been analyzed or discussed at length in efforts to counter-
act gender-based violence in conflict situations. “There is evidence indicating that sexual 
violence also takes place against men in armed conflict; indeed it takes place in nearly 
every armed conflict in which sexual violence is committed. What remains unknown is the 
precise extent to which this crime occurs87”. It seems that GBV against men and young 
boys in armed conflicts is frequent, is perpetrated by men and by women, is not yet well 
studied, is underreported, often is intentionally forgotten, and above all, is the least con-
demned type of  crime among GBV. In addition, doctors, counselors, humanitarian work-
ers and UN personnel present on the battle field are not fully prepared to recognize signs 
of  male sexual violence. Men are not seen as being as susceptible to sexual violence as 
women; hence medical workers may not pay as much attention to detecting signs of  sexual 
violence as they otherwise might88. Further, unlike in the case of  sexual violence against 
women, medical workers may not be trained to look for signs of  sexual abuse of  men89. 
Besides the use of  children associated with armed forces or armed groups, GBV 
against men and young boys tend to be perceived as abuse and torture. Often, castration 
85 OCHOA (2008). Use of  Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict: Identifying gaps in Research to Inform More Effective 
Interventions. UN OCHA Research Meeting – 26 June. Discussion Paper n.º  2, OCHA Policy Development 
and Studies Branch, 20 June, p. 1.
86 Programme Officer, US Office of  Disaster Assistance, July 2002.
87 Sandesh Sivakumaran (2007). Op. Cit., p. 255.
88 Van Tienhoven (1993). “Sexual Torture of  Male Victims”. Torture n.º 4, p. 134; Oosterhoff  et al. (2004). 
“Sexual Torture of  Men in Croatia and Other Conflict Situations: An Open Secret”, 12(23) Reproductive 
Health Matters, pp. 75 and 68, citing Donnelly and Kenyon (1996). “Honey, we don’t do men”: Gender 
Stereotypes and the Provision of  Services to Sexually Assaulted Males’, Interpersonal Violence, p. 441.
89 Oosterhoff  et al. (2004). Op. Cit., p. 74. The search for signs of  abuse in women may sometimes go too 
far, see Engle (2005). “Feminism and its (Dis)contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in Bosnia and Herze-
govina”. AJIL n.º 99 , pp. 778, 794 – 5.
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is seen as “mutilation” and rape as “torture”, a view that becomes apparent when reading 
reports of  non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations. This may be due to, 
and also reinforces, the view that men cannot be subjected to sexual assault. However, 
in conflicts in which sexual violence has been properly investigated, male sexual violence 
has been recognized as regular and unexceptional, pervasive and widespread, although 
certainly not at the rate of  sexual violence committed against women90. 
UN OCHA91 refers that male to male sexual violence in wartime, as being pre-
dominantly an expression of  aggression, power and dominance over the enemy 
rather than an expression of  satisfaction of  the perpetrator’s sexual desire. Sexual 
violence often involves purposeful action aimed at maintaining supremacy through 
intimidation, abuse and repression… also with the intent to “emasculate” the enemy 
himself, and turn him into a de facto “female” through sexual cruelty. “Gender ste-
reotyping suggests that men cannot be victims, only perpetrators… Victims are con-
sidered weak and helpless, while men are strong and powerful. On this basis, when 
sexual violence occurs against men, their masculine attributes are considered to have 
been taken away from them – they have been emasculated”92. The Peace and Security: 
Study submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
1325 (2000), emphasizes this particular aspect of  the gender violence against men 
and young boys, which is the deliberate intention to produce harm that impacts be-
yond the circle of  a single individual. Those deliberate acts of  gender violence are 
not isolated or random acts of  violence. As mentioned by Sandesh Sivakumaran, 
“certain factors signify power and dominance, primary among which is gender; oth-
ers include sexuality, ethnicity, race and religion”93.
Chapter II - Impact of  Armed Conflict on Women and Girls, §59 - Men and adolescent boys are also 
subject to gender-based and sexual torture. The sexual abuse, torture and mutilation of  male detainees 
or prisoners is often carried out to attack and destroy their sense of  masculinity or manhood. Abuse and 
torture of  female members of  a man’s family in front of  him is used to convey the message that he has 
failed in his role as protector. These forms of  humiliation and violence take on powerful political and 
symbolic meanings. The deliberate initiation and endorsement of  these acts by military commanders and 
political leaders underscores the significance of  these acts as more than random assaults94.
90 Sandesh Sivakumaran (2007). Op. Cit., pp. 256 and 259.
91 UN OCHA (2008). Op. Cit., p. 1. 
92 Sandesh Sivakumaran (2007). Op. Cit., p. 270.
93 Ibid.
94 United Nations (2000). Women, Peace and Security: Study submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 1325, II, §59.
95 Duško Tadić was “the first international war crime trial involving charges of  sexual violence”. Tadić was found 
guilty… sexual violence against men (forcing a detainee to bite the testicles of  another detainee), and guilty of  
cruel treatment violation of  the laws and customs of  war and inhumane acts (crime against humanity). Prosecu-
tor v. Duško Tadić, ICTY, IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997, §198, §206. Incidents of  sexual violence against men were 
examined in other cases before the Tribunal, including among others Češić, Mucić et al., Todorović and Simić.
96 The ICC Statute uses the word “enforced” and “forced” associated to different crimes: 8(2)(b)(xxii)-3 War 
crime of  enforced prostitution, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-4 War crime of  forced pregnancy , and 8(2)(b)(xxii)-5 War crime 
of  enforced sterilization. Both terms mean imposed by force, but “enforced” typically means imposed by the 
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threat of  the use of  force or carried out by a third party using force, while “forced” simply means lacking victims 
spontaneity. The former emphasizes the passive intervention of  the victim (enforced prostitution or enforced 
sterilization) and the latter the result of  an action carried out by the victim which wasn’t called for (forced preg-
nancy). The Spanish version of  the ICC Statute uses the expression “Forzada”, and the French version uses 
“forcée” for both situations. The German and the Portuguese version differentiate “forçada” and “à força”.
97 WHO, Guidelines for Medico-Legal Care for Victims of  Sexual Violence (2003), §12 –16.
98 Sexual slavery and enforced prostitution though at first sight seemingly specific in practice to women, may 
well turn out to be inflicted on men as well... Sandesh Sivakumaran (2007). Op. Cit., p. 263.
99 UN OCHOA (2008). Op. Cit., p. 1.
100 R. Charli Carpenter (2006). Op. Cit., p. 96.
101 Prosecutor v Zdravko Mucić, Hazim Delić and Esad Landžo, ICTY, IT-96-21-Abis, April 2003, §40 (3).
102 Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, ICTY, IT-98-33-T, 02 August 2001, §46.
103 Preliminary report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and con-
sequences, Ms Radhika Coomaraswamy, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 
1994/45, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/42, §64.
104 Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, ICTY, IT-98-33-T, 02 August 2001, §616.
105 Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić , Review of  the Indictments Pursuant to Rule 61 of  the 
Rules of  Procedure and Evidence, IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18-R61, §13 and Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić , 
Opinion and Judgment, IT-94-1-T, §206.
106 Peel et al. (2000). The Sexual Abuse of  Men in Detention in Sri Lanka, §2069 have been in torture photos 
too: The Abu Ghraib images are all too familiar to Irish republicans. The Guardian, 5 June 2004.
TYPOLOGY OF ABUSES COMMITTED AGAINST MEN AND YOUNG BOYS IN ARMED CONFLICTS95
Rape 
(and “rape plus”)
The “plus” being 
HIV (AIDS), forced 
pregnancy96 for 
women, or another 
consequence of  
rape, which may 
have been the very 
purpose for the 
rape in the first 
place97
… Whether oral or anal, whether involving objects, the 
perpetrator or two victims… A number of  different forms 
of  male rape take place in armed conflict. Victims may be 
forced to perform fellatio on their perpetrators or on one 
another; perpetrators may anally rape victims themselves, 
using objects, or force victims to rape fellow victims. It has 
been noted that an appropriate name has not even been 
invented for this latter form of  abuse, though it may be 
termed “enforced rape”98. It is included the enforced incest 
or enforced rape of  female or other males99.
Secondary victimization: rape of  women as psychological 
torture of  men100
• The public act of  humiliation and shame by 
exercising public sexual violence intends to 
develop more than physical harm but add 
a social stigma. This type of  public sexual 
violence is also a way of  communicating. 
Thus, the community is informed that their 
male members, their protectors, are unable 
to protect themselves;
• … Charged with sexual violence against 
Bosnian Serb civilians kept in a prison camp 
in Čelebići… Zdravko Mucić, the camp 
commander was found guilty of  these and 
other crimes committed by his subordi-
nates… The judges ruled that the purpose 
of  the rapes was to obtain information, 
punish the women for their inability to pro-
vide information and to intimidate and co-
erce them101;
• Throughout the night and early the next 
morning, stories about the rapes and killings 
spread through the crowd and the terror in 
the camp escalated .
• The construction of  masculinity is that of  
the ability to exert power over others, par-
ticularly by means of  the use of  force102.
• The Trial Chamber is not, however, con-
vinced beyond reasonable doubt that the 
murders, rapes, beatings and abuses com-
mitted against the refugees at Potocari were 
also an agreed upon objective among the 
members of  the joint criminal enterprise. 
However, there is no doubt that these 
crimes were natural and foreseeable conse-
quences of  the ethnic cleansing campaign.104
Castration 
(and other forms of  
enforced steriliza-
tion)
The Review of  the Indictments in the Karadžić, Mladić, 
and Tadić cases before ICTY all recognized the practice 
of  castration105. 
Other forms 
of  sexual 
mutilation or
exploitation
Genital violence 
(Genitals beatings or 
the administration 
of  electrical shocks 
to the genital area)
Sexual abuse of  prisoners in de-
tention often commences with 
enforced nudity, accompanied by 
verbal sexual threats, which adds to 
the humiliation.  Other more seri-
ous forms of  sexual violence such 
as beatings to the genitals and rape 
then follow106.
Enforced nudity
(Often accompanied 
by threats or mock-
ery)
Enforced masturba-
tion107 (and other 
forms of  sexual hu-
miliation)
Groups of  male detainees were 
forced to masturbate themselves 
while being photographed and vid-
eotaped108… are reports of  victims 
having been forced to masturbate 
their captors109.
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107 The forced masturbation of  the victim and the perpetrator is considered to be one of  the most common forms of  
sexual violence experienced by men. WHO (2003). Guidelines for Medico-Legal Care for Victims of  Sexual Violence, §16.
108 The Taguba Report on Treatment of  Abu Ghraib Prisoners in Iraq, available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/
docs/iraq/tagubarpt.html - Part One (Detainee Abuse): Findings, §6.
109 Peel et al. (2000). Op. Cit., §2069.
110 “The castration of  a man is considered to emasculate him, to deprive him of  his power. The castration of  a man 
may also represent the symbolic emasculation of  the entire community. This is particularly pronounced in an ethnic 
conflict where “the castration of  a single man of  the ethnically defined enemy is symbolic appropriation of  the mas-
culinity of  the whole group. Sexual humiliation of  a man from another ethnicity is, thus, a proof  not only that he is 
a lesser man, but also that his ethnicity is a lesser ethnicity. ’ 159 This is not particular to castration but is applicable 
to sexual violence more generally. Sexual violence against individual men of  a particular group is thus a means of  
emasculating that entire group”. Quoted by Sandesh Sivakumaran (2007). Op. Cit., pp. 274-275.
111 Susan Brownmiller (1976). Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape. New York: Ballantine Books, pp. 79–80. Adrien 
Katherine Wing and Sylke Merchan (1994). “Rape, Ethnicity, and Culture: Spirit Injury from Bosnia to Black Amer-
ica”. Columbia Human Rights Law Review n.º 1, pp. 20-25; Kelly Dawn Askin (1997). War Crimes against Women: Prosecu-
tion in International War Crimes Tribunals. The Hague: Martin Nijhoff, pp. 267-270. J. Wagner (2005). “The Systematic 
Use of  Rape as a Tool of  War in Darfur: A Blueprint for International War Crimes Prosecutions”. Georgetown Journal 
International Law n.º 37, pp. 193, 205 and 213; Karen Engle (2005). “Feminism and its (Dis)contents: Criminalizing 
Wartime Rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. AJIL n.º 99, pp. 807-808; Theodor Meron (1998). Bloody Constraint: War 
and Chivalry in Shakespeare. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 59-60.
112 B. Allen (1996). Rape Warfare. University of  Minnesota Press. p. 27–28 and Report of  Argentina’s National Commis-
sion on Disappeared People, cited in Skjelsbaek (2001). “Sexual Violence in Times of  War: A New Challenge for 
Peace Operations?”. International Peacekeeping, §71.
113 Amnesty International (2004). Democratic Republic of  Congo: Mass Rape – Time for Remedies. AI Index: AFR 62/018/2004, p. 19.
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Emasculation
(individual and 
collective110)
Feminization
The intention of  the rape may 
be to “lower” the social status 
of  the male survivor by “re-
ducing” him to a “feminized 
male”… the most lethal gen-
der roles in modern times111.
• Regardless of  the actual gender of  the perpetrator or victim, the characteristic 
of  masculinity is attributed to the perpetrator and femininity to the victim112;
• …[o]ne male survivor of  rape in armed conflict has stated that, while he was 
being raped, the perpetrators “kept saying“ you’re no longer a man, you are 
going to become one of  our women”113. 
• ”[i]t was made known unofficially by the authorities (Algeria) that men had 
been raped in detention, and should no longer have the status of  adult males in 
the community”114.
Homosexualization
Rape is about power and 
dominance and not sex, 
this would explain why the 
male rapist retains his het-
erosexual (powerful) status, 
while the male victim loses 
his heterosexual status and is 
considered homosexualized 
(made weak, effeminate). 
• When reference is made to masculinity, the dominant construct is that of  het-
erosexual masculinity. It is the heterosexual male that is the symbol of  power.
• The homosexual male is considered less masculine and more effeminate than 
the heterosexual male115. 
• During a rape, it is not uncommon for the victim to experience an erection or 
ejaculate, causing him to question his sexuality116. 
• This may be a particular worry for those victims of  enforced rape who were 
forced to rape a male, as is often the case in time of  conflict117. 
• However, when two male victims are forced to rape one another, the traditional 
power dynamic no longer applies118.
Prevention of  Procreation
Even if  survivors come 
through the assault with 
their reproductive capabili-
ties intact, they may experi-
ence psychological difficulties 
leading them to suffer from 
sexual and relationship dif-
ficulties119.
• Indeed, perpetrators themselves, at times, will explicitly express the intention 
of  depriving the victim of  their procreating capability, stating in the course of  
deliberately aiming beatings at testicles that, “you’ll never make Muslim children 
again”120… and while raping women that, “they will bear children of  the perpe-
trator’s ethnicity … they must become pregnant”121.
• The linkage between the prevention of  procreation on the part of  both sexes 
would seem to be recognized by the Rome Statute of  the International Criminal 
Court, which lists enforced sterilization as a crime against humanity, defined in 
the elements of  crimes, in part, simply as the deprivation of  “biological repro-
ductive capacity”122.
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114 M. Peel (ed) (2004). Op. Cit., p. 66.
115 R. Seifert (1994). War and Rape: A Preliminary Analysis. London: Sage, p. 60; J.S. Goldstein (2001). War and 
Gender. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 374.
116 American Medical Association, ‘Strategies for the Treatment and Prevention of  Sexual Assault. Peel et al. 
(2000). “The Sexual Abuse of  Men in Detention in Sri Lanka”. The Lancet n.º 355, pp. 2069–2070.
117 M. Peel (ed) (2004). Op. Cit., p. 66-67.
118 Sandesh Sivakumaran (2007). Op. Cit., p. 272.
119 For a list of  possible consequences see WHO (2003). Guidelines for Medico-Legal Care for Victims of  Sexual 
Violence, p. 16.
120 Application of  the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of  the Crime of  Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), §44D (c).
121 Final Report of  the United Nations Commission of  Experts, supra note 31, UN Doc. S/1994/674, page 
59 – 60, §250(b).
122 International Criminal Court, Elements of  Crimes, article 7(1)(g)-5, element 1: The perpetrator deprived 
one or more persons of  biological reproductive capacity (the deprivation is not intended to include birth-
control measures which have a non-permanent effect in practice).
123 To spread terror, stigma, as psychological torture, to obtain information, to spread diseases, to communi-
cate power and dominance, to destroy individuals psychologically, to jeopardize the community and family 
bonds, destroy the reproductive capacity, etc.
124 Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice (2005), p. 16.
The following table summarizes the typology of  the sexual abuses against men and 
young boys.
A glance over the above table seems to indicate that the different forms of  exercis-
ing violence against males in the context of  armed conflicts are particularly blameworthy. 
In fact, they are not only a mere expression of  satisfying the perpetrator’s sexual desire 
(crimes included in the Group I), but they represent much more than that. If  truth is 
to be told, this sort of  crimes is associated with a certain level of  organization (such as 
detention facilities, public acts or contribution to genocide) and the perpetrator’s intent 
to produce either an effect as contribution to the military action123, (by exploring a gen-
der feature in which the sexual dimension used as a mean of  exploitation), or part of  a 
systematic and widespread campaign or even as a contribution to genocide. This type of  
violence is included in Group III.
The Organized Character of  the Offences and Command Responsibility
“Rape is an effective weapon of  war precisely because it relies on community held belief  systems regarding the 
crime to create a breakdown of  the community. It does this by fracturing individual and family networks and 
social and cultural connections”.
Gender in Practice124
On the one hand, the concept of  gender draws the attention towards the impact 
of  social and cultural differences on the relationships between women and men. Conse-
quently, GBV in its different forms must be an expression of  a serious offence, perpe-
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trated through the exploitation of  these socially and culturally accepted roles to produce 
mental and physical damage or harm to living beings, in order to increase the efficacy and 
efficiency of  the methods/tactics of  warfare. In fact, “gender-based crimes and sexual 
violence originate in the pre-existing social, political and cultural context in which women 
and men live”125, and are perpetrated by those who explore pre-existing social, political 
and cultural context, as a method or as tool of  war, in which non-combatants are used 
as weapons126. Thus, is the large and willful exploitation of  gender features to produce 
“significant harm”, transforming systematically non-combatants in “human weapons”, 
that stands as a key attribute of  GBV crimes. 
The organized character of  the gender-based crimes lies on the willful exploita-
tion of  the perception of  social roles to produce significant harm at a large scale. 
The expression “organized” is understood in this context, as a group of  people not 
randomly formed, acting in a concert, over a period of  time, with the aim of  pro-
ducing (by committing, instigating or abetting)127, a significant harm of  a large scale 
or as a contribution to the armed conflict. The ICTR jurisprudence mentioned the 
RTLM (radio television libre des mille collines) broadcasts and the newspaper Kan-
gura (especially number 6) as instruments used to “encourage and facilitate” the use 
of  violence128. Mentioned even further: “[w]ithout a firearm, machete or any physi-
cal weapon, he [Ferdinand Nahimana] caused the deaths of  thousands of  innocent 
civilians”129. Both statements display the existence a minimal level of  long standing 
arrangements, capable of  intentionally using instruments to produce harm by using 
people as weapons.
The intended effects or the “significant harm” produced by the use of  GBV as 
a tool of  war are many. Among them are the following: (1) rarely GBV is committed 
with a single objective, they tend to achieve dominance through the combination of  
fear and horror ; (2) GBV aims to increase or to save combat power, by using human 
being as instruments; (3) it supports the performance in logistics and intelligence re-
lated tasks; (4) it is an opportunity to exercise publicly a “superior” status and domina-
tion; (5) It is used to “gaming” by waging direct armed engagement of  children and 
through that challenging moral standards; (6) GBV is a source of  economical assets 
(women as property); it produces moral breakdown: fear, terror, humiliation and men-
tal destruction; (7) it produces infertility and loss of  virginity in order to make women 
unmarriageable in some societies; (8) it is used with the specific intent  to destroy 
125 Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice (2005). Gender in Practice, pp. 2 and 5.
126 The word “weapon” is employed in the context of  an instrument used in order to inflict mental and physi-
cal damage or harm to living beings, or to increase the efficacy and efficiency of  the tactics of  warfare.
127 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, General Assembly Resolution 55/25 
2000, article 2(a).
128 Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, 
Judgement and Sentence, December 2003, §138.
129 Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, 
Judgement and Sentence, December 2003, §1099.
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women’s reproductive competence in order to reduce the number of  the opposing part 
individuals; (9) women or men sexually assaulted aiming to humiliate and having as a 
natural consequence the disembowelment of  their community; (10) GBV is used to 
maintain and restore certain power balances; (11) it undermines the well-being and se-
cure existence of  a community; (12) it intentionally protracts the conflict even beyond 
the cessation of  armed hostilities; (13) GBV is used as a contribution to cultural and 
ethnic destruction and to stigmatize the next generation; (14) it destroy group bonds, 
causing pervasive, and even deadly effects for women and young girls; (15) it exploits 
stigma upon rape victims and their children; (16) it exercises dominance by awarding 
an individual to another as prize or a trophy of  war; (17) it spreads AIDS and other 
sexually-transmitted diseases; (18) it weakens family, marital, and communal relations 
and hampers the ability to reconstitute long term standing bonds.
On the other hand, the notion of  command responsibility in international law 
has changed over the time, especially in regard to subjective elements of  the crime 
(mens rea). Although, the objective elements established since the very beginning 
were based on the breach of  the duty to effectively control the subordinates. Gener-
ally speaking, the doctrine establishes that commanders may be criminally responsi-
ble for failing to control their subordinates in the sense of  repressing (to halt), pre-
venting, or punishing the commission of  crimes by subordinates. Moreover, today is 
largely accepted that command responsibility is neither a personal commission of  a 
crime, nor an involvement intended to facilitate a crime, but an unacceptable failure 
of  control to prevent or to repress the practice of  a crime. In the concept of  crimi-
nal command responsibility under international law, there isn’t a contribution (by the 
commander) to the commission of  the crime carried out by his subordinate. In fact, 
if  such contribution exists, than the commander is responsible under the principle 
of  individual responsibility130. 
Joshua H. Joseph mentioned the following “… This note proposes that the solu-
tion lies not in punishing the soldiers who commit such heinous acts, but in making it 
easier to convict the military leaders who allow the violence to flourish. In some situ-
ations, it is apparent that military leaders have explicitly ordered their subordinates to 
commit rape and other forms of  gender-based violence as part of  a national policy of  
ethnic cleansing. In other situations, soldiers may have perpetrated such crimes without 
the express consent of  their superiors”131. In fact, the author identifies two types of  
responsibility. The first is related to the perpetration by omission where “the military 
leaders who allow the violence to flourish… soldiers may have perpetrated such crimes 
without the consent of  their superiors” and it is clearly the case of  command respon-
sibility. Therefore, this type of  responsibility addresses to military commanders who 
130 Francisco Leandro (2012) Responsabilidade dos Chefes Militares e dos Outros Superiores Hierárquicos. Lisboa: Uni-
versidade Católica Editora.
131 Joshua H. Joseph (2006). “Rethinking Yamashita: Holding Military Leaders Accountable for Wartime 
Rape”. Bepress Legal Series, Paper n.º 1404, p. 4.
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neither physically perpetrated the crimes, nor were present at the crime scene, nor in-
volved in the facilitation of  the crimes, and did not necessarily order rape. The second 
is related to the perpetration by action132 in which “… military leaders have explicitly 
ordered their subordinates”, turned a blind eye to the preparations acts, refused to take 
in consideration the information provided or even to create the perception of  his con-
sent by their silent presence at the crime scene. These are visibly the case of  individual 
responsibility of  military commanders, on the grounds of  their relation with the crime. 
Thus, the organized character of  groups II and III crimes is internationally relevant to 
account criminals under the principle of  individual responsibility and not to command 
responsibility, precisely due to the direct involvement in the commission of  the crimes. 
The usage of  GBV and BSBV as a method of  war by subordinate soldiers, as they are a 
result of  direct or implicit orders, or well accepted practices by the chain of  command 
of  regular armed forces or armed groups, doesn’t relieve the commanders of  their 
individual responsibility. In fact, commanders are criminally liable as authors or accom-
plices by the acts of  their subordinates. On contrary, crimes within the scope of  Group 
I, as they are the result of  individual initiatives, are likely to be a result of  the lack of  
control of  subordinates under effective control of  a superior. Finally, the following ta-
ble depicts the parity of  GBV in the context of  war crimes and crimes against human-
ity. There are quite interesting differences and common aspects, especially in the crimes 
committed in the context of  armed conflicts and those for which such requirement 
does not exist. However, it is the systematic, organized and intentional exploitation of  
socially learned and constructed roles, behaviors, activities, and attributes that once 
again constitutes the main feature of  GBV. In fact, in both cases are serious breaches 
of  international law, in both cases the scale of  effects and the intentional exploitation 
of  socially learned and constructed roles wouldn’t be possible without a minimal level 
of  organization. Indeed, GBV is referred as a form of  violence characterized by the 
existence of  a basic form of  systematization or organization and consequently GBV is 
not a random or accidental form of  violence.
In fact, only through organization or systematization is possible to exercise power 
and dominance in order to produce a relevant contribution to military action of  a party 
to a conflict, to obtain a widespread perpetration, to use it as a method to ethic modi-
fication, and to be used with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group133. 
Random perpetrations or criminal acts triggered by single or individual initiatives, do not 
amount a GBV crime in international law. They “merely” appear to be sexual violence in-
132 The commander ordered, solicited, induced, aided, abetted or otherwise assisted.
133 To illustrate better the influence of  gender in the crime of  genocide, a new word has been invented. In fact, 
the term “gendercide” was conceived to emphasize the gender influence on genocide. The expression has 
been used by scholars, policy makers and organizations such as European Union. R. Charli Carpenter (2002). 
“Beyond ‘Gendercide’: Incorporating Gender into Comparative Genocide Studies”. International Journal of  
Human Rights n.º 6, pp. 77-101. Mary Anne Warren (2012). Gendercide: The Implications of  Sex Selection. Brussels: 
European Parliament - Directorate-general for External Policies. Available at http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/committees/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=73211
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cluded in the Group I. Nevertheless, as mentioned J. M. Smith in 2004, regardless the or-
ganized character of  the crime and the dimension of  the acts of  perpetration, they always 
remain, in terms of  responsibility, the sum of  millions single criminal acts of  GBV134.
Key Final Remarks
“Men and boys as well as women and girls are the victims of  this targeting, but women, much more than 
men, suffer gender-based violence. Their bodies become a battleground over which opposing forces struggle. 
Women are raped as a way to humiliate the men they are related to, who are often forced to watch the as-
sault. In societies where ethnicity is inherited through the male line, ‘enemy’ women are raped and forced to 
bear children. Women who are already pregnant are forced to miscarry through violent attacks. Women are 
kidnapped and used as sexual slaves to service troops, as well as to cook for them and carry their loads from 
camp to camp. They are purposely infected with HIV/AIDS, a slow, painful murder”. 
Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen Sirleaf  Johnson (2006)135
Firstly, the expression sexual violence in the context of  armed conflicts appears to 
be a framework expression in which crimes with a particular dynamics might be included. 
Initially, the dynamics of  sexual violence was understood by IHL, LOAC and a good 
part of  domestic law as a serious violation based on an individual blameworthy perpetra-
tion of  an act, often exclusively associated to outrages to personal dignity through rape. 
Furthermore, IHL and LOAC were biological sex sensitive (such as the article 12 of  
GC, I and II) but not gender sensitive. Initially, the inclusion of  rape in the category of  
crimes against humanity by the Council Control Law 10 and later the provisions of  GC 
(article 27, GC IV) also appears to be biological sex sensitive and not gender sensitive. 
However, the modern provisions of  the hybrid tribunals, the ad hoc tribunals, and the 
ICC statute included the requirement “linkage to the conflict” in the case of  war crimes, 
134 If  you must remember, remember this… the Nazis did not kill six million Jews… nor the Interahamwe kill a million 
Tutsis, they killed one and then another, and then another… genocide is not s single act of  murder, it is millions of  
acts of  murder. A time to remember: Rwanda ten year after genocide. Kigali, Republic of  Rwanda: The Aegis Trust.
135 Available at http://www.stopvaw.org/sexual_assault_during_armed_conflict.html 
FEATURES OF GENDER BASED VIOLENCE A TOOL OF WAR
Features War Crimes Crimes Against Humanity
Serious Breaches 1 Yes, in international and non-internation-
al armed  conflicts
Yes, but is a more serious offence than an 
ordinary war crime.
Scale of  effects 2 In particular when committed as a part 
of  plan or policy or as part of  a large 
scale commission
Widespread or systematic attack direct 
against any civilian population
Linkage to the conflict 3 Yes No
Intentional exploita-
tion of  socially learned 
and constructed roles
Yes, as a contribution to increase the 
efficacy and efficiency of  the tactics of  
warfare.
Yes, but does not require the existence of  an 
armed conflict.
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the requirement “widespread or systematic” in the case of  crimes against humanity, and 
the requirement “specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group”. These 
requirements are gender sensitive, taking into account, the systematic character of  these 
crimes, as a result of  willful exploitation of  socially learned roles, to produce an effect 
impacting on the conflict. 
Secondly, if  we look at the gender-based violence concept as a willful exploitation 
of  socially learned roles, to produce an effect impacting on the conflict, than non-com-
batants are used as “weapons” or means or instruments employed to inflict mental and 
physical damage to harm living beings, or to increase the efficacy and efficiency of  the 
tactics of  warfare. It is undeniable that rape is nearly endemic in modern warfare136, 
especially if  we consider that “… the scale of  rape and sexual violence appears to have 
expanded exponentially during the twentieth century”137. Alona Hagay-Frey emphasizes 
the context of  rape as a tool of  war as an act to produce an intended effect, which stays 
further than the act itself: “[W]hen the bullets are whizzing by and the survival is depend-
ent on another person’s mercy, it is much harder to assume consent – the relationship of  
domination and subordination is perpetuated”.138
Thirdly, considering article 1 of  the ICTY Statute and article 1 of  the ICTR Statute 
which establishes the competence of  each International Tribunal “to prosecute persons 
responsible for serious violations of  international humanitarian law…”139; considering 
the ICTY article 3 (violations of  the laws or customs of  war), which establishes that the 
International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons violating the laws or 
customs of  war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to…; considering the 
ICTR article 4 (Violations of  Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and the Ad-
ditional Protocol II) which establishes that the International Tribunal for Rwanda shall 
have the power to prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed serious 
violations of  Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of  12 August 1949... These 
violations shall include, but shall not be limited to…; considering article 8 of  the ICC 
statute which defines war crimes using the following expressions: article 8(2)(a) Grave 
breaches of  Geneva Conventions of  12 August 1949, namely, any of  the following…; 
article 8(2)b) Other serious violations of  the laws and customs applicable in international 
conflict; article 8(2)(c) In the case of  an armed conflict not of  an international character, 
serious violations of  article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of  12 August 
1949, namely…; article 8(2)(e) Other serious violations of  the laws and customs appli-
cable in armed conflicts not of  an international character; a single conclusion must be 
drawn: all of  them have jurisdiction over “violations of  the laws or customs of  war” and 
these violations due to the character enumerative of  the expressions “namely” and “but 
136 Joshua H. Joseph (2006). Op. Cit., p. 7.
137 Susan Brownmiller (1975). Op. Cit., p. 297.
138 Alona Hagay-Frey (2009). Op. Cit., p. 52.
139 Statute of  The International Tribunal for The Former Yugoslavia, adopted 25 May 1993 by Resolution 
827, Amended 13 May 1998 by Resolution 1166, and as Amended 30 November 2000 by Resolution 1329.
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not be limited to” are not restricted to the readings of  the provisions listed. In fact, they 
might include jurisdiction over all types of  employment of  “weapons” and “methods of  
warfare” calculated to cause unnecessary suffering as prescribed by the fundamental prin-
ciple defined by article 35(2) AP I. Consequently, any form of  BSBV and GBV crimes, 
which are used as method of  war employing non-combatants as weapons of  war, can be 
brought before this type of  internationals (or hybrid) courts as established within their 
jurisdiction.
Fourthly, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820 (2008) by stating the 
following: “1. Stresses that sexual violence, when used or commissioned as a tactic of  
war in order to deliberately target civilians or as a part of  a widespread or systematic at-
tack against civilian populations, can significantly exacerbate situations of  armed conflict 
and may impede the restoration of  international peace and security, affirms in this regard 
that effective steps to prevent and respond to such acts of  sexual violence can signifi-
cantly contribute to the maintenance of  international peace and security, and expresses 
its readiness, when considering situations on the agenda of  the Council, to, where nec-
essary, adopt appropriate steps to address widespread or systematic sexual violence…” 
acknowledges not only the difference between sexual violence and sexual violence used 
as a tactic of  war, but also the difference between sexual violence and the use of  sexual 
violence as part of  a widespread or systematic attack. 
Fifthly, if  we assume as mentioned by the jurisprudence at Duško Tadić (§73) that 
crimes against humanity are more serious offences than ordinary war crimes, than GBV 
related crimes included in the category of  crimes against humanity, are especially blame-
worthy form of  perpetration, even in situations where doesn’t exist an armed conflict.
Finally, IHL, LOAC and ICL incorporate all three groups of  crimes and methods 
of  violence presented in this study. The differentiating factors appear to be the organ-
ized character of  the perpetration with the intention to use non combatant as means 
of  war, side-by-side with the fact that perpetration of  GBV impacts far more exten-
sive than the effect on the immediate victims. GBV crimes impacts effectively on the 
victims’ families, their community, all of  the groups involved in the conflict and the 
entire society. Thus, for example, crimes of  sexual violence and enlisting children, 
need to be studied and criminalized not only as such, but also as “tools of  war” tak-
ing into account their dimension of  being a result of  an organized extended harm.
Furthermore, women, men and juveniles might be victims of  sexual violence and 
gender based violence. Both forms of  violence are blameworthy. Both forms of  violence 
are violations of  international law. Both forms of  violence are serious offences of  ICL. 
Both forms of  violence trigger individual criminal responsibility. However, rarely GBV 
in armed conflicts might be associated with command criminal responsibility, precisely 
due to the organized character of  the perpetration. Actually, GBV crimes have a propen-
sity to be associated to individual criminal responsibility of  each commander.
All in all, the offences based on the notion of  gender as a tool of  war has been crimi-
nalized under international law and consequently, international criminal law is equipped 
to fight against impunity of  GBV crimes related. These are good news to battle against 
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the evil installed in the mind of  those commanders, capable of  transforming victims who 
require to be protected, in weapons of  long range harming effects, in which unbearable 
and gigantic human suffering is likely to remain for generations of  innocent individuals. 
Nevertheless, the world would be a better place to live in, if  the fundamental principles 
applicable to methods and means of  warfare established by the Additional Protocol to 
Geneva Conventions would clearly associate GBV crimes to unlawful acts of  superflu-
ous injury or unnecessary suffering, each time human beings are used as weapons and 
tools of  war. “Rape has become more than a deplorable side-effect of  war, has become a 
weapon of  war”140. GBV is likewise a framework expression, which encompasses organ-
ized and large scale forms of  sexual violence in modern armed conflicts, leaving behind 
a deliberate legacy of  an unbearable long standing human suffering. GBV is unacceptable 
and legally speaking it is not “part of  the game”. GBV in armed conflicts has to stop 
immediately!
140 Joshua H. Joseph (2006). Op. Cit., p. 12.
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Introduction
On October the 21st 2000, the Security Council of  the United Nations approved 
unanimously the Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. The resolution rec-
ognizes the distinct way women, girls, men and boys experience war, peace and security 
and highlights the disproportion of  women towards men involved in peace as well as in 
conflict prevention and resolution processes. The document was followed by three other 
resolutions: UNSCR 1820 (2008), UNSCR 1888 (2009), and UNSCR 1889 (2009), con-
stituting an international regime and agenda for gender, peace and security.
Despite being international law, the UNSCR 1325 is not covered by Chapter VII of  
the UN Charter, i.e., its implementation cannot be enforced nor can its non-compliance 
be penalized. The success of  its implementation on the ground is, therefore, depend-
ent on the political will of  those involved in wars and peace processes. Since national 
governments perform a prominent role within conflict resolution, peacebuilding and 
reconstruction processes – as parties to armed conflict, contributors of  peacekeeping 
troops, members of  the UN Security Council, UN members and donors –  national gov-
ernments are a central actor as far as the implementation and supervision of  practices 
and policies related to UNSCR 1325 are concerned. Consequently, the national level 
of  the implementation process is critical to successfully address women and peace and 
1 This work was developed within the Project “Women, Peace and Security: the implementation of  the 
UNSCR 1325 in Portugal”, coordinated by Tatiana Moura and Teresa Cunha, hosted by the Association 
for Justice and Peace and the Centre for Social Studies of   the University of  Coimbra.
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security issues as framed within the UNSCR 1325. Bearing this need in mind, the UN 
Secretary-General’s Report (2004) invited the member states to prepare National Action 
Plans (NAP) in order to take strong steps towards the implementation of  UNSCR 1325. 
Being part of  the EU – where a comprehensive political and legal framework was 
set to implement the Resolution and whose member integrate the majority of  countries 
adopting NAP – as well as of  the UN, Portugal has adopted a NAP to better translate 
the policies and the ideas expressed in the Resolution 1325 into its reality and practices.
This article intends to present the Portuguese NAP and identify the challenges that 
lie ahead. For that purpose, it is divided into three parts. The first part presents the UN-
SCR 1325, the second part explains the Portuguese NAP, and the third part discusses it 
based on the possibilities and limitations of  the UNSCR 1325 text/contents and Portu-
gal’s own specificities - a democratic country, formally at peace and having a clear tradi-
tion of  participation in peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. 
The Resolution 1325
Unanimously approved in October 2000, under the Namibian Presidency, the Reso-
lution 1325 established an international framework policy for issues regarding women, 
peace and security, setting an international agenda and framework on the topic (OSAGI, 
2007). Its international mandate assumes as its main goal to take into account the specific 
gender conditions and circumstances women and girls experience in war and post-war 
scenarios; and to promote a more active and equal role for women in processes of  con-
flict  prevention and  management as well as in peace building dynamics. On the basis of  
this international mandate and reference lies the belief  that women, girls, men and boys 
experience war, peace and security distinctively from each other and perform different 
roles in contexts of  armed violence and peace keeping or consolidation processes. The 
resolution does not claim strictly for simple equality but it takes one step further, by call-
ing for the recognition of  the distinct experiences women and girl have on war and peace 
contexts – which are also a result of  the ideological inequalities that separate men and 
women - and to act upon them.  It demands a radical change in the habits, procedures 
and mentalities of  all people involved in the implementation of  the resolution in both 
perspectives: top-down and bottom-up.
Being built on earlier resolutions and conventions,2 the UNSCR 1325 is the corollary 
of  a long gender sensitization and demand/advocacy/lobbying process and represents 
a historical landmark within the international agenda for gender, peace and security not 
only for its mandate but also because it represents the acknowledgement of  both the 
2 Resolution 1325 builds on earlier resolutions and conventions, such as  Resolutions 1208 (1998), 1261 
(1999), 1265 (1999), 1296 (2000) and 1314 (2000); the Windhoek Declaration and Namibia Plan of  Ac-
tion (S/2000/693), Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (A/52//231), 23rd Special Session of  
the General Assembly of  the United Nations (A-S23/10/), Geneva Conventions of  1949, the Additional 
Protocols of  1977, the Refugee Convention of  1951 and Protocol of  1967, CEDAW of  1979 and the 
Optional Protocol of  1999, the BPA of  1995, the UN Convention on the Rights of  the Child in 1989 and 
the two Optional Protocols of  2000, the Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court.
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governmental and non-governmental sectors (e.g NGO, academia, social movements) of  
the need to take into account the specificities of  gender concerning peace, conflict, vio-
lence and security. This confers even more strength to the document (Cohn, et al, 2004). 
The resolution’s eighteen points focuses on three main axes: recognition; claim 
and action which can be translated into the three supporting points of  RUNSC 1325. 
The first – a crosscutting one – refers to acknowledgment of  the specific impact armed 
conflicts have on women and girls and the unique contribution women can make to 
peacebuilding. The second craves for the increased protection and prosecution of  crimes 
against women and girls during war and urges for women’s active involvement, participa-
tion and representation at higher-level decision-making positions within local, national 
and international platforms regarding peace security and (armed) conflict areas. The last 
outlines specific actions to be taken by the Secretary-General, the Security Council, UN 
departments and member states to mainstream gender into peace and security policies 
and practices (e.g. training of  specialized agents, creation of  guidelines). 
The United Nations have developed the Resolution’s content by approving three 
different other Resolutions – UNSCR 1820, 1888 and 1889 – and releasing, since 2004, 
a Secretary-General Report exposing and reflecting on the updated implementation sta-
tus of  the Resolution (with a special focus on the UN work). According to Fritz (2010), 
these four documents have helped to clarify and deepen the commitment to a concrete 
international agenda for women, peace and security.
National Action Plans
Although the UNSCR 1325 is international law, it is not covered by Chapter VII 
of  the UN Charter and its implementation cannot, hence, be enforced nor can its non-
compliance be penalized. The success of  its implementation on the ground is directly 
dependent on the political will of  those involved in war and pace processes – e.g. the 
UN system, member-states, and parties to conflict. Since national governments perform 
a prominent role within conflict resolution, peacebuilding and reconstruction processes 
– as parties to armed conflict, contributors of  peacekeeping troops, members of  the UN 
Security Council, UN members and donors - they emerge as crucial actors concerning 
the implementation and supervision of  practices and policies related to the UNSCR 
1325.
Among the different ways in which countries have operationalized the resolution 
1325, there are two distinct approaches that can be highlighted: the integrative approach, 
which can have three different expressions - to include provisions of  the Resolution on 
National legislation (e.g. Israel, Serbia, Colombia, Fiji); mainstream gender perspective 
into different aspects of  their peace and conflict policies (e.g. Argentina); combine the 
implementation of  multiple resolutions on the topic in a joint plan (e.g. Uganda) ; the 
national action plans (NAP) approach (UN and IA, 2010), which has been the most fre-
quent option so far (Barnes, 2010) and the one strongly emphasized by the UN. 
On the 13th October 2004, the UN Secretary-General’s report invited the mem-
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ber states to prepare NAPs3 in order to take strong steps at national level towards 
the implementation of  the UNSCR 1325 since it is a way of  facilitating the Resolu-
tion content to the local actors, promoting local discussions on it and allowing the 
Resolution to acquire importance in terms of  foreign policy (UN INSTRAW, 2006). 
Specifically, according to the UN Secretary-General (2008), the development of  NAP 
is an opportunity to initiate strategic actions, identify priorities, allocate resources, de-
termine responsibilities and set deadlines to guide and evaluate the implementation 
of  the Resolution. In order to be successful, NAP should include: political will from 
the part of  the originator (national government and implementing organizations); 
participatory and transparent drafting process (Barnes and Lyytikäinen, 2008), giving 
particular consideration to potentially marginalized groups; formulation of  clear and 
realistic objectives, timeframes, initiatives, responsibilities, functions, monitoring and 
evaluation mechanisms; provision of  appropriate financial and human resources; ef-
fective and systemic monitoring and evaluation of  the implementation of  action plans 
using defined success indicators by leading originators and civil society players (Villel-
las, 2010).  However, it is important to bear in mind that NAPs have the potential of  
being an effective tool for the implementation of  the spirit of  UNSCR 1325 only if  a 
comprehensive process is undertaken and as long as it is recognized as a means to an 
end rather than an end in themselves (Luciak, 2008). 
Portuguese National Action Plan
The Portuguese NAP was approved for the period 2009-2013 by the resolution of  
the Council of  Ministers (71/2009) (Conselho de Ministros, 2009a) on the 25th August 
2009, just before UNSCRs 1888 and 1889. It was drawn within the context of  the Portu-
guese application for non-permanent membership of  the Security Council of  the United 
Nations and it is the result of  a working group coordinated by the National Mechanism 
for Equality – Commission for Citizenship and Gender Equality, a government body un-
der the direct supervision of  the Presidency of  the Council of  Ministers and assisted by 
a Consultative Council (integrating public consultations – as widely suggested), in which 
all relevant ministries are represented (including the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, the 
Presidency of  the Ministries Council, Ministry of  Defense, Ministry of  Internal Affairs 
and Ministry of  Justice) (Conselho de Ministros, 2009b). 
The Portuguese NAP (2009-2013) starts by framing itself  within the wider inter-
national agenda on Women, Peace and Security and, specifically, the UNSCR 1325. It 
3 In ideal terms, an action plan is a written document that deals with the “what”, “how”, “who” and “when” 
of  implementation. Strategic actions, resources, priorities and responsibilities should, therefore, be identi-
fied (EPLO, 2010).While the original resolution – 1325 – and the resolutions that followed (1820, 1888 
and 1889) did not require national action plans to be developed,  the UNSCR 1889 (2009) welcomed “the 
efforts of  Member States in implementing resolution 1325 (2000) at the national level, including the de-
velopment of  national action plans”, which are regarded as “an opportunity to kick off  strategic actions, 
identify priorities, and determine responsibilities and deadlines to orient and evaluate the implementation” 
(SG Report, 2008).
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explicitly acknowledges the need to strength women’s participation and representation in 
the sectors of  security (peacekeeping missions, security system reform), justice, develop-
ment aid, as well as to reinforce the protection of  women and girls in conflict and post-
conflict areas. Along with 1325 recommendations, the document expresses concerns for 
both a governmental and civil society dialogue and a national international and European 
legislative framework.
Specifically, the Portuguese NAP identifies five strategic objectives (Conselho de 
Ministros, 2009b) to be pursued:
(1) To increase the participation of  women and integrate gender equality into every 
phase of  peacebuilding, including all levels of  decision-making;
(2) To promote capacity-building of  those involved in peacebuilding and develop-
ment aid efforts on gender equality and gender-based violence and other ‘woman 
peace and security’ aspects;
(3) To promote and protect the respect for the human rights of  women and girls 
in areas of  conflict and post-conflict, regarding the need for the prevention and 
elimination of  gender-based violence against women and the promotion of  wom-
en empowerment;
(4) To deepen and raise awareness of  women, peace and security, including training 
and raising awareness of  decision-making entities and public opinion;
(5) To ensure the participation of  civil society in the implementation of  the UNSCR 
1325 and the Portuguese NAP. 
Constituting the references to assess and monitor implementation, these five stra-
tegic goals are deployed into different specific goals, activities and indicators identified 
along the NAP. 
Assessing Portuguese NAP
The Portuguese NAP has been assessed by different actors both at governmental - 
e.g. the Report of  the Portuguese Government (Governo de Portugal, 2012) issued in 
2012, the EPLO Report (2010) – and non-governmental level (e.g. Portuguese Platform 
for Women’s Rights (Plataforma Portuguesa para os Direitos das Mulheres, 2010), Ob-
servatory on Gender and Armed Violence and International Action Network on Small 
Arms (OgiVA and IANSA, 2008). Being a national action plan of  an international docu-
ment, the Portuguese NAP integrates logically much of  the latter’s possibilities and limi-
tations. However, despite being a ramification of  UNSCR 1325, Portuguese NAP also 
has its own specificities both content wise and at the operational level. 
Content
Portuguese NAP not only follows the Resolution 1325 text but also goes a step fur-
ther by stemming from the governments’ interpretation of  the Resolution as “extending 
beyond armed conflicts and humanitarian aid to include the promotion of  policy coher-
ence at a national level concerning issues such as disarmament and weapons control, 
public security and the elimination of  gender-based violence’’. It is, hence, a particularly 
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comprehensive and groundbreaking plan. However, expectations of  this comprehensive 
interpretation of  the Resolution 1325 text are not met when analyzing the Portuguese 
NAP closely. From a content and policy perspective, three interlinked elements should 
be considered:
(1) Disregard of  domestic gender-based violence – The Portuguese NAP focuses 
much more on war and post-war contexts than domestic gender-based violence. 
This happens not only due to the fact that Portugal has been domestically at 
peace for long decades but also to an artificial line that is usually drawn be-
tween war and peace scenarios as if  no continuum could be established between 
these two poles. The relation between peace and war is not one of  opposition 
and detachment, but of  connectedness (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004). In 
wartime, violence corresponds to the hyperconcentration of  daily and publicly 
consented crimes. Violence and discrimination appear as a normal pattern for 
social, political and economic relations. In turn, formal peace scenarios also 
witness high levels of  daily violence and discrimination (sometimes based on 
the same prejudices and structural and cultural problems as the ones generating 
and fueling war violence), but they are less visible and usually unrecognized or 
dismissed as less important. Intimidations, insecurities and threats experienced 
by women and girls are common to all the various contexts – war, post-war 
and formal peace. Attentive and effective response to these domestic violent 
expressions and their international links would benefit from a broader inter-
pretation and implementation of  the Resolution 1325. In this sense, in addi-
tion to considering the Resolution 1325 in the field of  foreign policy, Portugal 
should be aware of  the continuum of  violence in their own domestic con-
text, contemplating gender-based group/organised and armed violence when 
drawing both prevention and combat strategies towards gender-based violence 
(OGIVA and IANSA, 2008). This need is highly recognized by academics and 
non-governmental organizations.4 However, there is still much resistance on 
the governmental side5 who believes that by focusing on the domestic sphere 
of  gender-based violence the NAP would lose its force since the plan would 
try to address two different realities – the domestic and the international, the 
civil realm and the security forces and political representatives sphere – hence 
widening the target area and losing its strength.  
(2) Small arms – Intimidations, threats and insecurities experienced by women and 
girls resulting from the spread and misuse of  firearms are common to war, 
post-war and formal peace. Therefore, Portugal, within its domestic context, 
should create prevention and combat strategies in this sector. The Observatory 
on Gender and Armed Violence of  the Centre for Social Studies (University 
of  Coimbra) and the International Action Network on Small Arms (OGiVA 
4 Interviews to NGO representatives working on gender issues in Portugal (April to June 2012).  
5 Interviews to governmental and former governmental representatives in Portugal (April to June, 2012). 
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and IANSA, 2008) draw specific recommendations for the Portuguese NAP 
concerning small arms. According to these two institutions, at international 
level, Portugal should carry out increasing bilateral efforts to promote and con-
tribute to the development of  appropriate policies, strategies and legislation 
to prevent gun violence, including domestic armed violence, and to protect its 
victims. At the same time, it should ensure gender mainstreaming concurrently 
in development programs and projects, strengthening pre-existing measures re-
garding security sector reform and DDR programs. In line with this, and as 
far as the multilateral level is concerned, Portugal should deepen its commit-
ments to comprehensive measures of  arms control, including the support for 
an international treaty on arms trade (ATT – Arms Trade Treaty), the Program 
of  Action of  the United Nations to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit 
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, as well as their conferences/regional 
declarations. At national and local level, Portuguese government should sup-
port research, policies and programs intending to reduce and prevent armed 
violence (regarding small arms supply and demand). Another crucial aspect to 
consider is to improve national legislation on possession and use of, including 
the introduction of  a more clearly defined and restricted criteria that preclude 
the granting of  licenses to people with a history of  violence at home or in com-
munity, and considering the motivations for applying for a license, the context 
and the likelihood of  small arms misuse (Ibidem).
(3) Femininities and masculinities – Patriarchy is intimately connected to the gender-
based violence during war and formal peace time. As such, efforts to balance the 
participation of  women in war and peace processes and to prevent and combat 
gender-based violence should also aim at deconstructing the hegemonic notion 
of  masculinity. The term refers to a particular idealized image of  masculinity cor-
respondent to an independent, risk-taking, aggressive, technology-driven, rational 
man (Barrett, 2001). This image stems from a hierarchical perception of  gender 
identities and encourages men to dominate other males and subordinate females, 
hence contributing to the normalization and legitimation of  the subservient posi-
tion of  women and violence towards them. Therefore, Portuguese PNA should 
include the need to deconstruct the dominant and hegemonic notion of  mascu-
linity in order to improve the long-term efficiency of  the plan and to contribute 
to full implementation of  the Resolution 1325 in Portugal. 
Operational
Since the NAP started to be implemented, the presence of  women in security forc-
es has not significantly changed (Governo de Portugal, 2012). However, within today’s 
sharp financial crisis context, the fact that women’s presence has not decreased can be 
regarded as positive point of  the NAP. Also, there has been a great investment in training 
going along the guidelines of  the 1325 principles. However, , six areas should be consid-
ered in order to improve the Plan from an operational point of  view:
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• Budget – There is a lack of  specific budget towards the NAP which emerges as a 
clear limitation concerning the effectiveness of  its implementation (Governo de 
Portugal, 2011).6 
• Monitoring – lack of  efficient mechanisms for monitoring the activities carried 
out within the NAP (EPLO, 2010).
• Staff  selection – Civil servants who are developing the NAP usually have no 
background or were not previously sensitized towards gender, peace and security 
issues. Hence, despite strong dedication to the topic during the time the NAP is 
being drawn and assessed, the knowledge of  this nominated staff  on women, 
peace and security cannot develop to the stage where new, deep and groundbreak-
ing interpretations of  gender reality come across, allowing for more effective and 
creative policies to be adopted. 7 Consultancy, in the short-term, and civil servants 
gender training in the long-term would be crucial to overcome this gap.  
• Timeline and indicators – The Portuguese NAP does not provide any program-
matic timeline or sequence of  actions to develop (Governo de Portugal, 2012). 
According to Fritz (2011), one of  the most important aspects of  a plan is includ-
ing specific timelines since they are central elements for both implementation and 
evaluation. The set up of  a rigorous timeline as well as the identification of  concrete 
goals and indicators should be considered to improve the Portuguese PNA.
• Coordination and communication – The implementation and assessment of  the 
Portuguese NAP is responsibility of  four key Ministries – Foreign Affairs, Justice, 
Defense, Internal Affairs. A coordination unit that would monitor and coordinate 
all national efforts to put the Portuguese National Plan into practice is highly rec-
ommended in order to optimize ministries’ efforts. Also, a specific team allocated 
to the implementation of  the UNSCR 1325 within each Ministry and department 
should be set up.8 This would give visibility and strength to the NAP instead 
of  being diluted among different bureaucratic ministerial procedures. Another 
element that would promote a more efficient NAP design and implementation 
would be better internal procedures providing coordination between the differ-
ent implementing agents. The Portuguese NAP does not mention the specific 
number of  formal meetings there should be and communication among the dif-
ferent ministries is good. Nonetheless, it could be improved. In order to put 
that forward, Fritz (2011) recommends that how and how often participants will 
communicate with each other and the public should be added to all NAP in or-
der to optimize efforts. Better communication and coordination procedures and 
strategy would also encourage a more holistic approach to the Resolution 1325. 
6 Interviews to governamental representatives and former governamental representatives in Portugal (April 
to June, 2012) 
7 Interviews to former governmental representatives and non-governamental representatives in Portugal 
and the UK (April to June, 2012).
8 Interviews to governamental representatives and former governamental representatives in Portugal (April 
to June, 2012).
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In fact, despite the existence of  a NAP, there is a tendency to each ministry follow 
its own gender policy that, in the end, flows into the NAP but does not integrate 
the in-depth and ambition of  the UNSCR 1325. 
• Allocation of  responsibilities – There is no mention to responsible departments 
for each goal and activity. In order to increase efficiency and accountability, the 
Portuguese NAP should not leave any blanks regarding implementation and each 
agent should be identified. 
• Civil society participation – The Portuguese National Action Plan identifies the 
need for civil society to participate in the process of  this resolution’s implementa-
tion, but does not identify the specific mechanisms of  this intervention. The par-
ticipation of  the whole civil society is very important for a deep implementation 
of  the Resolution. Therefore, this point should not be disregarded. 
• External communication – Most of  Portuguese citizens as well as technical staff  
professionally dealing with women, gender and security issues don’t know the 
Resolution 1325 or the Portuguese Action Plan. Better communication strate-
gies should be implemented,9 since external communication is the way the Plan 
is introduced to society. A main challenge to overcome in the implementation of  
UNSCR 1325 continues to be the lack of  knowledge about its existence and con-
tent (Fritz, 2008; Gumru and Fritz, 2009). So, indicating in a plan that the general 
public will be informed about (1) the relevant UNSCRs and a country’s NAP and 
(2) the kinds of  specific advertising tools that will be used (e.g., NGO network 
campaign, radio scripts, hotline number, website) supports the implementation 
and evaluation processes.
• Training – Gender sensitization should be included in all professional and informal 
school training curricula and not only within institutional (security forces) circles.
• Resistance – There is an institutional resistance from the part of  governmental 
authorities regarding the need for the Resolution 1325. It is widely believed that 
gender policies in Portugal were already an on-going process and that the Resolu-
tion only duplicated the gender efforts: the Resolution did not reinforce gender 
policies in Portugal nor has it raised awareness on gender-based violence or dis-
crimination. This can be a symptom of  resistance towards a new and ground-
breaking instrument or of  lack of  understanding of  the comprehensive frame-
work and mission the Resolution entails. 
Conclusion: Challenges Ahead
The creation and implementation of  NAPs is a new and still evolving process. Portu-
guese NAP is no exception – it can be considered a ‘living ongoing document’. By being 
a democratic, at peace, semi-peripheral country with large tradition in peacekeeping mis-
sions, Portugal gathers some characteristics to be a putative successful case in the imple-
mentation of  the NAP at the national level.  However, and despite being groundbreaking 
9 Interviews to representatives of  NGO working on gender issues in Portugal (April to June, 2012).
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when compared to different other National Action Plans, the Portuguese NAP has still 
a long way to go. Aforementioned operational and content wise improvements must be 
considered in order to assure a full implementation of  UNSCR 1325 in Portugal. How-
ever, all of  these distinct gaps converge into two main and deeper challenges which are, 
in turn, on the basis of  those insufficiencies: first, to make the NAP a goal in itself  and 
not a means to an end, i.e., to perceive the NAP as a comprehensive valuable normative 
reference and not as a bargaining tool for international political advantage and integra-
tion (this would imply a deeper political knowledge on the triangular relation “women, 
peace and security” and a more dedicated and efficient communication, training and 
assessment strategy and subsequent procedures); second, to uphold visibility for gender 
issues as well as allocate resources in today’s context of  severe financial crisis.
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Em 2004, o Relatório da ONU A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility – Report 
of  the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change apresentou um balanço sobre um 
novo cenário de instabilidade geopolítica, definindo todo um novo conceito de ameaça 
transnacional e apontando, a partir daí, para novas vias de resposta aos desafios do início 
do século XX.1 Contudo, já desde a década de 90 que a nova incerteza e o défice de orien-
tação suscitava um intenso debate em todas as áreas do saber que veio proliferar depois 
do 11 de Setembro, incidindo exaustivamente sobre as condições e as consequências da 
globalização, o novo terrorismo, as ameaças ambientais e a urgência da formulação de 
uma nova estratégia para a paz. A vastíssima bibliografia sobre a temática reflecte bem o 
zeitgeist de uma época de transição e crise.2 
1 Vide http://www.un.org/secureworld/ (consulta de 14.03.2013). É esta definição que orienta a nossa reflexão.
2 Sem pretensão de querer sintetizar as inúmeras análises e teorias que avançaram com diagnósticos, ousaram 
prognósticos ou propuseram soluções, será talvez pertinente referir apenas algumas das reflexões que mais 
influenciaram o nosso trabalho. Assim, foram perspectivas tão díspares como as de Ernst-Otto Czempiel 
(1992), Arjun Appadurai (1996) ou Samuel Huntington (1996); Jürgen Habermas (2004), Ulrich Beck 
(2004) e Anne-Marie Slaughter (1997 e 2004); Joseph Nye (2004), John Ikenberry (2002 e 2004), Charles 
Kupchan (2001), Pierre Hassner (2003) ou John J. Mearsheimer (2001), Charles Krauthammer (2001), 
Wohlforth (1999) e Edgar Morin (2002) ou Soromenho-Marques (2010) que contribuiram, entre muitos 
outros, para o desenvolvimento do ponto de partida que aqui apresentamos. Para além destas, foram sobre-
tudo as acepções de Wilfried von Bredow de um “mundo turbulento” (1994) ou de Wichard Woyke sobre 
um tempo de “complexidade e discontinuidade” (1995), bem como de Werner Link sobre um “mundo 
móvel de configurações flexíveis” (1998) que observam tanto tendências para a homogeneização e uni-
versalização, como para a diferenciação e, finalmente, de Adriano Moreira sobre um tempo de “anarquia 
madura” (2009) – em que a maior tarefa será a “governabilidade de um mundo” em que “todas as vozes 
devem ser ouvidas” mas que se oriente, ainda assim, pelo respeito dos Direitos Humanos como o “eixo da 
roda” (2009) – pareceram-nos produtivos para esta reflexão.
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Contudo, não seria possível debater estas questões sem reflectirmos a importância 
dos media na nossa percepção dos conflitos e da própria transformação da conflituali-
dade. À tentativa de definição de uma nova ordem mundial sobrepõe-se já há muito uma 
“nova ordem mundial da informação” que altera radicalmente os nossos horizontes de 
conhecimento, de responsabilidade, de expectativa e de intervenção. 
As novas tecnologias possibilitam hoje vias de percepção e de comunicação de infor-
mação sem precedentes. Contudo, no início do século XXI, a massificação da informação 
cria novas incertezas:
Por um lado, o aumento exponencial e a própria pluralidade da informação, não di-
minuem, mas expandem o sentimento de ignorância e imprevisibilidade. Assim, o recep-
tor de informação enfrenta novos desafios de descodificação que o remetem para uma 
espécie de paradoxo do saber a que já Georg Simmel aludia quando falava na diferença 
entre “cultura objectiva” e “cultura subjectiva”3. 
Por outro lado, o acesso a informação vasta, imediata e aparentemente plural, di-
versificada, participatória e “livre” não é tão “aberta” como se poderia esperar, não é 
isenta, nem apresenta respostas “objectivas” para o entendimento do mundo e a tomada 
de decisões / posições. As notícias continuam uma selecção de quem as escreve, edita 
ou publica e o acesso à informação continua a ser limitado e controlado. Tal como na 
época em que Adorno e Horkheimer denunciavam a “indústria da cultura”4, mantêm-se 
estruturas de poder com uma agenda (política, económica, cultural) e que influenciam 
acesso e divulgação de notícias.  
No caso da informação sobre conflitos (domésticos ou internacionais), estas obser-
vações parecem-nos particularmente pertinentes, uma vez que as notícias sobre guerras 
ou sobre conflitos em ebulição implicam cobertura de actos de violência e terror e de 
sentimentos de medo e ódio. Pela sua intensidade e gravidade são “devoradoras” de aten-
ção captando o maior interesse dos media. Todavia, também aqui, o que “é real” é o que 
aparece na televisão e nos jornais e inversamente o que aparece na televisão e nos jornais 
é percepcionado como “real”. A responsabilidade de quem escreve, edita ou publica a 
notícia é muito grande, pois pode vir a ter implicações sobre a vida ou a morte. 
O papel das mulheres em conflitos armados depende particularmente de quem “co-
bre” a notícia, podendo muitas vezes “descobrir” as suas histórias. Isto não significa, no 
entanto, que o trabalho do jornalista deve limitar-se a consciencializar para o problema 
do aumento da intensidade da violência (física ou psicológica) que as mulheres sofrem 
em situação de conflito, mas que deve sobretudo transmitir que as mulheres são hoje - 
para além de vítimas frágeis e silenciosas de guerra - também agentes fundamentais da 
resolução de conflitos e da construção da paz. Com base nestas considerações chegámos 
a um conjunto de interrogações prévias que orientaram a nossa reflexão sobre a violência 
baseada no género em situações de conflito armado. Em primeiro lugar há que olhar de 
modo mais atento e crítico para o papel dos media na cobertura dos conflitos armados. 
3 Georg Simmel “Vom Wesen der Kultur” (1908).
4 Max Horkheimer e Theodor W. Adorno (1947). 
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Depois podemos analisar o contributo dos media para chamar atenção para o grave 
problema da violência contra mulheres - e que aumenta de forma visível e invisível du-
rante conflitos armados. Por fim, devemos apontar para a importância das mulheres na 
resposta ao conflito armado e, mais precisamente, na construção da paz – e o papel do 
jornalismo não só na cobertura destas histórias, mas especialmente na “descoberta” (ou 
divulgação e promoção) desta faceta do peacebuilding.
Isto significa igualmente que devemos ousar ir mais longe e questionar-nos sobre 
os efeitos de uma notícia (ou de uma reportagem sobre um conflito) sobre essa mesma 
situação de conflito: Pode um determinado tipo de cobertura / de jornalismo influenciar 
directa e/ou indirectamente uma situação de conflito (incluindo o período de escalar do 
conflito e o pós conflito)? E, no caso da violência baseada no género, qual o contributo 
que podemos observar – ou mesmo esperar?
Temos de começar por submeter esta nossa agenda a algumas questões básicas que 
alertam já para a urgência de uma análise mais rigorosa do jornalismo dos conflitos arma-
dos. Devemos assim tentar descobrir:
• Que acontecimentos são objecto de cobertura nos media?
• Que “factos” e que “histórias” são apresentados a propósito desses acontecimen-
tos?
• Que perspectivas são apresentadas e que vozes são ouvidas?
• Que perguntas são feitas?
• Por que são feitas e, sobretudo, para quê/quem?
Subjacente a estas questões, estão outras – que a elas se ligam inextricavelmente – e 
cuja resposta parece ainda mais propícia à nossa análise:
• Que acontecimentos (ou mesmo: que conflitos) não são objeto de cobertura?
• Que histórias não são contadas?
• Que vozes não são ouvidas?
• Que perguntas não são feitas? 
Uma apreciação preliminar da cobertura de situações de conflito nos media faz-
-nos suspeitar que a mediatização da violência e do terror privilegia um tipo de jor-
nalismo focado nos acontecimentos extremos e mais violentos, nas vozes “oficiais” 
e mais poderosas, construindo-se facilmente narrativas únicas que são quase sempre 
simplistas em torno do ódio e do sangue, tendo como protagonistas os bons e os maus 
e que só podem ter um único desfecho: vencer ou perder. Em vez de uma análise do 
contexto (político, histórico ou cultural) e de espaço para perspectivas diversas ou so-
luções alternativas, o conflito é-nos apresentado como mal inevitável (e cíclico, quase 
natural) que assume uma dimensão de espectáculo. O mais convencional “jornalismo 
de guerra” assume muitas vezes este foco pouco diferenciado que se desinteressa por 
iniciativas de pequenos passos por parte de pessoas comuns, silenciando estas vozes 
e estas “histórias” com consequências, por vezes, muito negativas para as possibilida-
des de resolução do conflito. Assim, o discurso centrado exclusivamente na violência 
potencia e perpetua a violência e torna outros discursos inaudíveis, limitando a per-
cepção de posições e soluções alternativas. Para além disso, o fascínio pela violência 
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que se relata com alegada “neutralidade dos factos”, a redução do olhar apenas para 
um acontecimento-espectáculo (como se tivesse surgido do nada) e o tempo de antena 
apenas para as fontes oficiais leva a uma cobertura susceptível de ser instrumentalizada 
como “propaganda de guerra”. 
Nestas narrativas de guerra, a voz das mulheres é geralmente inaudível. Contudo o 
silêncio significa aqui “silenciamento” e representa uma nova violência. Uma violação da 
possibilidade de expressão e, assim, de agir e de ser.
Mas se é esta a perspectiva do mais convencional “jornalismo de guerra”, temos 
de ter em conta que não estamos perante um blueprint de comunicação, pois há outras 
formas de cobrir um acontecimento e de “contar a história” descobrindo o que está ge-
ralmente invisível e dando visibilidade à perspectiva das mulheres num conflito armado.
Na óptica dos Estudos da Paz, o “Jornalismo de Paz” afirma-se como representação 
alternativa dos conflitos nos media, partindo de questões e critérios diferentes e por vezes 
mesmo opostos aos do “Jornalismo de Guerra”. É nas linhas deste tipo de jornalismo 
que se escreveram nos últimos anos muitas histórias de mulheres e enquanto alternativa 
crítica com cada vez mais expressão, esta orientação desafia a cobertura convencional ou 
mainstream de conflitos e lança novas pistas para a leitura do admirável novo mundo do 
século XXI.
Para a denúncia dos crimes cometidos contra mulheres em situação de conflito inter-
nacional o Jornalismo para a Paz tem um potencial simultaneamente crítico e desafiador.
O Potencial do “Jornalismo de Paz” 
De um modo genérico, o Jornalismo para a Paz (JP) afirma-se como concepção e 
perspectiva alternativa ao Jornalismo de Guerra (JG). Tem por objectivo dar visibilidade 
aos espaços vazios do JG e responder às questões que ficaram por fazer e esclarecer.
Uma das definições mais concisas é dada por Jake Lynch, Director do Centre for 
Peace and Conflict Studies, da Universidade de Sydney, e um dos principais promotores do 
Jornalismo de Paz:
“Peace journalism is when editors and reporters make choices - of  what stories to report and about how 
to report them – that create opportunities for society at large to consider and value non-violent response 
to conflict.” (Lynch, 2008)
A partir destas palavras depreendemos, de imediato que o JP se fundamenta na 
concepção de que qualquer escrita sobre conflitos representa sempre uma escolha e 
que essa escolha é determinada por objectivos. A escolha do JP é olhar para “histórias 
alternativas” que não apontam para a violência, mas que possam ser vias para a resolu-
ção do conflito. O seu objectivo é justamente quebrar o ciclo de violência e contribuir 
para a paz consciencializando através da notícia ou da reportagem para actores diferen-
tes no palco da guerra – neste caso, por exemplo, as mulheres - bem como para o seu 
potencial de superação de violência através da gestão pacífica de conflitos, da mediação 
e da conciliação.
De um ponto de vista teórico, o JP inscreve-se nos Estudos de Conflitos e da Paz 
utilizando conceitos e orientações desta área científica, motivo pelo qual será pertinente 
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esclarecer esta sua “matriz”: Os Estudos da Paz partem de um conceito crítico e dinâmico 
da paz. Em contraste com acepções clássicas da paz enquanto “estado final e perpétuo”, 
estático e perfeito que dependia essencialmente dos Deuses (ou só seria acessível a Deus), 
advoga-se aqui uma ideia política da paz: a paz deixa de ser entendida num sentido ne-
gativo como mera “ausência de guerra”, mas toma um significado próprio e muito mais 
abrangente. Depende dos Homens que têm o dever de a fundar, construir e garantir - e 
como tal, permanece imperfeita (ou inacabada) e sempre aberta a novos desafios e sig-
nificações. 
Face a uma teoria da paz convencional, Johan Galtung propôs nos anos 60 e 70 um 
“estudo crítico da paz” que levou a um alargamento dos conceitos de violência, por um, e de 
uma alteração do paradigma da paz, por outro lado.5 Para Galtung, a ausência de guerra 
não seria uma definição aceitável de paz, uma vez que essa interpretação permitiria que 
classificássemos uma sociedade em que o mais forte oprime o mais fraco – que, temendo 
represálias não se poderia nem insurgir, nem defender, não havendo assim sinais de con-
flito – como pacífica e bem ordenada. Contudo, na sua acepção de paz pressupõe-se não 
só ordem, como ainda tranquilidade, segurança, liberdade e justiça6. Introduz-se assim o 
conceito de “violência estrutural” ao lado dos conceitos de violência directa e pessoal que 
altera o debate sobre a construção da paz. Os estudos críticos da paz alargam a própria 
ideia da paz e atribuem-lhe um papel interventivo na esfera política e social. A paz exige, 
pois, não só a eliminação ou ausência de violência directa (ou seja, estados de “guerra”, 
na sua expressão comum) ou de violência pessoal (exercida por um ditador ou um regime 
opressor), mas a eliminação da violência estrutural que se expressa como uma distribui-
ção desequilibrada de poder e de recursos. 
Esta visão da construção da paz é partilhada por Dieter Senghaas, um dos mais im-
portantes teorizadores da paz, que entende a justiça social, a igualdade de oportunidades, 
o funcionamento transparente das instituições políticas bem como o equilíbrio de poder 
como factores essenciais à consolidação da paz. Apenas uma sociedade solidária poderá 
resolver os conflitos emergentes de um modo mais pacífico e prevenir, assim, a explosão 
da agressividade como forma de mal-estar e de expressão extrema de sentimentos de 
injustiça e desespero. Trata-se, nas suas palavras, de conseguir “civilizar” os conflitos 
(Senghaas, 1971). 
Nesta tradição, a paz torna-se simultaneamente princípio, processo e produto de uma 
gestão de conflitos não violenta. E sublinhe-se, não se trata de ambicionar um mundo 
sem conflitos, mas a transformação da gestão dos conflitos e, em última instância, o 
estabelecimento (por leis) de um regulamento de gestão de conflitos sem violência ao 
nível mundial. 
Para o JP isto significa que assume descomplexadamente o seu normativismo quan-
do propõe uma agenda de trabalho orientada num “dever ser” que deseja alcançar, no-
5 Vide Galtung (1969 e 1982). Veja-se aqui também Senghaas (1971)
6 Há aqui uma nítida referência a uma visão cristã de paz que apela simultaneamente a “iustitia, securitas, 
tranquilitas, caritas”. Mas Galtung vai mais longe ligando a paz à realização plena do “potencial humano”. 
Vide Galtung (1971).
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meadamente um papel (interventivo) na pacificação do “mundo” (que se desdobra no 
Estado, na cidade ou no bairro) através de uma representação mais diferenciada das situ-
ações de conflito. Estamos perante um “jornalismo com causa”, um jornalismo militante 
que, nas palavras de Nadine Bilke, é um meio e um instrumento para “evitar guerras” 
(Bilke, 2008).
Estas orientações traduzem-se, como já vimos, numa percepção e interpretação al-
ternativa dos conflitos. A situação de conflito em análise é observada de uma “macro-
perspectiva” que se preocupa não apenas com um acontecimento ou um incidente em 
si, mas com todo o seu contexto (político, histórico, cultural etc.) e as possíveis causas, 
escutando a uma “micro-perspectiva” várias vozes, incluindo aquelas sem poder (apa-
rente) e que são geralmente ignoradas (e silenciadas) e várias explicações, mesmo aquelas 
que são aparentemente marginais ou contrárias às nossas próprias certezas e expectativas. 
É aqui que o Jornalismo para a Paz se torna um veículo precioso para “cobrir” e 
“descobrir” não só a violência contra mulheres que ocorre com maior intensidade e 
frequência durante conflitos armados internacionais, mas também o sistemático silencia-
mento do seu papel nos conflitos e na resolução dos mesmos. Este silenciamento é em 
si um acto de violência:
Em muitas culturas (incluindo a ocidental) – e durante muitos séculos – a mulher 
não foi considerada como “testemunha” fiável. A sua palavra não tinha qualquer valor 
judicial. Na prática, estava mesmo excluída da esfera política. A História está repleta de 
narrativas masculinas, dos feitos dos Homens e dos seus filhos - especialmente nas guer-
ras, que glorificam a masculinidade que aí se torna sinónimo de poder e de violência – e 
que legitimam a dominação sobre as mulheres quer através de uma caracterização das 
mulheres como frágeis, dependentes, menores e por isso vítimas “naturais” (a mulher 
raptada, violada, abandonada), quer através de uma imagem construída de uma mulher 
agressora, dominadora “exóticas” ou “sobrenatural” (a Amazona ou a bruxa má) e que 
tem de ser eliminada. 
Na actualidade, esta visão mais esterotipada de lendas e narrativas arcaicas está a mu-
dar. Na medida em que cada vez mais mulheres participam na esfera económica e políti-
ca, também as representações culturais tomam novas configurações. E há cada vez mais 
interesse em conhecer a perspectiva das mulheres em situação de conflito. Isso deve-se 
a vários aspetos: em primeiro lugar houve um aumento muito significativo de mulheres 
jornalistas. Até 1970 apenas 6% de correspondentes de guerra eram mulheres. Hoje mais 
de um terço são mulheres. Procuram o olhar de outras mulheres, entram nos seus lares 
(geralmente considerados periféricos dos palcos de guerra) e querem conhecer a sua voz. 
Muitas destas jornalistas sabem o que é “não ser ouvida” e, assim, estão provavelmente 
mais sensibilizadas para a denúncia e a crítica de crimes cometidos contra mulheres, bem 
como para a denúncia da situação difícil das mulheres durante conflitos. Mas não se trata 
(de um modo ainda paternalista) de expor os crimes e proteger as vítimas, este género 
jornalístico tem por objectivo apresentar o papel das mulheres na resolução de conflitos 
(engendering), deslocá-las da periferia para o centro da história, mostrá-las como atoras (e 
não meras atrizes), como participantes ativas e indispensáveis da construção da paz.
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A Resolução do Conselho de Segurança da ONU 1325 e a aplicação por parte da 
NATO desta nova medida é um importante exemplo, como o papel das mulheres pode ser 
crucial para o peacebuilding, não só para vencer a paz, mas essencialmente para ganhar a paz. 
De um ponto de vista prático (ou metodológico), o JP define orientações muito 
específicas que devem guiar o trabalho do jornalista e que se formulam basicamente 
em oposição ao “tradicional” JG. Apesar de não concordarmos com todos os critérios 
referidos no seminal “Modelo de Galtung”7, a abordagem crítica dos seguintes pontos 
é incontornável para a nossa avaliação do JP enquanto resposta à violência baseada no 
género em situações de conflito. 
Segundo Galtung, o JP cobre um conflito durante um período mais amplo, explo-
rando a formação do conflito e analisando as motivações e causas de vários pontos de 
vistas, vários participantes, vários objectivos e várias questões. Tenta compreender os 
diferentes lados envolvidos e humanizá-los (recusando culpabilizações simplistas) e de-
termina como problema – não uma ou outra parte – mas a própria violência. Neste 
sentido, entende-se como peace/conflict orientated em contraste com o JG que acusa de ser 
war/violence orientated. 
Um outro critério de contraste é que se vê o JP como people-oriented em vez de “elite-
oriented” como o JG. Para além de tentar dar visibilidade a todos aqueles que sofrem com 
os conflitos (especialmente as mulheres, as crianças, os idosos, os doentes), aponta atroci-
dades cometidas pelos vários lados envolvidos num conflito responsabilizando pessoas em 
concreto e foca particularmente o trabalho dos pacificadores, dando voz aqueles que pro-
põem caminhos de resistência à violência e ao ódio e projecção a todos que se empenham 
na conciliação. Esta cobertura que pretende aumentar a percepção dos pequenos proces-
sos para a paz opõe-se à narrativa das “elites” que assenta muitas vezes na concepção de 
inimizades naturais, inevitáveis e intransponíveis sem qualquer possibilidade de resolução. 
Por esta razão, o JP é, na perspetiva de Galtung, solution-oriented, abrindo espaços (de repre-
sentação) para o potencial criativo do trabalho da paz, divulgando sobretudo iniciativas e 
projectos de resolução de conflitos por vias não violentas como alternativa a um jornalismo 
que apenas se interessa por apresentar quem ganha e quem perde a guerra. Assim o JG é 
considerado como victory-orientated, por olhar unicamente para o dia do cessar-fogo ou a 
assinatura do Tratado de Paz, como se a paz fosse um produto “declarável” e “acabado” 
que surge no fim dos combates armados, logo que haja uma nova “ordem” de segurança - e 
que permanece assim até à próxima (e inevitável) guerra. 
Neste enquadramento conceptual, o JG é acusado de perpetuar o ciclo de violência, 
o JP representa uma alternativa que aponta para a possibilidade (real) da resolução pací-
fica dos conflitos, destacando o potencial de “pacificação” que cada ser humano / socie-
dade tem quando a paz é entendida não como “estado perfeito”, mas como permanente 
processo e desafio de aperfeiçoamento.
7 O quadro é traçado por Lynch (2008) a partir de um modelo mais alargado de Galtung (1998). A nossa 
recusa deste modelo prende-se em grande parte com o seu maniqueísmo e a sua redução do JG a um 
jornalismo “uniformizado” que é entendido linearmente como “propaganda”.
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Na sequência das propostas de Johan Galtung, vários investigadores, conciliadores, 
“peace-workers” e jornalistas apresentaram recomendações concretas para o trabalho 
nos “campos de batalha”8. 
Consciente da importância e da influência da informação sobre conflitos o JP des-
taca o papel dos jornalistas (e mais precisamente dos editores) como gate keepers que per-
mitem umas e não outras histórias. O objectivo do JP é precisamente alargar os portões 
(ainda muito estreitos) da informação (advogando um novo gatekeeping), que privilegia a 
notícia mais “acessível” ou mais fácil (que repercute geralmente a posição do lado mais 
poderoso ou influente) e que está demasiadamente preocupada em confirmar expectati-
vas (alinhando num discurso sobre violência, sangue e terror, ao expor a “brutalidade” 
dos agressores e a “tragédia” das vítimas), como se a cobertura de uma situação de con-
flito fosse uma via de sentido único.9  
A grande preocupação do JP em ouvir outras vozes e outras “histórias” também se 
prende com a consciência das implicações que uma notícia sobre uma determinada situação 
de conflito tem sobre o próprio conflito. De facto, a informação sobre um conflito pode 
contribuir para o escalar do conflito ou - como argumentam os defensores do JP - para o 
seu “descalar”. Do mesmo modo, pode suscitar interesse e simpatia em países terceiros (do 
público a quem a informação se destina) e levar a possíveis ajudas, sanções ou intervenções 
- ou não. A repercussão da notícia sobre o conflito pode ser, então, directa ou indirecta. 
No JP este fenómeno é tematizado como feedback-loop. Os jornalistas que seguem as 
orientações do JP advogam consequentemente a divulgação de respostas pacíficas a situ-
ações de crise e conflito e privilegiam “narrativas de conciliação” na expectativa que estas 
possam apontar vias para manter a esperança e multiplicar os gestos da boa-vontade e de 
8 Veja-se aqui os serviços de informação do projecto TRANSCEND (http://www.transcend.org/tms/
about-peace-journalism/3-principles-and-guidelines-for-tms-writers/) ou as recomendações de Jake Lynch 
e Annabel McGoldrick formuladas em “17 dicas para jornalistas” (www.yavasgamats.org/docs/17%20
Tips.ppt). Consultas de 31.10.2012.
9 A recusa da “narrativa única” é bem perceptível através do exemplo citado por Applebaum (2010) e que 
ilustra as possibilidades para o JP: For example, prior to the presidential election of  2009 in Afghanistan, the counter-
insurgency approach, advocated by US commander General McCrystal, contained elements of  relationship building to a 
degree that is unusual among military approaches in Afghanistan. In the lead up to the Presidential election in Afghanistan 
in mid 2009, an unusual example of  the relationship-sensitive approach to counter-insurgency was applied by US troops in 
the Nawa district, of  Helmand province. However, the overwhelming majority of  attention that Nawa district received in 
2009, the year that this new strategy was first applied, was reports of  violence there, principally in early-to-mid July, during 
intensified military operations. For example in 2009, seven out of  ten articles in the ‘Washington Post online’, tagged under 
the key word “Nawa”, focused almost exclusively on violence and US combat operations in the region, with similar ratios 
appearing in online coverage  from the Guardian, the Independent, and the New York Times. In fact, relationship building 
has succeeded, in contrast to violent methods, in winning “hearts and minds” in Nawa, Afghanistan, but also on a larger 
scale in Iraq. The US military’s promotion of  these methods as successful may of  course be a less than “objective” evalua-
tion. However the military’s promotion of  relationship building as a legitimate tactic to attempt in addressing violence does 
contribute to the normative strength of  non-violence responses to conflict. In acknowledging the importance of  (at least being 
seen to) build cooperative relationships with local populations (over simply violently suppressing disagreement to military policy) 
the legitimacy of  these non-violent responses to violence conflict is reinforced. And indeed researchers also note the importance 
of  relationship building for ‘vertical and horizontal integration’ in peacebuilding to support the sustainability of  institutional 
reform and in promoting ‘peace with justice’ and respect for human rights.
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boas-práticas, por mais ínfimas que sejam. É através do destaque dado a estas histórias 
que se poderá quebrar o ciclo de violência e combater a expectativa do “espectáculo do 
terror” que alimenta muitos grupos armados (governamentais ou não) quando lançam, 
por exemplo, ataques sangrentos precisamente num momento propício (e com o único 
objectivo de ser) a “serem a notícia” de abertura ou de primeira página de um jornal de 
informação. Como recorda mais uma vez Jake Lynch: “it is not the influence of  news on public 
opinion as such, but assumptions by parties to conflict about its likely or possible influence, that condition 
their behavior.” (Lynch, 2008).10 
Se a notícia centrada na violência fomenta sentimentos de vingança, ódio, incom-
preensão aumentando a escala de violência, a notícia sobre iniciativas para a paz, para 
a solução de um problema (concreto), para o perdão e a conciliação, não incentiva de 
imediato e de igual modo para uma “imitação” de boas práticas, nem leva directamente 
à prevenção ou ao fim de guerras, mas consciencializa para possibilidades de acção para 
além da violência e chama atenção para o potencial de escolha - mesmo numa situação de 
conflito (seja como actor ou espectador). 
Neste sentido, podemos entender o JP como jornalismo de re-mediação. Como ano-
ta Lynch o JP afirma-se como “remedial strategy and an attempt to supplement the news conventions 
to give peace a chance” (Lynch, 2008). Rejeitando a cobertura mainstream, apresenta vozes, 
histórias e perspectivas plurais e alternativas que têm por objectivo transformar a notícia 
com o intuito de contribuir activa e assumidamente para a conciliação, para a prevenção 
de conflitos ou para a solidificação dos processos de paz. Como nos lembra Paul Lede-
rach, um dos maiores estudiosos da paz e um verdadeiro peacemaker, no centro das narra-
tivas de conflito, há sempre “grandes” pequenas histórias de coragem e de conciliação e 
é aí que nos devemos focar: 
“I have not experienced any situation in conflict, no matter how protracted or severe, from Central 
America to the Philippines to the Horn of  Africa, where there have not been people who had a vision 
for peace, emerging often from their own experience of  pain. Far too often, however, these same people 
are overlooked and disempowered either because they do not represent `official´ power, whether on the 
side of  government (...) or (...) of  the various militias, or because they are written off  as biased and 
too personally affected by the conflict.” (Lederach, 1997) 
Tendo em conta esta agenda, o JP aposta particularmente no seu papel na cobertura 
de conflitos em regiões em situação de pré- ou pós-conflito e vê no peacebuilding, tal como 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali o definiu em 199211, o seu maior campo de acção.   
Se bem que ainda relativamente recente, tendo-se formalizado a partir das Confe-
rências que Johan Galtung apresentou no Curso de Verão da Universidade de Taplow 
Court (no Reino Unido) em 1997 sobre “Peace and Conflict Journalism”, não se lhe podem 
negar raizes mais remotas, nomeadamente na Literatura de Paz que se afirmou com mais 
incidência desde o século XIX e que tinha nos jornais o seu principal meio de divulgação. 
10 Veja-se aqui, por exemplo, a conferência de Julia Bacha “Pay attention to nonviolence” www.ted.com/
talks/julia_bacha.html)
11 Disponível em http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pbun.shtml
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Por fim, também devemos referir que este modelo de jornalismo tem a sua origem nos 
trabalhos de Centros de Estudos de Comunicação, como por exemplo, a World Association 
for Christian Communication.
Num momento de reflexão sobre as possibilidades de responder à violência baseada 
no género em situações de conflito internacional, será pertinente terminar com as pala-
vras de uma mulher que pensou e agiu em tempos de guerra, em nome de tantas vozes 
silenciosas e silenciadas, que nos inspiram para enfrentar os difíceis desafios que a cons-
trução da paz nos exige. Estou a referir-me a Eleanor Roosevelt, uma “mulher de armas” 
que sabia que a paz é um processo longo, que requer persistência e muito trabalho, mas 
que deverá ser, cada vez mais, um horizonte possível: “For it isn`t enough to talk about peace. 
One must believe in it. And it isn`t enough to believe in it. One must work at it.”(1944). 
A História deu-lhe razão. Não temos como não agir da mesma forma.
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Building Capacity on Gender-based 
Violence in Integrated Missions
Annemieke Verrijp De Los Santos
Is currently seconded with the Spanish Ministry of  Defence as a Strategic Coordinating Officer. In 
her capacities as Course Director of  the Spanish-Dutch training initiative to create gender capacity 
in international operations, she upholds the comprehensive approach in which military, diplomats and 
other civilians including police obtain the necessary skills to effectively coordinate and interact with local 
women and men, to protect civilians, and to promote equal participation of  men and women in conflict 
prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding. She worked for the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs in The 
Hague, Netherlands where she was responsible for the coordination of  the implementation of  the Dutch 
National Action Plan “Taking a stand for women, peace and security” and for drafting the Dutch efforts 
in response to conflict-related sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of  Congo.
“On the first day of  a training course for military and civilian middle management in a peaceful Western 
European city, a male lieutenant-colonel made a remark on female gender advisors in a peacekeeping 
mission. A civilian woman sitting next to him disagreed with his statement, but shied away from reacting. 
She felt intimidated by his uniform. He was unaware of  the impact his uniform on her, and unaware of  
her opinion. Both participants were to be deployed, in the same peacekeeping mission.”
The comprehensive approach is all about mind-set. Gender is all about mind-set. 
It is an approach towards a situation, a conflict, the people engaged in the conflict, the 
people affected by the conflict. It is about two-way communication; trying to listen to the 
other, to understand how the other thinks and acts. It is about having an open attitude in 
interacting with others, be it the commander or head of  mission, the local governor, or a 
traumatized man who had to watch his wife being brutally gang-raped by rebels. 
And yes, the comprehensive approach is also about breaking the (perceived) barri-
ers between participants in a course on gender in international missions and operations. 
Why? Because it is must to be able to work as an effective and united team. A team that 
consists of  military and civilians, and that makes use of  their broad range of  skills and 
expertise. A mission in which all personnel can count on each other, and can act against 
the systemic violation of  human rights. A team that will act and never look away.
So how do we do this? This paper discusses the experience of  the bilateral Spanish-
Dutch training initiative on building gender capacity in international missions and opera-
tions. This ESDC (European Security and Defense College) certified course builds on three 
principles for effectiveness: Knowledge as a preventive factor; Common interests and com-
mon goals; and obviously the comprehensive approach towards gender-based violence.
This course is one of  the expressions of  the firm commitment of  both the Neth-
erlands and Spain to implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and follow-
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ing resolutions on women, peace and security. Both countries have National Action 
Plans on 1325 in place.
Knowledge as a Preventive Factor
The need for adequate gender training can hardly be overestimated, especially for 
missions and operations in conflict settings where sexual and gender-based violence 
(SGBV) is an issue. Unfortunately, it almost always is. Conflict-related rape and other 
forms of  sexual violence used to be hidden and silent. Now it is front-page news, or is 
posted ´live´ on YouTube or Facebook. Who doesn´t recall the screams in the spring of  
2011 of  a Libyan woman who burst into the hotel housing the foreign press in Tripoli in 
an attempt to tell journalists that she had been raped and beaten by members of  Colonel 
Muammar el-Qaddafi’s militia? She had been raped by 15 men, was tied up, and they 
defecated and urinated on her. They took turns raping her and sodomizing her with 
rifles. Violence was used as a weapon with the intention to demoralize and destabilize. 
Rape is a cheap yet very effective weapon of  war, which is used on a daily basis in today´s 
conflicts. Mostly women and girls are targeted, but also men and boys fall victim of  such 
atrocious acts.  
Peacekeepers need to be well-prepared to recognize gender violence and to deal 
with both the victims as the perpetrators. Though the primary obligation to protect 
civilians affected by conflict lies with national governments and parties to the conflict, 
the international community can and must play a role to protect the civilian population 
and to address impunity. Contributing nations have a responsibility to ensure peace-
keepers arrive well-equipped at the missions, be it peacekeeping, military or diplomatic. 
They should be sensitive towards local perceptions, security and other concerns, and 
be able to distinguish the ones identified by men and by women. Mission personnel 
should be sensitized to the valuable and constructive role women and men can play 
towards stabilizing volatile circumstances. A more comprehensive understanding of  
the circumstances can lead to bridging gaps between international standards and local 
perceptions. 
In 2010, millions of  men, women, and children were killed, raped, displaced, injured, 
or recruited by force in armed conflicts throughout the world. Whether caught in 
the crossfire or deliberately targeted, civilians too often suffer disproportionately as a 
result of  conflict (OXFAM, 2011)
The first mission with a Protection of  Civilians mandate was UNAMSIL, the UN 
Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone in 1999. More and more, peacekeeping op-
erations are being tasked to protect civilian populations affected and traumatized 
by armed conflict, in particular women and children. Currently, UN missions in 
Sudan, Afghanistan and the DRC have Protection of  Civilian components in their 
mandates.
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The Dutch-Spanish ESDC course intends to provide practical skills to recognize 
signs of  human rights violations, such as sexual violence, and to act in order to protect 
the civilian population. In very practical terms this means that by means of  plenary ses-
sions and scenarios knowledge and skills are provided to:
• Have a better understanding of  the challenges and dilemmas facing military and 
civilian decision-makers in the field with regard to the protection of  civilians and 
sexual violence, and what is required to address these matters;
• Promote the necessity to distinct the diverse security needs and perspectives of  
the local male and female population in a mission area as a essential element for 
increasing operational effectiveness and improving the overall security situation;  
Knowledge in combination with an open mind-set becomes a powerful tool for 
change, and can contribute to conflict prevention.
Common Interests, Common Goals
The lieutenant colonel and the civilian woman mentioned in the beginning of  this 
paper saw each other later on in the day, both in jeans. Their different appearances broke 
down the walls, and they had the most interesting conversation. Sometimes, it can be as 
simple as that; a pair of  jeans.
Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen asserts in his book Identity and Violence (Sen, 2006) 
that stereotyping people with a singular identity leads to fatalism, resignation, and a sense 
of  inevitability of  violence. Far too much violence in the world today is fomented by the 
illusion that people are destined to a ´sectarian singularity´, he claims. It partitions people 
and civilizations into twofold oppositions; it ignores the plural ways that people under-
stand themselves. To understand a person according to Sen, one must consider diverse 
differences such as religion, nationality, class, community, culture, gender, profession, skin 
color, morals, politics, language, family of  origin, and many more.
In conflicts - lingering or violent ones – those characteristics that that define the 
´otherness´, and supposedly separate ´us from them´ and ´him from me´ are what mo-
tivate people to prolong or even intensify the conflict. It goes without saying that these 
oppositions are exploited by those benefitting from the conflict. Therefore, finding com-
mon ground and common interests, is fundamental in peace negotiations. These com-
mon interests can be best identified if  they are based on a comprehensive analysis of  all 
interests of  all parties involved, and of  the needs and concerns of  men and women, of  
people in power, and of  people in poverty.
If  we truly want peacekeeping missions and international operations to contribute 
to advancing our collective security, we have the responsibility to engage everyone. This 
goes for internal aspects of  the missions such as its composition, but most certainly also 
for its external aspects in the preparation and implementation of  the mission. Yet, ac-
tive and inclusive engagement of  women remains below the mark. Still less than 10% of  
peace negotiators are women, less than 3% are signatories to peace agreements. Moreo-
ver, in the past 20 years the proportion of  deployed female uniformed personnel has only 
increased from 1% to a meager 4% (UNIFEM, 2010)
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These numbers need to increase. Nonetheless, this is not merely a matter of  num-
bers; inclusive engagement of  both men and women is a precondition for enduring tran-
sitions towards sustainable peaceful, secure and stable societies. 
Three reasons why women´s participation can be added value to peacekeeping  
operations:
1. Sensitize the armed forces to operate with a broader, more human centred defini-
tion of  security
2. Serve as role models for the local population
3. Have better access to certain segments of  the local population
For achieving long-term stability it is paramount to take into account all human capi-
tal. The higher the level of  participation of  all citizens, men and women alike, the greater 
the opportunities for economically and politically thriving societies. This makes gender in 
fact a strong motor in our human society (Macaulay, 2009). Just as families, communities 
and societies as a whole can be destabilized by the systemic use of  rape as a weapon of  
war; similarly post-conflict societies can come out stronger if  they build on the social fab-
ric of  these same families and communities. This implies next to providing medical and 
psychosocial support and livelihood programmes, also dealing with complex issues such 
as stigma and exclusion of  victims of  rape, of  children born out of  rape. Furthermore, 
local structures can be used in reshaping the rule of  law in matters as broad as prosecu-
tion, access to justice, policing, reconciliation, and renewed legislation.
Building Gender Skills in Security Sector in (post)conflict situations: the case 
of  the DRC
The NGO Search for Common Ground has established 36 Civilian Protection 
Committees at Army Headquarters and inside brigades and battalions in five of  
the country’s most troubled provinces of  the Democratic Republic of  Congo. They 
reach 25% of  the Congolese military with training programs that use interactive 
tools to change the abusive behavior of  soldiers. Programmes include sensitization 
sessions for soldiers that involve participatory theater and dialogue. To date, there 
have been 1,500,000 participants. Moreover, they have reached 600,000 Congolese 
soldiers and civilians with mobile cinema screenings at which films are demonstrated 
that communicate the need to prevent sexual violence. The films are followed by dis-
cussions led by trained military and civilian facilitators. This successful programme 
is now also being used for training of  the Congolese police. According to Search for 
Common Ground, the Congolese rebel group M23 who deserted the army in April 
2012 and took hold of  the town of  Goma in the Kivu province early November 
does not seem to be applying rape as a weapon of  destabilization. This surprising 
fact may have been partially a result that many a rebel received training whilst still 
integrated in the Congolese army. 
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The Dutch-Spanish ESDC course aims for participants to: 
• Recognize the different impact of  conflicts on men and women, as well as oppor-
tunities and challenges for women to participate equally in conflict resolution, cri-
sis management and reconstruction, and to translate this to operational planning 
and implementation.
• Promote the necessity to distinct the diverse security needs and perspectives of  
the local male and female population in a mission area as a essential element for 
increasing operational effectiveness and improving the overall security situation.  
Comprehensive Approach to Conflict-related GBV
Widespread sexual and gender-based violence in conflict situations, the lack of  effective institutional arrange-
ments to protect women, and the continued under-representation of  women in peace processes, remain serious 
impediments to building sustainable peace.
Chicago Summit Declaration by Heads of  State and Government, 20 May 2012
There is an increasing insight that gender is a strategic, effective and sound invest-
ment in a country´s stability and security. But as stated in the start of  this paper, it re-
quires an open mind-set, often a different mind-set. It cannot be applied solely by deft 
diplomacy or military might. It requires “A Comprehensive Approach”. Comprehensiveness 
is all about building on varying views and perspectives, from military, civilian, police 
and civil society actors. Joint missions require both civilian and military approaches, and 
need to make use of  diverse operational and communication tools and diverse potential. 
Equally, a comprehensive approach to missions and operations requires both male and 
female views on complex situations, from different positions in society. These perspec-
tives complement each other and together make for a more complete analysis of  the 
conflict, and make for a more effective response. 
In Afghanistan for example, this is becoming all the more evident when planning for 
withdrawal of  international troops in 2014. In October Human Rights Watch stressed the 
need to outgoing US Secretary of  State Hillary Clinton to elaborate a women´s rights strategy 
with clear plans and commitments. “The US and other countries have worked hard to create a security 
strategy for Afghanistan and have made plans to support the country’s soldiers and police after the 2014 draw-
down” (Human Rights Watch, 2012). But eleven years after the end of  Taliban rule, women 
have no such commitment. Afghan women need and deserve a strategy of  their own for the 
protection of  their rights in the perilous years ahead.” This interface between civil society, 
diplomats and military (NATO in this case) is an effective tool to build bridges between the 
various actors. Security is not synonymous, nor limited to the security sector. 
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Human Rights Watch urges to:
• Continue to press the Afghan government at the highest political levels to proacti-
vely promote and protect women’s rights and use women’s rights as a key indicator 
for measuring development and security;
• Issue prompt public responses to Afghan government actions and statements that 
violate Afghanistan’s domestic and international obligations to the rights of  women 
and girls;
• Push for women-friendly leadership in key Afghan institutions;
• Ensure a central role for women in all Afghan peace-building processes;
• Press for enforcement of  Afghanistan’s Law on Elimination of  Violence against Women.
• Make basic human rights for women a key US funding priority in Afghanistan;
• Ensure Afghanistan’s security strategy focuses not just on support for military and 
police but also on security for women and girls; and
• Organize and promote broad international support for this strategy.
The Dutch-Spanish ESDC course aims for the students to:
• Understand the concept and aims of  the Comprehensive Approach; 
• Describe how the gender perspective and the comprehensive approach com-
plement each other;
• Act effectively in a mixed working environment consisting of  military, police 
and civilians. 
Conclusion
Over the past two years more than 200 military and civilian participants from over 
25 countries and from various international organizations have taken the Spanish-Dutch 
course “A Comprehensive Approach to Gender in Operations”. If  each and every one of  them 
has taken just as little as one remark, one moment, one story that touched them and put 
this in practice in their daily work, and the decisions they make, then we have reached our 
goal, and created 200 new change agents who will never look away!
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Women in Kosovo and Gender Perspectives 
for Operational Effectiveness
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Military operations in today’s world require a diversity of  qualifications and resourc-
es to ensure that peace and security are achieved and maintained. The complementary 
skills of  both male and female personnel are essential for the operational effectiveness 
of  NATO operations, especially in the light of  the increasing complexity of  civil-military 
interaction, public relations and intelligence gathering. NATO’s operational effectiveness 
includes making a contribution to sustainable and lasting peace, within which gender is a 
decisive factor. The integration of  the gender perspective to all aspects of  NATO opera-
tions therefore can provide a key element to operational effectiveness. 
The term gender refers to the social differences and social relations between men 
and women. The term gender therefore goes beyond merely the sex of  the individual, 
to include the way relationships are socially constructed. A person’s gender is learned 
through socialization and is heavily influenced by the culture of  the society concerned. 
The gender of  a person may result in different roles, responsibilities, opportunities, needs 
and constraints for men, women, boys and girls. 
The last decade has witnessed significant changes in military peacekeeping opera-
tions, characterized by increasing demand for peacekeeping missions, a fluid operation-
al environment and expanded peacekeeping mandates from the UN Security Council. 
Against this background, the performance of  military tasks in multidimensional peace-
keeping missions has increasingly come to require engagement with local populations. 
Identifying and responding to any differential impact of  the work of  military peacekeep-
ers on different groups in the local population is, therefore, a necessary strategy for en-
suring that the security concerns of  men, women, boys and girls are adequately addressed 
throughout all phases of  a peacekeeping mission. 
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NATO and its partners are taking concerted action to support implementation of  
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on “Women, Peace and Se-
curity”, which was adopted in October 2000. This resolution recognizes the dispropor-
tionate impact that war and conflicts have on women and children and calls for the inclu-
sion of  gender perspectives in peace negotiations, humanitarian planning, peacekeeping 
operations, post-conflict peacebuilding and governance. 
NATO and its partners’ active commitment resulted in a formal NATO/Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) policy on implementing UNSCR 1325, first is-
sued in December 2007. This policy, which was updated in June 2011, provides the 
overall framework for the implementation of  UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions 
by its partners. 
As part of  the policy, the NATO Military Authorities were tasked to develop prac-
tical proposals for the implementation of  UNSCR 1325. This resulted in Bi-Strategic 
Command Directive 40-1 on “Integrating UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in the 
NATO Command Structure including measures for protection during armed conflict” 
which was issued on 2 September 2009. 
While UNSCR 1325 is the legal authority for signatories, the Directive is core to 
integrating gender perspectives in NATO military organizations and operations. In ad-
dition, Heads of  State and Government approved in November 2010 a concrete NATO 
Action Plan on mainstreaming UNSCR 1325 into NATO-led operations and missions.  
A key achievement has been the appointment of  a number of  Gender Advisors both 
in the field and at several Allied commands. In November 2010, the Gender Advisor post 
in KFOR has been created.
There are a lot of  misperceptions of  what a Gender Advisor does. It is often 
useful to start with a negative definition, what the Gender Advisor does NOT do. 
The KFOR Gender Advisor is not responsible for internal relations within the force, 
internal equality matters, disciplinary issues, sexual harassment or equal opportunity 
matters. The Gender Advisor’s focus is external and is responsible for supporting the 
operation in its mandate and tasks by maximizing information gathering and dissemi-
nation. By making sure to address men and women and all the different groups in the 
society, the Gender Advisor is responsible to increase operational effectiveness and 
situational awareness.
The Gender Advisor does this by actively taking into account the different security 
needs of  men and women in a society. Numerous studies show that men and women 
experience security in different ways due to the different roles, responsibilities and needs 
men and women have in their lives. They also experience insecurity in different ways. In 
line with KFOR’s mandate to continue to contribute to a safe and secure environment 
for all people in Kosovo, the KFOR Gender Advisor’s main task is to support the KFOR 
commander and key leaders in the planning, conduct and evaluation of  operations by 
integrating a gender perspective into the planning and decision making processes. 
A Gender Perspective is recognizing if  and when an operation will affect men and 
women, boys and girls differently due to the different roles they have in society.  In other 
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words, implementing a gender perspective means that, with every operation we do, we ask 
ourselves the question: How does this affect men, women, boys and girls? Also, as many 
societies in the world have a formal patriarchal structure which places much emphasis on 
the roles of  men, we can easily overlook not only how our operations may impact women 
and children, but also, very importantly, we could overlook the influence of  women. 
A Gender Perspective can act as a Force Multiplier benefiting both, the local popu-
lation and the operation. KFOR is convinced that a lasting peace in Kosovo will only 
be achieved by fully engaging all members of  Kosovo society in the peace process.  As 
women and minorities are often not represented, even proportionally, in formal or of-
ficial positions, NATO and KFOR have established methods to reach out to them and 
create a dialogue to further the peace process in Kosovo. 
As all peacekeeping missions must remain within their mandate, there will always be 
areas of  concern that the mission is simply not mandated to address.  Much of  UNSCR 
1325 and related resolutions are the mandate of  other organizations in Kosovo, among 
them EULEX and the OSCE.  KFOR makes a concerted effort to support these other 
organizations in achieving their mandates. KFOR may not have the lead in these impor-
tant areas, but it does nonetheless take as active a role as possible in affecting positive 
change for all people in Kosovo.
KFOR’s Gender Advisor is the primary liaison KFOR has with women’s organi-
zations in Kosovo, being responsible for developing relationships between KFOR and 
these groups and then trying to identify areas of  mutual benefit.
The Gender Advisor ensures that KFOR’s soldiers are trained in Gender Awareness. 
Much of  the time of  a Gender Advisor is dedicated to training on the benefits of  reach-
ing out to women in Kosovo and the how to perform this outreach.  
Therefore, it is important that KFOR understands the role of  women in Kosovo. As 
in any society, the roles women have in Kosovo are influenced by tradition and the chang-
ing expectations women have in the modern world. Below is an excerpt from my doctoral 
thesis, (“Positive Peace in Kosovo.  A Dream Unfulfilled.”, published by Peter Lang, Ger-
many, 2012).  The excerpt covers the role of  women in Kosovo and their recent struggles 
and advances in the fields of  economics, political participation, and security. 
Women in Kosovo
Any description of  the role of  women in Kosovar society is complicated by the 
presence of  two contradictory sets of  influences. On the one hand are the traditional, 
patriarchal attitudes, particularly in rural areas, that often limit a woman’s ability to gain 
an education or even choose her own marriage partner; on the other hand, there is now 
a powerful Western influence as a result of  the international presence, the diaspora and 
the availability of  international media. The impact of  the latter, while important, remains 
concentrated in urban areas. Elsewhere the traditional influences prevail. A 2006 study 
found that about 93 per cent of  Kosovo families are headed by a man, with most excep-
tions being households headed by widows. In many rural areas, women are effectively 
excluded from public life and “family voting”. The same UN study found that in 76 per 
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cent of  families it is the father who makes the important decisions, and, where this is not 
the case, mothers do not necessarily take charge. They are the decision makers in only 
seven per cent of  all households while other members of  the family have this role in 17 
per cent.1 Many traditions in Kosovo present serious obstacles to female emancipation, 
whether in the social, political or personal spheres. The average age of  marriage for 
women is 26, and it is considered a matter of  shame for the family if  a female member is 
not married by the age of  30. Divorce remains rare, due to a combination of  social and 
economic constraints. There was a sharp increase from a very low base between 2000 and 
2003 when the annual divorce rate quadrupled from 325 to 1,385. Divorces subsequently 
increased steadily until 2008, when the number fell to 1,026 only to rise again to 1,555 
in 2009.2 Given Kosovo’s inadequate social security net, women have poor prospects 
without family support. They have equal rights under the laws governing inheritance, but 
hardly ever claim them due to lack of  information and low educational levels.3 An inter-
viewee quoted by the European Stability Initiative explained that the main reasons why 
so few women gain secondary education are poverty and the lack of  any real prospect 
of  even educated women earning a living. Families that are more affluent due to having 
members working abroad have not absorbed a different approach to education from the 
diaspora; largely because education does not increase a girl’s social status. Indeed, the 
ability to emigrate can be seen as more desirable than education: 
“A girl with papers is more valuable, she enjoys a higher social status, than a female doc-
tor or engineer working here in Kosovo. There are few reasons here for girls to continue 
studying … Some even quit and throw away their university degree even if  they are only 
2-3 exams away from finishing, if  there is a chance to marry a person with papers. Educa-
tion has lost its value.”4 
Two indicators used to assess gender inequalities in human development are the Gen-
der-related Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM). 
The GDI measures the degree of  equality between men and women with reference to the 
same basic capabilities as measured by the Human Development Index in respect of  the 
whole population. The GEM attempts to quantify gender inequality in the spheres of  po-
litical and economic participation. While the GDI focuses on expansion of  capabilities, the 
GEM is concerned with the use of  those capabilities to take advantage of  opportunities in 
life.5 Although a slight increase in Kosovo’s GDI can be seen between 2002 when it was cal-
culated for the first time at 0.70 and 2009 when it had risen to 0.76, this score continues to 
show that women are substantially disadvantaged with Kosovo’s GDI remaining the lowest 
in the Balkan region. Kosovo’s GEM at 0.465 puts it in approximately 52nd place globally.6
1 UNDP Kosovo (2006). Youth - A New Generation for a New Kosovo. Human Development Report, p. 22. 
2 Statistical Office of  Kosovo (2010). Statistics of  Divorces 2009. Prishtina, p. 6. 
3 ESI (2006). Cutting the Lifeline: Migration, Families and the Future of  Kosovo. Berlin/Istanbul, p. 24. 
4 Ibid, p. 22. 
5 UNDP: Human Development Indices. Available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/hdi/.
6 United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM): Regional Office for Central and Eastern 
Europe. Country Profiles. Kosovo. Available at http://www.unifem.sk/index.cfm?module=project&page
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However, in contrast to the traditional role of  women in the rural areas, there are a 
growing number of  urban westernized women, emancipated and with the same oppor-
tunities as men.
During the 1990s, when Kosovo Albanians created their underground parallel sys-
tem, women in Kosovo started to attain a more important, though still subordinated, 
social position. They were engaged in setting up the parallel structures, particularly in 
the education and health sectors, both areas traditionally dominated by women. In this 
period, the first women’s movements and NGOs addressing women’s issues developed 
in Kosovo. The number of  women’s organizations addressing areas such as violence 
against women and women’s rights, health, education, economic position and empower-
ment increased significantly after the war. Today, more than 80 women’s organizations 
of  all ethnic groups and regions of  Kosovo are associated with the Kosovo Women’s 
Network, an important umbrella organization established in 2000 and a partner of  the 
United Nations Development Fund for Women. However, the war also brought redefini-
tions of  manhood and the role of  men in society. Constructions of  masculinity based on 
martyrdom, heroism and patriotism led to further consolidation of  male influence and 
exclusion of  women from sociopolitical areas.7 
Clearly, the role of  women in Kosovar society can vary dramatically according to 
circumstances. The challenge for policymakers is to take account of  the whole picture 
and not assume that the traditional stereotype applies universally.8
Shortcomings in Advancing the Role of  Women
As the international community started its work of  reconstruction and institution 
building in Kosovo, many women activists hoped that the reorganization of  society 
would strengthen the position of  women and bring about enhanced women’s rights 
regulated by law. Women pinned their hopes on the international community and be-
lieved that now they would be treated as equal to men and be included in rebuilding 
Kosovo. However, these expectations have not been met. The international commu-
nity chose to be guided by the traditional image of  Kosovar women, and as a result they 
weakened the position of  women even further. This can be explained by a simple lack 
of  cultural knowledge and understanding of  Kosovo on the part of  those involved, 
especially at the very beginning of  the mission but unfortunately often still today. For 
example, the traditional kanoon, a fifteenth century code of  honor,9 was considered by 
many international members to be still valid for every Kosovo Albanian and it was er-
=country&CountryISO=KS#_ftn8.
7 Helmut Kramer (2006). Vedran Džihić: Die Kosovo Bilanz. Scheitert die Internationale Gemeinschaft? Lit. Vienna 
(second edition), p. 115. 
8 See Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation (2001). Getting it Right? A Gender Approach to UNMIK Administration in 
Kosovo. Stockholm, p. 10. Available at http://www.kvinnatillkvinna.se/sites/default/files/File/Rapporter/
getting_it_right.pdf. 
9 The kanoon is a set of  laws developed in the fifteenth century by Lekë Dukagjini, who fought against the 
Ottoman Empire.
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roneously believed to explain everything about Kosovo’s society. It is true that before 
1999, many Kosovo Albanians preferred to settle their problems according to the rules 
of  the kanoon rather than to contact Serbian law and order institutions in which they 
lacked confidence. However, the kanoon’s significance was eroded by the institutionali-
zation of  modern laws under the socialist system and it was further undermined by the 
new laws introduced by UNMIK. Although some extreme traditionalists, particularly 
in rural areas, still live according to the kanoon, this is far from the case for the general 
population, which regards it as a thing of  the past. Unfortunately, many international 
representatives, even in key positions, still believe in the importance of  the kanoon and 
argue that its dictates prevail throughout Kosovo.10 These are mainly people who have 
never had personal contact with the local population or prefer to rely on mission brief-
ings that are sometimes outdated or wrongly interpreted rather than to believe Kosovo 
Albanians who have been trying to explain the real position to them for the past ten 
years. This is not an isolated example. The same approach has been a consistent theme 
of  the entire mission period and explains the international representatives’ often lim-
ited understanding of  what is really going on in Kosovo in many areas including the 
role of  women.
As a result, the international community focused on the traditional picture of  wom-
en and simply ignored the fact that there were emancipated women who wanted to be 
included in decision-making. This lack of  sensitivity has caused increasing estrangement 
between the international community and the local female population, whose disappoint-
ed expectations have led first to lack of  trust in the international organizations and later 
to active demonstrations against UNMIK.11 
Igballe Rogova, Executive Director of  the Kosovo Women’s Network, sums up the 
disappointment experienced by emancipated Kosovo Albanian women: 
“In Kosovo in the 1990s, women and men kept society together for ten years. Women 
and men operated schools and health clinics and provided social assistance under the 
Serbian oppression. Women and men were involved in politics together; together women 
and men kept the peaceful resistance; together women and men fought in the Kosovo 
Liberation Army. Then in 1999 UNMIK came and first of  all divided men and women. 
No women were involved in the reconstruction process; no women were involved in the 
negotiation process. Many accuse my government for that but I think it was the model 
of  UNMIK that came to Kosovo. We were divided by the same institution that adopted 
UN Security Council Resolution 1325.”12 
UNSCR 1325, passed on 31 October 2000, stresses the importance of  full and equal 
participation by women in all efforts to maintain and promote peace and security, and the 
10 Author’s own experience.
11 In an interview conducted by the author with the Executive Director of  the Kosovo Women’s Network, 
Igballe Rogova, she describes this lack of  gender awareness and mentions various demonstrations, such as 
the March 2004 demonstration, that were organized due to discontent with UNMIK. 
12 Statement of  Igballe Rogova during the presentation “Kosovo after Independence. Is the EU’s EULEX 
Mission Delivering on its Promises?” by the Renner-Institute on 27 November 2009 in Vienna. 
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need to increase their role in decision-making. However, one of  the most obvious failures 
of  UNMIK has been the lack of  women’s participation in the postwar political processes 
in Kosovo, as well as their exclusion from the highest levels of  decision-making over the 
whole mission period. Within the UNMIK structure itself  only a few senior positions 
have been held by women. There have been seven SRSGs in Kosovo but none of  them 
was female. The same applies to the heads of  the four UNMIK Pillars. Women were 
not only excluded in the postwar phase but continued to be excluded later on. The most 
telling example of  what Igballe Rogova is complaining about is that the Kosovo Negotia-
tion Team, which led the final status negotiations in Vienna, did not include any women. 
These examples clearly show that it is not enough for the international community 
to establish institutions and pass laws and regulations. What matters are the individuals in 
those institutions and their readiness to implement those laws. The best laws – and this 
applies to all areas, not just where gender equality is involved – are of  no value if  those 
who are responsible for monitoring their implementation do not follow them themselves. 
Achievements in Advancing the Role of  Women 
Despite many shortcomings, Kosovo managed to create a solid basis of  legislation 
and institutional mechanisms for the accomplishment of  gender equality in Kosovo.13 
However, as noted above, there has been no satisfactory progress towards implementing 
this legislation. One of  the most important steps to promote gender equality has been 
the development of  the National Action Plan for the Achievement of  Gender Equality 
in Kosovo, which was approved by the Government of  Kosovo in April 2004. The ap-
proval of  the National Action Plan led the way for the Law on Gender Equality, prom-
ulgated in June 2004, which includes provisions relating to the economy, political parties, 
property and employment. It provides for monitoring mechanisms and sanctions if  the 
law is violated. 
Due to these and other laws, significant progress has been made in improving female 
representation in Kosovo’s institutions, particularly at the lower levels, but a lot remains 
to be done to reach the degree of  female representation envisaged by the law on gender 
equality. Women in leading positions are still outnumbered by men by approximately ten 
to one.14
Political Representation of  Women in Kosovo 
Women’s participation in public offices and in decision-making processes in the West-
ern Balkan countries is slowly increasing after a decrease in the 1990s following transition 
and armed conflicts in the region. During the 1990s, the number of  women in parliament 
was between seven to 20 per cent. Nowadays, the average for Europe (excluding the Nordic 
countries) is 21.5 per cent while the regional average for the Western Balkans is 24.6% (Bos-
13 For the institutional mechanisms see Kosovar Gender Studies Center: Monitoring Security in Kosovo 
from a Gender Perspective. p. 8. Available at http://www.kgscenter.org/pdf/Monitoring%20Security%20
in%20Kosovo%20from%20a%20gender%20Perspective%20%28english%29.pdf.
14 Ibid. p. 8.
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nia and Herzegovina 17.35 per cent, Croatia 21.4 per cent, FYROM 30.9 per cent, Kosovo 
33.3 per cent, Montenegro 12.3 per cent and Serbia 32.4 per cent) according to the database 
of  the Inter-Parliamentary Union on Women in National Parliaments.15  
Given the depressing statistics on women’s education, and the prevailing patri-
archal attitudes, it is not surprising that women’s participation in politics is low. One 
approach to increasing women’s political involvement has been the introduction of  
quotas. Since 2002, following a decision by the Central Election Commission, all politi-
cal parties in Kosovo must ensure that one-third of  candidates in their election lists 
are women. However in May 2009, female politicians called for changes to bring the 
election laws into line with the gender equality law under which the quota should be at 
least 40 per cent.16
In the elections for the National Assembly in 2004, 27.5 per cent of  elected mem-
bers were women and 28 per cent of  all seats in municipal assemblies were occupied by 
women.17 In the November 2007 elections, women increased their numbers, winning 38 
seats in the 120-seat Assembly, or 32 per cent.18 (However, of  the 205 candidates running 
for mayor in the 2009 municipal elections, only 11 were women.19)
Despite this progress, women are still under-represented at the highest decision- 
making levels and all parties are currently led by men.20 As of  November 2012, two out 
of  18 ministers are women – the Minister of  European Integration and the Minister of  
Trade and Industry. 9.4% of  the deputy mayors are women. 
Representation of  Women in the Security Sector in Kosovo 
The security sector in Kosovo has been recruiting women since its establishment. 
In normative terms, the recruitment of  women reflects on progress towards gender 
equality. In operational terms, the recruitment of  women into the Kosovo Security 
Force and the police services reflects on the increased recognition of  the valuable 
contribution women make to ensure a safe and secure environment. Within transitional 
and post-conflict countries, the recruitment of  women constitutes a part of  the secu-
rity sector reforms aiming at making the security sector more democratic, transparent, 
and accountable towards the human security needs of  the ordinary civilians in general 
and of  vulnerable groups. 
15 The Inter-Parliamentary Union’s database on Women in National Parliaments. Available at http://www.
ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm 
16 Women MPs want Kosovo’s election law changed. In: Southeast European Times. 26 May 2009. 
Available at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/newsbriefs/setimes/news-
briefs/2009/05/26/nb-01. 
17 UNIFEM: Regional Office for Central and Eastern Europe. Country Profiles. Kosovo.  
18 Freedom House (2009). Freedom in the World 2009. Kosovo [Serbia].
19 European Network of  Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO). International Observation Mission 
to Kosovo Municipal Elections 2009. 16 November, p. 7. Online via Internet: http://www.enemo.eu/
press/Preliminary_Statement_first_round_ENG.pdf  . 
20 KIPRED: Strengthening Women’s Citizenship in the Context of  State-Building: Kosovo Security Sector 
and Decentralisation. July 2010. p. 9. 
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In the security sector, about 15 per cent of  uniformed officers in the Kosovo Police 
are female, with ten per cent of  female officers in decision-making positions. In the 
Kosovo Security Force about eight per cent are female.21 The number of  women in the 
Kosovo Police is quite remarkable and is further evidence that many Kosovar women do 
not correspond to the conventional traditionalist image.  
The Kosovo Police has several structures through which it aims to address women’s 
human rights and gender equality. The Human Rights and the Gender Equality Unit was 
established under the office of  General Director in 2004. At municipal and regional level, 
in police stations Gender Focal Points and Domestic Violence Gender Focal Points are 
present which report to headquarters on gender-related issues. Fifty per cent of  Gender 
Focal Points within police stations throughout Kosovo are led by women investigation 
officers who follow domestic violence cases until trial. The special investigations units on 
domestic violence and human trafficking were established in 2004, and since 2005 they 
are decentralized. 
Kosovo has a high representation of  women in the police services compared to 
other countries in the region and even when compared to many other European states. 
To strengthen the position of  women within the police, the current President of  Kos-
ovo, then the Deputy Director of  the Kosovo Police, took the initiative to suggest the 
founding of  an association of  women police. Since then, several consultations with 
women police in all regions of  Kosovo resulted in the decision to establish such an 
Association. This decision is supported at the highest level within the Kosovo Police 
and its establishment will be supported by UN Women. The role of  the Association 
will be to: create a venue for women in the police to identify and introduce measures 
to mitigate and overcome challenges they face in their daily work; identify ways to in-
crease the number of  women in higher and middle management positions within the 
police and foster conditions for career advancement by means of  capacity building and 
raising awareness as to the operational value of  women police officers; and to enable 
policewomen to share experiences and network with their counterparts in the region 
and internationally. 
After 1999, women were for the first time employed in the Kosovo Protection Corps 
that served as a civilian emergency service agency. In 2009, there was a restructuring of  
the Kosovo Protection Corps to become the Kosovo Security Force. Representation of  
women in the Kosovo Security Force is 8.1 per cent. Representation of  women in the 
structures of  the Ministry of  the Kosovo Security Force is 32.5 per cent and 6.4 per cent 
uniformed.22
On the other hand, women are not adequately involved in the judicial system. Cur-
rently, 30 per cent of  prosecutors are women, and 29 per cent of  chief  municipal pros-
ecutors are women. However, all chief  district prosecutors are men. No known steps 
21 UNIFEM: Regional Office for Central and Eastern Europe. Country Profiles. Kosovo. 
22 USAID. Women in Kosovo: A Snapshot of  the Political, Security and Economic Position of  Women. 
October 4-6, Prishtina. 
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have been taken towards establishing special chambers for rape, trafficking and domestic 
violence cases, however some municipal courts have judges specializing in domestic vio-
lence cases. The judicial system suffers from weaknesses that are particularly related to 
domestic violence and human trafficking cases. Judges and prosecutors are in need of  
training in gender equality and women’s human rights.23
The Economic Situation of  Women in Kosovo
During the 1990s, Kosovo’s economy was destroyed. As s post-conflict country that 
is alos transitioning from a socialist to a free market economy, the rebuilding of  a pros-
perous economy which ensures sustainable growth remains a challenge.
By adopting the Gender Equality Law and the Action Plan, the government has 
acknowledges the importance of  investing in the empowerment of  women as key to sus-
tainable economic development and prosperity. This important legislative framework has 
resulted in a legal obligation on all public and private sector employers to provide equal 
rights and opportunities, and equal pay, for men and women. The law treats women equal 
to men in all economic, financial and social welfare programs thus stipulating the equal 
access to resources and economic opportunities.
The unemployment rate in Kosovo is 43 per cent whereas women’s unemployment 
rate is about 57 per cent. The lack of  women in the workforce actively perpetuates pov-
erty at the household level. 
Out of  47,401 private properties registered in Kosovo in 2011, it is estimated that 
eleven per cent are owned by women and as such, there is still a need to exploit the ben-
efits of  women’s participation in private business. Women business owners state that the 
hardest barrier in setting up a business remains the start-up cost and access to resources. 
It is estimated that 92 per cent of  the collateral assets needed to start businesses are regis-
tered to men, and the requirement to provide property as collateral severely hampers pro-
spective female business owners. Subsequently, nearly three out of  four women-owned 
start-ups have used their own capital to get business going. 
Education remains a problem as young girls tend to drop out of  higher level of  educa-
tion at a higher rate than their male counterparts. Based on data, 97.7 per cent of  girls aged 
10-14, and 74.6 per cent aged 15-19, attend school. There has been significant progress in 
women’s school attendance, however lower rates of  attendance remain in rural areas. 
Women have been recognized as a largely untapped pool of  entrepreneurial talent in 
Kosovo and the government of  Kosovo is committed to improving the socioeconomic 
situation of  women. Despite progress being made, there still remains a lot to be done to 
achieve this goal; it takes a governmental and social effort to jointly improve the wellbe-
ing and the socio-economic position of  girls and women. 
Currently, only eleven per cent of  firms in Kosovo have female owners and only 
three per cent of  bank loans to startup businesses go to women. In order to change 
this, it is important to remove the barriers for women business owners, including le-
23 UNIFEM: Regional Office for Central and Eastern Europe. Country Profiles. Kosovo. 
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gal and institutional barriers and cost of, and access to, finance. This includes ensuring 
implementation of  the legislation which ensures equal participation of  women in the 
economic sector.  
The socio-economic position of  women in Kosovo still needs to be improved. 
There have been attempts by the government to run training programs aimed at women, 
including programs allowing women without primary school certificates to acquire them. 
However, more needs to be done in terms of  programs targeting the economic empow-
erment of  women combined with a change in social conventions on gender roles and 
responsibilities with regard to work and family.24 
Many of  the above figures appear encouraging for those concerned with women’s 
rights, but this is to a large extent superficial. As long as the integration of  women into 
public life is more a matter of  box ticking to comply with regulations rather than based 
on a genuine conviction of  women’s competencies on the part of  decision makers, true 
gender equality cannot be said to have been achieved. And so far, this unfortunately 
seems to be true of  the participation of  women in all social, economic and political areas. 
To achieve equal participation of  women in all areas of  public life, it will be necessary to 
take account of  gender issues, including those related to personal safety, in the process 
of  policy development and strategic planning by the Kosovar authorities and institutions 
involved in security.25
Personal Security of  Women 
Data and analyses of  personal safety issues produced by the Kosovar Gender Studies 
Center show that women and girls in Kosovo are increasingly vulnerable, especially to 
domestic violence and human trafficking.26 KFOR, OSCE, UNMIK and various NGO 
reports mainly deal with two forms of  violence: interethnic and political. This can give 
the impression that these are the major aspects of  violence in Kosovo today. However, 
violence against women is at least as common –  if  not even more common going by 
the statistics shown below – and might become even more prevalent in future. As Igballe 
Rogova, Executive Director of  the Women’s Network explains:
“Violence is growing in Kosovo and mostly it’s violence against women and the reason 
that violence is growing is economic underdevelopment and unemployment. More and 
more people get angry and depressed because they have no jobs and then what they do 
is hit their loved ones. And depression is really growing in Kosovo and as a nation we 
are told do not react, do not complain, do not criticize, so we are sitting like zombies 
not expressing anger that something is happening and then we go and hit people in our 
family and express anger there.”27 
24 USAID. Women in Kosovo: A Snapshot of  the Political, Security and Economic Position of  Women. 
NDI. October 4-6 Prishtina. 
25 Kosovar Gender Studies Center: Monitoring Security in Kosovo from a Gender Perspective, p. 4.
26 Ibid, p. 5.
27 Interview with Igballe Rogova, Executive Director of  the Kosovo Women’s Network. Vienna 27 Novem-
ber 2009. 
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Domestic violence against women was particularly prevalent during and immedi-
ately following the war but it remains a serious problem as does violence towards sexual 
minorities. Several UN studies indicate that when the war ended in 1999, 23 per cent of  
women had experienced domestic violence.28 Rape, human trafficking, sexual slavery and 
prostitution were also serious issues affecting women in Kosovo during the war.
The report “Security Begins at Home”, published by the Agency for Gender Equal-
ity in the Prime Minister’s Office and the Kosovo Women’s Network, indicates that about 
43 per cent of  Kosovars – 46.4 per cent of  all women and 39.6 per cent of  all men – 
have experienced domestic violence in their lifetimes.29 Only a small fraction of  cases are 
reported, mainly because of  shame and fear of  ostracism by the family and community. 
As a result, most cases of  domestic violence are never brought to justice so official data 
underestimate the importance of  the problem and domestic violence is almost ignored in 
policy debates. Between 2002 and 2007, the Kosovo Police received 7,660 reports of  do-
mestic violence. Of  those cases reported between 2005 and 2007, women were reported 
as the victims in 79 per cent of  instances whereas in 2008 1,073 women reported cases 
of  violence to the police (90 per cent of  all cases) and, in 90 per cent of  the cases, the 
perpetrator was a man.30 From these figures it is difficult to conclude whether violence 
has increased or decreased but there is no question that the incidence is very high.
Unfortunately, the state has limited powers to protect the victims of  domestic vio-
lence. In the absence of  adequate public funding, support to victims and the provision 
of  safe houses must come from Kosovo’s women’s rights groups. Public awareness of  
domestic violence also remains low.31 
Additionally, women are victims of  organized criminal groups that procure women 
for prostitution and trafficking. Kosovo serves as a source, a transit route and a destina-
tion for women and children trafficked for prostitution. There are considerable discrep-
ancies between the international organizations’ accounts of  the origins of  the trafficked 
victims in the country. While UNDP reports that most come from Moldova (about 50 
per cent), Romania (20 per cent) and Ukraine (about 13 per cent), with a smaller number 
from Kosovo itself, the European Commission indicates that most victims are internally 
trafficked (60 per cent) and only 20 per cent originate from Moldova.32
Poor economic conditions after the war, high unemployment, lack of  education, the 
28 United Nations Development Group (2001). Kosovo Common Assessment. 2001. p. 56. Available at http://
www.undg.org/archive_docs/1729-Kosovo_CCA_-_2001.pdf  . 
29 Agency for Gender Equality and Kosovo’s Women’s Network (2008). Security Begins at Home: Research 
to Inform the First National Strategy and Action Plan against Domestic Violence in Kosovo. Prishtina, p. 
2. 
30 UNIFEM: Regional Office for Central and Eastern Europe. Country Profiles. Kosovo. 
31 Human Rights Watch (2008). A Human Rights Agenda for a New Kosovo. p. 2. Available at http://www.hrw.
org/sites/default/files/reports/kosovo0208.pdf. 
32 UNDP Kosovo (2006). Youth. A New Generation for a New Kosovo. Human Development Report, p. 24. Com-
mission of  the European Communities (2009). Kosovo under UNSCR 1244/99 2009 Progress Report. 
Brussels, p. 48.
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presence of  organized criminal groups, porous borders and a large international commu-
nity, which provided a relatively affluent clientele for the trade, rank among the reasons 
for the growth of  trafficking of  women in Kosovo. With the downsizing of  the inter-
national peacekeeping forces, the international community has subsequently declined in 
importance as potential customers and the sex industry has developed to serve a wider 
client base. Amnesty International estimates that the local community constitutes about 
80 per cent of  the clientele.33
There is no central database for recording cases of  trafficking. Therefore statistics 
refer to the number of  victims assisted by different international and national agen-
cies. Between 1999 and 2007, about 658 trafficked persons were assisted, the majority 
female.34 Children from disadvantaged backgrounds and in rural areas are particularly 
vulnerable to trafficking as well as forced labor.
According to the European Commission 2009 Progress Report on Kosovo, only 
limited progress in combating human trafficking has been achieved. The number of  
identified victims remains low and child trafficking for the purpose of  forced begging 
is an increasing problem. Services for victims, including shelters and vocational training, 
depend largely on support from women’s organizations. The poor record of  investiga-
tion and prosecution of  trafficking crimes by the Kosovo authorities remains a concern.35
As mentioned in several Kosovo Women’s Network reports, domestic violence im-
poses a significant cost on society, in terms of  expenses related to healthcare, policing, 
prosecution and social assistance to victims.36 Consequently, fighting violence and abuse 
of  women in Kosovo is a priority requiring a constant commitment from the authori-
ties to support and extend the efforts of  women’s rights organizations, and to ensure 
that domestic violence is dealt with as a crime. Recommendations for tackling domestic 
violence include firstly, that violence against women should be addressed in the context 
of  women’s rights rather than merely as a welfare issue and secondly, that campaigns and 
education to heighten public awareness of  the problem need to be intensified. Both of  
these are critically important to change public attitudes as well as to empower women 
to demand justice in all types of  gender-based violence. A third recommendation is that 
adequate public funding should be provided to ensure that there is a safe house for vic-
tims of  domestic violence in every municipality. Fourthly, existing laws should be imple-
mented strictly and legal procedures should be revised. Fifthly, there should be training 
for police, prosecutors, judges and healthcare staff  in how to deal with violence against 
women as a violation of  human rights.37
33 Amnesty International (2004). So does it mean that we have the Rights? Protecting the Human Rights of  Women and 
Girls Trafficked for Forced Prostitution in Kosovo. London, p. 7. 
34 UNIFEM: Regional Office for Central and Eastern Europe. Country Profiles. Kosovo. 
35 Commission of  the European Communities (2009). Kosovo under UNSCR 1244/99 2009 Progress Re-
port. Brussels, p. 48.
36 Kosova Women’s Network (2009). More than Words on Paper? The Response of  Justice Providers to Domestic Vio-
lence in Kosovo. Prishtina, p. 9. 
37 Human Rights Watch (2008). A Human Rights Agenda for a New Kosovo, p. 3. 
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Social inequality is often an important cause of  social and political instability; there-
fore the issue needs to be addressed effectively by Kosovo’s authorities. In particular, 
women’s participation in the effort is essential to address not only problems specific to 
women, such as rape and domestic violence, but also to ensure that the whole popula-
tion is represented in policy-making. Moreover, improving women’s status will have a 
beneficial influence on social environments and ultimately accelerate the demographic 
transition.
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